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The study of British civil-military relations has been dominated by works dealing
with the administration and reform of the Victorian army, and by the two world wars of
the twentieth century. This thesis, however, emphasises the importance of a colonial war
as a major test of civil-military relations in a modem parliamentary system. The thesis
examines the army's relations with both British and Colonial politicians and officials.
The main part of the thesis demonstrates how the political authorities, in London
and South Africa, increasingly lost control of the war to the generals. The British
government was blamed for the initial defeats suffered by the army, which placed
ministers in a weak position when dealing with popular military figures such as Roberts
and Kitchener, who had been appointed to retrieve the situation.
Milner, the High Commissioner for South Africa, was also placed at a
disadvantage by the British government's weakness. Kitchener's appointment, in
particular, exacerbated Mimer's already fraught relationship with the generals, and
eventually wrecked his policies and ambitions. The thesis argues that as a result of these
differences there developed a military perspective on the future settlement of South Africa,
which had a direct influence on the peace process. Kitchener, who personified the military
viewpoint, helped ensure a negotiated end to the war.
The thesis also examines relations between the military and the Cape government,
which were embittered by the army's administration of martial law. It argues that neither
the theoretical development of martial law, nor its administration, can be understood
without a detailed investigation of the role and contribution of the British government.
The intervention of British ministers was vital to restrain both the military and Cape
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FROM: Sir F. MAURICE & M.H. GRANT (eds.),
Official History of the War in South Africa
(London, 1906-1910).
Vol.1 (Maps), Special Maps No.3.
9INTRODUCTION.
I
The Second South African War was the largest and most costly war Britain fought
between 1815 and 1914. It provided the Victorian army with its greatest test, provoked
enormous interest in the nature of Britain's imperial expansion, and affected in varying
degrees the societies of all the participants: British, Afrikaner, Colonial and African. Yet
despite the wide-ranging literature which covers virtually every aspect of the war, a
comprehensive survey of British civil-military relations has not been undertaken. This
thesis therefore has two main objectives: to fill a gap in the literature; and to add a new
direction to the study of civil-military relations. For the purpose of this study the term
'civil-military relations' denotes the association between governments (both imperial and
colonial) and the leading generals and officers of the British army. The generals are those
who were involved either with the administration of the army in Britain and South Africa,
or who commanded British forces during the war. This is essentially a study of civil-
military relations at the highest level.
There are several reasons why the South African War in particular, and colonial
conflicts in general, have been neglected by historians. Primarily, the study of British
civil-military relations has been directed by scholars who have focused their interests on
the controversies which resulted from Cardwell's army reforms enacted between 1870 and
1872. 1
 Perhaps this is not surprising considering that Britain's parliamentary system
meant there was a perennial balancing act between the requirements of party politics and
the demands of the army. The precedence given to these disputes has fixed attention
fmnly on civil-military relations during peacetime, and this has characterized the direction
in which late-nineteenth century British civil-military relations have been studied. A new
direction therefore would be to examine the civil-military connection under the strain of
war.
1 ws Hamer, The British Army: Civil-Military Relations 1885-1905 (Oxford, 1970); E.M. Spiers, The
late Victorian anny 1868-1902 (Manchester, 1992), Chapters 1-3,6; J.Sweetman (ed.), Sword and Mace.
Twentieth Century Civil-Military Relations in Britain (London, 1986), pp.ix-xv, 1-18.
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As the main raison d' etre of the Victorian army was to police and defend the
Empire,2
 it might seem curious that the effects of colonial warfare on civil-military
relations have not been examined. This neglect resulted from the fact that the two world
wars of the twentieth century, particularly the First World War, overshadowed earlier
colonial conflicts. For too long the South African war was regarded as a milestone on the
road leading to 1914. Yet this struggle generated problems, albeit on a smaller scale, of
a type which can be clearly identified during the First World War. For instance, Robert
Blake in his assessment of the importance of civil-military relations between 1914-1918,
notes that a difficult constitutional question arose: 'How could the ultimate responsibility
of the Cabinet be reconciled with the need to give military experts freedom to make
military decisions?'4
 That it was a perennial issue is illustrated by the problems which
dogged civil-military relations in South Africa, particularly when Lords Roberts and
Kitchener were in command. There is good reason therefore to bring the South African
conflict out of the shadow cast by the First World War.
Given that the conflict in South Africa has generated such a vast literature, perhaps
it is strange that historians interested in aspects of the war have not looked at civil-
military relations. There are several reasons for this: first, the main historiography has
centred on the origins of the war. Since J.A. Hobson's assertion in 1900 that the war was
fought for the benefit of capitalists in Johannesburg, historians have argued over the
reasoning behind the British government's decision to precipitate a war in South Africa.5
A second line of investigation was developed by writers and historians whose interests
focused on the campaigns, battles and sieges.
However, it is only during the last thirty years or so that a more scholarly
approach to the military history of the war has emerged. Recent work, for example, has
2 H. Bailes, 'Patterns of Thought in the Late Victorian Army,' Journal of Strategic Studies, 4, (1981),
pp.37-40; I. Beckeu, 'The Stanhope Memorandum of 1888: a Reinterpretation,' Bulletin of the Institute of
Historical Research, 57, (1984), pp.240-247.
J.F.C. Fuller, for instance, classed the Boer War as part of the 'nots of armageddon,' in his The
Conduct of War 1789-1961 (London, 1961), pp.139-140.
R. Blake (ed.), The Private Papers of Douglas Haig (London, 1952), p.33.
5 J.A. Hobson, The War in South Africa: its Causes and Effects (London, 1900). For a recent review
of the literature on this subject, AN. Porter, 'The South African War (1899-1902): Context and Motive
Reconsidered,' Journal of African History. 31, (1990), pp.43-57.
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explored the experiences of the army's logistical services.6
 Most recently, historians of
the war have developed a deep interest in how the war affected the various societies
involved. The attitudes of the British working-classes to the war and the nature of the
influences upon those attitudes have now been evaluated.7 A growth area has been the
interest accorded to the role of Blacks and Coloureds during the war, especially their
contribution to the British war effort. Put together, these trends confirm the vitality of
the South African war as an area of historical investigation.
It would be incorrect to state that civil-military relations have been passed over
altogether, but the historiography provides a sketchy and often limited appraisal. Much
of what we know about the views, opinions and attitudes of the soldiers and politicians
in this area has come from numerous biographies, which, on the whole, are disappointing
and generally unhelpful. For example, several biographies have been written on the two
most important politicians, Joseph Chamberlain, the Colonial Secretary, and Alfred
Milner, the High Commissioner for South Africa. The early works, by authors such as
Garvin, Amery and Headlam, are rich in material drawn from their subjects' personal
archives, but they have tended to ignore or simplify the difficulties which characterized
civil-military relations.9
Similarly, the generals have been ill-served by their biographers. In particular, Lord
Roberts has suffered from the attention of those too ready to repeat contemporary
6 A.H. Page, The Supply Services of the British Army in the South African War 1899-1902 (unpub.
D.Phil. thesis, Oxford, 1976). For a review of the military history of the war see I.F.W. Becketi, 'Military
Historians and the South African Wan A Review of Recent Literature,' Soldiers of the Queen, 54, (1988),
pp. 12-14. For literature on the army and the empire see P. Burmughs, 'Imperial Defence and the Victorian
Army,' The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 15, (1986), pp.55-72; J.M. Mackenzie (ed.),
Popular Imperialism and the Military 1850-1950 (Manchester, 1992).
R. Price, An Imperial War and the British Working Class (London, 1972); M.D. Blanch, 'British
Society and the War,' in P. Warwick (Cd.), The South African War: The Anglo-Boer War 1899-1902
(Harlow, 1980), pp.210-238; J.M. Mackenzie (Cd.), Imperialism and Popular Culture (Manchester, 1986).
For a recent examination of the British population in Johannesburg prior to and during the war, D.
Cammack, The Rand at War 1899-1 902 (London, 1990).
'P. Warwick, Black People and the South African War 1899-1902 (Cambridge, 1983); W. Nasson,
Abraham Esau's War. A Black South African War in the Cape 1899-1 902 (Cambridge, 1991).
'J. Garvin & J. Amery, Life of Joseph Chamberlain, (London, 1934 & 1951), m & N; C. Headlam,
The Milner Papers, (London, 1931 & 1935), I & II.
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adulation.'° Biographies of Kitchener have either been too wide-ranging, or have focused
on his ministerial career during the First World War." Because the conflict in South
Africa was but a phase in the careers of all the leading soldiers and politicians,
biographies have not proved useful source material.
The dispute between Milner and the generals has often been regarded as the only
conflict between soldiers and politicians during the war. Most of the works are what might
be described as 'Milnercentric;' they pay too much attention to Milner's views and
aspirations and therefore provide an unbalanced account of civil-militaiy relations. Yet it
must be remembered that Mimer was subordinate to the Colonial Office, and, surprising
as it may seem, the role and influence of the British government on civil-military relations
has been neglected. This explains why historians such as Le May and Pakenham have not
explained how and why Roberts, and later Kitchener, were able to defy Mimer so
successfully. In their respective accounts both touched on civil-military relations, but this
was secondary to the questions and priorities they pursued. 12 Pakenham's book
concentrates largely on military history, especially before the onset of the guerilla war.
Moreover, he wanted to emphasise the role of the capitalists (or Randlords) and Sir Alfred
Mimer in precipitating the conflict. He also sought to redeem the reputation of General
Buller, one of the war's notable failures.'3 Similarly, Le May strove to apportion blame
for starting the war and concentrated on Milner's activities before, during and after the
conflict. Le May also considered Mimer's conflict with Roberts and Kitchener, and makes
two pertinent observations on the nature of civil-military relations. He argues that military
exigencies thwarted Mimer's personal plans; and that the military disregarded political
'° H. de Watieville, Lord Roberts (London, 1938); D. James, Lord Roberts (London, 1954); W.H.
Hannah, Bobs: Kipling's General (London, 1972).
0. Arthur, Life of Kitchener (London, 1920;) C. Ballard, Kitchener (London, 1936); P. Magnus,
Kitchener (Penguin Edition, London, 1968); 0. Cassar, Kitchener, Architect of Victory (London, 1977); T.
Royle, The Kitchener Enigma (London, 1985).
12 T. Pakenham, The Boer War (Futura Edition, London, 1982); G.H. I.e May, British Supremacy in
South Africa (Oxford, 1965).
13 Pakenham, pp.xvi-xvii; for an alternative view on Buller's merits see E.M. Spiers, 'Reforming the
Infantry of the Line, 1900-1914,' Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, 59, (1981), pp.82-94.
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considerations.'4
 Although both these points are endorsed below, Le May's examination
of Mimer's troubled relationship with the generals tells only a small part of the story.
There is, therefore, a case for a wider examination of British civil-military
relations. The main theme of this thesis will be the controversial question of control: that
is, how far were the politicians prepared to let the soldiers exercise complete control over
the conduct of operations; and how far were the generals prepared to resist what they
regarded as undue interference. This issue was complicated greatly by the onset of guerilla
warfare which blurred the distinctions between military and political responsibility. The
South African war provides a singular case-study in civil-military relations, particularly
as the army faced competition for control from three sides: the British government; the
High Commissioner; and the Colonial authorities. I intend also to add an extra dimension
to the various political histories of the war by emphasising the role played by the army.
I propose to shed new light on the attitudes of the officer corps, which reflected the nature
of the society from which officers were recruited, and which subsequently influenced the
peace settlement; and to show the effects of the army's actions on political aspects of
Colonial society. The main result, therefore, is to accentuate the army's role in relation
to that of the politicians.
Personality clashes helped shape and embitter British civil-military relations
throughout the nineteenth century.' 5
 This was no less true during the South African War
and it was felt necessary, therefore, to base this study primarily on the private and official
correspondence of the leading politicians and generals. Consequently, the bulk of the
archival material has been drawn from the private papers of politicians such as
Chamberlain, Milner, Salisbury, Balfour and Brodrick; and the high-ranldng generals,
Kitchener, Roberts and Wolseley. As the thesis emphasises the role of the military, the
papers of other soldiers have been consulted, notably those of Generals Ardagh, Hamilton
and Rawlinson. Unfortunately, I was unable to consult the papers of Lord Lansdowne.
However, this has not been felt to be a great handicap as many of his letters, and copies
of those to him, can be found in the collections of others. Where possible, I have also
used sources which provide still more informal comment or background 'gossip' on the
The manner m which Mimer s grand design was frustrated is the theme of this book. Le May, p.36.
15 M. Howard (ed.), Soldiers and Governments (London, 1957), p.21.
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various problems; for example, Brodrick's letters to Violet Cecil afford further insights
into Cabinet discussions, and official viewpoints on unreliable influences such as public
opinion. (As far as I am aware these papers have not been used for this period).
The papers in the Colonial Office and War Office files at the PRO have been
examined extensively. These files proved invaluable because the departments had
reciprocal arrangements whereby confidential material was passed between the two. These
were often telegrams between Chamberlain and Milner, and between the generals and the
War Secretary. In addition, extensive use has been made of the Cabinet files which cover
the war.
In some cases I have been unable to use official documents. In Chapter Five, for
example, which deals with martial law, the records of martial law court cases are kept in
South Africa. These could perhaps have added extra substance to the chapter, but have
been extensively covered by local historians and are better suited, I feel, to a local history
rather than an overall analysis of the war.' 6
 Similarly, but owing to a lack of space, it
was deemed necessary to omit a discussion of the wider constitutional consequences of
Cape Colony appeal court decisions. These always found in favour of the military and not
civilians who had complained about the army's actions under martial law. These decisions
created legal precedents which are still valid today. However, a discussion on this aspect
would, perhaps, be more suited to a work solely on martial law and the British
constitution.'7
For reasons of clarity I have referred to the Dutch-spealdng inhabitants of the Cape
as Afrikaners in order to distinguish them from their counterparts in the republics, who
I have referred to as Boers throughout the thesis.
'6 Nasson has made valuable use of these records for an examination of court cases involving the use
of Black witnesses, see Chapter 8.
a brief summary see R.A. Cosgrove, 'The Boer War and the Modernization of Bntish Martial
Law,' Military Affairs. 44, (1980), pp.124-127.
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II
The fascination behind the study of civil-military relations owes something to the
fact that at various times soldiers and politicians were locked in acrimonious debates over
certain issues. This dissension centred around the conflicting demands of political
expediency and military requirements. In Britain, the doctrine of civilian control was well-
established and the government was able to insist and ensure that political requirements
took precedence over the views of the soldiers; as Lord Salisbury remarked, 'I have the
greatest respect for the advice of soldiers as regards the conduct of a war, none whatever
for their opinions as to the policy which dictates war." This view clearly enunciated the
way in which the British government approached the various diplomatic crises between
December 1895 and June 1899, and forms the basis of Chapter One. This chapter shows
how ministers clashed with their military advisers over the best way to deal with Boer
intransigence. Ministers were too ready to appease public opinion, to avoid unnecessary
costs, and use the minimum amount of force to browbeat the Boers, despite the fact that
this course highlighted the numerical weakness of the South African garrison and the lack
of planning.'9
 Moreover, the running feud between the Commander-in-Chief, Field-
Marshal Lord Wolseley, and the Secretary of State for War, Lord Lansdowne, did nothing
to clarify Britain's dealings with the Boers. The British government emerged from these
difficulties with a policy which, on the surface, appeared to work; consequently, ministers
favoured the same approach during the final crisis. Moreover, by June 1899, Mimer had
already had acrimonious exchanges with his military counterpart, General Butler, over the
important issue of control, albeit on a small scale, but which foreshadowed the problems
he would face once the war had begun.
Chapter Two examines the period between June and December 1899 and
encompasses the final diplomatic crisis and the first three months of the war. Between 5
June 1899, following the failure of the Bloemfontein conference, and the outbreak of war
Cit Harner, p31
"In 1890, Wolseley wrote. 'Party government nowadays does not mean the leading or the endeavour
to lead public opinion so much as the following of public opinion and the giving effect to it.' Cit Hamer,
p.219.
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on 11 October, the policy which the government had formulated earlier collapsed. This
period clearly illustrated the divide between the civil and military authorities; the
government believed its response to Boer obduracy was dictated solely by constitutional
and political imperatives, almost to the exclusion of military opinion. Fearing to go to war
without the support of public opinion the government only initiated military preparations
when war seemed inevitable, despite the continual urging of Wolseley and other generals.
Small additions to the garrison, which had sufficed earlier, failed to intimidate the Boers,
whose own preparations for war were well advanced. Consequently, when war came the
British army in South Africa found itself short of troops until the arrival of the main body
some two months later. Almost inevitably, during that interim period, the garrison suffered
a series of defeats, as did the main force when it attempted to retrieve the situation.
Following the military defeats between October and December 1899, the British
government found that cultivating public opinion was no antidote against criticism. Critics
blamed the politicians for authorising military preparations too late and, by implication,
if not by outright condemnation, said the government had ignored the advice of their
military advisers. It might seem curious that the politicians took all the blame for the
disastrous situation in South Africa, but on reflection this is not surprising. The Unionist
government had a poor domestic record and the country was isolated diplomatically. The
government's handling of the crisis during the summer of 1899 was targeted by critics as
a clear example of the ministry's incompetence, hence the magnitude of the criticism
endured by the government.
The condemnation of the government is more understandable when the relationship
between the army and society is considered. Imperialism had made the army extremely
popular,2° and it became clear that the army and its generals were held in high esteem
and were considered above criticism, especially from politicians. Yet what has not been
considered, and needs to be stressed, are the effects of this criticism. The condemnation
of the British government in January 1900 obliged it to make decisions which completely
altered the complexion of civil-military relations.
British ministers were faced with the problem of retrieving the poor military
situation, but without condemning high ranking military officers. The solution was to
Spiers, Late Victorian Army, Chapter 7.
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appoint Lord Roberts in overall command, and leave the defeated General Buller to
manage the campaign in Natal. Buller was still popular with both the public and his
troops, which meant the government could not afford to dismiss him outright. The
decision to appoint Roberts provided a temporary respite for the ministry, but had
unforeseen long term disadvantages.
Chapter Three analyses the change in civil-military relations brought about by
Roberts's appointment, and focuses particularly on his relationship with Milner. It stresses
the point that once Roberts arrived in South Africa, military necessity began to supersede
political requirements, despite enormous pressure placed on Roberts by politicians to make
him consider political priorities. Historians have overlooked the fact that political pressure
originated from two sources, Mimer and the British government. Mimer felt every move
made by the generals ought to be considered from a political viewpoint. And as Roberts's
victories appeared to presage the end of the war, the British government wanted Roberts
to appreciate their problems elsewhere and to begin tailoring his strategy to suit their
needs. Usually, politicians prove reluctant to interfere in military operations. Colonial
governors were advised not to intervene in the Colonial Office regulations. But from May
1900 the war degenerated into guerilla warfare, which apparently relieved the politicians
of this restriction. From then on, they were faced with two perennial and most important
questions which afflict civil-military relations: how far should political control be
exercised over the military? And how far should the army consider political objectives?
Mimer felt that political considerations should take precedence; for him, the reconstruction
of South Africa was of paramount importance. This explains why the main difficulty
between Roberts and Milner was over the refugees from Johannesburg and the need to
send them back. Roberts proved unresponsive to this idea because he regarded his primary
task was to defeat the guerillas and maintain the supply route of his army. Consequently,
Milner began to interfere in an area considered taboo earlier in the year - military strategy.
He tried to convince Roberts his ideas would help solve the strategic problem and when
this failed he appealed directly to the British government and attempted to undermine
Roberts's authority. Yet this aspect has not been stressed by historians.2'
Cammack deals more with the efforts to relieve the hardship of the refugees in Cape Colony and
Natal, see Chapters 6 & 9. Cammack's focus, of course, is not on civil-military relations.
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The British government, while sympathetic to Mimer's ideas, were in no position
to help. Ministers had been trying to persuade Roberts to alleviate their problems since
June, following the capture of Johannesburg and Pretoria. They wanted troops to be sent
home owing to problems with other European powers, and volunteer units disbanded to
save money. But Roberts had been given carte blanche to end the war, and despite the
mounting costs, the diplomatic problems elsewhere and the dissension within the Cabinet,
the British government could not order Roberts to change tack. The answers to the
questions mentioned earlier were clear: political control could not be exercised far enough,
and only Roberts could decide if he was willing and able to consider political objectives.
Thus without the support of the British government, Milner could not impose his ideas
on the military.
Chapter Four deals with Kitchener's command in South Africa. Between December
1900 and May 1902, the distinctions between the political and military domains blurred
considerably. In order to win the war, Kitchener took little notice of political
considerations. While he tolerated no interference in the conduct of military operations,
his army assumed control over resources needed to bolster the war effort. The army
commandeered food, recruited labour and ignored the social consequences; and it
undermined civil authority through the administration of martial law. Professor Finer has
pointed out that warfare expands the political powers of the military, which is best
demonstrated when politicians have tried to oppose the army's conduct of war? Because
the guerilla war was dragging on, with no perceptible change in fortune, both Mimer and
the British government tried to resist Kitchener's accumulation of power. Once again,
Mimer initiated the challenge to military authority, and his campaign took two forms; the
first was designed to force Kitchener to change his strategy; and when this failed he tried
to have Kitchener sacked. In both cases Mimer enlisted the support of the British
government. Ministers were still concerned about the cost and duration of the war, and
the dissension within the Cabinet was even more bitter. Milner's schemes appeared to
offer an escape from these problems and they were given the utmost consideration.
However, Kitchener emerged from these challenges unscathed, which enhanced his already
well-cultivated aura of indispensability. These incidents have received scant attention from
S.E. Finer, The Man on Horseback. The Role of the Military in Politics (Second Edition, London,
1988), p.64.
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historians, which has meant that important aspects of the British government's role and
the state of civil-military relations in Britain have also been overlooked. Kitchener's
biographers have also failed to appreciate the nature of the dispute; that it was the greatest
challenge to military authority throughout the war.
Chapter Four also identifies a current of opinion running through the army, and
shared by Kitchener, which came to light following the abortive peace talks with Louis
Botha in February 1901. There developed a widespread tendency to raise questions about
the reasons for going to war, and how the war should finish. The root of the problem for
the army lay in the fact that the war in South Africa was not a colonial war in the usual
sense of the word; it was not a war that could be easily characterised like many others
before. In most colonial wars the army had fought non-Europeans. These wars had been
viewed as conflicts which benefitted civilization. The army became the vanguard of this
process and embodied British prestige, influence and culture. When the army went to war
in 1899 the reasons for doing so seemed clear enough; the army would restore British
power, uphold the lot of oppressed Britons in Johannesburg, and finally avenge the defeat
at Majuba. However, there was a certain uneasiness about fighting the Boers, a kindred
race; for example, General Methuen was not considered for General Butler's job in South
Africa because he like Butler was felt to be too 'pro-Boer.'
One factor eventually undermined the army's view of the war in South Africa, and
that can be summed up in one word - gold. Both the soldiers and the politicians became
conscious of the stigma attached to the war: that it was widely seen as being fought solely
for the benefit of the gold-mining industry. During the crisis before the war, Salisbury and
Chamberlain were aware of the hazards produced by Johannesburg's main indusiry.
Salisbury's famous remark that 'we are fighting a war for a people we despise,' and
Chamberlain's view that 'There was too much 'money-bags' about the whole business to
Lansdowne to Chamberlain, 15 Aug 1899, JC 5/51/61; there was also a certain Lmeasiness in the
despatches of G.W. Steevens, the 'Apostle of Empire.' After seeing Boer prisoners taken during the battle
of Elandslaagte in October 1899, Steevens wrote, 'They were manly and courteous, and through their
untrimmed beards and rough corduroys a voice said very plainly, uRuling race. 0
 'G.W. Steevens, From
Capetown to Ladysmish (London, 1900), p.64. For a discussion of Steevens' attitude towards the Boers see,
R. Steam, War Images and Image Makers in the Victorian Era: Aspects of the British Visual and Written
Portrayal of War and Defence c.1866-1 906 (unpub. Ph.D thesis, London, 1987), pp.378-380.
20
be agreeable to any of us,' showed the disquiet pervading at the time, particularly as
many of the Randlords were also Jewish.
Even before the war began certain officers were noted for their anti-semitic, 'pro-
Boer' views. General Butler, with whom Mimer had to deal in early 1899, embodied
ideals which distinguished the officer corps. He was a member of the landed gentry, he
viewed capitalism with suspicion, and regarded South African capitalism, especially in the
person of Cecil Rhodes, with utter contempt. And, as a devotee of Carlyle and Ruskin,
Butler fortified his anti-capitalism with a strong line in anti-semitism. As the war
progressed the officer corps became uneasy about for whom or what they were actually
fighting. Many admired the Boers' fighting skills, and viewed them as 'country yeomen,'
a type of person who was disappearing from England and no longer comprised the
backbone of the British army. All these factors: anti-capitalism, anti-semitism; the
admiration of the Boers as yeomen and soldiers, combined to produce a general but
compelling outlook which eventually influenced the army's attitude to the peace
settlement.
Although some historians have argued that Kitchener acted on his own motives and
wanted to gain the quickest settlement possible, so that he could assume the Indian
command, this view takes little notice of Kitchener's own ideas, or those of articulate
and thoughtful officers within the high command. By early 1902 many officers felt the
Boer leadership should be consulted over the future of South Africa. General Hamilton
openly said that the Boers should be treated leniently and was at the forefront of a lobby
which distrusted Mimer's connections with the Randlords. Much of this distrust was
created by Milner's adherence to the concept of unconditional surrender, Hamilton and
others knew this was unacceptable to the Boers and would prolong the war. Kitchener also
rejected unconditional surrender and was determined to discuss terms with the Boers and
to ensure the final peace settlement reflected British magnanimity, because he believed
' To Lansdowne and Milner respectively; both cit. A!4. Porter, The Origins of the South African War.
Joseph Chamberlain and the Diplomacy of Jnzperialism 1895-1899 (Manchester, 1980), pp.247, 274.
For a review of Butler's writings, S. Gwynn, 'The Writings and Opinions of General Sir William
Butler,' The Nineteenth Century and After, 69, (1911), pp.314-328.
Le May, p.l2'l; Pakenham, p.561; J. Amery, IV, p.55; L. Amery, My Political Life, (London, 1953),
I, p.165; D. Denoon, A Grand Illusion. The Failure of Imperial Policy in the Transvaal Colony During the
Period of Reconstruction 1900-1905 (London, 1973), p.23.
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the Boers would not otherwise settle down under British rule. In the end, Kitchener was
helped by the British government's war-weariness, and desire not to lose another
opportunity to achieve peace. Consequently, Mimer's hopes that the Boer generals would
be excluded from the peace process and the political system of the new British South
Africa, foundered when confronted with ministerial exhaustion and military intransigence.
The factor which embittered civil-military relations in the South African colonies
was the imposition of martial law, and this aspect is examined in Chapter Five. The few
historians who have investigated martial law during the conflict have left many issues
unexplored, and have failed to link events and decisions in Cape Colony with those in
Britain and the rest of South Africa. 27
 For example, there has been no detailed appraisal
of the debates and problems which arose between the civil and military authorities in
South Africa and Britain. These arose from the fact that martial law gave the army power
to make rules to fit any circumstance, to arrest merely on suspicion, and that in Kitchener
resided the ultimate authority to formulate regulations and confirm sentences imposed by
military courts. In this chapter an examination of the problems caused by martial law
shows how the politicians and soldiers approached a subject which has an uncertain
position in the British constitution. It will explain, for instance, why officers were not
deterred by the requirement which stressed that their actions would have to be indemnified
after martial law ended. A study of the debate over the supremacy of civil or military
courts will show how the army achieved complete authority in martial law areas, whilst
an examination of the period immediately after the end of the war, which has not been
done before, will show how the various debates were resolved.
At another level, this study analyses the dilemma faced by the politicians: should
they give the army complete authority to administer martial law, or should they insist the
army take note of political sensitivities and thus weaken the response against rebellion?
If the administration of martial law went unquestioned, the politicians would seem to be
abdicating civil authority altogether. This was the view of the Cape government,
particularly between 1900 and 1902. Prime Minister Sprigg and his ministers proved
v c Townshend, Britain's Civil Wars. Counterinsurgency in the Twentieth Centwy (London, 1986),
pp.172-186; 'Martial Law: Legal and Administrative Problems of Civil Emergency in Britain and the Empire
1800-1940,' Historical Journal, 25, (1982), pp.167-195; J.S. Galbraith, 'British War Measures in Cape
Colony 1900-02: A Study of Miscalculations and Mismanagement.' South African Historical Journal, 15,
(1983), pp.68-84.
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reluctant to acknowledge that martial law gave the military special responsibility, and that
its administration was beyond the purview of politicians. Consequently, the Cape
government became embroiled in a series of acrimonious disputes with the militaiy.
Historians, such as Le May and Galbraith, have failed to recognise the wider implications
of the British government's involvement in this dispute. That apart from trying to settle
the differences between the Colonial authorities and the army, the British government's
main priority was to ensure that strategic decisions made in June 1901, with regard to the
war in Cape Colony, were implemented by the military, without the hinderance of
Sprigg's government.
In the end, the British government was obliged to uphold the army's administration
of martial law: It could not risk being accused of hampering the war effort, and it could
not afford to see military decisions challenged in the courts by the Colonial governments;
nor could the British authorities risk senior military officials being taken to court, because
senior politicians were bound to follow. After the war it was felt best to ignore the subject
altogether which had serious implications for the future, as no one could foresee where
and when martial law might have to be utilised again.
Although the South African war was the last great colonial conflict, it generated
problems which were both perennial and distinctive, and which severely affected the
nature and balance of civil-military relations. Not only does the South African war tell us
much about the effect of colonial warfare on the association between politicians and
generals, it also serves as a useful starting point for a study of civil-military relations
affected by far larger conflicts.
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CHAPTER ONE.
RECONSIDERING THE MILITARY POSITION:
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND THE BOER 'THREAT.'
December 1895-June 1899.
The period December 1895 to June 1899 witnessed a succession of political crises
between Britain and the Transvaal; each prompted attempts by soldiers and politicians to
define the role and strength of the South African garrison in a possible conflict with either
one or both of the Boer republics. Until 1895, the garrison's main function was the
defence of Cape Town against seaborne attack by imperial rivals. However, from
December 1895, as Anglo-Transvaal relations deteriorated, the garrison's role was directed
away from the wider aspects of imperial defence and towards the Transvaal. For the
British, this change in outlook accentuated divisions between the civil and military
authorities. By 1899, these divisions had contributed to the formulation of a compromise
strategy designed to deal with the Boers. Although this strategy neither united the
politicians and generals, nor engendered real confidence in its ability to end Boer
defiance, it nevertheless influenced the British reaction to the final crisis of 1899.
The persistent military dimension to the South African question has received little
attention from historians, even though the generals were constantly consulted by the
politicians as the crisis unfolded and contributed to the formulation of policy. The aim of
this chapter, therefore, is to unravel the contribution of the government's military advisors.
The chapter has four parts: the first section deals with British civil and military reactions
following the abortive Jameson raid in 1895-96; the second section discusses the political
crisis of 1897 which greatly involved the military authorities and emphasised the strategic
importance of Natal. Thirdly, the situation in 1898 will be examined, as the political
situation deteriorated and the weakness of the Cape garrison became apparent. Fmally,
relations between Sir Alfred Mimer and General Butler are discussed; these highlighted
the lack of planning and provide the first example of the clash between Milner's desire
to control events in South Africa, and the opposition he invoked from the military which
distinguished the years 1899-1902.
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I
The economic power of the Transvaal, which developed following the discovery
of gold on the Witwatersrand in the late 1880's, threatened the ties that bound Britain,
Cape Colony and Natal, and promised the Boers political hegemony in South Africa.' The
combined threat of a powerful and potentially hostile neighbour, and a Cape Afrikaner
population still mindful of the war in 1880-81, increased British military concerns,
particularly for the safety of the vital strategic position of Cape Town. In 1884, a War
Office memorandum had argued:
It is impossible, for political reasons, to create a Gibraltar out of the Cape
Town peninsula, and.. .[thus] the permanent retention of the peninsula...is
dependent upon the maintenance of British ascendancy in all South African
colonies.2
Nevertheless the strength of the garrison was not reviewed and, until 1896, it remained
at between 3,500-4,000 men, divided almost equally between Cape Colony and Natal.3
Conflict with the Boers was hardly considered as more pressing problems surfaced in
other parts of the world.
British concerns were heightened, however, by the increased interest shown in the
region by Germany and France, as the booming economy of the Transvaal formed a
natural focus for investment. Cecil Rhodes, founder of the British South Africa Company
(1889) and Prime Minister of Cape Colony (1890-1895), also viewed these developments
with alann. He wished to create a British South African federation dominated by English-
speaking colonists. This might be achieved by overthrowing the Transvaal's government
and in 1895 this became a real issue. In a dispute between the Cape and the Transvaal,
the latter showed its power by preventing Cape goods from entering the country over the
Vaal river railway bridges. This dispute, the 'Drifts Crisis,' obliged Rhodes to call on the
help of the British government, which eventually forced the Boers to back down.
1 R. Robinson and J. Gallagher, with Alice Denny, Africa and the Victorians (Second Edition, London,
1981), pp.410-420.
2 D. Schreuder, Gladstone and Kruger. Liberal Government and Colonial Home Rule 1880-1885
(London, 1969), p.15.
3 Royal Commission on the War in South Africa, (hereafter RC), PP(1904), XL, Cd.1789, p.21.
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However, to Rhodes it became a matter of necessity that the regime in Pretoria be
removed. Rhodes therefore attempted to overthrow the Transvaal government by sparking
an uprising in Johannesburg, the centre of the gold industry.4
Johannesburg was a city of foreigners, known as Uitlanders, whose industry and
taxes had done much to create the Transvaal's wealth. Most Uitlanders were of British
origin and their concentration in Johannesburg frightened the Boers into believing their
numbers vast. Consequently, the Uitlanders were denied political rights which caused great
resentment. However, the size of the Uitlander community was exaggerated by the
Uitlanders themselves as part of their demands for greater political autonomy. Kruger
himself exaggerated Uitlander numbers to convince the Boers that their homeland was
under threat.5
 In December 1895, Rhodes and his co-conspirators in the mining industry
attempted to use Uitlander resentment to ignite a rebellion, but the forces of his lieutenant,
Jameson, were easily defeated by the Boers.6
Just before the Raid, a Unionist ministry had taken power in Britain. The new
Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, was fully conscious of the need for Britain to
exert her supremacy in South Africa and elsewhere in the world. The defeat of Jameson,
and the Kaiser's congratulatory telegram to Kruger, were keenly felt. Chamberlain urged
the Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury, to consider a vigorous act 'to soothe the wounded
pride of the nation' and recommended as one response 'the immediate preparation of a
force of troops for Capetown sufficient to make us the masters of the situation in S.
Africa'?
In early 1896, Chamberlain's deputy, Lord Selbome, considered Southern Africa
in the aftermath of the Jameson Raid. For Selborne, the government needed to formulate
a policy by which British prestige and supremacy could be reasserted. In two memoranda,
Selborne established that Britain had to persuade Kruger to alleviate the lot of the
Porter, Origins, pp.55-56.
For Uitlander numbers see J.S. Marais, The Fall of Kruger's Republic (Oxford, 1961), pp.l-3. He
concludes that in 1899 there were more Boers in the Transvaal than Uitlanders, but Uitlander males
outnumbered Boer males.
'Robinson and Gallagher, pp. 438-461; Porter, Origins, pp.95-121.
7 Charnbezlain to Salisbury, 4 Jan 1896, SP CC/f.43. South Africa was not the only area of concern;
Britain and the USA were at loggerheads over British claims along the border between Venezuela and
British Guiana.
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Uitlanders, and mollify Cape Afrikaner opinion which had been antagonised by Rhodes
and the Raid. The main long-term objective was to create a confederation, which might
bind South Africa to Britain; to do this it would be necessary to acquire control of the
Delagoa Bay railway as this enabled the Transvaal to maintain its economic independence
and power.8
 Selborne viewed the situation pessimistically, and decided the time had come
for Britain to assert its power before it was too late.
Military officials also began to review the South African situation in a similarly
individualistic manner, military responses were uncoordinated and there existed no
machinery to encourage a coherent appraisal. When the Unionists took power they
inherited a scheme to re-organise the office of Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C). The Order-
in-Council of November 1895, which finalised this re-organisation, limited the power of
the C-in-C in order to secure civilian control over that office, and marked the end of a
conflict that had started with Cardwell's army reforms. The government then had little
alternative but to appoint Lord Wolseley: General Buller was lower in rank and less
respected, although he had administered the army for many years; Lord Roberts, the
outgoing C-in-C in India and Wolseley's great rival, had spent his career in India and
could not match Wolseley's knowledge of the home army. Once appointed, however,
Wolseley made no effort to accept his position and preferred to circumvent the constraints
imposed by the Order-in-Council. He was helped in this by the fact that his duties were
imprecise and ambiguous. The Order-in-Council stated that the C-in-C would now
supervise the various military departments, under the Adjutant-General, the Quarter-Master
General, the Inspector-General of Fortifications, and the Inspector-General of Ordnance.
But the government was unable to state clearly what 'supervision' meant. On paper,
Wolseley was primus inter pares; in practice, as the senior officer in the British army and
by virtue of his title and experience, this meant that others naturally deferred to his
authority. General Wood, when Adjutant-General, was actually ordered by Wolseley to
consult him first before going to Lansdowne on any matter. 9 As Wolseley had hoped to
$ Memo. by Selborne, (Jan) 1896, in 0. Boyce (ed.), The Crisis of British Power. The Imperial and
Naval Papers of the Second Earl of Selborne 1895-1910 (London, 1990), pp.30-32 Selborne to Salisbuiy,
26 March 1896, cit. Robinson and Gallagher, pp.434-437.
'H.E. Wood, From Midshipman to Field-Marshal, II, (London, 1906), pp.251-252; 0. Wheeler, The
War Office. Past and Present (London, 1914), p.257.
27
wield the same powers as his predecessor, his frustration and bitterness at being given a
mass of administrative work without the requisite authority spilled over into his relations
with Lansdowne. Wolseley could not accept being directly subordinate to a politician,
whom he considered an amateur who meddled in army affairs, and probably kept
Lansdowne unaware of military papers circulating the War Office. Lansdowne resented
Wolseley's refusal to co-operate and give the new system a fair trial. Each was
unsympathetic to the other's viewpoint and unwilling to understand the constraints within
which the other worked when dealing with the crisis in South Africa.'0
As part of his office, Wolseley was directly responsible for the Intelligence
Department. Unlike its European counterparts, the British army did not have a general
staff and there was little in the way of investigation and planning. Gathering information
therefore was the duty of the Intelligence Department. Its task, however, was not to issue
advice and influence policy; the department only collected and collated military
intelligence; nor were its officers assigned to help Wolseley prepare plans for future
contingencies. Although other crises erupted in the late 1890's, in the Sudan and Niger
valley, the department's duties and resources were neither specialised nor increased.
Indeed throughout this period, the Intelligence Department received only £11,000 per
annu,n, whereas the Transvaal government spent £90,000 on its intelligence services.'1
The Department's Section B was responsible for gathering information relating to
the colonies. It had to cover all aspects of the Empire's military needs, except India, but
usually had a staff of only two officers and a clerk. The Department as a whole was
neglected by both the civil and military authorities. Civilians were suspicious and stingy,
regarding an Intelligence Department as a short step from a General Staff and unfettered
militarism; Wolseley gave little help, showing no appetite for work as a Chief of Staff.
Most Victorian commanders planned their campaigns on the spot and against colonial
enemies there was little call for detailed planning beforehand.
Wolseley sent Lansdowne a minute that combined two aspects which greatly
concerned the military establishment: European conflict and the Boer threat. Wolseley's
appreciation of the South African problem was more intuitive than reasoned, and this
10 Hamer, pp.148-173.
T. Fergusson, British Military Intelligence (Maryland, 1984), PP.109-1 12.
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owed much to the nature of his office and relationship with Lansdowne. Although
Wolseley's minute was designed to obtain an increase in the numerical strength of the
British army, his growing anxiety about South Africa was evident. As yet, however, the
Boer menace was not considered sufficient to warrant a substantial increase in numbers;
Wolseley envisaged an addition of about 3,500 men, two battalions of which, (roughly
2,000 men) would be positioned in Cape Colony, the rest in Natal. This small addition to
the Natal garrison would be sufficient to have a 'steadying effect on the Boers' and would
enable the force to take up forward positions along the frontier if necessary. Considering
the modest strength of the Natal garrison, this confidence in its ability to overawe the
Boers revealed Wolseley's contempt for Boer military abilities. Even so, Wolseley realised
that more was needed to uphold British prestige:
To anyone who knows South Africa well, it must be evident that the
present state of things, the existing distribution of power in South Africa
cannot long continue. To give any future redistribution of it an English
character, we should be strong there. At present, and indeed ever since we
pulled down our flag after our defeat at Majuba, the Africander, has
believed the Boer power to be superior to ours, and Dr. Jameson's recent
surrender, and the policy it has forced upon us, will inevitably tend to
strengthen this belief.'2
At the same time, officers of the Intelligence Department also provided
appreciations of the situation in South Africa. Officers were able to produce memoranda
as and when they deemed them necessary, and could prepare them for any office of state.
In fact, Lansdowne often by-passed Wolseley and approached General Ardagh, Director
of Military Intelligence (DM1) personally. As a result, intelligence appreciations were
circulated around the various departments and to various ministers.'3
The first appreciation was written by Major Altham, currently in the Intelligence
Department but about to go to South Africa as Military Secretary to General Goodenough,
the General Officer Commanding, South Africa (GOC(SA)). Altham was to undertake
intelligence work whilst there and probably felt it beneficial to produce an evaluation
before leaving. Unlike 1880-8 1, Aitham believed the Boers would take the offensive, as
'2 Wolley wrote this on his own initiative: 22 Feb 1896, RC PP(1904), XL, Cd.1789, pp.225-226.
13 Ardagh's relations with other departments and with Wolseley see RC PP(1904), XL, Cd.1790,
p.210, and with Lansdowne, for whom he had previously worked when Lansdowne was Viceroy of India,
RC PP(1904), XLI, Cd.1791, p.502.
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they had more arms and coveted the port of Durban. Aitham urged that the GOC(SA)
should be sent some strategic guidance, and suggested stressing the points to be defended
by the garrison. Aitharn preferred to defend the bridges across the Orange river, vital to
the advance of any main army arriving in South Africa. He stated that the Natal frontier,
particularly Laing's Nek, was not worth defending but offered no reason for this, although
he must have been aware of its isolation. However, he felt that Durban and
Pietermaritzburg ought to have garrisons for reasons of prestige. Furthermore, Aitharn
suggested that the Uitlanders might be encouraged to carry out acts of sabotage to
supplement regular operations.'4
The second memorandum was provided by Ardagh, who drew official attention to
the possibility of a conflict with the Orange Free State (OFS) as well as the Transvaal.
As DM1 and adviser to both Wolseley and Lansdowne, Ardagh's views carried some
weight. Although, as he later confessed, his rank was not high enough to guarantee
influence with his superiors, he felt duty bound to inform them of his views.' 5 In 1889,
the Boer republics had signed a defensive alliance.' 6 Consequently, Ardagh wondered if
the Bloemfontein authorities would cooperate with Pretoria should war occur between
Britain and the Transvaal: this, he argued, should be known on the outbreak of hostilities.
Ardagh wanted the OFS given two alternatives; the first being that the OFS should be
benevolently neutral, allowing the British to pass through its territory; the second
alternative was war. According to Ardagh there was no alternative to an invasion of the
OFS, no matter what its attitude. The Natal route into the Transvaal was inadequate: it
was serviced by only one small section of railway; and the border country was difficult
to traverse, owing to its mountainous nature. Ardagh concluded:
The remarkable and unprecedented spectacle afforded by the Transvaal
must, so long as present conditions last, inspire us with apprehension, and
14 11 June 1896, WO 32/7844)079/8501.
RC PP(1904), XL, Cd.1790, 5045-5046, p.213.
"was signed after F.W. Reitz, a noted Boer nationalist, became president of the OFS. In Maith
1897, Presidents Steyn and Kruger reaffirmed the alliance. By then, Reitz was State Secretaiy of the
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compel us to regard armed intervention as a possibility which may be
forced upon us, however conciliatory our attitude may be.'7
Lansdowne's response to Wolseley's advice was not altogether dismissive but
showed him concentrating on short-term solutions. Lansdowne explained that he could not
agree to a substantial rise in anny numbers unless the necessity for the expenditure was
fully proved, and this he said Wolseley had not done. Lansdowne was not interested in
strengthening the garrison in South Africa. Wolseley's recommendation of two battalions
as a deterrent and the nucleus of an expeditionaiy force was inadequate and would not do
for either task. He reminded Wolseley that the garrison in Natal was only temporary as
it had been agreed that in 1898 the Natal government should be responsible for its own
defence, five years after the grant of self-government. Lansdowne's response to the
evaluations provided by Altham and Ardagh is unknown.'8
However, in 1896 the garrison was increased, but the surviving evidence in the
War Office files does not state when decisions were made to reinforce the garrison. The
returns printed in the Royal Commission give half-yearly figures so that it is possible to
gain some idea at what point it was decided to send out extra troops. In December 1895,
the garrison numbered 3,588 men;'9
 in June 1896, the garrison had been increased by
1,000 men; by December, the garrison stood at 5,409, with the greater proportion
concentrated in Cape Colony, an extra increase of about 800 men. These figures
confirmed that Wolseley's recommendations were acknowledged. Evidently, the garrison
in 1895 had been at its lowest level at a time of international tension?°
17 Oct 1896, PRO 30/40/16. Apparently, this memo. was submitted to Wolseley on 13 Nov 1896:
evidence of General Nicholson, RC PP(1904), XL, Cd. 1789, p.155. The memorandum dealt chiefly with the
Transvaal Boers military capacity, Ardagh believing the Boer rifleman was degenerating into 'an untrained
yeoman' owing to the lack of spae in which to trek and shoot game.
IS Memo. by Lansdowne, 10 July 1896, CAB 37/42/32. In his evidence before the Royal Commission
Lansdowne, when asked whether Aitham's and Ardagh's papers had ever been put before him replied, 'I
do not think so; I may have seen some of them.' RC PP(1904), XLI, Cd.1791, 21085-21088, p302.
"Including the 1/2 battalion assigned to Mauritius, part of the South African defence establishment, and
then stationed in the Cape because barrks in Mauritius were awaiting completion: Nicholson, 15 Oct 1902,
RC PP(1904), XL, Cd.1789, p.153.
20 1b1d.. p.21. Wolseley himself seemed to be unsure about the decision-making process: '...we went on
adding to it [the garrison] bit by bit. That was on the strong recommendations I made from time to time.'
Ibid., 8719, p.365.
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Colonial Office ministers still hoped the garrison would be strengthened further.
Selborne considered the time had come to increase the numbers of the Cape garrison. He
told Chamberlain he had been impressed by a memorandum from George Fiddes,21
which showed Britain unable to assert its interests with the force currently in South
Africa. Selborne further believed that the Boers had not been overawed by the recent
increase in the garrison, and that only a major expeditionary force would do that. To
ensure that British power was evident, to the Boers, to the Colonials, and to the Cape
Afrikaners, required the largest garrison in South Africa compatible with Britain's
defensive requirements.
This may have influenced Chamberlain who pressed Lansdowne to increase the
garrison by an extra 5,000 men. Lansdowne, using Wolseley's figures, informed
Chamberlain at some length that this would mean recruiting more troops, and would be
difficult because it would require the sanction of Parliament to alter the army
estimates. Chamberlain nevertheless insisted on presenting his proposals to the
Cabinet. He explained that from information received from South Africa it appeared the
Boers were preparing to throw off British suzerainty and invade British territory. To
counter this, Chamberlain stressed the diplomatic advantages of strengthening the garrison;
of demonstrating British resolve; and of fortifying the resolve of the loyalists.
Chamberlain believed that a display of military strength had always impressed the Boers
and had, on several occasions, prevented serious consequences; he mentioned General
Warren's expedition to Bechuanaland in 1885 as a prime example. An increase in the
garrison would be a sensible defensive measure on its own, gaining time, in the event of
hostilities, for the arrival of reinforcements. However, Chamberlain, perhaps impressed
by the reservations of the War Office, tempered his appraisal by stating that the problem
was not urgent, but a matter of policy requiring the agreement of the military authorities
to spare 5,000 men for garrison duty in South Africa for a year or two. He was prepared
Private Secretary to Sir R. Meade, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Colonial Office.
Selbome to Chamberlain, 6 Oct 1896, Boyce (ed.), pp.40-41.
Lansdowne to Chamberlain, 6 Nov 1896, JC 5/51120; Wolseley's Minute, 5 Nov 18%, JC 5/51/19.
There is no copy of Chamberlain's letter to Lansdowne in the Chamberlain Papei.
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to drop the matter, however, if all this was dependent on an increase in the army and on
a vote of money in Parliament?
Lansdowne later summarised the military position, and informed ministers that
minor increases to garrisons abroad were required throughout the Empire. The
international situation was the main reason for this together with, as Lansdowne explained,
the inability of the Admiralty to guarantee the safety of various naval bases. The
Admiralty had stated that their first priority was to secure command of the sea in home
waters; until this was achieved naval bases would have to fend for themselves. In this case
Lansdowne agreed that the Cape garrison ought to be strong enough to defeat a seaborne
assault. However, Lansdowne emphasised that the primary task of the garrison was to do
just that and not be responsible for the land frontier, and stated that he would have to ask
the Cabinet 'whether the two extra battalions...are to be regarded as permanently quartered
there'. Lansdowne then was still not convinced about the necessity of increasing the
garrison to counter the Boer threat: it might be asked whether Lansdowne thought a Boer
threat even existed.
At the end of 1896, therefore, the South African garrison could still be regarded
as a defence against seaborne attack. Despite the evaluations presented by the Intelligence
Department, military policy in South Africa had been overshadowed by Wolseley and
Lansdowne squabbling over whether the British army needed a major increase in
battalions. A clear, comprehensive survey of the situation, which had been altered by
Jameson's Raid, was not considered. However, the promptings of the Colonial Office and
the soldiers had highlighted the potentiality of a Boer threat. The following year this threat
became more pronounced.
II
Desiring to limit the numbers of Uitlanders in the Trans vaal, Kruger's government,
early in 1897, attempted to impose an Aliens' Immigration Act which restricted both the
number of immigrants and their right to become citizens of the Republic. Chamberlain's
' 10 Nov 1896, CAB 37/43/45.
4 Dec 1896, RC PP(1904), XL, Cd.1789, pp.238-239.
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desire to strengthen the Empire and to educate the British public into supporting his ideals
meant that such an insult - as he and others perceived it - could not go unanswered.
Moreover, a strong response was required to convince the British element in South Africa
that London would and could uphold their interests. Furthermore, as the Transvaal was
now becoming very dangerous owing to the large import of arms since the Raid, it was
necessary for the British government to win a diplomatic victory which might discredit
Kruger's policy and, hopefully, his regime. This section, therefore, analyses the military
elements in the response to the crisis of 1897 and shows that significant divisions amongst
soldiers and politicians decisively affected the military response to the Transvaal's
intransigence.
On 5 April 1897, the Colonial Office informed the War Office that the
disagreement between Britain and the Transvaal had reached a point where it was
necessary to present certain despatches to President Kruger, regarding his government's
breaches of the London Convention of 1884?6 It was emphasised that these despatches
were not an ultimatum; but owing to the Transvaal's enhanced military capability and the
comparatively defenceless state of the British colonies, a Boer military response could not
be ruled out. An initial Boer victory, moreover, might add to British difficulties by
securing the support of many sympathizers in Cape Colony and Natal. The Colonial
Office thought the Boers were likely to attack Kimberley and Natal. To attack Kimberley
the Transvaal would need either the covert or manifest support of the OFS, which might
also lead to the destruction of the Orange river bridges. British forces were wholly
inadequate to defend the frontiers, a position which risked the hostility of the loyalists.
Chamberlain wanted his views put before Lansdowne who was reminded that he had 'the
responsibility of deciding what military measures should be taken, to safeguard the
interests of the Empire in South Africa at the present juncture.'
There were two questions to be answered before a coherent policy could be
produced. First, the politicians, with their military advisers, had to decide what strategy
the Boers were likely to employ should war break out; and second, how many troops were
required to defeat the Boers?
This convention finally settled the differences between Britain and the Transvaal following the war
in 1880-81.
27 C to WO, 5 April 1897, WO 32fl844A)79/8234.
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On 8 April 1897, Chamberlain called a Cabinet meeting to discuss the crisis. With
Salisbury away, the meeting comprised Chamberlain, Lansdowne, Hicks Beach, the
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Balfour, Salisbury's deputy, and Goschen, the First Lord of
the Admiralty. All admitted that there was a possibility of the Boers launching an attack,
but thought it was unlikely; nevertheless they acknowledged that an early Boer success
might win over the OFS and many Afrikaners. Again Chamberlain stressed the need to
support the loyalists who were 'alarmed at the apparent indifference of the British
government to their danger,' and advocated the immediate despatch of 3,500 men.
Evidently, Lansdowne favoured doing nothing, but Chamberlain and the rest wanted
something done for political reasons because they believed the Boers would back down
in the face of British determination.
However, after consulting his military advisers, Lansdowne acknowledged that the
garrison was inadequate both to meet a Boer offensive on a wide front; and to launch an
offensive. Lansdowne doubted the Boers would actually attack; he believed they were
preparing to meet a British offensive, as evidenced by the building and stocking with
'guns of position' fortresses at Pretoria and Johannesburg. He also felt the Boers would
not relish the prospect of leaving their homes for long to conduct a military campaign
outside their borders. Nor did Lansdowne think the Boers would make a dash into Cape
Colony to stir up support, as this would 'exasperate the loyal colonists'. (The thought that
it might provoke an Afrikaner rebellion and undermine British plans does not seem to
have occurred to him). Even if the Boers destroyed the bridges the soldiers did not believe
this would seriously jeopardise operations. Lansdowne added that Chamberlain wanted
something done for political reasons, primarily to bolster the loyalists as the weak garrison
had undermined their confidence. Unconvinced by this, Lansdowne preferred to send an
ultimatum followed 'by an overwhelming force when the moment for putting our foot
down had arrived.' The main force to be sent 'would probably be not less than 40,000
men', although owing to rinderpest providing transport animals might be a problem and
the main army might then be tied to the railway. However, none of these difficulties were
expected to hinder the advance through the Boer republics.
Chamberlain to Salisbury, 8 April 1897, JC 5 /30176.
Lansdowne to Salisbury, 9 April 1897, SP LC/ff.248-254.
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Lansdowne further explained that the soldiers were divided on the issue; Wolseley
supported Chamberlain, whilst Buller and Wood (Adjutant-General and Quarter-Master
General respectively) agreed with Lansdowne. The latter preferred to wait and felt the
British could do so longer than Kruger: the British he contended were already 'in the
wrong' over the Jameson Raid, and it would add to their difficulties to precipitate a
crisis.30
However, at a further meeting between Lansdowne, Wolseley, Buller and this time
Mimer (recently appointed High Commissioner for South Africa and Governor of Cape
Colony in place of the ailing Lord Rosmead) a new militaiy action was proposed.31
Instead of preparing for an invasion of the OFS it was agreed that the British should send
an immediate force to Natal, to hold the strategic position of Laing's Nek. Apparently
Mimer objected to an invasion of the OFS because, according to Lansdowne, he did not
like the thought of pushing the OFS into the arms of the Transvaal. Milner's ability to
change the plan suggests the others were undecided about it anyway. The decision to
change, however, completely altered the focus of British strategy; hitherto the OFS route
had been considered vital owing to the nature of the country and the number of railways
that could be used to bring troops and supplies to the frontier and then support the
invasion. Now this strategy had been superseded. Instead of using an 'overwhelming
force' and operating in advantageous country, the British had decided to rely on a small
addition to the garrison and place them in terrain which favoured the Boers. Evidently the
soldiers agreed but no evidence has survived of the reasons given; Lansdowne favoured
this change because it seemed to secure military objectives within the financial limit of
£200,000 imposed by Hicks Beach. 32
 Thus, it was agreed that the new military objective
was for British troops to occupy Laing's Nek, to block any attempted Boer invasion, and
provide a springboard for a possible offensive against the Transvaal, without recourse to
an invasion of the OFS.
3°Wo11ey noted in his diary that he continued to insist that the garrison at the Cape be increased, and
that while Chamberlain agreed, Lansdowne remained opposed. F. Maurice & 0. Alihur, The We of Lord
Wolseley (London, 1924), p.315.
31 Lansdowne to Chamberlain, 13 April 1897, JC 5/51/25.
32 Lady V. Hicks Beh, Life of Sir Michael Hicks Beach, (London, 1932), II, p.5!.
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Not all military opinion favoured such a move. Ardagh reiterated the danger posed
by the OFS. He believed that even if it remained neutral, an estimated 5,000 Free Staters
were likely to join the Transvaal; this action alone warranted a declaration of war. Ardagh
warned his superiors that: 'Procrastination and delay in settling this important question of
policy at the critical moment will be most prejudicial toward us.' He added that the Boers
could easily seize strategic locations, such as Laing's Nek and damage the railway upon
which a British advance depended. 33 Ardagh's opinion was supported by Wood, who had
missed the meeting with Mimer. Wood condemned the idea of occupying Laing's Nek,
as it could easily be dominated from adjoining positions; provided the Boers had not
already seized Laing's Nek beforehand.M
The advice proffered by the military thus involved two contrasting strategic
scenarios. One recommended that British reinforcements should be deployed near the OFS
border, and that OFS hostility ought to be assumed. Invading the OFS would facilitate the
advance of the main expeditionary force, which would number some 40,000 men. The
second scenario envisaged the deployment of British troops in Natal, where there was a
common border with the Transvaal in country of great strategic importance to both sides.
British conjectures were based on a small force holding an isolated position to deny
access to Natal and to facilitate a future advance. Disadvantages arising from such a
course were numerous: the position chosen, Laing's Nek, could easily be isolated and
dominated from neighbouring heights; the Boers could get there first if their suspicions
were aroused or the political situation deteriorated.
While Lansdowne was discussing the issue with his military advisers, his
colleagues were expressing their views. Balfour recommended that the government ought
to accede to Chamberlain's demands because he had been allowed to goad the Boers.
Although Balfour considered a Boer attack improbable, he reckoned that if the Boers
believed the British were determined to attack them, they might attack first. As the
" Memo, by Ardagh, 15 April 1897, WO 32f7844,V79/8234. General Goodenough refused to move
forces to Laing's Nek. He felt it was a bad strategic position and knew the Natal ministry, which feared
provoking the Transvaal, shared his view. Eventually, as a compromise gesture, troops were moved from
Pietermaritzburg to Ladysmith, a move also designed to improve the health of the troops Goodenough to
Ardagh, 21 April & 14 July 1897; Ardagh to Goodenough, 3 Sept 1897, WO 3/7844iV79I8270.
Lansdowne to Chamberlain, 20 April 1897, JC 5/51(27. Lansdowne wanted to await Salisbury's
opinion (he was in France) before making a decision.
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committee investigating the Jameson Raid was about to consider sensitive documents,
Balfour thought this would eventually antagonise the Boers, 'and it is a nice point whether
the sending out of 3000 or 4000 men will prove to be a sedative or a stimulant.'35 Hicks
Beach was more concerned about costs. He complained to Chamberlain that his main
worry was to persuade the War Office to cut their own estimates for the increase in the
garrison, especially as he had to consider further expenditure on the navy.
The final decision rested with Lord Salisbury. He was quite agreeable to
Chamberlain's viewpoint, recognizing that Chamberlain had considered the problem for
a long time. Nevertheless, Salisbury was concerned lest any precipitate action should have
a bad effect on European politics. He was especially worried that a war against the
Transvaal would see an alliance made between Germany and Holland against Britain.
However, Salisbury made one telling observation; he felt that sending troops to South
Africa would appear provocative to public opinion in England. He therefore thought the
best course, politically and strategically, was to take up Lansdowne's suggestion of
sending troops to Natal. As he told Chamberlain, it was the correct political decision
because:
No one could find fault with us for defending such an important point in
the face of Kruger's excessive armaments. Merely sending 2 regiments to
the Cape will not appeal to English opinion in the same way, or seem so
defensible: for they would be of little use against a surprise.37
Faced with such reasoning, especially that relating to public opinion, Chamberlain
was prepared to accept the Natal alternative. 38 Chamberlain knew Lansdowne appreciated
his concerns regarding the position of the OFS, but Lansdowne had convinced himself the
Natal option was the best one to follow. Consequently, the Natal garrison was increased
from 1,881 men to 4,347 in June l897.
" Balfour to Salisbury, 10 April 1897, SP BC/f.168.
Hicks Beach to Chamberlain, 11 April 1897, JC 5/51/24.
Salisbury to Chamberlain, 16 April 1897, JC 5730/77; Garvin, III, p.141.
3' Chamberlain to Salisbwy, 19 April 1897, SP CC/f.89.
3' Lansdowne to Chamberlain, 16 April 1897, JC 5/51/26; RC PP(1904), XL, Cd.1789, p.21.
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This switch to Natal had two effects. It obscured the necessity of examining the
attitude of the OFS, and it perpetuated the idea that a small show of force would ensure
a Boer cimbdown. Regarding the first, Ardagh's and Chamberlain's expressions of
concern on the uncertainty of the OFS standpoint, and Wood's objections to the Laing's
Nek position went largely unheeded. Clearly Lansdowne achieved his objectives by
finding a position that appeared strategically viable, yet required only a small force to
make it secure, and, just as important, kept costs within Treasury limits. It also had the
added advantage of being acceptable to British public opinion which Chamberlain had
been unable to educate fully at this stage.
Lansdowne's political position was apparently enhanced once the crisis had passed.
The Boers did seem to back down, as the extra troops, coupled with a naval demonstration
in Delagoa Bay, indicated Britain's intention to uphold the cause of the Uitlanders.
Moreover, Chamberlain's intervention and his demands for military action were driving
an even bigger wedge between Lansdowne and Wolseley. It seemed the latter relished the
opportunity to oppose Lansdowne and side with another member of the Cabinet.
According to his biographers, from 1896, Wolseley's greatest concern was how
to avoid war with the Boers.4° Until June 1899 Wolseley believed strongly that the best
way to ensure peace was to increase the military presence in South Africa. This view had
wider implications, because Wolseley's demands for more troops in South Africa were
also demands for extra troops for the home army; in fact he was saying one could not be
achieved without the other. Chamberlain's vociferous demands for a strong British
response to Boer intransigence gave Wolseley both an ally and further occasions to
propagate his own ideas.
Lansdowne's suggestion regarding Natal scuppered any 'alliance' that might have
formed between Chamberlain and Wolseley because it fulfilled all government
requirements in one fell swoop. The War Office reply to the Colonial Office's letter of
5 April, reflected the War Office's success. The note criticised the Colonial Office for
leaving 'considerable room for doubt with regard to the attitudes of the Transvaal,' and
for trying to predict Kruger's future actions, especially as the Cabinet had not decided
what action to take if the Transvaal's response to British demands was unsatisfactory. As
40 Maurice & Arthur, Life of WoLceley, p.314.
39
for the need to make a military demonstration to impress South African opinion,
Lansdowne was aware of Chamberlain's views, but said it was for the government to
decide what course to follow; it remained only 'for the War Office to provide whatever
force is best suited for the purpose.' Evidently, Lansdowne was not averse to
'strengthening our diplomacy' and had consulted the soldiers as to 'what steps would,
within the fmancial limits, be most effectual both as a demonstration and as a
reinforcement.'4' Sending a few troops to Natal had, it seemed, done the job admirably.
There seemed little doubt that sending reinforcements was effective. Conynghame
Greene, the British agent in Pretoria, informed Selborne that the Boers would not fight
to remove the Convention, and he was strengthened in this belief by the arrival of the
troops, which:
will have a splendid effect and will be our best guarantee against having
to use them. The Boers are accustomed to deal forcibly with those whom
they know to be weaker than themselves, and this is the line of treatment
they best understand.
According to Greene, the 'first fence had been carried', and it was essential Britain should
continue to be firm and forceful.42
Milner, now firmly settled in Cape Colony, was also sure that reinforcements had
had a good effect. Having discussed the issue with leading South Africans, including some
sympathetic to the Transvaal, he was convinced the military and naval response had
impressed Boer opinion, which 'regarded [it] as a clear indication that we meant business
& that they must yield or fight.' Mimer believed those who said the Boers would not fight
if faced by a clear demonstration of British determination. Although he favoured
conciliation it had to be from a position of strength:
And from war with England, I believe even the most violent reactionaries
will shrink, as they have shown already, if such a contingency stares them
fairly in the face.43
The crisis of 1897 had emphasised a discernible trend in the way the British
approached the South African question. If the British appeared ready to go to war, then
41 W0 to CO. 29 April 1897, WO 32fl844i)79j234.
42 Conynghame Greene to Selbome, 18 June 1897, Boyce (ed.), p.52.
Mimer to Chamberlain, 2 Aug 1897, JC 10/9/10.
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the Boers backed down especially after troops had been sent to Natal. What was not
considered was the reason why the Boers pulled back. On the surface, the British had
overawed their opponents; but few British officials seemed to appreciate that the Boers
might not be quite ready to accept a challenge and were biding their time. In 1898, the
British discovered how transitory their response had been.
III
The re-election of Kruger as the Transvaal President, with an increased majority
convinced Mimer that: 'There is no ultimate way out of the political troubles of S.Africa
except reforms in the Transvaal or war. And at present the chances of reform in the
Transvaal are worse than ever...' In this section, the difficulties arising in 1898 are
discussed as both the civil and military authorities reacted to flourishing Boer nationalism,
the Transvaal's expanding arms-buying programme, the failure of previous attempts to
overawe Kruger's government, and the weakness of the Cape garrison.
Conynghame Greene informed Mimer that the Boers were arming rapidly, paying
for their weapons from the taxes provided by foreigners, i.e. the British, residing in the
republic. He stated that in 1895, the Transvaal spent £61,903 on arms, which in 1897 had
risen to £256,291: 'it is a matter of common gossip,' he explained, 'that it is the aim of
the Transvaal Government to arm the Free State Burghers and such of the Colonial Boers
as may eventually be induced by their offers.'45
Obviously alanned at the worsening political situation, the Colonial Office
continued to send such information to the War Office, in the hope of stirring some
response. So concerned were Colonial Office officials that even Milner's despatches were
passed on, notably those which dealt with the dearth of military transport in the area
following the Basutoland crisis in late 1897. Mimer was anxious that the transport
deficiency might hamper future operations against the Boers. He suggested that a small
Mimer to Chamberlain, 23 Feb 1898, JC 10/9/18.
45 Conynghame Greene to Milner, 7 Feb 1898, WO 32f7844U79/50l, enclosed in CO papers sent to
the WO, see fn.49.
Headlam, I, pp.156-158.
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nucleus of transport be maintained, and, as there would be a need for civilian help, a
standing contract for transport be negotiated forthwith.47
The debate regarding the provision of military transport highlighted the continuing
apprehension and uncertainty still prevalent within the British government. However, for
the soldiers this debate went beyond the number of wagons and horses; for them it meant
a change in perspective. The crisis of 1897 had almost brought war between Britain and
the Transvaal; in 1898, the soldiers expected a war to come sooner rather than later.
Although the military continued to think a Boer war would be a corollary of a European
conflict, military attention was now firmly focused on the need to prepare for a war in
South Africa. Military evaluations produced during the transport debate, although as
before more the product of individual concern than departmental, clearly showed that a
war against the Transvaal at least was considered a 'certain eventuality.' Not all War
Office opinion shared this view however. Lansdowne did not see beyond the immediate
discussion and confined his decisions to the numbers and cost of wagons and horses. The
almost total breakdown in outlook between the civil and military elements in the War
Office completed the division between Lansdowne and his military advisers.
An indication of military concern was provided by a further comment on Boer
intransigence by the DM1, who echoed Conynghame Greene's concern over the scale of
Boer arms-buying. Ardagh stressed that the Boers themselves seemed to have a 'definite
policy' underlining their military preparations:
which will build up a Dutch Oligarchy in South Africa strong enough to
shake off the English suzerainty when a favourable opportunity offers, and,
perhaps, even to carry out the larger dream of a great Dutch independent
state reaching from the Zambezi down to the Hottentot Holland mountains,
and with Delagoa Bay as its seaport.48
Again, the Colonial Office copied to Lansdowne Milner's despatches which
continued to emphasise the growing intransigence of the Transvaal. For good measure a
copy of Ardagh's report, referred to above, was also sent, for 'facility of reference.' The
Colonial Office stated that the Transvaal appeared to be waiting for Britain to become
involved in a dispute with other European powers, either to denounce the London
CO to WO, 11 Mar 1898, enclosing Mimer to Chamberlain, 1 Feb 1898, WO 3W844/)79/487.
' Ardagh to CO. 17 March 1898, WO 32f7844V79/85O1.
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Convention, or to attack the British colonies. Apparently, Chamberlain wanted Lansdowne
to consider whether the garrison in South Africa needed augmenting in order to meet the
growing crisis; at the same time, he reminded him of the lack of transport in Cape
Colony.49
In reply, the War Office appeared unwilling to authorise expenditure on a nucleus
of military transport. Nevertheless they were prepared to negotiate a standing contract,
especially if the Cape government would contribute some of the money. 5° This financial
diffidence was not appreciated at the Colonial Office and the minutes show a developing
sense of frustration and annoyance. Graham noted: 'Notwithstanding the warnings of their
Intelligence Department, the WEar] O[ffice] seem to grudge every penny in S.Africa.'51
The Colonial Office deprecated the financial stringency shown by the War Office at a
time of growing political crisis. The importance of having an efficient garrison was
stressed again, both for its political and military value, and it was emphasised that costs
ought not to stand in the way of military efficiency.52
Lansdowne's attitude is difficult to fathom. He seemed reluctant, or unable, to
appreciate Chamberlain's pessimistic view of the British position. Although he had agreed
to 'forceful measures' in 1897, he remained unconvinced. He had chided Chamberlain
after the crisis for remarking in parliament that the reinforcements were "substantially &
practically a permanent increase in the garrison," because it 'appears to me to go beyond
what was intended.' Lansdowne believed the intention had been to respond to a passing
difficulty with a temporary measure. 53
 However, on hearing of Milner's 'strenuous
resistance' to any attempt to reduce the garrison, backed by Wolseley 'and other high
military authorities,' Lansdowne eventually acknowledged the need to keep a larger
garrison in South Africa permanently; but he still hoped the Cape would assume
responsibility for defending its own land frontiers sooner rather than later.M Thus, in
' CO to WO, 6 April 1898, Ibid.
° WO to CO, 14 April 1898, CO 417j252/8358.
51 CO Minutes, 18-20 April, Ibid.
52(() to WO, 5May 1898, WO 3217844/079/8520.
" Lansdowne to Chamberlain, 5 May 1897, JC 5/51/28.
' Memo. by Lansdowne, 6 Oct 1897, CAB 37/45/33.
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early 1898, Lansdowne revealed how reluctant he still was to commit the War Office to
expensive and pennanent adjustments to the defence establishment in South Africa.
When the War Office wrote again in June some action had been taken. Lansdowne,
'on the recommendation of his military advisers,' had finally authorised General
Goodenough to purchase sufficient vehicles and to negotiate a standing contract to supply
the animals within seven days of notification. Furthermore the GOC(SA) was allowed to
negotiate for enough vehicles and animals to be supplied to make the whole garrison
mobile after 30 days following notification. 55
 The recommendations of his military
advisers seemed to have had some effect on Lansdowne's judgement.
Ardagh felt the Natal garrison, combined with local forces, was adequate for
defensive operations, but he was still disturbed by the state of the Cape garrison.
Dispersed amongst a hostile population, and lacking in cavalry, artillery and transport, he
felt the garrison could do little should hostilities commence. Returning to a favourite
theme, Ardagh noted that much would depend on the attitude of the OFS, if the Cape
garrison was to help Natal by menacing the Transvaal from Bechuanaland. Ardagh
advised that the Cape garrison should receive equipment to enable it to operate
independently of the railway.
Wood, now Adjutant-General, complained that he had told the War Office civilians
of the deficiency in transport eighteen months ago, when, in collaboration with the
GOC(SA), he had urged that a standing contract be made with Weil & Co; his attempt
to help the garrison in Natal, by requesting that reserve supplies be stockpiled in
Ladysmith, was also refused by Lansdowne. Wood was prepared to play down the Boer
threat by stating that their leaders (most of whom he had met in 1881 when negotiating
peace) were unlikely to be adventurous in their strategy. He expected them to wait until
Britain was in conflict with a European power before declaring war, and even then, send
only raiding parties into British territory. Nevertheless, the garrisons needed to be efficient
" WO to CO, 9 June 1898, CO 417t252/13057. This was a concession to the Colonial Office which
wanted all forces capable of rapid mobilization, 'this being the object of chief importance from a political
point of view.' CO to WO, 25 June 1898, Ibid.
Ardagh to Wolseley, 14 April 1898, WO 3217844j079/8501.
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and ready to combat raids and able to mobilise within two weeks!7 Armed with these
opinions, Wolseley entered the fray and wrote that:
As long as there is a probability of our having trouble with either France
or Russia, there may be some good reason why more troops should not be
sent to South Africa, but there can be no valid reason why we should not
send the stores and supplies & transport which I believe to be necessary
in order to make us sale until troops could be sent from home both to
Natal and Cape Town.58
Only under the combined weight of military and Colonial Office opinion did
Lansdowne agree to the measures indicated above. Yet these measures hardly did more
than make the garrison more efficient. Although the military power of the Boers was still
underestimated, the manner in which the British authorities gradually increased their
military presence had little to do with a coherent appreciation of the situation. It seemed
that the decisions taken in Whitehall were more to do with interdepartmental politics and
personal rivalry than the needs of the British position in South Africa.
If anyone hoped that these limited measures would indicate to the Boers Britain's
resolve then they were mistaken. Major Aitham, having returned to the Intelligence
Department in a permanent capacity in March 1897, informed the War Office that nothing
had changed in South Africa. British military preparations were still inadequate; the
Transvaal continued her military preparations, 'and the condition of affairs in South Africa
has practically now become that of an armed neutrality, which may last for years or may
culminate in a war at very short notice.' The defence problem was still serious especially
in the Cape because of the hostile population, 'and its difficulty will be enhanced by the
fact that any mistake or lack of firmness at the outset would seriously affect subsequent
operations.' Aitham explained that the Cape garrison consisted of only three and half
battalions (roughly 3,500), but 2 battalions were the war garrison of the Cape peninsula
and 1/2 battalion was for Mauritius; the remaining battalion was divided between
Grahamstown and King Williamstown. Practically the whole of the Cape force was placed
near the coast, hundreds of miles from the frontier: only the Cape Regulars, were of any
use to the army, the Volunteers having disgraced themselves in recent operations in
Wood to Wolseley, 17 April 1898, Ibid.
Wolseley to Knox (Permanent Under-Secretary, War Office), 20 April 1898, IbüL
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Bechuanaland. The force available, barely 5,000 men, was required to defend a frontier
of 320 miles, from Fourteen Streams to the Basutoland border. Aitham pointed to the lack
of planning, as nothing had been done to ensure a rapid mobilization nor to integrate the
recent transport arrangements into any plan, either in Natal or Cape Colony. Altham
argued that defence schemes ought to be submitted by the military authorities in South
Africa and urged:
That the arrangements which would be made for the despatch of
reinforcements from England and for the provision of supplies and
transport be worked out fully by the War Office; and that the General
Officer Commanding, South Africa, be informed what action under the
arrangements would be required of him on the outbreak of war?
Soon after this was written the poor health of General Goodenough led to his being
relieved. It was now up to his replacement to work out new military plans for the defence
of British South Africa.
Iv
As the political situation worsened, defence planning for South Africa became
more important. The British military authorities and Milner wished to ensure that the
garrison was ready if and when war broke out. In this last section, the plans made before
the war will be discussed, as will Mimer's association with Goodenough's successor,
General Butler. Milner, for the first time, had to work closely with a leading military
figure, an officer who did not share his outlook. The difficulties that arose between the
two provide an early example of the problems Milner was to face during the war, as he
and Butler clashed over who controlled the fate of the garrison.
In November, Altham followed up his September memorandum by drafting a letter
to General Butler in which he hoped to clarify the question of frontier defence. In
addition, to help the GOC(SA) draw up his own comprehensive plans, (all GOC(SA)'s
were required to submit plans during their tenure in office), Colonel Stopford of the
Mobilization Subdivision of the Intelligence Department, informed the C-in-C that the
Memo. by Altham, 21 Sept 1898, Ibid.
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officers 'concerned in the questions affecting mobilization in South Africa' had met and
come to the conclusion:
that the quickest & most satisfactory way of harmonizing the various
instructions which have been issued to the GOC South Africa is to send to
him a secret letter giving him full information on the situation which
would exist if war were to break out in that country...6°
Both views went to Butler in a combined letter outlining the current appreciation
of Boer military power, and recognising the incompleteness of British military plans.
Stopford explained that OFS burghers were expected to join the Transvaal in the event
of war even if the OFS remained neutral. This had been one of the major lessons from
the first war and would give the Boers a fighting force of 27,000 men, after allowing for
units to watch the Uitlanders and natives. However, a large scale Boer incursion was not
anticipated against either British colony: 'Raids. ..of 2,000 to 3,000 men may be expected,
and it is against such raids that a careful preparation on your part is necessary.'
Interestingly, Stopford remarked that any plans would be better prepared if the line of
advance of the main army was known, but said the C-in-C thought 'the plan for offensive
operations must depend upon the political and military situation of the moment, and
cannot be definitely fixed.' Nevertheless, Butler was expected to bear in mind an advance
in preparing his plans, and to base them only on existing resources and arrangements.
Once his plans were prepared he was to send copies to London.61
These were the first instructions Butler had received. Even before his departure he
had been given no directions as to what was expected of him, save for a friendly chat
with Chamberlain which clarified nothing. Stopford's instructions, however, offered no
real help. Under Queen's Regulations Butler was obliged to plan with only the forces at
his disposal which were then woefully inadequate to defend both British colonies. 62 Even
60 W0 Minutes, 15 Nov & 9 Dec 1898, WO 32/6369/266/Cape/30.
61 Stopford to Butler, 21 Dec 1898, Ibid. The Colonial Office, shown this letter on 23 Dec 1898, felt
the figure of 27,000 exaggerated as the War Office had used a Boer publication - the Staats Abnanack - for
their figures; they felt 15,000 nearer the mark. CO Minutes, 27 Dec 1898, CO 417/252129002.
Paragraph 168 of Queen's Regulations stated: 'As schemes of defence should deal only with the men
and material actually available, or that can be made available on emergency, the annual revision should
represent the plan on which the general officer would defend the place with the existing resources.' The
Queen's Regulations And Orders for the Army (London, 1899), p.49. On 1 Dec. 1898, the garrison in South
Africa stood at 8,456 men. In fact it was reduced from 9,593, the number listed on 1 Dec. 1897. There was
no real reason for this save wastage and general troop movements.
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if the Boers were only going to raid, their commandos would cause much damage,
especially with the garrison split between Cape Colony and Natal. How to defend
important points and leave neither colony bereft of defensive cover presented a substantial
headache for any commander. Consequently, Butler, between March and April 1899,
visited the frontiers of both colonies in order to gauge the situation for himself.
In December 1898, the killing of a British miner by a Johannesburg policeman
enabled Chamberlain and Mimer to promote Uitlander grievances as a major issue.63
 As
a result of this political tension, Milner became more concerned about the military
situation and decided to discuss defence arrangements with Butler. On 10 and 14 May
1899 the two met in what turned out to be acrimonious exchanges about political-military
developments in South Africa. Although normally friendly, Butler refused to divulge any
information about his plans and instead denounced the political strategy of Chamberlain
and Milner.
Butler's attitude caused Milner concern because as the situation in South Africa
deteriorated, so the military aspect assumed a greater importance. Mimer told Selborne
that an early Boer success would induce the OFS to join the Transvaal and spark a
rebellion in the Afrikaner North Eastern districts of Cape Colony. Mimer wanted to see
an overwhelming British force in Natal before the outbreak of war, and favoured the early
occupation of Laing's Nek. 'My view has been and still is, in spite of all these alarms and
excursions, that if we are perfectly determined we shall win without a fight or with a mere
apology for one.' But it would be necessary to have a large force in South Africa to
complement 'diplomatic pressure of steadily increasing urgency...' This would have the
double effect of preparing for a hostile Boer response while denying them the chance of
an early victory. Mimer realised the Boers might achieve an initial success owing to their
proximity to the strategic positions of Laing's Nek and the Biggarsberg, but the important
thing for Milner was that British forces should hit back immediately. Having a strong
force in South Africa would also be the only way to deter the OFS.
At this stage it is convenient to note how Milner, as High Commissioner and
Governor of Cape Colony stood in relation to his military colleagues in South Africa. The
' Butler, who stood in for Mimer during this episode, thought the furore greatly exaggerated. Milner
was in Britain until February 1899. W. Butler, An Aiaobiography (London, 1911), pp.400-403.
"Mimer to Selborne, 24 May 1899, Headlam, I, pp.400-404. [Milner's italics].
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structures of the civil and military establishments were in fact remarkably similar. The
civil authority had Mimer as its chief by virtue of his position as High Commissioner,
although he was also Governor of a colony like his counterpart Hely-Hutchinson in Natal.
As Governor, each had the extra title of Commander-in-Chief, although again in military
matters it was the High Commissioner who dealt with the GOC(SA); Hely-Hutchinson
dealt directly with his counterpart the GOC(Natal).
The military aspect mirrored the civil in many ways. The GOC(SA) was also
GOC(Cape Colony); in Natal there was a separate garrison and GOC, but he was junior
to the GOC(SA) and took his orders from him. Although the GOC(Natal) made his own
plans of defence, it was the duty of the GOC(SA) to formulate an overall defence scheme
for the whole of British South Africa.
The Colonial Office regulations specified that although the Governor held the title
Commander-in-Chief he was not in command of the troops. The authority of the Governor
extended into operations against rebels, when it was his duty 'to determine the objects
with which, and the extent to which Her Majesty's troops are to be employed in their
suppression.' But once the necessary preparations were made, the conduct of operations
was the sole responsibility of the GOC. However regulation No.11, stipulated that:
In the event of the Colony being invaded or assailed by a foreign enemy,
and becoming the scene of active military operations, the officer in
command of Her Majesty's land forces assumes the entire military
authority over the troops.
There was no mention of the need for the GOC(SA) to consult the Governor or
High Commissioner over planning. In the Queen's regulations, however, whilst paragraph
29 was much the same as Colonial Office regulation No.11, paragraph 167 stated that the
defence scheme had to be revised annually by a committee comprising the GOC(SA) as
president, the governor and up to five members 'selected on account of their military,
naval, and local knowledge.' However, it seemed that this arrangement was rarely, if
GOC(SA) had the local rank of Lieutenant-General; in Natal the GOC was allocated the rank of
Major-General.
W.E. Mercer & A.E. Collins, The Colonial Office List (London, 1899), Regulations 11 & 11k
pp354-355. These had been amended to take into account armed rebellion following a dispute between the
Governor of Natal and the GOC, General Smyth, during the Zulu disturbances in 1888. WO 32!7838.
' Queen's Regulations, p.49.
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ever, kept to. Mimer might even have been unaware of this regulation because he never
appears to have insisted Butler submit his revisions to a committee. Bearing in mind that
the military situation had been dormant for so long before 1895, and that even after
Jameson's Raid, no leading civil or military figure anticipated a Boer invasion, this
planning procedure had probably fallen into abeyance. Also, Milner might have just
deferred to military expertise, because planning was for a contingency in which the
GOC(SA) would be the supreme authority. Naturally, it would be helpful if the political
aspects of such plans were discussed, but even so, if the GOC(SA) felt that his troops
would be endangered by political considerations he had every right to ignore them.
Consequently, official consultation was perhaps expected only after the outbreak of
hostilities.
By May 1899, however, Butler had still not informed even the War Office of his
plans and officials there became steadily more concerned, especially after the breakdown
of the Bloemfontein talks between Milner and Kruger on 5 June. Evidently Butler had
been prompted twice, once in February and again in early May to consider two schemes
emanating from Natal for local and frontier defence. On 8 June 1899, Butler was ordered
to provide the information requested in December.
Butler's reluctance to forward his plans owed something to his lack of confidence
in certain unspecified War Office personnel. He was convinced some of the staff, if not
the whole department, were out to provoke war with the Transvaal. In his memoirs he
complained about the lack of orders and instructions on his appointment and believed
matters had been arranged beforehand; he was told nothing, 'still less with the
development of plans and purposes which I knew to have been then matured and
arranged... ' In fact, the War Office had nothing prepared except General Goodenough's
overall plan which dated back to 1896 and was based on the premise that the main anny,
when it arrived, would advance through the OFS. Goodenough intended to use his scarce
Heeltool [Col. Everett] to Butler, (tel.), 8 June 1899; DM1 [Everett] to Butler, (tel.), 6 June 1899;
Butler to DM1 [Everett], (tel.), 7 June 1899; WO Minutes, 8 June 1899; Everett's Minute, 3 July 1899, WO







resources to secure the bridges over the Orange river, having had them placed nearby
before the outbreak of war, although not close enough to arouse OFS suspicions.7°
As mentioned above, Butler had toured the frontiers to see the ground upon which
the defence of British South Africa would be based. This had taken up a good deal of his
time, but once ordered to comply, he sent his plans on 14 June. In his 'observations'
Butler raised a number of pertinent points that had still not been fully addressed by the
government. The first was the attitude of the OFS; the second that moving troops to the
frontier might precipitate a crisis which diplomacy had been trying to avoid or delay. This
was equally true for the Natal front, especially as the press had excited public opinion to
such an extent that troop movements anywhere, no matter how innocuous, were likely to
'create false impressions.' Nevertheless, in the event of hostilities, Butler anticipated
moving the Natal garrison forward to Glencoe, the Biggarsberg range, Ladysmith and
Pietermaritzburg. Unlike Lansdowne, Butler thought Laing's Nek impracticable, especially
as it had no water supply. In Cape Colony he proposed to occupy De Aar, Naauwpoort
and Molteno thus garrisoning the important railway junctions, while a strong detachment
guarded the bridge over the Orange river, ready to support Kimberley also. For good
measure he reiterated his conviction that the attitude of the OFS was the important
factor.7'
With the failure of the Bloemfontein conference, Mimer's thoughts turned
increasingly towards the prospect of war. Although still anxious about British military
preparations, Butler's attitude continued to cause him most concern. Mimer was still
ignorant of the details of Butler's plans and did not believe he was taking any interest in
ancillary preparations. All Butler appeared to be doing was waiting for his orders. For
Mimer the association with Butler was becoming intolerable, but there was little he could
do:
He never interferes with my business and is perfectly polite. But he is
absolutely no use, unless we mean to knuckle down, in which case he had
better be made High Commissioner.72
° Goodenough to WO, 30 Sept 1896, WO 32/6369t266/Cape/1.
71 Butler to WO, 14 June 1899, WO 32i369t266Aapef36.
Mimer to Chamberlain, 14 June 1899, Headlam, I, pp.423-426.
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Milner's lament to Chamberlain did not go unheeded, but Mimer was now
discovering how difficult it was to deal with prominent military officials, especially those
who did not see the world as Mimer did. Moreover, he was also discovering how difficult
it was to do anything about it. Chamberlain even suggested to Lansdowne that Buller
might replace Butler, but removing and replacing generals was problematical, and it would
not have been easy to justify Butler's dismissal. As Lansdowne explained, Butler was not
guilty of misconduct, even though he favoured the Boers and thought Milner too partial
towards the Uitlanders. 'It would in my opinion be better to leave him alone, unless he
does something outrageous.'73
Although Butler was not one of the great popular heroes he was a Lieutenant-
General, a rank high enough to warrant a great deal of publicity if he was dismissed. At
a time when public opinion was still unfavourable towards a war in South Africa,
removing a general who could claim to have preached the cause of peace would have
been too damaging. Moreover, as Mimer would have to consider later, would a
replacement be any more co-operative?
Butler continued to baulk at the prospect of preparing for war. He told Milner that
it was not surprising the Boers were making military preparations considering those being
made on the British side, especially by certain members of the 'Raiders.' Moreover, 'I can
find in the balance of things no reason to suppose the Dutch could be desirous of a war
with us. Can they think the same about us.' 74 Mimer sent this note to Chamberlain and
vented his frustration on the Colonial Secretary. But for all Milner's protests about
Butler's behaviour, all Mimer could charge him with was 'working to rule.' Milner hoped
that when war became a certainty he would get 'someone who would go into the thing
whole heartedly.'75
Mimer's frustration was reciprocated by Butler himself, who was depressed by the
whole situation. He continued to warn the War Office of the dangers facing the British
in South Africa if war broke out. He tried to show how Rhodes and other capitalists were
influencing the Boer mind against a peaceful solution, their aim 'the forcing of a racial
" Lansdowne to Chamberlain, 14 June 1899, JC 5/51/55.
Butler to Mimer, 17 June 1899, JC 10/9134. [Butler's italics].
" Mimer to Chamberlain, 18 June 1899, JC 10/9/35.
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war in this country,' the result of which would be the destruction 'of the social body
itself.'76
 Such was Butler's anxiety that when Lansdowne requested information
regarding transport animals and asked for further observations, he was unable to
restrain himself any longer. Although Lansdowne had wanted general military comments,
Butler offered political remarks instead. 'Persistent effort of a party to produce war forms
in my estimation graver elements in situation here.' A war, he believed, between the
'white races' would be calamitous for South Africa.78
Naturally, Butler was admonished for his outburst by Lansdowne and was told, 'it
is your duty to be guided in all questions of policy by High Commissioner, who is fully
aware of our views, and whom you will of course loyally support.' 79
 Yet even this
transgression into politics was still not enough to warrant Butler's sacking. No real harm
had been done in addressing his views to his superiors, as he had not blatantly publicised
his opinions. To Mimer these remarks were an affront; they hindered Butler's efficiency
and made him a 'source of weakness.' Milner asked outright:
Would it be possible to find some pretext for summoning the General
home immediately, say for consultations, and then finding him another
post?
Milner was positive that even an open dispute with Butler was better than the continuation
of the present arrangement. 8° Yet again, Chamberlain had to explain the unpalatable truth
that to recall Butler was inadvisable and would give ammunition to Mimer's critics, as
well as embarrass Chamberlain. Mimer was reminded that Butler would be superseded
anyway, should substantial reinforcements be sent out.81
Not long after this episode, Butler received a letter from London telling him how
unpopular he was in the War Office and in some newspapers. The writer, whom Butler
76 Butler to Knox, 21 June 1899, WO 3217850.
" Lansdowne to Butler, (tel.), 21 June 1899, WO 32/7849.
78 Butler to Lansdowne, (tel.), 23 June 1899, Ibid.
Lansdowne to Butler, (tel.), 27 June 1899, Ibid.
° Milner to Chamberlain, 24 June 1899, JC 10/9/37. Butler had actually shown Milner his observations,
see Butler, p.449.
81 Chamberlain to Mimer, 26 June 1899, JC 10/9/36.
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never revealed, told him to resign if the stories about him were true. On asking Mimer
if he had ever been a 'hinderance or an embarrassment,' Mimer told him he had..
Consequently, on 4 July 1899, Butler offered his resignation.
Faced with Mimer's hostility, forced to follow the policy of the High
Commissioner and unable to convince the authorities at home about the role of Rhodes
and his confederates, it is not surprising Butler finally resigned. It was not until the 8
August that Lansdowne informed Butler that his resignation had been accepted, that he
was to return to Britain to become the GOC(Western District) and that General Forestier-
Walker was to replace him. Only Butler's resignation had saved Milner from the strain
of working with a colleague who did not share his views. But by August, the military
situation had still not abated enough for Mimer to rest easily.
By June 1899, relations between the generals and politicians in Britain had
deteriorated significantly. Little consensus existed about the nature of the Boer 'threat' and
consequently the best method to deal with Boer intransigence. The government believed
it had formulated a policy which successfully overawed the Boers: strong words,
complemented by minor increases to the South African garrison, appeared sufficient to
enforce British demands. To the politicians, the Boer 'threat' was negligible. However,
since 1898, most generals agreed that war was inevitable. They felt that the correct
response to Boer stubbornness was the despatch of substantial reinforcements to South
Africa as a clear message of British impatience and resolve. This reaction would then
either deter the Boers completely, or defeat them if they risked a war with Britain.
Continual Boer defiance had convinced the generals that the government had failed to use
its policy effectively.
The division of opinion in Britain helped undermine civil-military relations in
South Africa. Mimer and Butler received little guidance from London. The British
government was prepared to 'wait and see,' while the generals remained uncertain about
government intentions. Consequently, as both Mimer and Butler held differing views about
South Africa, their relationship deteriorated. Mimer, however, discovered the difficulty in
dealing with military opinion so divorced from his own, and was given a foretaste of
future problems.
Butler, p.451; E. McCourt, Remember Busier (London, 1967), p.228. No dates arc given.
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CHAPTER TWO.
CRISIS, WAR AND DEFEAT:
FROM THE BLOEMFONTEIN CONFERENCE
TO THE BATTLE OF COLENSO.
JUNE - DECEMBER 1899.
After the Bloemfontein talks collapsed on 5 June 1899 the crisis between Britain
and the Transvaal worsened and eventually led to war. The British government attempted
to impose their demands for Uitlander rights on the Boers by utilising the diplomatic
tactics used in preceding crises. However, the Boers did not respond as expected and
forced the British government to increase the military pressure until a complete army
corps of 50,000 men was mobilised for service in South Africa. Until the very end the
British authorities never believed the Boers would fight, even though each British demand
was systematically rejected. Throughout this period civil-military relations deteriorated as
the generals failed to comprehend the government's desire to explain their policy to
British and Colonial public opinion at each stage of the crisis, and to give the Boers every
chance to back down. The failure of the civil-military authorities to formulate a policy
acceptable to generals and politicians alike led to serious flaws in the British response
which were to have serious implications once war broke out. Despite these differences,
however, ministers and soldiers were united by one factor, a complete underestimation of
Boer military power.
The flaws became apparent during the early stages of the war, between October
and December 1899, when all British expectations were shattered by Boer victories. These
defeats profoundly affected civil-military relations. Although the careers of Wolseley,
Buller and other generals were tarnished, public opinion blamed the government for not
having listened to military advice, and for perpetuating a system which failed to
harmonise the views of politicians and soldiers. Until then, the civil side had dominated
relations with the military; alter the defeats the balance swung the other way, as the
government had to rely on new generals, such as Lord Roberts, to save the imperial
presence in South Africa. Political interests which had animated the response to previous
crises were now subordinated to the needs and requirements of the military.
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This chapter comprises three parts: the first examines the period between June and
October 1899 when the British government's policy broke down against Boer obduracy
and embittered civil-militaiy relations. The second part analyses the repercussions of the
delay in military preparations, the military defeats and the standing of the politicians and
soldiers in public opinion; thirdly, the reasons for and consequences of Roberts's
appointment are discussed.
I
Three days after the conclusion of the Bloemfontein conference, Wolseley, on his
own initiative, presented a memorandum to the Cabinet outlining his ideas on the situation
in South Africa. Wolseley explained that, in addition to the garrison in South Africa, a
complete army corps of 50,000 men would be required to fight the Transvaal. Wolseley
felt the government should consider 'to what extent shall we at once prepare for this
contingency,' and whether preparations should be open or secret He favoured mobilizing
the army corps on Salisbury plain, under the general who would command it in South
Africa. This would reveal British determination, and could be done without calling out the
reserves, thus avoiding consulting Parliament.'
The Cabinet, however, rejected outright military preparations. Salisbury told the
Queen that public opinion, in Britain and Cape Colony, was not ready to support a war
with Kruger. Consequently, the Boers would be pressed steadily by diplomacy and nothing
like an ultimatum would be presented.2
Kruger was coerced by a combination of official publications and speeches. On 13
and 14 June Chamberlain published correspondence relating to Uitlander grievances,
which included Mimer's famous 'Helots' despatch of 4 May. On 26 June Chamberlain
himself launched the verbal assault on Kruger, by emphasising the importance of securing
Uitlander rights. It was the only way, he argued, to maintain peace in South Africa.
Evidently, the public reacted favourably to these tactics, particularly Chamberlain's
speech. But, the government lacked sufficient confidence to increase the garrison as
8 June 1899, CAB 37/50/38.
2 Salisbury to the Queen, 13 June 1899, CAB 41t25/12.
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Mimer demanded, even though he considered the publications had created a sensation in
South Africa. In fact, the Colonial Office officials were irritated by Mimer's views,
Chamberlain minuting that he would not be hurried and did not believe an Afrikaner
rising was imminent in the Cape, as Mimer had suggested. Selborne told Milner that the
publications had not won over the public sufficiently enough.3
As Chamberlain's speech had been favourably received, the Cabinet felt able to
make some military preparations. It was agreed to send Special Service Officers to South
Africa to enhance defences in Cape Colony. Cabinet assent was given to the GOC(SA)
to make minor transport arrangements for the garrison, and extra supplies of ammunition
were also sent. 4
 In addition, sometime in early June, General Buller was appointed the
commander of an expeditionary force should one be needed.5
Prompted by a combination of public confidence arising from Chamberlain's
speech, and the need to do more in case the Boers were unresponsive, Lansdowne asked
Wolseley and Buller about the possibility of more overt military preparations. Buller was
summoned to the War Office on 3 July and Lansdowne told him he was contemplating
the despatch of 10,000 men to South Africa. 6
 The following day, Lansdowne asked
Wolseley to prepare 10,000 men for service in South Africa, in case the negotiations
should collapse. Wolseley was advised to consider such matters as transport, equipment
and costs.7
 Whether doubling the garrison was felt to be a sufficient indication of British
resolve, or whether 10,000 men was the number the military could mobilise at short notice
is not indicated. Equally, it is not clear if this was Lansdowne's idea, or one taken by the
Cabinet. But as the generals' opinions were put before the Cabinet, it is likely the decision
was not Lansdowne's alone. On 6 and 7 July 1899, Lansdowne received Buller's and
Wolseley's views. Buller was hostile to the idea of sending troops from the main field
Milner to Chamberlain, (tel.), & CO Minutes, 16 June 1899, CO 48/5421ff.467-466; Selbome to
Mimer, 25 June 1899, Boyce (ed.), pp.83-85.
4 Lansdowne to Wolseley, 16 June 1899; Wolseley's comments, 17 June 1899; Lansdowne's decision,
18 June 1899, WO 3217846; Salisbury to the Queen, 20 & 27 June 1899, CAB 41125/13, 14.
5 Milner's military secretary, Hanbury-Williams, said Buller's appointment was well received. 'I am told
his name is a terror to the Boers.' Hanbury-Wihiams to Altham, 27 June 1899, CO 417/275/f.433.
6 Buller to brother, 3 Nov 1899; Memo. by Buller, c.1903, pp.1-2, WO 132/6 & 24.
'Lansdowne to Wolseley, 4 July 1899, WO 32/7847.
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force. Buller had taken this position two years before; he knew the Boers well and
probably realised that only an 'overwhelming force' would either intimidate or eventually
defeat them. He preferred to send the whole complement once hostilities were inevitable;
in the meantime he wanted defensive preparations made in the Cape and Natal. Buller also
wanted a decision made about the OFS, as 'the route to be adopted in operations against
Pretoria must chiefly be decided on with regard to our relations with the Orange Free
State,' especially as this route would make it easier to obtain supplies and transport.
Wolseley broadly agreed with Buller's comments and endorsed his plea that the
position of the OFS be clarified. But, as in 1897, Wolseley did not share Buller's views
regarding the 10,000 reinforcements. He considered it a good idea '...being an open
demonstration of a warlike policy, and also an efficacious method of strengthening our
present militaiy position there.' Apart from this Wolseley and Buller were in complete
accord.8
 However, on 12 July, Lansdowne informed Wolseley that 'There is now I think
a general agreement that if there is to be a serious demonstration it should take a different
shape. The proposal need not be further pursued.'9
The plan was altered by a change in the political situation. On 7 July, the Boers
issued tentative proposals that offered the prospect of revitalising diplomatic negotiations.
Unwilling to appear intransigent themselves, and genuinely optimistic, the British
government gladly deferred making overt military preparations. The Cabinet now saw the
chance of getting concessions from the Boers without the use of force or more
expenditure. Wolseley, however, feared Kruger was playing an intricate game, having
found the measure of the British Cabinet, especially their desire to avoid war until public
opinion clamoured for it. Rather contemptuously, he thought the politicians only desired
to forestall war and let a future government incur the odium of fighting the Boers.'°
Wolseley's anxiety was perceptive: Kruger was tantalising the Cabinet. Salisbury
explained to the Queen that he was 'much impressed with the more pacific tone of the
Cabinet:' most ministers felt Britain should be circumspect in its actions as public opinion
'Memo. by Buller, 6 July 1899; Wolseley's comments, 7 July 1899, CAB 37/50/43.
WO Minutes, 12 July 1899, WO 3217847.
'° Wolseley to Wife, 11 July 1899, WP 28138.
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was still unfavourable." The government's determination to hold back was further
strengthened when on 18 July, the Trans vaal Volksraad clarified the Boer proposals by
carrying an amendment reducing the residence qualification from nine years to seven. The
apparent Boer climb down seemed to indicate that if the government used diplomatic and
military tactics similar to those employed between 1896 and 1898 then the Boers, for all
their obduracy, would eventually retreat. Moreover, the apparent relief at being able to
drop military preparations at a stroke revealed the trend in civil-military relations
throughout June and July. Each time public opinion appeared favourable, military
estimates and preparations were asked and called for, until the next Boer diplomatic
initiative seemed to turn public opinion in the other direction.
Mimer, however, was astounded, especially as Chamberlain appeared to believe
the offer was genuine. So alarmed was he by Chamberlain's telegrams that he suspected
'He seems now to wish a patch-up.' 12 Yet Mimer realised the weakness of this policy:
the government left themselves with little room to manoeuvre. A forthright note to
Chamberlain revealed the nub of his argument. Mimer stated that as the Boers were so
powerful militarily, the present garrison of nearly 10,000 men was totally worthless. More
troops were needed to intimidate the Transvaal, to make them honour their side of the
bargain. He explained that if the crisis was resolved without the stipulation of Transvaal
disarmament, the Boers would be free to abrogate any treaty whenever they wished.
'Public opinion would surely approve action directed to prevent establishment of military
power overshadowing S.Africa."3
Mimer's protestations emphasised the fact that the government had not considered
how agreements were to be implemented and enforced. Intimidating the Boers had seemed
easy; ensuring that intimidation lasted was not so simple. Mimer tried to remedy this
defect in government policy; whether it was his pleas that awoke the government is
unclear, but Salisbury, at least, suddenly realised the importance of keeping military
pressure on the Boers, to stop them 'back-sliding' in the future. However, his suggestion
' Salisbury to the Queen, 11 July 1899, CAB 41f25/16.
12 Mimer to Selborne, 12 July 1899, Boyce (ed.), pp.89-9l. [Mimer's italics]. Selbome later assured
Mimer that public opinion was being won over - gidua1ly. Salisbury, he explained, wanted steady military
pressure to be applied. Selborne to Mimer, 27 July 1899, Ibid., pp.91-92.
13 Milner to Chamberlain, 16 July 1899, Headlam, I, p.511.
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that troops be positioned on the Transvaal's northern border, away from the politics of the
Cape, lacked subtlety.'4
Following the Boer announcement on 18 July, the Cabinet declared publicly that
now the Boers had offered concessions they would not tolerate any turning back, and
equated any such move as a threat to British supremacy. To reinforce their stand,
ministers, in reply to the Boer proposals, advocated the formation of a joint commission
to investigate how the proposals might work in practice. 15 However, while government
rhetoric was aimed at the British public, it did not impress politicians in Natal. Between
late July and early August, opinion within the Natal ministry began to exert a significant
influence over British policy.
The attitude of the Natal government was important for Milner. As the only colony
with a British majority, opinion in Natal, if cultivated properly, was a considerable asset.
Mimer, unable to rely on the loyalty of the Afrikaner Bond ministry in Cape Colony, had
to use Natal as the mainstay of his loyalist support. Without the backing of this important
sector of Colonial opinion, Mimer's attempts to persuade the British that Colonial loyalty
was at risk would have little credibility. But as Natal offered the Boers access to the sea
it was likely to become a major, if not the main, battlefield in the event of war. Even if
the capture of Durban was beyond the Boers' capabilities Natal, nevertheless, offered them
the opportunity of gaining early victories, as Milner had already told Selborne.' 6 Boer
numerical superiority and ability to concentrate numbers quickly, meant they might easily
defeat a smaller British contingent, and overrun much tenitoiy before British
reinforcements arrived. The propaganda value of Boer victories was something both
Milner and the Natal government were loath to contemplate.
To secure Natal's support, Milner instructed Hely-Hutchinson to inform ministers:
that it is out of the question that any invasion of Natal should be tolerated
by Her Majesty's Government. Such an event is highly improbable, I think:
but Natal would be defended with the whole force of the Empire, if it
occurred, and redress would be exacted for any injury to her.
14 Salisbury to Chamberlain, 19 July 1899, JC 5/67/1 14.
' Porter, Origins, pp. 223-233.
16 Chapter 1, p.47.
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Mimer told Chamberlain that he hoped this would make the Natal government 'overtly
[take] our side on the Uitlander question."7
Consequently, Milner was keen to humour the Natal government whenever
possible. So when ministers became apprehensive about the Colony's defence, and wished
to be informed about military plans, Mimer lobbied for them vociferously and
successfully.' 8
 Mimer attempted to use the Natal government's anxieties in a bid to get
the reinforcements he craved. However, his lobbying did not soothe the Natal government;
in fact it made their anxiety worse. Informed of the plans, ministers discovered that the
area to the far north, known as the 'triangle,' was to be abandoned owing to the lack of
troops. General Symons only intended to defend the Glencoe/Dundee coalfields and
forsake the defence of Newcastle and, more emotively, Laing's Nek. As Hely-Hutchinson
explained, Symons would need far more troops to defend the whole Colony.' 9 Symons
had informed the Governor that 1,600 men were required to render Natal safe from raids
and to hold Newcastle; while 5,600 men were required to defend the colony from Laing's
Nek.2° This information made the Natal ministry call for reinforcements, and remind
Mimer of his promise of 25 May; furthermore they added that if negotiations with the
Boers collapsed, 'such steps may be at once taken as may be necessary for the effectual
defence of the whole colony.'2'
The Colonial Office, responded enthusiastically to Natal's request. The Boers had
not been forthcoming in their answer to Chamberlain's joint enquiry proposal, and
therefore needed some prompting. Natal now provided the arguments for increasing the
military pressure on Kruger, and assisting Britain's bargaining position by an addition to
the garrison. Clearly, officials had in mind earlier Boer retreats when troops were sent to
'7 Milner to Chamberlain, 25 May 1899, WO 3217850. Chamberlain endorsed Milner's action.
"Mimer to Chamberlain, 16 July 1899, CO 417f263/f.685. Wolseley, however, was against this arguing
it would increase the difficulties of the GOC(SA). Wolseley did not trust Colonial governments and said
telling them military plans, '...amounts to throwing one's cards on the table.' Wolseley to Knox, 27 July
1899, WO 32/6369f266ape/41.
19 Hely-Hutchrnson to Ministers, 24 July 1899, CO 179/205/ff.858-859.
Symons to Hely-Hutchinson, (tel.), 21 July 1899, Ibid.. ff.863-864.
' Hely-Hutchinson to Chamberlain, 25 July 1899, CO 179t205/ff.791-792, 796-797.
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South Africa. Selborne wanted 5,000 troops sent, and argued it was the cheapest way to
conclude negotiations successfully.
Milner pointed out that reinforcements would make Natal secure and 'be in a
position of advantage almost compelling submission...' He also stated that for once Natal
was actually asking for troops rather than opposing the idea. 'It is an opportunity that may
never recur.'
In the end, the Cabinet decided to send only 2,000 troops to Natal immediately,
slightly more than Symons wanted to make the Colony safe from Newcastle and safe
against raids, but not enough to make the whole Colony secure. Apparently, Lansdowne
had recommended the figure of 2,000 and was supported by Hicks Beach who was against
any unnecessary expenditure. Salisbury had wanted to send 5,000, but eventually agreed
with his Chancellor and War Minister. Treasury control of the spending departments had,
it seems, created a mentality of economy, whereby ministers were loath to recommend
extraordinary expenditure. Undoubtedly, this played a part in the decision making
process, but Treasury control, actual or influential, was not the only reason for limiting
the number of reinforcements. Ministers were following precedent, as the earlier
discussion of previous crises has shown. Lansdowne told Wolseley:
The object of such an addition would be to strengthen our own position,
to reassure the colonists, and, above all, to strengthen our diplomacy during
the new phase which is commencing.
Lansdowne was swayed by several reasons for recommending the lesser figure. First, as
he explained further, this small addition was not designed to occupy Laing's Nek as this
would require a lot more men, especially as a Boer invasion was not expected, 'and we
are not asked to provide against it.' Secondly, he could refer to the precedent of 1897;
thirdly, the Natal ministry was expected to supplement the regular army by calling out the
volunteers. Wolseley welcomed the addition to the Natal garrison even though it would
not make the Colony entirely safe, but 'it will make our position north of the Tugela
CO Minutes, 26 July 1899, Ibid., f.790.
Mimer to Chamberlain, 30 July 1899, CO 417/264/ff.238-239.
24 Salisbury to the Queen, 1 Aug 1899, CAB 41125/17.
M.M.Yakutiel, "Treasury Control" and the South African War 1899-c.1 905 (unpub. D.Phil. thesis,
Oxford, 1989), pp.12-13.
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River, and at Ladysmith particularly, much more secure than it is at present. ' However,
Wolseley remained unconvinced that this was a proper answer to Boer obduracy. Thus,
the government had dealt with the Boers as they had done in the past; all that remained
was for the Boers to take the hint.
Early August was an anxious time for the British government. As the Boers
seemed unwilling to respond further to British overtures, drastic measures had to be
contemplated once more. The pattern of the period following the Bloemfontein conference
was repeating itself as Boer non-compliance appeared veiy real. In view of the fact that
'a new phase was commencing,' Lansdowne, at the behest of the Cabinet, presented a
memorandum on 12 August which provided information:
as to the time which would elapse between the occurrence of an event
rendering hostilities with the Transvaal inevitable and the concentration in
the north of Natal of the force which we should probably send out, viz., an
Army Corps and a cavalry division?
Lansdowne told his colleagues how difficult it was to get the timing right when
ordering full mobilization. If all was in readiness, the army corps would take less than a
month to embark for South Africa. Unfortunately, it would not only cost large sums to
get everything ready, but as nothing had yet been done, the mobilization would take far
longer. The army, in fact, lacked transport, equipment and supplies; and it would take
three months to remedy these defects. Furthennore, the Natal railway was so inadequate
it would take an extra six weeks for the army to move troops, equipment and supplies to
the railhead (the concentration point at the end of the line). Lansdowne estimated it would
take four months before the army corps was ready for action in South Africa. He
calculated that over £1 million would have to be spent to reduce that period by a month.
However, Lansdowne's concluding paragraph ended optimistically because he did not
believe the Natal garrison was in danger. 'The long delay anticipated in this Memorandum
would therefore not involve any risk of a military reverse although its political effect
might be serious and inconvenient.'
26 Lansdowne to Wolseley; Wolseley to Lansdowne, 2 Aug 1899, RC PP(1904), XL, Cd.1789, pp.264
265.
12 Aug 1899, CAB 37/50/49.
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Lansdowne was later asked why he did not make any recommendations. He said
it was:
because I cannot dissociate my position as Secretary of State for War from
my position as a member of the Cabinet. I placed the Cabinet in full
possession of the problem which lay before us. I gave them this "time
table", so that they might know what risk was incurred by the
postponement of the expendiwre...
The Cabinet had no intention of mobilizing the army corps, it was merely time to consider
options. The extent of the government's military policy was revealed by the despatch of
2,000 troops to Natal. To begin ordering the mobilization of the army corps, when public
opinion was unfavourable, would merely show the government to be war-mongering.
Moreover, the Boer response to the reinforcements had not been appreciated. Cabinet
policy was well settled at that stage; the Boers were to be gently prodded, not goaded into
retaliation.
That Lansdowne did not need to make a recommendation can be seen in
Salisbury's reaction to his memorandum. Salisbury, perhaps speaking for the Cabinet,
revealed the political thinking at the time. He did not consider it worth spending one
million pounds just to reduce the army's preparations from *& to -mmonths. For
Salisbury, the 'wiser plan' was to spend money only when war was inevitable.30
Nonetheless, the politicians were now aware of the requirements should they decide to use
the army corps; it remained for them to judge when the moment was politically suitable.
That it was unsuitable was illustrated by the Cabinet's rejection, a week later, of
a new memorandum from Wolseley, 3 ' written without the approval of his political
superiors, who were away on holiday. Wolseley focused on the weak garrison in Natal
and echoed Mimer's views that such a situation offered the Boers the chance of an early
victory, particularly if they occupied the 'triangle', which would dismay loyalist opinion.
He suggested the immediate despatch of 10,000 men drawn fmm the army corps. Once
question 21154, RC PP(1904), XLI, Cd.1791, p.508.
Ibid.
3° Salisbury to Chamberlain, 16 Aug 1899, JC 5/67/115.
31 18 Aug 1899, CAB 37/50/52.
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in position they could easily hold the 'triangle' and facilitate the future deployment of the
main force.
The Cabinet rejected Wolseley's request because there had again been a dramatic
change in the political situation. The Boers had despatched a new set of proposals (known
as the Smuts Proposals, after the Transvaal's Attorney-General who had been instrumental
in formulating them), which seemed to offer the British a diplomatic victory. Chamberlain
informed Lansdowne that these justified 'some delay in proceeding with preparations -
which would involve heavy expenditure.' Chamberlain was conscious that the proposals,
like others before them, might amount to nothing, and suggested that the War Office
prepare reinforcements as he expected the next British demand to be an ultimatum.32
However, these remarks hid, for the time being, Chamberlain's belief that the Boers had
finally backed down.
There was a hint of irritation in Lansdowne's reply to Wolseley because, after all,
the situation did seem to be changing for the better. Lansdowne told Wolseley he should
have spoken out earlier, preferably at the beginning of the month when the situation was
more critical. Lansdowne did not elaborate on this point and it is difficult to judge which
predicament was the more critical of the two. Perhaps the appeals of the Natal ministry
made it seem so; or Lansdowne was just exasperated with Wolseley for speaking out
when he, and other ministers were on holiday. Relations between the two were worse than
ever owing to Wolseley's reluctance to use British troops from India as a source of
reinforcements. Wolseley hated the Indian army for two reasons: first, Indian army troops
had, to him, lost the battle of Majuba in 1881; second, they were associated more with
his detested rival Lord Roberts. Lansdowne, however, reminded Wolseley that troops from
India could reach South Africa earlier than those from Britain, and then proceeded to give
Wolseley a lesson in strategy. Lansdowne, referring to Wolseley's favourable attitude
towards deploying troops in Natal, said British forces would be better disposed in Cape
Colony as a complete force. They would then be ready for an advance through the OFS,
should the OFS prove hostile, and added that he knew Wolseley endorsed this route: the
troops from India, which were earmarked for Natal, meanwhile, could act as a valuable
32 Chamberlain to Lansdowne, 18 Aug 1899, JC 5/51/63.
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diversion. Lansdowne did not share Wolseley's anxiety about the safety of northern Natal
and thought the present garrison quite capable of looking after itself.33
Wolseley was not prepared to let Lansdowne's note go unanswered. He reminded
him that Kruger's stalling was likely to cost more than any overt military preparations
owing to the continual unrest. Indeed, on 21 August, only two days after presenting their
proposals, the Boers had hastily put conditions on their acceptance, and were obviously
'backsliding' again. British strength in South Africa was such that if war came:
we shall surrender the initiative to Kruger, and in no recent case that I can
think of would, or, at least, if properly handled, could that initiative be
more likely to seriously injure our national prestige, or be more hurtful to
the party in office, if I may venture upon such a political comment.
To secure peace, therefore, it was necessary to have a show of force in South Africa.
As the Boers appeared to have promised so much and then backed down again,
ministers now had to consider the possibility of altering their tactics. Public opinion had
to be gauged carefully, and two questions needed consideration in attempting to measure
the trend of public support: had ministers exhausted the diplomatic option sufficiently?
Or was the time ripe for overt and substantial military measures to be ordered? As the
recent addition to the Natal garrison had obviously not intimidated the Boers, Chamberlain
felt strongly that the Boers had been accommodated long enough and it was time for a
substantial demonstration of British strength and resolve. As the views of Mimer and
Wolseley coincided, Chamberlain felt there was a point in sending out substantial
reinforcements to support British demands. He concluded that if the Boer conditions to
the Smuts proposals proved unacceptable, then they must be compelled towards a
settlement, and that 10,000 troops ought to go to South Africa. He also wanted it made
public that the army corps would soon fo1low. 3
 Lansdowne also was moving towards
this view, although a little reluctantly: the Boer proposals '...seem to me to merit
33 Lansdowne to Wolseley 20 Aug 1899, CAB 37/50/53; Lansdowne to Chamberlain, 21 Aug 1899, IC
5/51/67.
Wolseley to Lansdowne, 24 Aug 1899, CAB 37/50/56.
"Chamberlain to Lansdowne, 24 Aug 1899, JC 5/51/70. Chamberlain endorsed Lansdowne's view that
India should send the itinforcements as this was the cheaper option. Mimer wanted 5,000 troops in northern
Natal in order to quell any signs of rebellion and give heart to loyal colonists. Mimer to Chamberlain, 23
Aug 1899, IC 10/9/48.
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benevolent examination.' But, on hearing that Conynghame Greene believed the Boers
were likely to reject Chamberlain's demands, he concluded that the Indian contingent
should be sent sooner rather than later. Thus, 2,000 troops had proved incapable of
altering Boer intransigence; the precedent set by earlier crises had failed. The time had
now arrived for the government to increase diplomatic pressure and consider Wolseley's
favoured option - the despatch of 10,000 troops to South Africa. All that remained was
for public opinion to endorse such a measure.
On 28 August Chamberlain told the Boers he could not accept their conditions as
they stood, although his reply was not an outright rejection. Chamberlain left enough
leeway for the Boers to make some arrangement. However, on 2 September the Boers
withdrew the Smuts Proposals altogether. For the British, the military option was now of
paramount importance. The lull in preparations, evident in late August, made Mimer fear
that nothing would be done until the last moment. To Selborne, Milner wrote vehemently
that it was time for stronger action:
My own absolute conviction is that it is worth those millions to settle for
ever, as you would, the South African question. If the plunge cannot be
taken now, it will be too late.
The only problem facing the politicians now, as Chamberlain acknowledged to Mimer was
that 'the technical casus belli is a very weak one,' which hindered preparations and
resolute action.38
 Consequently, in order to discuss and consider the situation, ministers
decided to hold a special cabinet meeting on 8 September. Although ministers were
prepared to contemplate increasing the military pressure, they had failed to anticipate
sufficiently the need for any rapid moves in talks with their military advisers, and there
was a looming gap between what the politicians suddenly wanted and what the military
could provide.
On 5 September, General Buller interrupted the political debate and awoke the
Cabinet to this problem. He requested that before the government decided on an
ultimatum 'the military should be in a position to enforce it.' At the same time, he wrote
Lansdowne to Wolseley, 27 Aug 1899, CAB 37/50/57; to Salisbury, 1 Sept 1899, SP LC/ff.431-432.
Mimer to Selbome, 30 Aug 1899, Boyce (ccl.), pp.93-94 [Mimer's italics]; to Chamberlain, 30 Aug
1899, JC 10j9/49.
Chamberlain to Mimer, 2 Sept 1899, JC 10/9/50.
67
to Wolseley, and expressed his concern over future strategy. Buller had to assume the
army corps would be based in Natal as the attitude of the OFS remained unclarified. His
major concern, however, was the length of time needed for the reinforcements to arrive;
as far as he was concerned the present garrison could defend itself, but not the whole
colony. He urged therefore that any ultimatum be delayed until adequate numbers of
troops had arrived in Natal.39
Wolseley endorsed Buller's views in a note to Lansdowne, which represented the
difficulties facing the soldiers. While condemning the fact that preparations had not been
made sooner, Wolseley asked:
Can we not stave off actual hostilities for five or six weeks to enable us
to collect in Natal the military force I have all along recommended should
be sent there?
Wolseley's irritation centred on the belief that the Boers were now in a better position to
strike the first blow: they had, he said, been given 'the initiative.' Wolseley wanted
immediate reinforcements sent to Natal; his biggest fear was that the government would
precipitate a crisis before the army was ready, under the impression that it was. It was
time, he added, for the soldiers and the politicians to work hand in hand.4°
Chamberlain's views had now moved closer to those of Mimer and the soldiers.
He was anxious about loyalist fidelity, and used the arguments of the generals to support
his case. Chamberlain was concerned not to overstate his argument, particularly to fellow
politicians who were wary of taking military opinion at face value. He qualified his
assertions by saying he thought the soldiers' opinions somewhat exaggerated when they
declared the garrison to be weak or in danger. By so doing, Chamberlain was able to offer
the Indian contingent as a compromise; he could placate the military by sending troops
and accommodate the politicians by not making overt military preparations. For
Chamberlain the Indian contingent was the best of both worlds. He argued that if military
preparations were necessary 'has not the time arrived...when we should increase our
demands and make a fmal settlement?' The following day, Chamberlain emphasised his
views more forcefully. He reminded his colleagues that the only time the Boers backed
3' Buller to Salisbuzy, 5 Sept 1899, CAB 37/50/62; to Wolseley, 5 Sept 1899, CAB 37/50/66.
4° Wolseley to Lansdowne, 5 Sept 1899, CAB 37/50/69.
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down was when the British supported their demands with force; and if Britain failed to
resolve the crisis now:
we shall have to maintain permanently in South Africa a very large
garrison, at a great expense to the British taxpayer, and involving the utter
disorganization of our military system.4'
Chamberlain, in fact, echoed what Mimer had been saying for the past three months. He,
like Mimer also, worried that an early Boer victory might have disastrous results, with the
government held responsible. As a result, the Cabinet decided to send 10,000
reinforcements to Natal, exclusive of the those sanctioned in August; this, as Salisbury
explained to the Queen, was done after considering messages from Natal because there
were signs the Boers might strike first. They also resolved to test the OFS by demanding
President Steyn maintain a strict neutrality should war occur between Britain and the
Transvaal. Meanwhile, another note was sent to Kruger offering him the chance to
reconsider, and to allow for the period required for the reinforcements to arrive: if
Kruger's reply was unsatisfactory the next communication would be an ultimatum.42
The Cabinet had, apparently, met the requirements of the military. Although Buller
had second thoughts and wanted even more troops sent to Natal, Wolseley told
Lansdowne 'that he will stake his reputation that after the reinforcements have arrived we
shall be safe as to anything S[outh] of the Biggarsberg.' Any delay, he added, in preparing
further reinforcements would be an inconvenience, nothing more.43
Consequently, the government proved reluctant to order immediate preparations
for the mobilization of the army corps, despite Milner's pleas for them to do so. Ministers
were concerned lest they should either appear aggressive by not giving the Boers a chance
to consider their note of 8 September, or provoke them unduly. Such reticence, however,
went unrewarded. Kruger rejected the Cabinet's overtures, and it became clear to ministers
41 Memos. by Chamberlain, 5 & 6 Sept 1899, CAB 37/50/63, 70.
42 Salisbury to the Queen, 8 Sept 1899, CAB 41125/18; Hely-Hutchinson to Chamberlain, 6 Sept 1899,
CO 179/206/ff.226-228. Evidently, the Natal ministry was still anxious about abandoning Laing's Nek, and
that a successful Boer invasion would dishearten the loyalists and the natives. Consequently, one Colonial
Office official wrote that it was far more important 'from a political point of view' to defend Natal; he did
not believe the Boers would attack Cape Colony, probably because of the Afrikaner Bond ministry and
generally sympathetic population. CO Minutes, 7 Sept 1899, Ibid.. ff.223-224.
Lansdowne to Chamberlain, 9 Sept 1899, JC 5/51/80 Pakenham, p.97.
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and soldiers alike that the army corps would have to be mobilised. Lansdowne, after
consulting Wolseley and Buller, thought it best to wait until Natal 'should be thoroughly
safe.' Moreover, he explained that the army corps' transport would take 13 weeks to
collect in South Africa, whereas the troops themselves would take only 9 weeks to
mobilise and arrive in Cape Town. Thus the four weeks delay was necessary to
synchronise the arrival of the troops with the collection of their transport. Lansdowne,
therefore, wanted Cabinet authorization to purchase and arrange transportation and
supplies immediately. This he believed would not provoke the Boers, as purchasing for
the garrison was already taking place."
On 23 September, the day after Kruger was warned finally that if he did not
respond the next note would be an ultimatum, the Cabinet authorised Wolseley to spend
£640,000 on transport for the army corps, something he believed should have been done
in July. Wolseley did not share the government's concern with public opinion and had
little sympathy for or understanding of Cabinet policy. As he explained to General
Ardagh:
We have lost two months through the absolute folly of our Cabinet & the
incapacity of its members to take in the requirements & the difficulties of
war...It is no wonder we never achieve much in war & have to struggle
through obstacles created by the folly & war ignorance of civilian ministers
& War Office clerks.45
Ardagh shared Wolseley's frustration and felt Cabinet policy had not inspired
terror or respect in the Boer leaders, '...I cannot, from what I know, defend their attitude
as being the course most likely to end in peace with honour.'
The next matter for ministers to consider was the campaign strategy. As early as
3 June 1899, Major Altham had compiled a memorandum recommending an invasion of
the OFS as the best route to Johannesburg and Pretoria. On 8 August, Althain reiterated
his view that as the OFS was likely to side with the Transvaal, British military
"Mimer to Chamberlain, 19 Sept 1899, Headlam, 1, pp.540-41; Lansdowne to Salisbury, 21 Sept 1899,
SP LC/ff.433-439.
' Wolseley to Ardagh, 23 Sept 1899, PRO 30/4013/61-5; to Wife, 22 Sept 1899, WP 28155.
"Ardagh to Wife, 24 Sept 1899, PRO 30/4013/66.
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preparations ought to ensure they were based 'on the definite hypothesis of a hostile Free
State.'47
This aspect enabled the South African command to intervene in the political
debate. The garrison commanders had largely been forgotten by London, especially since
Butler's resignation. The Cabinet and the militaiy in London felt the South African
command was of little importance. Forestier-Walker was given no instructions before
leaving Britain, nor left any information by Butler.48 Similarly, General White, who had
been appointed commander of the enhanced garrison in Natal, left Britain on 16
September also having received no instructions.49 However, on 11 September, Forestier-
Walker, who had only just arrived in South Africa, told Ardagh that it was virtually
certain the OFS would join the Transvaal, as would Afrikaners living along the Cape
Colony border with the OFS. 5° That same day, Forestier-Walker informed Lansdowne
that Mimer was insisting that Laing's Nek be occupied at once, an operation he thought
too risky under the circumstances. Lansdowne then informed Chamberlain that the military
were against Mimer's request to occupy Laing's Nek: Wolseley, Buller, Forestier-Walker,
and White were all averse to such an action. 51
 The separation of the two commands in
South Africa was an indication of the military preference for the Cape route. Their
insistence that the Natal forces should not be moved further north than the Biggarsberg
(which effectively abandoned the 'triangle' area) was meant to facilitate an advance into
the OFS, and not risk the Natal garrison being Cut off in the north. As Lansdowne stated,
'Whatever our private opinions...we must upon a point of this sort be guided by our
military advisers.'52
Memos. by Aliham, 3 June 1899 & 8 Aug 1899, WO 3217844, WO 32/6369f266Aape/42; the OFS
had recently voted £34,370, or an extra 11% of its average annual expenditure, to be spent on arms.
Forestier-Walker evidence, RC PP(1904), XLI, Cd.1791, 13657-13662, pp.93-94.
4'Ibid., 14720-14722, p.49.
5°Forestier-Walker to Ardagh, 11 Sept 1899, WO 32(7855.
51 The Natal command was made distinct from that of Buller's, as he would be in Cape Colony. White
though was subordinate to Buller.
52 adoe to Chamberlain, 15 Sept 1899; also enclosed is Forestier-Walker to Lansdowne, 11 Sept
1899, JC 5/51/82.
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On 25 September, Lansdowne discussed the problem with the Cabinet and
presented notes by Wolseley and Buller (dated 24 & 25 September respectively) which
supported the OFS move, and which he endorsed. If the OFS was ignored and the Natal
route decided upon Lansdowne argued, 'we shall find it virtually impossible to alter our
plans should the Orange Free State at the last moment declare itself hostile.' Hostility
seemed likely given President Steyn's recent speeches. 53 Following a further note from
Lansdowne which stated that the OFS route would save a week's preparations, as the
army corps had less distance to travel, the Cabinet agreed to declare war on the OFS as
well as the Transvaal. Moreover, they also agreed to mobilise the army corps and call up
the Reserves, a public message to the Boers, British and loyalist opinion alike. The
military recommended the Reserves be mobilised on 7 October, and then Parliament could
meet on the seventeenth to sanction preparations. Despite the Transvaal's recalcitrance,
the Cabinet still hoped that these preparations might prompt a Boer retreat. Kruger was
given one last chance to back down. Significantly, the Cabinet agreed to hold back any
advance of the Natal garrison, in order to expedite the advance of the army corps. This
was to be a key factor as the campaign unfolded.
The decision to mobilize the Reserves and despatch the army corps, occasioned
relief rather than euphoria. Militarily, the British position seemed safe, and ministers did
not believe the Boers would attack first. 55 Military opinion echoed that of the politicians.
Wolseley was highly confident and felt the army corps was better led and equipped than
the army sent to the Crimea in l854 Colonel Everett, temporarily in charge of the
Intelligence Department, confidently stated that after the Transvaal had made troop
deductions to watch over natives, Rhodesia and Johannesburg, only 9,000 men would be
available for offensive operations. Similarly, the OFS, after their deductions, could only
" Memo. by Lansdowne, 25 Sept 1899, CAB 37/51f73.
Lansdowne to Salisbury, 30 Sept 1899, SP LC/ff.441-444; Salisbury to the Queen, 29 & 30 Sept 1899,
CAB 4125f20, 21.
Hicks Beach to Chamberlain, 4 Oct 1899, JC 16/5f26; Chamberlain to Balfour, 3 Oct 1899, JC 5/5/83.
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field 5,000 men. Furthermore, Lansdowne showed Chamberlain notes from Buller and
Wood which stated they were convinced the Boers would not attack Natal.58
However, an important factor was emerging from the last days of peace. Whereas
the Cabinet seemed content that everything had now been done to bring the crisis to a
head and safeguard British interests in South Africa, doubts were materialising about
government policy. Milner maintained that the interval between the arrival of the 10,000
reinforcements, who were expected to arrive in mid-October and the appearance of the
army corps in late November-early December, was critical. Until then, the Cape had few
defenders and any Boer success might cause an Afrikaner uprising. Mimer wanted units
of the army corps sent out immediately in order to foster the impression that a steady
stream of troops were arriving in Cape Town. Mimer was prepared for the worst:
and I foresee that if we met with any serious reverses in October, the fact
of being without any prospect of further support till the end of November
would discourage our men and give a tremendous impetus to the enemy.
We might lose in a few weeks what it would take months to recover.
Telegrams from home indicating long delay are doing mischief here.
Indeed, British public opinion was beginning to turn in another direction. Selborne
was concerned that only 4/5 of public opinion supported the government, not only due to
the stalemate in negotiations, but, more ominously, owing to 'our hesitancy (militarily
almost criminal) in making early preparations.' 6° In fact this problem had been
pinpointed earlier by Brodrick, Salisbury's deputy at the Foreign Office. He believed, 'The
Govt. have been courting disaster' because of the delay in authorising military
preparations. 'I am not a jingo or a Milnerite, but it goes to my heart to see the risks we
are running.'6' The government was facing a particular difficulty as war approached: how
Memo, by Everett, 28 Sept 1899, WO 32/6369. Altham's memo. of 3 June estimated a combined Boer
force of 29,000, plus 4,000 Cape rebels. Everett deducted 15% from the Transvaal official figures to remove
16-18 & 50-60 year olds. Likewise, 15% was deducted from the OFS figures suppiied by his own
department. The resulting figure was 55% of the total male population. Everett was in charge because
Ardagh was ill and Aitham was going to South Africa.
5'Lansdowne to Chamberlain, 4 Oct 1899, IC 5/51/86. The notes are not included in the Chamberlain
papers.
5'Milner to Chamberlain, 8 Oct 1899, JC 10/9171.
60 Selbome to Milner, 7 Oct 1899, cit. Porter, Origins, p.255.
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to prevent public opinion becoming extreme and demanding massive military preparations.
Now that the Cabinet had gained public support for war, they needed success to ensure
that this support was not turned against them. Already, the obvious gap between the
arrival of the reinforcements and the arrival of the army corps was pregnant with adverse
possibilities. If military defeats should occur during that time, then the government would
no doubt be assailed for delaying mobilization. This was a possibility perhaps barely
sinking into ministerial perceptions as the Boers presented them with their greatest public
relations coup on 9 October, when they pre-empted a British ultimatum by tendering one
of their own.
II
With the outbreak of war on 11 October, the British government had apparently
achieved its aim of educating public opinion and gaining support for its policy. Serious
divisions within the country had been avoided, but although the government had taken
risks with the military situation, and often differed seriously with their military advisers,
warlike preparations appeared to be sufficient.62 In all civil and military opinion appeared
quietly confident.
It remained to be seen, however, if the military preparations were sufficient.
Having cultivated public opinion so assiduously and brought public belligerence to the
surface, the government, for its own sake, had to deliver a quick and decisive victory as
the price of public support. In fact, in this respect, the Boer ultimatum had done the
government a disservice because it had greatly heightened public anger at Boer audacity.
Consequently, public expectations demanded the British army deliver a swift punishment,
and as a result public opinion became less tolerant and more extreme. This section,
therefore, will examine the opening campaign and the affect it had on civil-military
relations, as public and official expectations were shattered by a series of military defeats.
In official circles the level of expectation was high. Chamberlain believed the
Boers would not attack, but welcomed the prospect of them doing so. He later asked
'2 hambelain to the Queen, 12 Oct 1899, G.E.Buckle (ed.), The Letters q Queen Victoria. (London,
1932), III, p.406.
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Lansdowne if Laing's Nek might be occupied simply to provoke the Boers into crossing
the frontier.63
 Similarly, Wolseley wrote:
I rejoice beyond measure to think war must now come. Come it would
most certainly sometime or other, & now is best for us...Buller will, I am
sure, end the war with complete success for England.TM
Public expectation was just as high. Having seen British armies defeat a succession
of colonial enemies, the public had no reason to suspect the second war against the Boers
would be any different. Prior to the outbreak of war, one commentator believed the Boer
threat to be exaggerated, as was Boer confidence derived from the first conflict. He felt
there was no basis for thinking a war would be lengthy or costly. 65 The military pundit,
Spenser Wilkinson later remarked that his editor on the Morning Post suppressed an
article in which Wilkinson estimated the Boer forces at 50,000 men. His editor:
shared the almost universal opinion that a war with the Transvaal would
be a small affair, resembling the autumn manoeuvres and lasting for a few
weeks.
Similarly, as war began, The Times stated:
The military situation in Natal is a curious one, but there are no practical
disadvantages. The positions held at Ladysmith and Glencoe are the best
possible in the circumstances. If the forces there are not at present in
sufficient strength to undertake offensive operations, they are ample to
repel attack, which is most unlikely to be made, and they will suffice to
prevent serious incursions into the territory behind them...67
But as the campaign in Natal progressed this optimism appeared misplaced. At the
time Natal was the main theatre of operations and it was here the Boers concentrated the
bulk of their forces. Hely-Hutchinson actually thought the position of Cape Colony was
more serious, 'but fortunately the Boers have a fad about getting Natal & have directed
'3 Chamberlain to Balfour, 3 Oct 1899; to Lansdowne, 7 Oct 1899, JC 5/5/83, 5/51/88.
64 Wolseley to Wife, 11 Oct 1899, WP 28/65.
"Anon. (C.E. Caliwell), 'A Boer War The Military Aspect,' Blacbvood's Magazine. 166, (1899),
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nearly all their energies on this side." 9 With some 15,000 men in Natal, now that most
of the reinforcements had arrived, optimism in London and South Africa was running
high: yet the position was far from satisfactory.
As mentioned earlier, the Natal government had been depressed by the news that
General Symons was unable to defend the whole Colony. Symons felt that with the 2,000
reinforcements sent in August he could advance north to Glencoe, a move that was
eventually sanctioned on 24 September by Hely-Hutchinson. Thus at the outbreak of war,
a British force of 4,000 men stood isolated at Glencoe: its nearest support was the 11,000
men (the reinforcements of 8 September and Natal contingents) then assembling at
Ladysmith under General White.
These dispositions had resulted from the desire to allay the fears of the Natal
government, (although Symons's overconfidence also had much to do with them). White
had expressed his doubts about the position of Symons's force being so far north without
immediate support, but in an interview with Hely-Hutchinson, White was persuaded to
leave Symons at Glencoe. The Governor, with whom the Prime Minister concurred, stated
that ordering Symons to withdraw would have grave political consequences; it would
disgust the loyalists because of the abandonment of more territory and undennine the
loyalty of the vast native population who believed in British power.7°
During the opening phases of the campaign, Hely-Hutchinson continued to
bombard White with messages emphasising the fears of the politicians (including himself)
at the situation. On one occasion, Hely-Hutchinson feared a Boer raid on Pietermaritzburg
and Durban and wanted troops sent from Ladysmith to defend these towns. 'I think if a
successful raid were to take place Her Majesty's Government would be open to the charge
of neglecting to perform a solemn engagement made with Her Majesty's loyal subjects
"Hely-Hutchinson to Chamberlain, 13 Oct 1899, JC 1017/114.
"Hely-Hutchinson to Chamberlain, (tel.), 13 Sept 1899, CO 179t206/f.273; to Symons, to Milner
Mimer to Hely-Hutchinson, (tels.), 24 Sept 1899, WO 3217863; Hely-Hutchinson to Chamberlain, 29 Sept
1899, JC 1017/112; (tel.), 30 Sept 1899, CO 179/206/f.450.
70 Hely-Hutchinson to Chamberlain, (tels.), 10-11 Oct 1899, CO 179f206/ff.606-608. Both Chamberlain
and Lansdowne agreed with the decision, CO Minutes, 11 Oct 1899, CO 417f275/f.751. Later, Hely-
Hutchinson said White could withdraw Symons's force if he thought it necessary; White now considered
it would do too much harm. Hely-Hutchinson to White, (tels.), 17 Oct 1899, WO 32/7863.
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in Natal.'7 ' Also, a week later, on learning of White's unresponsive attitude, the
Governor reiterated his fears about the defenceless condition of Natal's two principal
towns. This drew a testy response from White: 'I must earnestly request that pressure may
not be put on me to reduce forces here.' White thought the reports of a raid misleading
and felt he stood a better chance with his entire force intact, especially as Symons
remained at Glencoe! The Colonial Office was perturbed by Hely-Hutchinson's
interjections, especially as Chamberlain felt that White alone was responsible for the
military situation, and that he should not be pressurised into changing his decisions.73
As Hely-Hutchinson would not let the matter drop, Chamberlain noted, 'I wish Sir W
Hutchinson would leave Gen. White alone. I have given him a hint & if this continues I
shall have to give him distinct instructions.' Later, as Hely-Hutchinson became more
disturbed by the defensive position, Chamberlain wrote:
I do not like Civil Governors meddling with Military Affairs... The fault
is entirely with the military authorities if they listen to civilians against
their own military judgment. They ought to know that this responsibility
is wholly with them.'4
Undoubtedly, the Colonial Office was becoming aware of the political pressure on White.
Perhaps, too, they were conscious that there was a possibility of political pressure being
blamed for the poor military situation. On 20 October, Symons had been mortally
wounded at the battle of Talana. His successor, General Yule, was forced to abandon
Glencoe and retreat to the relative safety of Ladysmith. Eventually, despite minor victories
at Elandslaagte and Rietfontein, White's force was cut off and besieged in Ladysmith. On
30 October White attempted to break the Boer siege, but part of his force was isolated at
Nicholson's Nek and forced to surrender. By the beginning of November, Natal virtually
lay open to the Boers.
White's misfortune completely unbalanced the campaign strategy. Buller, who
arrived in Cape Town on 31 October, felt he could not abandon White and some 15,000
71 Hely-Hutchinson to White, (tel.), 17 Oct 1899, WO 3217863.
Hely-Hutchinson to White; White to Hely-Hutchinson, (tels.), 25 Oct 1899, Ibid.
CO Minutes, 27 Oct 1899; Chamberlain to Hely-Hutchinson, (tel.), No.2, 27 Oct 1899, CO
179f207/ff.114, 118.
CO Minutes, 29 & 31 Oct 1899, CO 179/207/ff.264, 289. [Chamberlain's italics].
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British troops in Ladysmith. Even one of Buller's sternest critics later acknowledged that
Buller had little choice but to rescue White's besieged army. 75 As a result, Buller
abandoned his plan to invade the OFS and instead divided his forces. Whilst Buller took
the bulk of the army corps to Natal, in Cape Colony he left General Methuen to relieve
Kimberley, and General Gatacre to prevent the Boers advancing from the strategic railway
junction at Stormberg. The British government showed no inclination to interfere in the
conduct of operations as confidence in Buller remained high. Even so, Buller's own
confidence was waning. On 25 November he had informed Lansdowne that 'Up to date
we are still hanging on by our eyelids.' 76 When he arrived in Natal and learned of the
strength of the Boer position at Colenso, which blocked the route to Ladysmith, his
pessimism increased7 Moreover, the actions of his subordinates in Cape Colony did
nothing to allay Buller's anxiety. Methuen was defeated at Magersfontein on 11
December, following General Gatacre's defeat at Stormberg the day before. On 15
December, Buller's attempt to relieve Ladysmith failed at Colenso. These three defeats
in five days became known as 'Black Week' and were a profound shock to the British
public and authorities alike.
As a result of the poor performance of the British army, criticism of the
government began to intensify. Wilkinson was particularly scathing. Before the outbreak
of war, Wilkinson had highlighted the danger inherent in government policy, principally
the two month period between the arrival of the reinforcements and the arrival of the
army corps:
The Cabinet has knowingly and deliberately taken upon itself the
responsibility for whatever risks are now run. In this deliberate decision of
the Cabinet lies the best ground for hoping that the risks are not so great
as they seem.
Later he argued that White's task 'was disproportionate to his force' and blamed
Lansdowne for his 'unbusiness like way of playing with national affairs.' And on 8
November, Wilkinson entitled one article, 'How weak policy leads to bad strategy.'
" L. Amery (ed.), The Times History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902 (London, 1900-1909), II,
p.286.
76 Cit. Lord Newton, Life of Lord Lansdowne (London, 1929), p.161.
' Pakenham, p.211.
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Similar attacks by him continued well into the new year and concentrated on the
government's, and particularly Lansdowne's, culpability for the military defeats.78
Indeed, since White's performance in Natal, public opinion was beginning to turn
against the government. Brodrick believed the public was 'going through a great
depression,' and ministers themselves sensed this growing climate of disapproval, as
Lansdowne felt the necessity to defend the government's diplomatic record and inability
to synchronise diplomacy with military preparations.79 'Black Week,' in particular,
brought forth much criticism of government policy, and also the present military system.
Critics such as Major Arthur Griffiths and the ubiquitous Willdnson blamed the
government outright.80
 When ministers attempted to defend themselves, in and outside
Parliament, critics rounded on them even more. Balfour, particularly, was attacked for
three crass speeches made at Manchester between 8-10 January 1900. In one he stated,
'I don't feel the need, so far as my colleagues and I are concerned, of any apology
whatever.' To which The Times replied, 'There is need of apology on the part of the
Cabinet for serious errors, both in policy and warlike preparation.' 81 Mimer was
informed that Balfour's speeches had disappointed everyone, more so than the military
defeats. 'The nation has simply risen in wrath at the extraordinary superficiality & black
ignorance wh[ich] they have betrayed' Another critic wrote:
Mr. Balfour's speeches show him to have been blind and indifferent to the
danger, the plight of our army in South Africa, the half measures, the
H.S.Wilkinson, Lessons of the War (London, 1900), pp.1-47. These aie a collection of articles
published originally in the London Letter. Earlier, his book British Policy in South Africa (London, 1899),
argued that British democracy was on its trial, involving the 'welfare of South Africa; the unity of the
Empire and the character of the nation.' p. 112; also 'On the Art of Going to War', in War and Policy(London, 1900), pp.370-393.
" Brodrick to Violet Cecil, 3 Nov 1899, VMP VM35/C176/51; Lansdowne's Speech in the Cutlers' hail
Sheffield, The Times, 3 Nov 1899, p.7.
80 A. Griffiths, 'The Conduct of the War', Fortnightly Review, 67, (1900), pp.1-10; Wilkinson, Lessons,
pp.103-ill; Brodrick thought 'the country is in fire & flame [against] the Govt.' Bmdrick to Violet Cecil,
12 Jan 1900, VMP VM35/C176/62.
"B. Dugdale, Arthur James Balfour (London, 1936), I, pp.304-305. The Times, 10 Jan 1900, p.9. Lord
Salisbury's attempt to defend the record of the government in the House of Lords was a disaster. P. Marsh,
The Discipline of Popular Government: Lord Salisbury's Domestic Statecraft (Harvester Press, Sussex,
1978,) pp.294-295.
$2 Gell to Mimer, 12 Jan 1900, MP IV/Bj213/27/ff.187-188.
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manifest hesitations, and the tardiness of the despatch of reinforcements,
equally condemn Lord Lansdowne.
As one reviewer pointed out, this criticism of the government found an easy and
obvious target in Lansdowne.M The war, however, was now becoming a focus for a great
many discontents. This owed something to the ministry's own failings before the conflict
in South Africa. Up to 1898, they had enjoyed much success on the diplomatic front; but
domestically the government had acted without distinction. In 1896, the government had
withdrawn their Education Bill, but just before the outbreak of war this issue had surfaced
again owing to the Cockerton decision on secondary education. Certain ministers had
proved disappointing, particularly White Ridley at the Home Office, and Henry Chaplin
at the Board of Agriculture. Recently, historians have argued that the
Conservative/Unionist alliance of 1895 remained unimpressed by the size of its majority
and did not take success for granted, adding that the Cabinet was pessimistic rather than
optimistic. The war against the Boers, in fact, began to unravel the accommodation of
interests made by Salisbury to keep the alliance together. As one historian has argued, 'A
snapshot taken in 1900, gives a misleadingly favourable picture of the condition, prospects
and self-confidence of Conservatism.'
Not surprisingly, given the Unionists' poor performance, the critics singled out the
politicians for blame. By contrast the soldiers escaped censure at this early stage. The
explanation for this lies in more than political performance. The era of imperial expansion
and cheap military victories had militarised British society to a significant degree, and
popularised leading military figures. Recent historiography on this subject has identified
conduits which led to militarization. These include nationalistic and militaristic style
teaching in schools; cadet corps and boys associations; and involvement in the various
organizations connected with the army, such as the volunteers and militia. The subject
An Englishman (H.W.Wilson), 'The Causes of Reverse,' NalionaiReview, 34, (1900), p.836. See also,
H.W. Wilson, With the Flag to Pretoria (London 1900),!, pp.205-215. Arthur Griffiths also blamed the
government for an inadequate military system in Forinighily Review, 67, (1900), pp.214-223. As did the
anonymous writer (the well known soldier, GF.R. Henderson) of 'The War in South Africa,' Edinburgh
Review, 191, (1900), pp.247-78.
A Soldier, (W.E.Cairnes) 'Some Reflections on the War in South Africa,' MacMillan's Magazine. 81,
(1900), pp.313-320.
5 B. Coleman, Conservatism and the Conservative Party in Nineteenth Cent ury Britain (London, 1988),
p.200; Also, M. Bentley, Politics Without Democracy (London, 1984), p.295; Marsh, pp.247-290.
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matter of the music halls also conveyed an influence which heightened the nation's
awareness of matters military and the role of the army in expanding the Empire.
Evidently, not including those who joined the army before 1881, some 22.42% of the
entire male population between the ages of 17 and 40 had some form of military
experience. As Blanch suggests, 'we may conclude that powerful pre-war influences
helped shaped popular response to the war itself. '
Moreover, expansive coverage of colonial wars by the burgeoning popular press
did much to enhance the careers and popularity of successful generals. These great heroes
were imbued with an almost infallible quality and were lionised by press and public alike.
Wolseley, 'our only general,' was perhaps the most successful and well-known of the
Victorian generals, owing to his victories against the Ashanti and the Egyptians. Also, his
image as an army reformer did much to endear him to the public as a 'scientific general.'
As mentioned previously, Buller was very popular, and when in Natal, the famous
correspondent Bennet Burleigh described him as a 'masterly leader of lroops...an
indomitable man of more than bulldog pertinacity.V Correspondents such as G.W.
Steevens, not only helped the careers and reputations of officers like Kitchener, but
eulogised the army as the vanguard of British civilization. Moreover, certain officers,
notably, Havelock, Gordon and Roberts were exemplified as Christian heroes, and given
an 'intense aura of sanctity.' When war broke out in South Africa, Lord Roberts was the
most conspicuous example of this type of officer; pious, professional and abstemious.
Blanch, in Warwick (ed.), p.215. Blanch revises the opinions set out in Price, and in H. Pelling's
essay in Popular Politics and Society in Late Victorian Britain (London, 1968), pp.82-101. They argued that
the working-classes neither supported the war nor took much interest in its course: Blanch suggests
otherwise owing to the pre-war influences mentioned above. In fact, his view leans towards J. A. Hobson's
thesis expounded in his Psychology of Jingoism (London, 1901). For other specific influences see, J.
Mackenzie, Imperialism and Popular Culture (Manchester, 1986).
Cit. R. Steam, 'War Correspondents and Colonial War, c.1870-1900,' in J. Mackenzie (ed.), Popular
Imperialism and the Military 1 850-1 950 (Manchester, 1992), p.148; also J. Mackenzie, Introduction, Ibid.,
pp.1-24; RJ. Wilkinson-Latham, From our Special Correspondent. Victorian War Correspondents and their
campaigns (London, 1979), Chapters 4-8.
R. Steam, 'G.W.Steevens and the Message of Empire,' Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth
History, 18, (1989), pp.210-231.
A. Summers, 'Edwardian Militarism' in R. Samuel (ed.), Patriotism. The Making and Unmaking of
British National Identity (London, 1989), I, pp.249-250; 'Militarism in Britain before the Great War,'
History Workshop Journal, 2, (1976), pp.104-123.
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Moreover, Roberts's popularity was enhanced by the universal sympathy accorded to him
and his family after the heroic death of his son at the battle of Colenso.
In all, leading generals had become figures of reverence, identified with the best
aspects of British civilization. To criticise these men publicly or insinuate their
incompetence was a dangerous tactic. Balfour's Manchester speeches in January 1900
hinted at military incapacity and were a major reason for the criticism he received
afterwards. Indeed, Willdnson would not tolerate attacks upon the generals in South Africa
as a means of deflecting criticism from the War Office or Cabinet. Given the high
esteem of military figures, the government had to face censure alone, even if members
such as Balfour, with some justification, felt certain officers were as culpable as the
politicians.91
III
The government did have one alternative with which to appease their critics: they
could change the command in South Africa. This, however, was a difficult matter, with
repercussions that might seriously damage government prestige. If Buller was dismissed
outright his immense popularity meant the government might face a tirade of abuse. The
politicians would be portrayed as sacrificing a soldier to cover their own mistakes.
Buller's predicament was already being blamed on the poor defensive measures initiated
before the outbreak of war?2
 The government was perceived as having been too ready
to mollify Boer sensitivities and too reluctant to make hard military decisions. The
unfortunate Buller was paying the price for political irresponsibility.
Yet despite his defeats Buller's popularity endured. For all his faults as a
commander, as the Natal campaign revealed, Buller was still esteemed by his troops as
well as the public. Throughout the campaign, his soldiers had been well supplied and
'° Wilkinson, Lessons, p.122.
"Brodrick told Violet Cecil that in a discussion with Balfour the latter 'tremendously blames the
soldiers...He thinks they should have advised us of necessity for heavier guns - for a tactical retirement on
Colenso at outseL' Bmdrick to Violet Cecil, 24 Nov 1899, VMP VM35/C176/54.
'2 An Officer, 'The Government and the War,' Contemporary Review, 76, (1899), pp.766-792; Griffiths,
'The Conduct of War,' pp.1-4; Wilkinson blamed the government for Bullet's predicament as early as
November 1899, Lessons, pp.64-66.
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looked after, and part of his failing was that he would not expose them to the hardships
normally associated with campaigning. As it was, he proved reluctant to starve his men
or to incur excessive casualties, both aspects of warfare that often had to be endured in
order to obtain decisive results. His reluctance to incur losses, was one of the reasons why
he pulled back at Colenso. But, another reason for his popularity was no doubt due to the
fact that much opinion regarded his predicament as the fault of the government's bad
diplomacy in 1899; that opinion was strong enough to survive the evidence of Buller's
incapacity. Whatever the reasons for his popularity the government was fully aware they
had to be circumspect in dealing with Buller.
Fortunately for the government, the division of the army into 'British' and 'Indian'
sections ensured there was an officer senior to Buller, and with a greater reputation. This
facilitated a change of command in South Africa without necessarily demoting Buller. The
appointment of Lord Roberts on 18 December 1899, as the new C-in-C(SA), marked the
Cabinet's attempt to bring the war to a satisfactory conclusion. In fact, appointing Roberts
was the most immediate palliative the Cabinet could offer the country before the opening
of Parliament in January. And by so doing the politicians were able to move with public
opinion, which appeared to demand the utmost exertion be made to end the war. The
sudden rush of volunteering, and the establishment of volunteer bodies like the City
Imperial Volunteers testified to the resolution displayed by the British public to finish the
war once and for all. By sending Roberts to South Africa the government demonstrated
its own commitment to this ideal.
Why, it might be asked, was Roberts not appointed sooner? Roberts was a friend
of Lansdowne's from their time in India, and he was also on friendly terms with
Chamberlain. But to give Roberts command at the start of the war was virtually
impossible. For one, he was considered too old at 67; and for another, his military career
had been spent in India, making him unfamiliar with the administration of the home army.
Moreover, Wolseley's rivalry with Roberts meant that he would consider anyone but
Roberts. As Buller's appointment was well received there was no justification in thinking
he might fail. As Roberts was then C-in-C in freland, which was practically a retirement
post, he appeared to have no chance of assuming command at the outset of war.
Even so, Roberts kept the government aware of his presence and interest On 20
June 1899, he had informed Lansdowne of his ideas concerning a campaign against the
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Boers, adding 'I have marked this Private but you are welcome to show it to any member
of the Cabinet if you think it desirable to do so.' Again on 8 December, with the war
nearly two months old, Roberts wrote a long letter to Lansdowne explaining his views,
this time more forcibly and with more emphasis on personalities than strategy. Roberts
was aware of Buller's telegrams from Natal and became concerned at his gloomy
assessment of the situation. He noted that Buller seemed weighed down by the
responsibility of his command, and again offered his services:
This letter would never have been written, did I not know I could depend
from your knowledge of me, that I should not be misunderstood. It is for
your eyes alone, unless, after reading it, you think my proposal worthy of
consideration, then you are welcome to show it to the Prime Minister, and,
if you wish, Mr. Chamberlain.
Roberts asked Lansdowne not to show it to anyone else, especially in the War Office,
'for, impossible as it may seem, I am sorry to say I cannot help feeling they would prefer
running very great risks rather than see me in command of a British Army in the field.'
Undoubtedly, Lansdowne would have liked to appoint Roberts, especially given
his acrimonious relationship with Wolseley and Buller. But Lansdowne told Roberts that
as Buller had made no mistakes, his pessimism was no reason for his replacement.
Roberts insisted that one man could not possibly control all the forces in South Africa,
given the size of the army and the scale of the operations. Despite Roberts's desire to
assume control in South Africa there was nothing Lansdowne could do.95
Buller's defeat at Colenso on 15 December, and the subsequent tone of his
telegrams to the Ladysmith garrison and the War Office, provided the excuse for
Lansdowne to act, and to push the appointment of Roberts? 6
 Lansdowne found a willing
Roberts to Lansdowne, 20 June 1899, RP 110/1/ff.146-149.
Roberts to Lansdowne, 8 Dec 1899, RP 110/1/ff.203-208.
95 Lansdowne to Roberts, 10 Dec 1899, RP 181; Roberts to Lansdowne, 11 Dec 1899, RP 110/1/ff.210-
213. Lansdowne told Salisbury he did not know how Roberts knew so much about Buller's telegrams. He
suspected the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland was confiding in him. Lansdowne to Salisbury, 11 Dec 1899, SP
LC/f.480.
After the battle, Buller telegraphed Lansdowne and implied he would abandon White. Buller even
suggested to White, via heliograph, that he should be prepared to surrender. J. Symons, Buller's Campaign
(London, 1963), pp.168- 17&, Pakenham, pp.239-240. Lansdowne later wrote that the confidence of the War
Office in Buller had been 'rudely shaken.' CiL Newton, pp.165-166.
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advocate in Balfour, who was the only other high ranking Cabinet minister in London,
owing to the start of the Christmas holidays. Balfour agreed with Lansdowne's proposal
to place Roberts in overall command, and won Salisbury's acquiescence by appointing
Lord Kitchener as Roberts's Chief of Staff. That this moment gave Lansdowne the
opportunity for revenge on one of the generals who had betrayed him and his colleagues
cannot be doubted. The fact that neither Wolseley nor the Queen were consulted
beforehand testifies to the government's determination to impose their own solution to the
crisis. On 17 December 1899, Wolseley wrote to Sir Arthur Bigge, the Queen's Private
Secretary, informing him that the decision to supersede Buller had been taken without his
knowledge and that he still considered Buller the best man for the job. Balfour told
Salisbury that he had informed Bigge on the 19th, and once the Queen's objections to her
and Wolseley's treatment had been noted, stated 'it was impossible to consult the C-in-C
upon such an appointment, as his well known jealousy of Roberts made his advice on
such a subject perfectly worthless.'
The respite gained by the appointment of Roberts was real, if only temporary: at
last the government had done something right. The Times leader remarked:
The action decided upon by the Defence Committee of the Cabinet...will
command the warm approval of the British people.. .No more fitting
appointment would have been made, nor was any better calculated to
satisfy the public and the Army?8
Consequently, the government had found a way to relieve Buller of the
responsibility of directing the war. The new situation was in some respects very much as
before, with Roberts and Buller taking the roles of Buller and White. Not wishing to risk
antagonising public opinion, the government kept Buller on as GOC(Natal), whilst Roberts
took overall command in Cape Colony as a second army corps was mobilised and sent
to South Africa?9
 Yet there was a certain disadvantage in the appointment of Roberts,
something the government did not foresee. Roberts was the government's last hope of
'7 Lansdowne to Lady A. Roberts, 11 May 1921, RP 181; Wolseley to Bigge, 17 Dec 1899, Buckle
(ed.), p.437; Balfour to Salisbury 19 Dec 1899, SP BC/ff.47-51.
'9 The Times, 18 Dec 1899, p.9
'9 Buller was informed Roberts was taking command to enable Buller to give the Natal campaign his
complete and undivided attention. Lansdowne to Buller, (tel.), 18 Dec 1899, CAB 37/51j93; Buller to
Lansdowne, (tel.), 20 Dec 1899, accepting the situation, Ibid.
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obtaining a quick and decisive victory; consequently they were obliged to back him all
the way, despite any mistakes he might make. If Roberts proved unsatisfactory, the
government could hardly supersede him. In effect the government had severely limited its
options for they would have to sink or swim with Roberts, who, Cincinnatus-like, had
been called to save the Empire. The government would be obliged to defer to military
exigencies perhaps more than was usual during a campaign. If not, they certainly had to
be careful how they dealt with these officers, who were virtually the government's last
hope of bringing the war to a speedy conclusion. In effect, Roberts's position was one
which reduced the politicians grip on the management of the war, despite the approbation
the government had received for appointing him in the first place. However, the impact
of that decision in South Africa had yet to be felt, and it was for Mimer to face the
consequences of that decision. Philip Gell warned of the changed circumstances 'Nobody
believes much in them [the government] - except in Chamberlain. They believe in Roberts
& in Kitchener, and I truly think in yourself, and acquiesce in the Ministry, so long as it
gives Roberts what Roberts wants."°° Milner now had to discover how far the alteration
to the civil-military balance in Britain, had changed relations in South Africa.
'Gell to Mimer, 12 April 1900, MP IV/B/213f27/f.34.
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CHAPTER THREE.
THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL:
1.ROBERTS, MILNER AND THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT.
January - December 1900.
The appointment of Lord Roberts as C-in-C(SA) represented the British Cabinet's
last chance to retrieve the poor military situation and gain some credibility from a public
deeply concerned about the handling of the war. Everything now depended on Roberts
leading a successful campaign because if he failed it was likely the government would
fall. In this respect Roberts's appointment placed the government in a difficult position.
During the First Boer War, Gladstone's ministry had retrieved a poor military situation
by negotiating peace: but the position in 1900 was far worse; the Boers had overrun a
substantial portion of British territory and might gain much more from a negotiated
settlement. Never before had a Victorian government faced the prospect of such a defeat,
and the loss of international prestige this entailed. Consequently, Roberts enjoyed the
backing and confidence of the government on a scale few generals had ever received.
Roberts was given carte blanche. Lansdowne was quite content to let Roberts
pursue his own plan of action, the only criterion being he should meet with success.
Lansdowne, however, did not have much choice. His position was particularly vulnerable
owing to the criticism directed at the War Office. Both he, and the rest of the government,
were to find they had little room to manoeuvre in their dealings with the military. This
chapter, therefore, will examine how the ramifications of events in 1899, coupled with the
unfolding military campaign of 1900, affected civil-military relations in South Africa and
in Britain. The impact of Roberts's operations on relations with the British government,
and the government's reaction to those operations has previously been neglected, and its
analysis here will give the chapter more balance than earlier accounts of this period. The
chapter will deal with the problems created by the expectations of the British government
and Milner which were heightened by Roberts's apparently successful campaign; and with
the difficulties created by the attempted transition from military to civil government. But,
more important still, this chapter will demonstrate that even the combined interests of
Mimer and the British government were powerless to influence the results of Roberts's
strategy.
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The chapter contains five sections. The first examines relations between Mimer and
Roberts, immediately after the latter's arrival in South Africa. It will show how Mimer
tried and failed to impress on Roberts the need to take note of his concerns regarding the
political-military situation in Cape Colony, before and during the first phase of the main
campaign. The second part analyses Milner's worsening opinion of Roberts and the
military following the establishment of military government in the OFS after its
occupation by the British army. The third section deals with civil-military relations
affected by the Boers turning to guerilla warfare. The British government became anxious
to see an end to the war because of other diplomatic problems, and joined Milner in
urging Roberts to take notice of political requirements. The fourth part examines Mimer's
clash with Roberts over the refugees from Johannesburg and the need to send them back.
This was the real nub of the dispute between the two officials, as Roberts continued to
give priority to his own needs and those of his army, much to Mimer's frustration. In the
end Mimer lost all confidence in Roberts and called for his recall. The fifth part examines
the clash between Milner and Roberts over the size and scope of a new force designed
to counter the Boer guerillas. Despite both officials agreeing over the method, they
differed over who should command these troops - Milner or the army. This dispute did
nothing to enhance Roberts's relations with the British government and eventually, the
Cabinet decided to bring Roberts home to supervise new army reforms, and to appoint his
deputy, Lord Kitchener, to oversee the guerilla war, and, hopefully, end the contest
between political requirements and military necessity.
I
If Roberts had the blessing of the British government it did not follow that he had
the outright confidence of the authorities in South Africa: in particular, Milner had his
own ideas as to what the priorities of the British army should be. By January 1900,
Milner's immediate concerns centred on the vulnerability of Cape Colony. Buller, by
taking the bulk of his army to Natal, had denuded the Cape of troops, leaving the area
exposed to a Boer attack and a possible rebellion by disaffected Afrikaners. Both in fact
had occurred, although the advance of OFS commandos had stalled owing to their own
inertia. As a result, the rebellion was confined to areas under Boer occupation, but the
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possibility of it spreading could not be discounted. When General Gatacre was defeated
at Stonnberg on 10 December Milner became seriously alarmed about the military
situation. He expected the Boers to advance any moment and increase the extent of the
rebellion.
Ending the conflict in Cape Colony was Mimer's immediate priority, and to that
end he interfered in matters that were not his responsibility. He forwarded his own views
when not called for, and stated how tasks ought to be accomplished. Mimer showed his
complete distrust of the military because their priorities did not match his own. Mimer
frequently interpreted differences between his views and those of the soldiers as evidence
that the latter misunderstood the nature of Cape politics and society. Mimer himself felt
no respect for the current Afrikaner Bond government and questioned their loyalty. Nor
did he trust the Afrikaner population generally, even those who had not joined the
rebellion: to Mimer they were all irredeemable. In such circumstances, he felt the actions
of military men, uninformed by political insight, were potentially dangerous and guidance
was therefore essential.
Mimer's views were influenced significantly by his own recent experience. He had
already been frustrated and angered by Butler's intransigence, by his apparent inability to
see what for Mimer was the obvious truth of the situation. In working with Butler, Milner
had experienced the difficulty of dealing with a military mind totally distanced from his
own. In the short time he liaised with Buller, Milner had again faced military
intransigence, although not on the same scale as that displayed by Butler. Buller had
failed to see that the main priority was Cape Colony, which was virtually defenceless and
rebellious. Milner's frustration was evident when he summarised events for Chamberlain
and sought to justify his own predilection for interfering in military decisions. Milner was
exasperated by the conduct of military operations, although he explained he had not
interfered in any matters that were purely military. But he then asked, 'What is purely
military in this country?'
Every military movement is so dependent upon political conditions and
forecasts, that there can be no sound strategy without taking these into
account. And also I am compelled to warn, suggest, remind - to worry, in
fact, the soldiers in 100 ways...without as much result as might be hoped.'
1 Milner to Chamberlain, 27 Dec 1900, IC 1O9f76.
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Thus by denying any demarcation between military and civil requirements in Cape
Colony, Mimer attempted to justify his past interference and that of the future.
Perhaps Mimer's frustration was exacerbated by the fact that his titular title of
Commander-in-Chief no longer applied while the country was at war. In some cases it
might be justifiable for civilian authorities to question military decisions; but there was
a fme line between what might be considered proper questioning and blatant interference.
Mimer's actions verged on the latter, causing annoyance to the military and disquiet in
the British government. The British authorities were particularly vulnerable at that time
to criticisms of political interference and poor judgement. A recently published Blue
Book,2
 containing the correspondence between White and Hely-Hutchinson on the
disposition of troops in Natal at the outbreak of war, revealed how the political authorities
had interfered and limited White's options. The British government could not afford to
be tarnished by a similar indictment. As a result Chamberlain rebuked Milner for his
apparent interference. He explained:
that in my view it is the duty of the Governors of the Cape and Natal to
inform the military authorities of the political situation, but that the entire
responsibility for military operations rests with the latter, and they must
disregard the political question if the exigencies of the military situation
require it. I do not want them to say that they were pressed to take a
particular course which their own judgment rejected. The question has
arisen in regard to the retention of Glencoe and Ladysmith, but it may arise
in other forms if we are not careful...3
But as Mimer, who was insensitive to these criticisms, endeavoured to place his own mark
on military operations, he began to discover how difficult it was to cajole the soldiers, and
how earlier civil-military difficulties had restricted his room for manoeuvre.
With regard to future strategy, Mimer had definite ideas that he was eager to
impart to Lord Roberts. He wanted to see a large force deployed in Cape Colony, to
defend it from the Boers and to deter rebellious Afrikaners. Outside the areas occupied
by the Boers, the Afrikaners had proved reluctant to join the rebellion and it was clear
that only a disaster of the greatest magnitude would provide the spark for a general
uprising, but Milner remained apprehensive. Initially, he had felt that the fall of Kimberley
2 Correspondence Relating to the Defence of Natal, PP(1900), LVI, Cd.44, pp.22-26.
3 Chamberlain to Mimer, 20 Jan 1900, Headlam, II, p.58.
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would provide that spark.4
 As Kimberley had held out, Milner's fears abated until the
defeats of 'Black Week': then he explained to Chamberlain, 'The opportunity is golden,
the incitement incessant.' 5
 Again, the rebellion Milner feared so much did not materialise,
yet even with the arrival of Roberts and Kitchener, his anxiety persisted.
Although Milner was pleased that Roberts and Kitchener had arrived and had
begun to take control of matters, he nevertheless considered he could not remain silent
on issues upon which he felt deeply. As he told Selborne:
there are political considerations which have a direct military value. For
instance I have bothered, and shall continue to bother, every General, to
prevent at almost any cost, the further spread of invasion in the Colony.
Why? Because the Colonial Boer is the enemy's only Reserve. They have
got their last man and boy in the field. Let them at once get into the heart
of the Colony, even with a mere handful of men and a flag, and they tap
that Reserve, and get certainly 10,000, and perhaps, even 15-20,000
excellent recruits.
Milner felt that a few troops stationed near what he termed 'points of entry' would be
enough to deprive the Boers of this strategic reserve. 'But that is not Politics, though it
looks like it. It is Military Arithmetic.' 6
 Milner's somewhat self-contradictory note
revealed the extent of his agitation and frustration. The day after Roberts's arrival in Cape
Town, Mimer was already sending him advice about the current situation in Cape Colony,
and of the necessity of keeping the Afrikaners quiet. This advice ranged from arming
loyalists, to removing arms and ammunition from certain districts, and to buying up all
horses and fodder.7
The soldiers, however, seemed to have no qualms about the security of Cape
Colony. Roberts was prepared to allay Mimer's fears to some extent; he sent the 6th
Division to unsettled areas, but as he told Lansdowne, the hesitation and reluctance, or
inability, of the Boers to follow up their victories had lessened the seriousness of the
situation in the Colony. 8
 In any case, Roberts had already decided on the strategy he
Mimer to Selborne, 18 Oct 1899, Ibid., p.24.
Mimer to Chamberlain, 27 Dec 1899, JC 109f76.
6 lbid., 17 & 31 Jan 1900, JC 13/1f2, 7; to Selborne, 31 Jan 1900, Boyce (ed.), p.100. [Mimer's italics].
Milner to Roberts, (tel.), 11 Jan 1900, WO 105/19[F38f3.
'Roberts to Lansdowne, (tel.), 12 Jan 1900, WO 105131/ff.10-14.
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would pursue, having planned his operations on the voyage to South Africa with
Kitchener and his Chief Intelligence officer, Colonel G.F.R. Henderson. It was decided
that the main advance would take place along the western railway and not along the
central lines from Port Elizabeth and East London. By so doing, Roberts could relieve
Kimberley and, by abandoning the railway, invade the OFS from an area the Boers had
thought safe owing to the British army's normal reliance on a fixed supply line. 9
 But this
strategy also meant that few troops would be spared for the defence of Cape Colony.
Mimer was plainly aware of this and felt Roberts had forgotten the danger of
rebellion. Mimer believed that once Roberts's army had moved north there would be an
uprising along the lines of communication. He added, 'The danger in the Colony is
absolutely ubiquitous. There is no part of it, in which the Dutch population are not rebels
at heart, and would not rise against us if they saw a chance.' He then suggested that
Roberts should leave behind a mounted force which could quickly stamp out the first
signs of rebellion)0
Roberts reply was immediate, and perhaps showed that he was anticipating such
a response. It also showed that Roberts would not tolerate any interference from Mimer:
his priority, he explained, was to defeat the Boer forces in the field. No doubt Roberts
was aware of the criticism levelled at the government and knew he had to obtain quick
results. Just as importantly, the military situation had to be remedied for its own sake. The
besieged towns were suffering and Cape Colony was ripe for revolt; but Roberts believed
these difficulties could only be eased by a succession of battlefield victories. Also, the
army itself needed these victories to restore its own self-esteem:
A serious rising in the Cape Colony is a problematical danger, while the
fall of Kimberley and Ladysmith, which is inevitable unless these places
can be relieved at an early date, would produce a far reaching effect not
only on the inhabitants of South Africa, but on the prestige of the British
Army and on the prospects of the war.1'
'Roberts had considered this strategy as early as 1897 when he discussed the matter with Heniy Wilson
and other officers. B. Collier, Brasshaz. A Biography of Field-Marsha! Sir Henry Wilson (London, 1961),
p.43.
10 Mimer to Roberts, 4 Feb 1900, CO 48/545/ff.480-486.
Roberts to Mimer, 5 Feb 1900, CO 48/545/ff.487-491.
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Roberts felt he had to take the risk because, as he explained to Lansdowne, '...the only
chance of bringing the war to successful conclusion is to carry it into the enemy's
country.'12
Chamberlain was disappointed by Mimer's obvious disregard of earlier advice. He
noted on the receipt of this correspondence that Milner was intruding in an area for which
he was not responsible, and began to think Mimer would need a strong hint in onler to
stop his interfering.' 3
 What began to emerge was a divergence of opinion between the
civil authorities in London and South Africa. Chamberlain was conscious of the need for
Roberts to allay the criticism directed at the government; not only was the government
in need of encouragement, so too was the British public. Mimer's parochial and, as
Roberts pointed out, problematical concerns clearly paled before the needs of the British
government and people. Milner, it seemed, remained unconscious of Chamberlain's
difficulties.
Mimer, however, appeared vindicated by a rebellion at Prieska, in western Cape
Colony, following the appearance of a Boer commando, and emphasised that Schreiner,
the Prime Minister, was also greatly perturbed by this fresh outbreak of rebellion.14
Mimer was apparently tlying to provoke a response from Roberts. In this he succeeded;
Roberts sent a small force under Colonel Adye to deal with the Boers and rebels. He told
Mimer, however, somewhat exasperatedly, that the eastern and midland railways were
more important to his operations than chasing rebels, implying that he would not give the
Prieska rebellion much consideration.'5 Almost simultaneously, both officials appealed
to their respective superiors in London, no doubt preparing the ground should the situation
develop into a trial of strength. Whereas Mimer called for more troops to be sent to South
Africa, which in itself was an oblique way of saying Roberts was not doing much to
alleviate the crisis, Roberts was more direct. He made it clear to Lansdowne that Milner
was making a nuisance of himself. Although he said he was doing everything to meet
Milner's wishes, '...I feel that the one thing which will put an end to the war is to
'2 Roberts to Lansdowne, 5-6 Feb 1900, RP I l0/1/ff.356-360.
13 Co Minutes, 2 March 1900, CO 48/545/f.475.
' Mimer to Roberts, (tel.), 18 Feb 1900, CO 4I7/286/f.462.
15 Roberts to Mimer, (tel.), 21 Feb 1900, WO 105/34/8.
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advance in strength in the Orange Free State, and that everything must be sacrificed to
that end."6
For the moment, with the battle of Paardeberg underway, neither Chamberlain nor
Lansdowne reacted, but Mimer's anxiety continued to get the better of him. A series of
letters between 4 and 7 March showed how the rebellion in the west was affecting his
peace of mind. He ignored the fact that by then the battle of Paardeberg had been won.
Such was Mimer's preoccupation with events in Cape Colony that he urged Forestier-
Walker to send troops to General Settle, who now commanded operations in the Prieska
district, without, at first, reference to Roberts. Mimer had convinced himself Roberts could
not move north until the rebellion had been crushed. Roberts refused to share Milner's
anxiety as his operations in the OFS were proceeding apace. But a setback on 6 March,
when Colonel Adye was defeated at Houwater, only exacerbated Mimer's tension. This
time he urged Roberts to allow Forestier-Walker complete latitude in sending extra troops
to the area.'7
 Mimer's frustration was evident. He felt everything had been hurried for
the sake of Kimberley and Ladysmith, and felt that 500 men encamped at Prieska
beforehand would have deterred rebellion.' 8
 Chamberlain, however, remained
unsympathetic. He was not impressed by Milner's constant anxiety and was concerned lest
Mimer's actions should become general knowledge in Britain. 'I have warned Sir
A.Milner', he noted, '& he must take sole responsibility of intervention when it does not
seem to be called for from the Civil Power." 9
 In the end, Roberts let Kitchener oversee
operations, which had the happy result of deflecting Mimer's interference at Kitchener.
Mimer advised Kitchener that columns moving against the Boers should be not less than
1,000 men strong. Happily, Kitchener replied that the Boers had left the area and were
moving north.2°
16 Mimer to Chamberlain, (tel.), 22 Feb 1900, CO 48/545/f.640; Roberts to Lansdowne, 22 Feb 1900,
RP 110f2/150.
Milner to Roberts, (tels.), 4 & 7 March 1900 Roberts to Mimer, (tel.), 5 Maitth 1900, CO
48/545/if.792-795.
' Milner to Chamberlain, 8 March 1900, Headlam, II, p.67.
"CO Minutes, 29 March 1900, CO 48/545/f.790.
Milner to Kitchener; Kitchener to Mimer, (tels.), 9 & 10 March 1900, CO 48/545/if.909-912.
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For the time being Cape Colony remained quiet. Roberts's successful advance
through the OFS had deprived potential rebels of an important precondition for active
rebellion - a Boer commando. Roberts's strategy had worked, removing much of the
justification for Mimer's fears of a disastrous uprising in the wealdy defended areas
outside the main British advance.
In his early dealings with Roberts in 1900, Mimer had thus found that his views
had little power to affect the military situation. Roberts had been appointed as C-in-C(SA)
under extraordinary circumstances, not to help Milner but to retrieve a war going badly
wrong and to get the British government out of a dangerous political predicament. Mimer
had great difficulty in getting his opinions accepted by the military; but it seemed Milner
could not accept he was no longer the paramount official in South Africa. His priorities
did not match those of Lord Roberts, nor those of his superiors in London. Mimer's
attempts to persuade the British authorities that the problem in Cape Colony was a
political, as much as a military one, failed. In the end, Roberts's victories provided a
welcome tonic to both the British government and people, which enhanced his authority
in South Africa and his popularity. 2' Consequently, Milner was marginalised: all he
could hope for was that Roberts would finish the war quickly and allow him to put into
practice the ideas that he had been formulating ever since the beginning of the war, if not
before.
II
Roberts's advance into the OFS and the capture of Bloemfontein on 13 March
meant the war would be waged in the Boer republics. From then on, his army made a
steady advance into enemy territoiy, conquering the OFS (it was annexed on 24 May
1900) and then invading the Transvaal. Unable to face the British in open warfare, the
Boers continued the conflict by launching gueriula attacks on railways and telegraph lines;
the longer they persisted in this style of warfare the more adept at it they became. What
also became apparent was the inability of the British forces to stop Boer raids, which led
21 Bnxlrick wrote that 'Still everyone even the least initiated have felt the change to Roberts, who will
return the greatest British Hem of the century since Wellington.' Brodrick to Violet Cecil, 16 Mar 1900,
VMP VM35/C 176/72.
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to increasing frustration on their part. It also encouraged suspicions that the war might last
longer than anticipated. As the nature of the war deteriorated the relationship between
Mimer and Roberts soured. Mimer found great difficulty in accepting the methods chosen
by Roberts to settle the OFS, which merely reinforced his already low opinion of the
military.
During his campaign, Roberts had two main priorities. First, to ensure his lines of
communication were secure in order to facilitate the advance north; and secondly, to
occupy the leading centres of the OFS as this would be the most visible sign of British
success. The post-war settlement was not his concern; that was for the politicians to sort
out. His task, therefore, was to defeat the Boer field-armies and demonstrate the fact that
the Boer republics had been absorbed by the British Empire. Roberts understood that the
administration of conquered territory could not be undertaken by the military alone, except
perhaps while operations lasted. On 15 March he issued a proclamation which offered
lenient terms to OFS Boers who laid down their arms and went back to their farms,
having signed an oath not to participate in the war again. This proclamation supplemented
one made just as Roberts entered the OFS, which made clear that the British had no
quarrel with the people, only their government. As far as Roberts was concerned the OFS
had lost the war and should now surrender; leniency was to be his method of facilitating
this.
Leniency, however, did not have the desired effect. Although many Boers chose
to surrender, substantial numbers did not. And as the British were unable to protect those
who returned to their farms, those still on commando easily induced them to renew the
fight. Meanwhile, the Boers increased the scale of their attacks on the British lines which
affected the British war-effort noticeably. On 31 March and 4 April, isolated British forces
were defeated or forced to surrender at Sannah's Post and Reddersburg. Milner felt
anxious that nothing was being done to discourage or prevent those who had taken the
oath from rejoining their comrades. For once, Roberts was not annoyed by Milner's
interference as he admitted, 'I am delighted to flnd...that your views and mine are in
accord.' Roberts had in fact begun to inflict harsh penalties on oath breakers, sentencing
one offender to one year's imprisonment and confiscating his property. He had also taken
up Mimer's suggestion about dividing the country into military districts, in which a
governor would disarm the Boers and remove their horses. Roberts hoped the governor's
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would be able to ascertain who were 'for and against us' and hoped that the country
would settle down?2
As an extra measure, Roberts advocated the early annexation of the OFS, which
would allow him to set a date after which Boers still on commando would lose their
property. Roberts felt that many would return home once it was clear President Steyn
would not be allowed to return?3
 Roberts reiterated the point again five days later stating
that the OFS Boers longed for peace and would accept defeat when assured the British
would not leave the country? 4
 Roberts was too optimistic and it is difficult to know how
he arrived at the view that the OFS Boers were desperate for peace. Undoubtedly Roberts
was concerned about the condition of his army, and in particular its inability to police the
whole country owing to numerical weakness. If his forces were split simply to protect the
Boers who had surrendered then his chances of invading the Transvaal would be slim.
Roberts's prime concern was to occupy the Boer republics, and to bring the war to an end
in a conventional way. Consequently, he was ready to resort to expedients that might
facilitate a speedy conclusion to the war in the OFS without denuding his army of men.
In this respect Roberts shared the same view as Mimer, the only difference being
that Mimer wanted to see signs of a permanent settlement, and not something that
appeared hasty and ill-thought out. This was evident in May when he made plain his
concern about Roberts's tactic of letting surrendered Boers go back to their farms, and
argued it was ill-conceived. Mimer felt that only those who lived in areas under the
complete control of the British army should be allowed to return home. Otherwise, those
living outside those areas should be sent to heavily guarded camps and only allowed back
once the country had been truly pacified. Furthermore, Mimer advocated warning those
surrendering and who lived in unsecured districts, that they would be placed in custody
until the military authorities thought it safe for them to return. Mimer was anxious lest
Roberts to Mimer, 30 April 1900, MP IV/A/175/ff.20-21.
Ibid., (tel.), 4 May 1900, WO 105/34iC1470.
Ibid., (tel.), 9 May 1900, Ibid., C1532.
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the Boers should claim breach of faith when surrendering under the proclamation of 15
March and that they had not been given any warning.
Mimer was becoming very pessimistic about the end of the war and felt it would
not finish early. 'The present trend of events seem rather to point to a prolonged guerilla
warfare in the outlying districts.' His discouragement, however, was not shared by
Roberts to the same degree. Roberts was clearly aware that the military situation was
unfavourable, but felt his ideas should be given a chance. He was, therefore, unsure about
sending surrendered Boers to camps; by so doing, Roberts felt the British would merely
confirm Steyn's and the Transvaalers views, as they were telling the OFS Boers that
anyone who surrendered would be sent out of the country as prisoners. While Roberts
assured Milner that everything would be done to deprive the Boers of arms and horses,
he added that those who surrendered knew the risks, and knew also that the British could
do little to reduce them. As it was, those who surrendered and lived outside the zone of
occupation would not be allowed to return until the country had been cleared. Up to that
point some 400 men had surrendered and Roberts felt the present policy was worth
persevering with.
Milner was dismayed that Roberts believed Boer professions of war-weariness. 'In
most cases all it means is that they want a rest and look at their families & property.'
Mimer hoped that names of those returning were being collected and swift punishment
meted out to those who broke their oath. Milner though remained unconvinced: in his
view, too many surrendered Boers were falling prey to the commandos, whilst the motives
of those who surrendered remained questionable. But while Roberts claimed to have
obtained results, albeit of a limited nature, Milner could only remain on the sidelines
without being able to influence the course of events. This was a trying time for Milner.
Roberts to Mimer, (tel.), 14 May 1900; Mimer to Roberts, (tels.), 14 May 1900, Co 417t290/ff.35-
38. Colonel Brabant suggested that surrendered Boers be sent to the Cape for safe keeping; Milner agreed
in principle but wanted these Boers kept in secure areas in the OFS, to emphasise British protection. In
August 1900, the British authorities seriously contemplated the use of concentration camps. S. B. Spies,
Methods of Barbarism: Roberts, Kitchener and Civilians in the Boer Republics (Cape Town, 1977), p.47'
147-153.
Mimer's Diary of Events, 10 May 1900, CO 417/290/ff.83-84.
2 Roberts to Mimer, (tel.), 15 May 1900, WO 105/34/C1622.
Mimer to Roberts, (tel.), 17 May 1900, CO 417/290/f.213.
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Roberts's policy was not a clear demonstration of British power, and nothing was being
done to make the British occupation a reality. British forces were too few to be seen
everywhere, and where they were seen they were too weak to offer any real protection:
the country was not being settled in either a permanent or systematic manner. All Milner
could hope was that oath breakers would be punished severely, and their punishments well
publicised. It was with some misgivings, therefore, that Mimer received Roberts's
assurances that everything was being done to disarm the Boers, that they were tired of the
war, and that announcements of annexation and other proclamations would be enough to
induce the Boers to surrender.
On 24 May 1900, the OFS was formally annexed and four days later became
known officially as the Orange River Colony (ORC). If Roberts hoped the Boers would
consider the war to be over, then he was mistaken: the proclamation was ignored. On 1
June, therefore, a proclamation was issued which stated that citizens of the former OFS
still fighting would be treated as rebels and punished accordingly if they had not
surrendered within two weeks. This measure revealed that British efforts to end the
guerilla war were becoming desperate. On 31 May, a battalion of the Imperial Yeomanry
was captured by the Boers at Lindley; on 7 June, De Wet's forces overwhelmed three
garrisons in succession (at Rhenoster River, Roodewal and Vredefort). These disasters
were symptomatic of the problems facing the British. At Lindley, a British force had
occupied the town but had insufficient men to garrison it, and had left it empty after
marching on. The Imperial Yeomanry had then marched in thinking the main force still
there, only to find an overwhelming force of Boers had got there first. The need for troops
was so great that various towns were evacuated at times to provide them; places such as
Smithfield, Wepener, and Rouxville were all abandoned despite having been considered
important earlier. 30
 The basic tactics used against the Boers hardly changed during
Roberts's command. Columns of troops, overladen with transport and supplies, would
attempt to pursue the more mobile Boer commandos. They would march into a town,
march out again only for the Boers to reappear soon after. Sometimes, small garrisons
would be left, but they often proved unable to withstand a determined Boer attack, as the
Roberts to Mimer, (tels.), 19 & 23 May 1900, WO 105/34,1715, C1779.
3°F. Maurice & M.H. Grant (eds.), Hi.s:ory of the War in South Africa 1899-1902, (London, 1908),
ifi, pp.105-106, 115-116, 470-71. (The Official History).
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actions at Roodewal and Vredefort demonstrated. Roberts never had enough men to
provide for the columns, his field army and for permanent garrisons. As a result it proved
almost impossible to protect those who had surrendered. The situation was so desperate
that some of the generals began to fall out amongst themselves.
The Military Governor of Bloemfontein, General Pretyman, was in dispute with
the GOC(ORC) General Kelly-Kenny, over who was responsible for the pacification and
general administration of the occupied areas. Pretyman, who dealt with the civil side of
the occupation and whose subordinates were the civilian District Commissioners, was in
communication with both Mimer and Roberts. Consequently, he kept Mimer informed
about the problems he faced in dealing with the 'military' Kelly-Kenny, who was directly
responsible to Roberts, and the trouble caused by Kelly-Kenny's officers who clashed
incessantly with the District Commissioners over the administration of the occupied areas.
Milner was aware that the military authorities appeared to be acting high-handedly,
as he had already received complaints about their conduct; evidently, officers were seizing
stock without due reason, or purchased stock with 'chits' which were impossible to
redeem promptly.31
 Surprisingly perhaps, Pretyman confirmed that Mimer's enquiries
were true. Officers were seizing stock without care or attention, 'I must, however, tell you
that I have been greatly handicapped by the unnecessary interference of certain general
officers in my administration of the more settled districts.' Pretyman did not elaborate, but
explained he was writing to Roberts about 'chits,' so they could be redeemed quickly, and
would not honour those presented by speculators.32
For Milner, all this was plain evidence that the military were incapable of
sustaining a coherent and systematic administration. If the soldiers were falling out
amongst themselves within the limited areas they had apparently pacified, what hope was
there that they could succeed in bringing the rest of the region under military control, and
if the situation in the ORC was to be the standard by which Lord Roberts and his officers
operated then the prospects of a swift pacification of the Transvaal looked bleak. Mimer
had plans for the Transvaal and he was unprepared to stand idly by while the military
went chasing after Boers, without achieving any results.
' Mimer to Pretyman, 20 June 1900, Headlam, II, pp.133-134.
32 Pretyman to Mimer, 26 June 1900, MP IV/A/173/ff.17a-19. For the acrimonious corresponcience
between Pretyman and Kelly-Kenny, and Roberts reprimand of Pretyman see, RI' 57/ff.24-51 & 11113/989.
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Ill
On 27 May 1900, Roberts's army crossed the river Vaal and began the invasion
of the Transvaal. In response the Boers attacked Roberts's lengthening supply lines,
garrisons and railway and telegraph communications. These attacks did nothing to
harmonize the relationship between Milner and Roberts. Nor did they improve Roberts's
relations with London. The reputation of the British government had been saved by
Roberts's victories, although not enough to shake off all criticism. Moreover, events
elsewhere in the world presaged a possible clash with other European powers, and
reawoke critics who became concerned at the over extension of Britain's military
resources, most of which were in South Africa. This combination of foreign and imperial
crises also began to undermine Cabinet cohesion, as certain departmental heads pressed
for a greater consideration of their interests. Consequently, as the war in South Africa
dragged on, so the government became more anxious.
A notable effect of the various crises was the drawing together of Mimer and the
British government. Earlier, their interests had diverged over Milner's interference with
Roberts's strategy; but as the British army entered the Transvaal their interests began to
coincide. Yet both had different reasons for this convergence. Milner wanted a change in
tactics to defeat the Boers and a change in strategy to permit the effective administration
of the conquered areas. On the other hand, the government wanted to see immediate
results to save money and to divert resources to other crises. Each then had their own
particular reasons for wanting the war to finish quickly. Yet what they found, despite the
convergence of interests, was great difficulty in trying to impose civilian interests in the
face of military exigencies. While Mimer's and the government's concerns appeared
similar, they were not close enough to ensure a collective approach against the military
conduct of the war. As a result they were unable to influence Roberts when they felt the
war was going badly.
At first Lansdowne had acquiesced in Roberts's attempt to treat the Boers
leniently. However, as this policy had not succeeded in abating the guerilla war,
Lansdowne told Roberts that:
experience has shown that your confidence has been grossly abused & you
will be supported if you insist on thorough going measures for disanning
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the suspect part of the population, and if you inflict stern retribution where
unfair advantage has been taken of your clemency.33
Lansdowne, and no doubt the government, were anxious about the lack of results. After
all, Roberts's army had been in the ORC for about three months and had effectively
defeated the Boer army. By 6 June 1900, both Johannesburg and Pretoria had fallen (31
May and 5 June respectively) and ministers sensed that the war might soon be over, in
fact some of them were already discussing the possibility of troop withdrawals.
Lansdowne, however, felt it was too early to begin taking troops from South Africa, or
to stop sending drafts there either. As he told Salisbury, 'Until we can form an estimate
of the amount of opposition still to be encountered, it would. ..be unwise to relax the
pressure.'
The fact that the campaign had still to be concluded in its conventional form
assisted Roberts in his dealings with the civil authorities. He believed Boer opposition was
insubstantial. The armies of the former republics now appeared to be operating separately,
and these were inconsiderable in number. The war in the Transvaal, like that in the ORC,
was now turning into a guerilla war, but Roberts was confident it would not last long in
that form. He admitted the commandos were a nuisance, threatening railways and
telegraph lines, but believed he had been right to advance on Pretoria and would be
'greatly disappointed if our being here does not result in the war being soon brought to
a conclusion.'35
Looking at the problem from a conventional military point of view, Roberts, like
many others, believed that the capture of the visible symbols of Boer nationhood would
be enough to terminate the war. Roberts was not alone in thinking the Boers prized their
towns and particularly the goldfields. For example, in June 1899, Major Aitham had stated
that the Boer was no longer a simple nomad:
The wealth in the land has excited him; the taint of corruption has reached
him; his hopes and desires for favours in the shape of railways, personal
loans, or good bargains are concentrated in the official offices at Pretoria
or the markets of Johannesburg, and not a few of the old Boers are taking
" Lansdowne to Roberts, 19 May 1900, RP 34/f.373.
Lansdowne to Salisbury, 6 June 1900, SP LC/ff.556-557.
Roberts to Lansdowne, 7 June 1900, RP 110/3/538.
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up a permanent residence in Pretoria to watch over their own interests on
the spot, leaving their sons to take care of the farms.
There were good reasons, therefore, for Roberts to capture key population centres, If
Roberts hoped the Boers would stand and fight for their towns then he was disappointed,
because they were abandoned without a struggle. Even without the luxury of a set-piece
battle, Roberts could still reasonably hope that the capture of the towns would weaken
Boer morale to such an extent that they would offer terms. This revealed however his
inability to comprehend the nature of the enemy he was fighting.
Yet he had no real reason to suppose the guerilla war might be protracted. In any
case, Roberts could not admit it would be, or that it would cause undue difficulty. Roberts
obviously had confidence in his own ability and, perhaps more importantly, had a
reputation to maintain as well. Moreover, it must be remembered that even after the fall
of Pretoria, General Botha had kept the Transvaal army in being, and despite its numerical
weakness it still represented the military power of the Transvaal. As this army remained
astride the last railway link with the outside world it could still hope that some form of
help might arrive. Until the Boers had been completely cut off from the outside world,
Roberts still had room for optimism because once Botha's forces were defeated, the Boers
might finally recognise the hopelessness of their cause and surrender. For all Roberts
knew, the existence of Botha's army might have been the one factor that kept the guerilla
bands operating; once they knew of its defeat then they too might finally see that all was
lost. Thus it was for these reasons that Roberts kept a bold front when corresponding with
the government, and until the defeat of Botha's army the government could at least
appreciate why Roberts could not comply with their wishes.
It was not long before Roberts's confident tones became more gloomy. Roberts
began to realise that his forces could not defeat the guerillas and march to the
Mozambique frontier at the same time. This became more apparent after Lansdowne
telegraphed Roberts on 22 June. Lansdowne revealed that the international crisis arising
from the Boxer Rebellion in China was causing the Cabinet great anxiety. He still
believed it was too early to begin reducing the army in South Africa; but felt Roberts
Memo. by Aitham, 3 June 1899, WO 32/7844/079/8501.
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should keep the matter under consideration, especially when peace was assured!
Roberts, however, did not think any troops could be spared until September, the Boers
were active against the lines of communication and it was taking time to get counter-
measures, in the form of mounted columns, ready and active. Meanwhile, the Boers were
destroying bridges and culverts at will. 38 This last communication was shown to the
Cabinet, which confirmed they were now taking a greater interest in the day-to-day
conduct of the campaign. Whether Roberts was aware of this is uncertain, but he seemed
to have regretted his less than cheerful note of 24 June because four days later he was
more optimistic as he stated, 'beyond cutting the telegraph wire and destroying a culvert
here and there, I doubt their being able to do us much harm.' He did acknowledge,
however, that British difficulties elsewhere were giving fresh impetus to the Boer military
effort.39
Roberts obviously realised there was no advantage in being pessimistic about the
guerilla war; after all he had accused Buller of undue pessimism. Roberts had to be
careful to ensure he presented a balanced version of events to the government. If he
admitted he could not stop the guerilla war, or minimise its effects, then he would seem
to have failed. Conversely, he could not present too rosy a picture otherwise the
government might insist on taking some of his troops, when he was barely able to fight
the guerillas and the conventional war. As it was, Roberts appeared to have succeeded in
this balancing act because the government did not insist he make a definite statement on
the condition of the campaign.
Before Roberts could embark on the final campaign, however, he had to build up
his supplies and rest his men. Not surprisingly, the attacks on his communications began
to affect adversely the speed with which this could be achieved. Consequently, Roberts's
methods of dealing with the commandos, and those who aided and abetted them, became
more drastic. This change in tactics reflected the failure of the policy of leniency, and the
fact that the commando raids were becoming more than just a nuisance. As a result, on
16 and 19 June 1900, Roberts acknowledged this failure with the issue of two
Lansdowne to Roberts, (tel.), 22 June 1900, WO 105f30/f.318.
Roberts so Lansdowne, (tel.), 24 June 1900, CAB 37/54/144.
Roberts to Lansdowne, 28 June 1900, RP 110/3/606.
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proclamations (nos 5 & 6) aimed against the guerillas. The main clauses stated that
property in the vicinity of a Boer raid was liable to be destroyed as it was deemed to have
harboured the culprits, and civilians would be used as hostages on trains in order to
prevent the destruction of the railway. The latter clause was not used much at first owing
to the outcry it provoked in Britain, but in July, as the raids increased Roberts reactivated
it. However, George Fiddes, Roberts's Political Secretary, objected to this policy stating
it was unproductive because it was an inducement to the Boers to blow up those who had
surrendered, it upset those who had surrendered in good faith, and it shamed the
army.4° Consequently, this procedure was dropped, but the policy of destroying
property continued. Roberts firmly believed in the efficacy of these measures, as he later
told General Clery:
I am not in favour of lessening the punishment laid down for any damage
done to our railway and telegraph lines. Unless the people generally are
made to suffer for misdeeds of those in arms against us the war will never
end.4'
Roberts told Lansdowne he was no longer treating the Boers leniently. In the Transvaal
particularly the guerilla war was more pronounced and he was using:
much more severe measures than formerly. The people are beginning to
understand this now, and the raids on the railway, cutting the telegraph
wire, etc., are not nearly so frequent as they were.42
Yet Roberts was becoming sensitive to general comments or criticisms of his campaign.
He complained of the criticism about the length of time his forces had spent in Pretoria,
arguing the delay was caused by his having to direct numerous minor operations. In fact
his comments to Lansdowne on 18 August showed how discouraged Roberts was
becoming. He now blamed the guerilla war for delaying operations and conceded that this
aspect of the campaign was wasting too many of his soldiers in fruitless secondary
operations. No doubt it was with some relief when he told Lansdowne he was about to
resume his march, and 'I trust they [operations] will have successful, if not final, result.'43
4° Fiddes to Roberts, (tel.), 23 July 1900, WO 105t25/Index.No.66/ff.18-27; Spies, pp.103-109.
41 Roberts to Clery, 17 Sept 1900, RP 111/8/2371.
42 Roberts to Lansdowne, 16 Aug 1900, RP 110/31767.
4° Roberts to Lansdowne, (tel.), 18 August 1900, RP 110/31782.
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Roberts's advance on Komati Poort was effectively the last stage of the
conventional war. Much was hoped from the success of this enterprise, not least the total
capitulation of the Boers. Although China continued to trouble the government,
Lansdowne told Salisbury, 'The South African news is good, and I hope we may soon
hear of proposals for peace.' On 1 September Roberts formally annexed the Transvaal.
This was followed by a proclamation on 13 September which called on the Boers to
surrender. On 25 September, Roberts's forces occupied Komati Poort, and the Boers were
cut off from the outside world.
The remorseless march of the British army made the defeat of Botha's forces
inevitable. Few doubted that the war would be over once Komati Poort had been reached,
and the only bone of contention outstanding concerned the seriousness of the guerilla war.
Roberts informed Lansdowne and Mimer on 2 September that, as the attacks on his
communications continued and that the Boer general Christian De Wet had publicly stated
his intention to attack British outposts at every opportunity, sterner measures were
required. In June, Roberts had sent families of combatants who were residing in
Johannesburg and Pretoria to Botha's forces, as he believed they should not be supplied
at British expense. He further informed Botha that any farm near the scene of a Boer
attack would be destroyed and those within a ten-mile radius would be cleared of stock
and supplies. Moreover all remaining families who had not been removed would be sent
to Botha's headquarters.45 Roberts was becoming increasingly irritated by the wilfulness
of the Boers, by their inability to see that their cause was lost. In fact, throughout August
and into September, British units had carried out a policy of devastation in the countryside
and especially against buildings in and around the railways. Indeed, farm burning began
to be carried out with what Spies calls 'a casual ruthlessness'; and Roberts later told
Botha he would send Boer families out on the veldt 'regardless of whether they were able
to support themselves or not.'
Lansdowne certainly supported a stringent policy at this time. The government
clearly believed the Boers were finished and it was only a matter of time before they
Lansdowne to Salisbury, 31 Aug 1900, SP LC/ff.585-586.
' Roberts to Lansdowne & Milner, (tels.), 2 Sept 1900, WO 105f27,70/3/f.4.
Spies, pp.124, 135.
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surrendered. Lansdowne informed Roberts of government backing and told him to do
everything and anything to bring the war to an end because the government was seriously
concerned about events outside South Africa. Although the Boxer rebellion had been
crushed in June, the crisis in China continued, owing to the Russians seizing territory in
Manchuria. Lansdowne explained:
At the moment we are [spread] all over the face of the Earth, & the
knowledge that we have so much on our hands weakens us diplomatically.
Six days later, Lansdowne told him that severity had the support of the 'man in the
street,' especially after Roberts had tried to be lenient; it was time to abandon 'kid gloves'
and resort to sterner measures. 'This is what you have done & the new departure has been
welcomed.
In the letter of 13 September, Lansdowne revealed the other major factor which
disturbed the Cabinet - the cost of the war. Lansdowne himself was under constant
pressure from the Treasury; in fact since the occupation of Pretoria the Treasury had
continually demanded that the army in South Africa be reduced. All Lansdowne could do
was argue that Roberts's measures would soon have the desired effect of ending Boer
resistance. Hicks Beach was not placated by Lansdowne's assurances and repeatedly
called for a reduction in troop numbers; he even wanted Salisbury to intervene directly
and order Roberts to tailor his strategy towards lessening costs and troops. By showing
the Cabinet the earlier correspondence, Lansdowne managed to allay their concerns for
the time being.48
 Although Hicks Beach was not the most popular member of the Cabinet
his views regarding the cost of the war did not have to be elaborated or continually
reiterated. Ministers were aware that costs had risen dramatically since the first estimates
had been produced almost a year before. Yet they faced a dilemma in trying to redress
this problem. First they had to be careful not to alienate the electorate by increasing the
tax burden, particularly on those sections of society from which they drew their support.
Secondly, they could not impress this point too forcefully on Roberts otherwise they might
have a public dispute with the country's favourite general. It was difficult for the
' Lansdowne to Roberts, 7 & 13 Sept 1900, RP 34/f .405, 406.
See above, pp.104-106; Yakutiel, pp.124-125, 130-133.
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government to know just how much pressure to apply; for the time being it had to be in
the form of gentle persuasion because the war appeared to be coming to an end.
Indeed, everything was being prepared for the war to be terminated. Roberts
reported from near Komati Poort that now, 'the settlement of the country will be more a
civil than a military duty.' He explained that Baden-Powell was now organising a police
force and that, hopefully, by October, he could start sending troops home.49 A week
later, he modified his predictions and stated that few regulars could be spared, but
intimated that the various volunteer regiments - South African, Dominion and British -
would be disbanded first. This was favourably acknowledged by Lansdowne who was
pleased the volunteers would go first as they were the most expensive troops in the
army.5° For the moment, relations between the British government and Roberts were
cordial. Ministers had no need to apply unnecessary pressure because the war seemed to
be over, and Roberts was proving responsive to their anxieties.
Mimer' s hopes of a rapid end to the war, like those of the government, were raised
by Roberts's advance on Komati Poort. The apparent inevitability of a successful
conclusion to the campaign allowed Mimer to devote more time to consideration of the
future. As virtually all the major population centres had been taken by the British, he told
Chamberlain that it was time the occupied areas were properly pacified. Milner was not
concerned whether Botha's forces escaped into the northern regions of the Transvaal as
these areas were bad for horses and lacked supplies. Mimer did not want to see British
troops and resources wasted against these men because it would not help in pacifying the
captured territories. Any further advances would only expose more lines of communication
to attack.51
Two weeks later, as Roberts's final objective was in sight, Milner reiterated his
views on the military situation more explicitly. He was particularly annoyed at the tactics
being used by the army. He could not see the use of troops occupying a town one moment
and then being withdrawn the next to go chasing Boers, only to give those Boers the
luxury of recapturing the town. Throughout the South African winter months, especially
' Roberts to Lansdowne, 16 Sept 1900, RP 110/4/865.
°Ibid., (tel.), 25 Sept 1900, CAB 37/53170; Lansdowne to Roberts, 12 Oct 1900, RP 34/f.416.
' Mimer to Chamberlain, (tel.), 5 Sept 1900, CO 417t293/ff.682-683.
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between July and August, troops had been plundered from garrisons to assist in what
became known as the first De Wet Hunt. These operations, however, were not the only
ones being conducted: in the western Transvaal, General De La Rey was active, obliging
the British to divert forces to hunt his commando. Mimer felt that chasing Boers the
length and breadth of the old republics was both slow and wasteful, instead he advocated:
the occupation, with a fixed resolve not to be turned out or to withdraw,
of some commanding position in every district, which will form a base of
supplies, and a rallying point for our friends or the neutrals who may
require protection, and our firm retention of which will convince the people
that we have come to stay. This is, in my opinion, a point of supreme
importance.
The main advantage of this method would be that British troops could operate from
numerous supply bases and not be hindered by having to take transport with them. Mimer
felt the commandos would soon be discouraged as they would be unable to penetrate the
strongpoints, or evade the columns operating between them. Mimer added that the
protraction of the war prevented the restarting of industry, by which he meant the
goldfields. While industry lay idle, the refugees from Johannesburg, who had fled to the
Cape and Natal, were becoming destitute. In short, the guerilla war was not only
impoverishing the countryside, it was ruining industry and the people who worked it.52
The latter part of Mimer's lengthy communication was particularly important
because he laid special emphasis on the speedy rehabilitation of the Transvaal and its
economy. While the army seemed incapable of settling the countryside, Mimer's
annoyance became more discernible. Thus, by the time Roberts's forces had taken Komati
Poort, Milner and the British government had converged after the breach earlier in the
year. This convergence had been steady since the occupation of the ORC, and by the end
of September Milner and the British government were once again united in wishing to see
a rapid end to substantial, regular military operations. Although the interests of Mimer and
the government overlapped, their different priorities kept them apart. Thus, despite the
united front shown by the politicians in both London and South Africa, they were unable
to use it to ensure Roberts took notice of their views.
52 Ibid., 19 Sept, CO 4171294/ff.146-150.
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Iv
Simultaneously with these developing problems in the ORC, Mimer and Roberts
also faced difficulties of other kinds from May 1900 in reaching agreement on how to
proceed in the Transvaal. For Mimer, it was important that the new Colony be pacified
as quickly as possible to facilitate his plans for the rebuilding of a new British South
Africa. Mimer wanted to see the mining industry restarted promptly, so as to provide the
financial resources for reconstruction. The best method of achieving this, as far as Mimer
was concerned, was a short period of military government immediately followed by a
substantial term of 'autocratic' civilian government 53 To do this, to clear the 'Augean
stable' that was the Transvaal, also meant that Milner relinquished his post as Governor
of Cape Colony to become Governor of the Transvaal; he still kept his position as High
Commissioner. Mimer felt that his idea of a new, British South Africa could only be
created from the Transvaal itself - the centre as he called it. Mimer thought Cape Colony
was beyond redemption:
But if we make the T.V [Transvaal] what it ought to be, the Colony will
matter less, and in the long run, with the heart sound, the whole body will
be saved, especially as Orange River is, I believe, easily saveable.M
For Milner, therefore, the reconstruction of the Transvaal was of the utmost importance.
The success of his venture would make or break the British Empire in South Africa.
Consequently, civil-military relations were soured further by two problems, both linked
and both dependent on the resolution of the other before one could be fully resolved.
These were the fate of the Uitlander refugees in Cape Colony and Natal, and the
establishment of a paramilitary police force to provide the means for the transition from
military to civilian policing. In this section the fate of the refugees and how this issue
embittered civil-military relations will be discussed.
As early as 10 May 1900, Milner and Roberts had been in contact over the fate
of the Trans vaal. This was just before the capture of Johannesburg and Mimer was already
"Ibid., 9 May 1900, Headlam, II, pp.142-144.
54 Ibid., 30 May 1900, Ibid., pp.145-146.
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determined to make his views known. Mimer was plainly pushing for the establishment
of civil administration and was particularly interested in the formation of a new police
force, one which would not only police Johannesburg, but eventually the country districts
also. But until these districts were pacified, Mimer acknowledged that the refugees could
not be allowed back. He was aware the single line railway would not be capable of
supplying the army and a growing civilian population. 55
 Mimer's uncontroversial, and
apparently sensible, views found favour with Roberts. These ideas were, as Roberts stated,
'general principles,' and both officials found it easy to agree at this level. But as the
campaign unfolded and the guerilla war took root further agreement became difficult to
achieve.
On 1 June 1900, Mimer began to consider ideas regarding who of the Uitlanders
should be allowed back to Johannesburg. He was prompted to do so by the Chamber of
Mines which wanted 580 staff members (drawn from a total of 12,541 employees) to be
given permission to return to the city. Despite his earlier pronouncements to the contrary,
on 10 May for example, Mimer now favoured this idea. In Cape Colony, the refugee
problem was acute. Many refugees were destitute and were protesting about their
conditions; while the British government was unwilling to supply public money for their
relief. Moreover, refugees in Britain were about to return owing to Roberts's victories. In
any case, Milner was eager to see industry restarted: he explained to Roberts that by
allowing these representatives back into Johannesburg, 'we shall satisfy industry,
strengthen our hands in refusing miscellaneous inrush and prepare the way for prompt
resumption of business whenever a larger population can be admitted.' In addition to
employees of the mines, Mimer wished to see representatives from the commercial sector
allowed back; this again was to resist massive applications in the near future. It seems
Mimer's eagerness and enthusiasm got the better of him. He gave no thought to the
problems Roberts either faced or might have to face in the future. No consideration, for
example, was given to the problem of supplying these people, and none to the pressure
that might be exerted by others wishing to return. Milner's somewhat bland assurances
" Mimer to Roberts, 10 May 1900, MP IV/A/175/ff.68-70.
Roberts to Mimer, 16 May 1900, Ibid., ff.28-30.
Mimer to Roberts, (tel.), 1 June 1900, CO 417/290/ff.781-782.
111
that to allow a few back would be enough to reassure those left behind was based on
nothing but conjecture. He ignored the possibility that the opposite effect might happen,
the few becoming an avalanche of humanity, which the authorities would be hard pressed
to stop. While Roberts agreed in principle with Mimer's suggestion he made no firm
promises and merely said he hoped to fix a date sooner rather than later.58
Although Mimer seemed, for the moment, to accept Roberts' evasive reply, others
began pressing Mimer to get a timetable prepared for the return of the refugees. The
Standard Bank, for example, was anxious to know what coin was left in their branches
in Johannesburg and Pretoria. As they were the army's bankers, Mimer felt some of their
men ought to return; perhaps Milner was content to use the applications of others to
persuade Roberts, rather than keep pressing the Field-Marshal himself. But pressure also
mounted on Milner as the mines, the banks, insurance companies and various other
organizations, agitated for permission to return. Indeed the avalanche Mimer had not
suspected had begun to develop; he even stated that the first batch to return should
contain representatives from all these institutions, which would number about 1,000. In
just over two weeks, the 580 suggested by the Chamber of Mines had nearly doubled; by
endorsing their suggestion, Milner had pulled the first stone of the avalanche?
Unfortunately for Milner, Roberts was unable to meet his requests. Roberts blamed
the insufficiency of engines and the lack of supplies for refusing to allow a large number
of civilians to return to Johannesburg. As a sop, Roberts was prepared to allow twenty
persons to come north.6° In fact, the supply situation was serious. A few days after
Roberts's refusal, he telegraphed Milner requesting that the prohibition on trading with
the enemy be lifted. Furthermore, Lt-Colonel Gimuard, the Director of Railways, had
informed Kitchener that allowing mining officials to return would provoke trouble in the
irregular regiments drawn from Johannesburg. Girouard had heard that Mimer wanted 350
Roberts to Mimer, (tel.), 5 June 1900, Ibid., f.786.
Mimer to Roberts, (tels.), 7 & 17 June 1900, Ibid., ff.102, 109.
60 Roberts to Milner, (tel.), 26 June 1900, CO 417/291/f.328.
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employees to return but knew that former mine managers serving with the Johannesburg
regiments would resent newcomers arriving at the mines and doing their old jobs.61
Mimer was aware of this problem. If he was hoping that pressure from the
refugees would make Roberts relent, then he was wrong. Mimer asked Roberts if only
those granted permits might be allowed to return, a suggestion which Roberts dismissed
because 'at present there are military reasons against it. I would be very glad if you would
undertake the granting of passes when the Military situation admits of civilians coming
up.'62
Roberts was hinting that the situation was far from satisfactory. How unsatisfactory
Milner soon discovered. He had, in collaboration with leading Uitlanders, been compiling
a list of those most suitable for an early return. In this way, Milner could send north any
number Roberts decided to allow in. It must have been a great disappointment, therefore,
for Mimer to learn of the fate of the twenty representatives Roberts had allowed to return
to Johannesburg. First, they were detrained at Bloemfontein, and secondly were told by
Girouard that they could only stay for a month. Milner considered this stipulation
preposterous. To treat the representatives of the mining industry in such a way was
absurd, especially as 'they have been most reasonable and helpful throughout and can be
of immense use in the future.'63
Roberts was experiencing troubles of his own. The day after receiving Mimer's
complaint, he told him that news of the twenty representatives had been received badly
by members of the various Uitlander regiments, who felt their jobs would be lost. This
was the reason for the delay. Members of the Railway Pioneers and Imperial Light Horse
(ILH) had threatened to resign if the refugees arrived in Johannesburg and, as Roberts
explained, some troops from De Montmorency's scouts had actually done so. Roberts did
not want others to follow their example and create a shortage of troops he could ill afford.
As it was, two days earlier Roberts had been obliged to tell Mackenzie, the Military
Governor of Johannesburg, to instruct Samuel Evans and other mine managers not to
"Roberts to Mimer, (tel.), 1 July 1900, RP 11113/835; Gimuard to Chief of Staff, (tel.), ND, WO
105134/Political Secretary File. Mimer rescinded the proclamation forbidding trade with the enemy on 2 or
3 July, Milner to Roberts, (tel.), 2 July 1900, CO 417/292/ff.527-528.
62 Milner to Roberts, (tel.), 1 July 1900; Roberts to Milner, (tel.), 2 July 1900, Ibid., ff.201-202.
' Milner to Roberts, 5 July 1900, MI' IV/A/175/ff.98-99; (tel.), 5 July 1900, CO 417/292/f.203.
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communicate with men from the Uitlander regiments because of the unrest it caused.
Roberts also began to lose patience with the Uitlander soldiers themselves and threatened
that if any resigned they would be sent back to their place of enlistment and not be
allowed to return to Johannesburg. As most had enlisted in Cape Colony or Natal this was
quite a threat.M
The opposition of the Uitlander regiments was proving irksome to Mimer. He
already had enough trouble persuading the high command to resume work on the mines;
what he did not need was trouble from a quarter that, to him, had no reason to be
troublesome. Milner felt the action of the irregulars to be short-sighted and wholly
unwarranted.65
 Annoyingly for Mimer, Roberts chose to give his own needs priority,
viewing the effect of a large-scale withdrawal of service with dismay. He told Mimer he
would now allow the representatives only ten days in Johannesburg. Mimer was quite
irritated by Roberts's lack of co-operation; he sent the Field-Marshal messages from the
Chamber of Mines which promised to hold open the jobs of those on active service,
alongside protestations that the Uitlander soldiers could have thought their employers so
inconsiderate.67
 Mimer though was caught in a quandary. He recognised it would take
months before a sufficient number of refugees could return and restart industry. He
admitted as much to Chamber1ain, which begs the question why did he continue to
harass the military? Presumably, Mimer still wanted to keep the issue alive, so that all
returns would occur as soon as possible; furthermore, he was unable to remain idle, and
the representatives of the Uitlanders refused to let him do so. And to add to Milner's
frustrations the military situation continued to worry him, particularly after outposts
around Pretoria were attacked, costing the British several hundred men and two guns.
On 21 July 1900, Roberts began his march on Komati Poort. Milner's hopes of a
quick end to the war now that Roberts had embarked on his final campaign may have got
Roberts to Milner, (tel.), 6 July 1900; to Mackenzie, (tel.), 4 July 1900 RP 11113/898, 877.
Milner to Roberts, (tel.), 9 July 1900, CO 417f292/ff.205.
Roberts to Mimer, (tel.), 9 July 1900, Ibid., L208.
' Milner to Roberts, (tel.), 9 July 1900, Ibid., f.206.
61 Mimer to Chamberlain, (teL), 11 July 1900, Ibid., ff.191-193.
Milner to Chamberlain, (teL), 18 July 1900, Ibid., f.427.
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the better of him, because nine days later he sent a long note to the Field-Marshal
outlining the difficulties he faced. The 'impatience of the exiles' troubled him greatly. He
acknowledged that the fall of Pretoria had heightened expectations unrealistically, but the
attitude of the irregulars had incensed the refugees. Perhaps Milner felt this note would
be a last plea to Roberts. He tried to explain that by allowing some representatives back
in order to restart industry, the irregulars would benefit once they were disbanded. But
recognising how matters were decided in South Africa, Mimer added that it was up to
Roberts to judge and that he would back him whatever decision was made.7°
Roberts, unable to escape Mimer's pleas even when away campaigning, replied
rather testily. 'There is not the least use in the exiles worrying themselves about
Johannesburg, no one will be allowed to return until peace is made.'71 This
uncompromising statement revealed Roberts's own impatience with events. Probably
Roberts believed his march would end in final victory and that the refugees could be put
off until then - when he had either left South Africa or was in the process of leaving. But
as Roberts's march proceeded so refugee impatience grew, forcing Mimer to continue
pestering him for an early resolution of this difficulty. Not unnaturally expectations
amongst the refugees had begun to rise again as the end of the war was in sight, and the
further the campaign progressed the greater the anticipation. Thus, throughout August and
up to the capture of Komati Poort on 25 September, the refugee problem continued to
plague civil-military relations. It was not surprising it should do so considering how many
refugees were destitute. Mimer explained that the refugees knew that 'notorious anti-
British traders' were operating in Johannesburg and resented it. (This was no doubt a
consequence of the lifting of the proclamation which forbade trading with the enemy.) He
recommended, therefore, that twenty representatives of the commercial interest be allowed
to return, just as those of the mining companies had earlier. To this Roberts agreed, but
only for a week! Nevertheless, the anticipated conclusion of the war created a climate
which generated much tension between Milner and Roberts. More than anything this
° Milner to Roberts, 30 July 1900, RP 45/f.37.
71 Roberts to Milner, 10 Aug 1900, MP IV/A/175/ff.52-56. Mimer wrote on his copy, 'Keep. More
sanguine than convincing.'
Mimer to Fiddes & Roberts, (tels.), 8 & 16 Aug 1900; Fiddes to Mimer, (tel.), 14 Aug 1900 CO
4171293/ff.459, 474, 460. Roberts to Kitchener, (tel.), 29 Aug 1900, RP 11117/1956.
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tension led to the development of false hopes and a failure to appreciate the direction the
war was taking.
For Roberts, the growing impatience of the refugees, coupled with criticism
emanating from both the British and South African public, became more irritating. In
having to defend himself he admitted that the guerilla war was far more dangerous than
first thought. 73
 Mimer's criticism of the army, however, was now becoming more
specialised. The inability of the army to get the refugees back to Johannesburg made
Milner think about the present course of the war. He was convinced the army was not
doing an efficient job, and he was losing confidence in Roberts. Milner was prepared to
admit that the process of subjugation would be slow, but emphasised the essential point
was to make some effort at establishing civil administration; which of course included
industry and commerce. He added, 'If we can confine resistance to a definite area - even
a wide one - sufficiently removed from the centres of industry, it will die of itself.' Mimer
was perturbed at the thought of Roberts having to conduct several minor campaigns,
which left him no time to consider establishing a civilian presence in the conquered
territories.74
 Consideration of the refugee problem and his own overwhelming desire to
begin the reconstruction of South Africa meant Milner was ready, once again, to interfere
in a politically dangerous area - military strategy. He was no longer content with trying
to hustle Roberts along, merely to ensure he did not forget important details which might
get lost in the minutiae of military technicalities.
Having appealed to London, Mimer tried to impress on Roberts that his policy of
leniency had failed and the requirement now was to detain able-bodied Boers in camps.
By so doing they would be kept away from the commandos, and reduce any inclination
to rejoin their former comrades. By keeping them in South Africa, moreover, it would
reduce the fear they might have of being sent abroad. As for the refugees, Milner merely
reiterated that destitution was rife.75
Milner's concerns, however, appeared to cut little ice with Roberts. He had his
hands full trying to conduct his campaign, the guerilla war and the deteriorating supply
Roberts to Milner, (tel.), 18 Aug 1900, WO 105/34,C3685. Lansdowne was sent the same note.
Mimer to Chamberlain, 22 Aug 1900, JC 13/1/56.
" Mimer to Roberts, 23 Aug 1900, RP 45/f.38.
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problem in the Transvaal. Roberts telegraphed Milner offering little hope to the refugees,
and stated, rather sarcastically, 'It might perhaps satisfy some people who are eager to
return to Johannesburg if they were told there is a meat famine there, and that horses have
now to be eaten by the few civil residents in the place.' 76 Such was the seriousness of
the supply problem that Roberts had to go begging to the Natal authorities for the use of
engines from the Natal railway. As a result, he had to promise Natal due consideration
in the trade to supply the Rand with food?7 Indeed, on 29 August, Roberts even ordered
Kitchener to plunder other lines of rolling-stock in order to supply his army marching on
Komati Poort
The impending conclusion of the war brought on by Roberts's successful march
was indeed raising British hopes eveiywhere. Mimer's appeal to London had seemed to
work because Chamberlain replied by expressing his frustration about the delay in
establishing civil administration. He was also disappointed that a military police force had
not yet been formed, and agreed that business should be restarted on the Rand. He felt
that thousands of 'Englishmen' back on the Rand, suitably armed would have a
disquieting effect on the Boers. Chamberlain hoped that Roberts's impending success
would, in conjunction with the establishment of a police force, mean that Roberts could
start sending regular troops home?9
 Mimer had obviously struck a chord when he had
written to Chamberlain on 22 August, although not as deeply as he might have hoped. The
government was still reluctant to press Roberts as the results of his campaign had yet to
be known. For the Cabinet, the peace dividend they anticipated did not match Milner's
sufficiently enough to warrant a direct questioning of Roberts's conduct; nor was it the
time to do so as optimism was running high. The thought of reduced costs and the ability
to reassert British interests throughout the world more forcibly was enough for the
Cabinet.
76 Rob to Milner, (tel.), 23 Aug 1900, WO 105134/0811. Roberts explained this more subtly in
a letter to Milner, in which he agreed with Mimer's suggestion about the internment of Boer prisoners. He
also agreed that leniency had failed and that it was time for harsher measures. Roberts to Milner 3 Sept
1900, MP IV/A/175/ff.58-61.
Roberts to Hely-Hutchinson, 30 Aug & 9 Sept 1900, RP 11117/1974, 2198.
7' Roberts to Kitchener, (tel.), 29 Aug 1900, RP 11117/1957. Roberts calculated he would require 4
trains of 13 trucks eh every day from Pretoria.
' Chamberlain to Mimer, 10 Sept 1900, IC 13/1/68.
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In any case, Mimer had little to complain about. On 13 September he had sent
another imploring note to Roberts about the destitution of the refugees. This time he asked
Roberts to be more forthcoming about setting a date when they could return. 8° Having
returned to Pretoria early, with his army in sight of Komati Poort, Roberts clearly felt
more confident about the turn of events. Consequently, he was able to inform Mimer that
supply trains for civilians would be sent once a week and, therefore, he could permit a
select few to return. For the first time Roberts gave Mimer a date - 10 October - when
the first Uitlanders could return to Johannesburg.8'
The setting of a date for the return of the refugees had raised expectations, which
were boosted by Roberts's announcement that with enough trains, some 3,000 refugees
could be moved north every week. The only proviso was that veterans, men who had
served in the Uitlander regiments, and particularly those who had been wounded or were
sick ought to be given precedence. Indeed, Roberts was extremely conscious of
placating the Uitlander volunteers, especially after the problems he had encountered
earlier. He told Generals Buller and Hildyard on 4 October that they were to discharge
10% of their irregulars to enable them to reach Johannesburg before the refugees from the
Cape and Natal. As the war seemed over, the various volunteer corps were clainouring
for their release. The problem here was that although Roberts could save the British
government money by discharging the volunteers - and as these were paid 5/- a day they
were the most expensive men in the British anny - he would create problems for himself.
The discharge of some of the finest mounted troops would create a shortage of such men
at a time when he needed all the forces he could muster. Roberts could not stop the return
of the British units; the Dominion soldiers he could keep a little longer, but for those who
lived in South Africa it was a different matter. These he could insist remained on active
service as the war was in their homeland and had still not subsided. Roberts wanted
Milner to assure Colonel Wools Sampson, commander of the ILH, that his men would be
given preferential treatment when applying for jobs in the newly forming police or
Mimer to Roberts, 13 Sept 1900, RP 45/f.41.
• Roberts to Mimer, (tel.), 22 Sept 1900, WO 105f34/C4863.
Roberts to Milner, (tel.), 28 Sept 1900, WO 105f34/C5055.
'3 Roberts to Bullet and Hildyard, (tets.), 4 Oct 1900, RP 11 1,W2776, 2777.
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elsewhere, principally to keep the regiment together. TM
 In fact over the next three or four
days, Roberts despatched a host of telegrams endeavouring to keep the Uitlander
regiments in the field with a promise of preferential treatment.
Two telegrams to Mimer on 10 October revealed Roberts's concern. First he
wanted only fit and loyally disposed men to return to Johannesburg, after having agreed
to serve in a volunteer unit or the town guard. Second, he wanted Mimer to intercede with
Wools-Sampson for him, by utilising the services of Percy FitzPatrick, a leading
representative of the Uitlanders, as a mediator. 85 Roberts was sensitive to the demands
of the British government for the release of troops, but he had none to spare. He had to
be honest and admit the Boers were causing trouble and that he needed all the troops he
could muster. Disbanding the volunteers would be a retrograde step and deprive his
forces of good quality soldiers. Roberts was in such an awkward position that he was
forced to make strenuous appeals to the Chamber of Mines, asking that the volunteers be
given preferential treatment so as to prevent any trouble when the refugees arrived
home.V
Of course it was still too early for despondency about the fact that the occupation
of Komati Poort had not ended the war immediately. In truth, the Boers continued their
raids on the railways and telegraph lines, obliging Roberts grudgingly to praise their
endeavours. 'The persistency of the Boers is somewhat remarkable', he wrote, 'for the
damage done is soon repaired, and is invariably followed by severe punishment.' TM The
persistence of the Boers was causing more disappointment than Roberts would at first
admit. Supplies were not getting through and on 9 October railway repair parties were
attacked causing more disruption. Consequently, on 13 October, Roberts told the leading
civil and militaiy officials in South Africa - Mimer, Hely-Hutchinson, Girouard, Forestier-
'4 Roberts to Mimer, (tel.), 9 Oct 1900, RP 111/9/2846.
'3 Roberts to Milner, (tels.), 10 Oct 1900, WO 105134/C5434 & RP 11 1j9f2854.
"Roberts to Lansdowne, 11 Oct 1900, RP 110/4/970.
'7 Roberts to Pres. Chamber of Mines, (tel.), 11 Oct 1900, RP 11 1/9f2871.
"Roberts to Lansdowne, (tel.), 12 Oct 1900, WO 105/32/1339.
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Walker and Major-General Murray, [the GOC, Lines of Communication in Natal] - that
the departure of the refugees had been postponed.
For Mimer the blow must have been tremendous; once more, he was faced with
a crisis which he could do little to alleviate without the cooperation of the army. The
extent of his anger can be discerned by the fact that in a meeting with Roberts, he told
the Field-Marshal that he should leave South Africa and let Kitchener take over. Although
Mimer told Roberts in a polite manner and did not offend him, it is clear Mimer had
ceased to believe in Roberts as the man to finish the war. Indeed, Mimer began to
cultivate Kitchener and attempted to bring him round to his way of thinking, particularly
over the refugee crisis. Mimer had travelled north, had discussed the situation with
Roberts in Pretoria, and then spoken to Kitchener in Johannesburg. Afterwards, he
explained to Kitchener that it was imperative, both for military and political reasons, the
refugees be allowed back. Militarily, if thousands did return they could provide a reservoir
of potential volunteers for the army. Moreover they would be useful in catching spies and
counteracting their activities. Politically, if discontented refugees remained in Cape Colony
and became even more disenchanted, they might act as a spur to rebellious Afrikaners,
who might then take advantage of the discontent. Mimer was worried about the fact that
some 6-7,000 Boer prisoners were kept in the Western provinces amongst a sympathetic
population. He also tried to assure Kitchener that the problem with the irregulars would
disappear once they were properly informed about the extent of the crisis and thought they
would not cause trouble as a result. He explained, 'I have fenced with their growing
impatience for 4 months, not altogether unsuccessfully; but I am getting to the end of my
tether.' As a token of the army's commitment to the refugees, Mimer wished for 6,000
tons of supplies to be sent to Johannesburg ready for the return of the refugees; he felt
it would dissipate their anger.9'
Miner was clearly perturbed by the worsening situation, not only for the refugees
but for himself also. Everything seemed to be going wrong: the refugees and irregulars
were totally disenchanted, and the army appeared to do little to get the Rand operational
Roberts to Mimer & Others, (tel.), 13 Oct 1900, CO 417f295/f.238.
9°Roberts to Lansdowne, (tel.), 22 Oct 1900, WO 105f33/f.296.
"Mimer to Kitchener, 25 Oct 1900, CO 417/295/if.368-370.
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again. Mimer appealed once more to Chamberlain, appraising him of the discontent
amongst the irregulars and the near 'mutinous' state of the refugees. The latter group were
so incensed they had begun to fall prey to radical agitators who blamed the capitalists for
the delay and the fact that Roberts was under 'capitalistic influences.' Mimer was
exasperated by what he felt was an unnecessary situation, caused by the wilful obstinacy
of the irregulars to see that the return of the refugees was in their own interests, and that
the high command had kept them in the field too long. Mimer felt that Roberts should
release the irregulars immediately in the hope of getting many to join the paramilitary
policef2
 Milner's troubles were now getting out of hand; the army, in attempting to
alleviate their own problems, were making his even worse.
For Roberts his problems stemmed from the fact that the irregulars, both South
African and Dominion, were clamouring for their release. It seemed the Boers were aware
of this and had stepped up their activities as a result. Roberts refused to grant any more
discharges until fresh South African units had been raised: as he told Lansdowne, 'I
mention all this in order that you may understand why troops cannot be sent home... '
Roberts, in fact, was running out of ideas: he could only offer Mimer a scheme of public
relief to get poor, surrendered Boers working, possibly on railway construction, and thus
prevent them from going back on commando? Kitchener though offered more
immediate hope. Milner was informed that if refugees joined the new irregular regiments
'they would no doubt considerably accelerate their own return, and that of their fellow
refugees.' Milner approved of this, and wanted it mentioned to the Uitlander
committees?5
Milner was more in tune with Kitchener than he was with Roberts. Kitchener had
apparently given a more substantial assurance that as long as the Uitlanders were prepared
to help the army, the army would help them. At least it was more than Roberts's bland
statements about relief work and a step in the right direction. This sort of suggestion must
' Mimer to Chamberlain, (tel.), 28 Oct 1900, JC 13/1178.
" Roberts to Lansdowne, (tel.), 28 Oct 1900, WO 10533/f.299.
"Roberts to Milner, (tel.), 31 Oct 1900, RP 111/9i3154.
" Wairond to Mimer, (tel.), 31 Oct 190&, Mimer to Walrond, 1 Nov 1900, CO 417f295/ff.372-373,
378.
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have added to Mimer's belief that Kitchener was the man he should discuss matters with
and not Roberts. Mimer had now clearly tired of Roberts; and although his opinion of the
high command overall was not great, he must have felt that Kitchener would provide
some impetus to the refugee problem and be more receptive to his ideas than Roberts.
Milner's disappointment with Roberts was palpable, and his accumulated annoyance was
probably the reason which induced him to despatch a long letter to Kitchener on 31
October. Without mentioning Roberts by name, it is plain Mimer was criticizing him. 'It
is quite evident,' he wrote, 'that what is the matter now is not so much anything the Boers
do as our own choppings & changings & want of system.' Mimer, in the hope of gaining
support, if not in the present then in the future, was, it seems, attempting to convert
Kitchener to his way of thinking; or, at least point out the fallacies of Roberts's methods:
if by concentrating our efforts we could absolutely subjugate certain
definite areas and screen the people in them, in their usual occupations,
from molestation from without, we should dishearten the enemy &
encourage the waverers to come to us. Every step in that direction will
make the next step easier.
It was this reasoning which prompted Milner to continue to demand the return of the
refugees. In order to placate the irregulars, Milner wanted them to be released, because
he believed that within a month of their return, alongside 20,000 refugees, the army would
get enough recruits to form an Uitlander corps which could garrison the Rand and the
outlying districts?6
 Mimer had reiterated at greater length what he told Kitchener on 25
October. But in this last letter he had disclosed his intense frustration at the lack of
progress in Johannesburg. The point here, and it must have galled Mimer, was that he had
to spell it out, in no uncertain terms, to the high command, and keep hammering the point
home. However, Milner's preaching to Kitchener was not to the converted; if anything it
was to the heretic.
Mimer was continually looking ahead, trying to make preparations for a peaceful
South Africa. The army, however, had more immediate problems, which they thought
more important and better understood. This was the question of troop numbers and the
amount they would lose if the irregular corps resigned en masse on the arrival of the first
refugees. Both Roberts and Kitchener were becoming increasingly vexed by the
6 Mimer to Kitchener, 31 Oct 1900, KP 17/Si. [Milner's italics].
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intransigence of the irregulars. Percy FitzPatrick had arrived in Johannesburg to mediate
between the irregulars and the army, following Roberts's suggestion of 10 October?' His
mission, therefore, was of vital importance, not only to engender good relations between
the high command and the irregulars, but also to remove one prominent impediment
blocking the return of the refugees. Moreover, FitzPatrick also carried the interests of the
mine owners who, no doubt, were eager to see a return to partial, if not full, production.
The problem in dealing with the irregulars was that the army regathed them as
indispensable, and the irregulars knew this. The actions of generals had made this plain
because they had promised disbandment on numerous occasions, and then failed to deliver
at the last moment. The last straw had come in October when the irregulars were marched
to Pretoria for demobilization and were then told this could not be done, as their services
were still required. This caused a storm of protest, obliging the army to discharge some
to quieten the rest. However, the irregulars were then informed that preferential treatment
would only be given to those men still in the field when the war was over. FitzPatrick's
visit to see both Roberts and Kitchener paid off. Roberts willingly accepted FitzPatrick's
idea of creating a reserve of discharged irregulars, to be recalled if and when necessary.
Kitchener was reluctant at first, having no sympathy for men who wanted their discharge.
In the end, Kitchener agreed to FitzPatrick's suggestion that discharged volunteers be
given a free railway warrant to travel to Johannesburg to see for themselves the desperate
situation of the town; once they had acknowledged this, FitzPatrick argued, they would
return to their units and say no more about going home before anyone else, and persuade
the others to cease their agitation?8
Although this accommodation with the irregulars had removed a major obstacle
to the return of the refugees, other problems surfaced which confounded a solution to the
problem. On 5 November 1900, Roberts told Mimer that the reason which prevented the
refugees moving north was the precarious food situation. Roberts explained that owing to
the continual attacks on the railway, the food requirements of the army were not being
met and that they were drawing on scarce reserves. He added that once enough food had
'7 See above, pp.118.
' FitzPatrick to BelL 7 Nov 1900, A.H Dummy & W.R Guest, (eds.), FitzPatrick South African
Politician. Selected Papers 1886-1906 (Johannesburg, 1976), pp.281-289. For correspondence appraising
Mimer of FitzPatrick's mission, see CO 417/295/ff.380-381, 39 1-392, 502-503.
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been brought in and a substantial reserve stock accumulated, he would consider allowing
the refugees to return homeY9
 Roberts was not making excuses. Girouard confirmed how
bad the situation was and how difficult it was to supply the army let alone an increased
civilian population.' In fact, Roberts's problems were monumental, and by mid-
November, his telegrams began to take on an air of desperation. On 16 November, he
ordered Forestier-Walker to remind Mimer that food-shortages were preventing the
refugees from returning.'01
 16 November was a busy day regarding the supply situation.
There had been a lack of supplies coming from Natal, only 30 trucks in the last three
days, and representations were made to Hely-Hutchinson to increase the flow. 1°2 Roberts
summarised the position for Mimer's benefit:
I am most anxious to get them all back as I believe the political effect
would be excellent. I would be very glad also to see you take office at
Pretoria, but at present we barely get sufficient supplies for the daily use
of the troops, and to increase the number of people to feed would be a
danger instead of a strength.103
So great were the problems, that Roberts refused, at first, to allow 66 managers and
engineers to return after they had been given permits by Milner. Roberts thought this
would raise the hopes of the refugees unduly; he also felt that there was no room on trains
given over to the task of bringing in supplies. Mimer disagreed and practically demanded
these representatives be allowed to return. It would, in his opinion, give the mining
companies equal representation on the Rand, as each would have employees guarding their
property. More importantly, it would demonstrate to those left behind that something was
being done to facilitate their return, even though, as Milner pointed out, the Uitlanders had
realised their move north had been postponed indefinitely.' 04 More likely, it was Milner
" Roberts to Milner, (tel.), 5 Nov 1900, WO 105f34V6049.
Milner's Diary of Events, 15 Nov 1900, CO 417i295/ff.690-691.
101 Roberts to Forestier-Walker, (tel.), 16 Nov 1900, RP 111/10/3381. In another telegram, Roberts told
Forestier-Walker that supplies and remounts only should be given precedence on the railways. Roberts to
Forestier-Walker, (tel.), 16 Nov 1900, Ibid., 3386. Page, pp.84-119.
'°2 Roberts to Hely-Hutchinson, 16 Nov 1900, RP 111/1013385.
'°' Roberts to Mimer, (tel.), 16 Nov 1900, WO 105/34jC6367.
'°'Roberts to Milner, (tel.), 20 Nov 1900, WO 105/34jC6496; Milner to Kitchener, (tel), 17 Nov 190&,
to Roberts, (tel.), 21 Nov 1900, CO 417f295/ff.747, 750-751.
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who now accepted the move had been postponed. As far as the army was concerned the
problem of the refugees had been shelved. Consequently, Mimer lost what little faith he
still had in Roberts's ability. He was not impressed by any of the ideas advanced by
Roberts, such as putting a price on the heads of Boer leaders like Botha and De Wet; or
threatening to confiscate their property. 105
 Mimer, in fact, was totally disillusioned by
Roberts's failure to get to grips with the guerilla war, and the pacification of the country;
as he told Chamberlain:
We are making but little progress, though I believe military policy is
gradually settling down on sounder lines. Personally, I think this process
will be facilitated by Lord Roberts's return home.'°6
V
By mid-September 1900, Roberts's main priority was to leave South Africa. He
first asked to be relieved on 17 September and had left the occupation of Komati Poort
to his subordinates.'°7
 On receiving this request, the Cabinet quickly nominated Roberts
as the C-in-C to succeed Wolseley on his retirement, and were thus able to settle two
pressing problems: to remove Roberts from South Africa, and to ensure Wolseley was
replaced with the minimum of fuss.'°8
 Roberts arrived back in Pretoria on 21 September
to await Lansdowne's reply, which came on 29 September, acceding to Roberts's request
and confirming him as Wolseley's successor. Roberts was convinced that operations were
now of a 'police nature.' It was not for him to set about creating cleared zones; all his job
entailed was that the basics of civilian administration be established and forces left to deal
with the remaining commandos. As far as Roberts was concerned his task was over.
Despite the fact that he and Mimer agreed that only police operations were necessary,
even this failed to settle the differences between the two officials..
Mimer's Diary of Events, 17 Nov 1900, CO 417f295/ff.695-696.
' Mimer to Chamberlain, 14 Nov 1900, JC 13/li')!.
' Roberts had told Milner on 2 June that he wanted to see a civilian governor installed in the
Transvaal, 'and that I may be allowed to leave South Africa as soon as necessity no longer exists for actual
military operations.' Roberts to Mimer, 2 June 1900, MP IV/A/175/ff.36-41.
'James, pp.342-343.
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The problem facing Roberts and Mimer arose from the fact that the period after
the capture of Komati Poort was in a sense one of neither peace nor war. The demarcation
between civilian and military authority was now peculiarly blurred. Indeed, just before the
capture of Komati Poort, Milner had tried to push his case; he wrote to Roberts saying,
'...I think with the brealdng up of the enemy's army, the political aspect begins once more
to be a very important one.' 1°9
 Although this letter was never sent it shows that Mimer
now considered himself to be the paramount official in South Africa. Yet, as long as the
Boer commandos continued to remain active, Mimer's hopes could never be realised: nor
for that matter could Roberts's. Thus the situation was ripe for disagreement and
misunderstanding.
The elation following the capture of Komati Poort affected opinion not only
regarding South African problems, such as the refugees, but also wider considerations.
Mimer was not alone in his anticipation of a satisfactory end to the war: the British
government shared his optimism. Consequently, hopes were raised that Roberts would
alter his strategy which would reflect the belief that the war was, indeed, practically over.
As a result, the government in London took a keen interest in events in South Africa,
particularly after Parliament was dissolved on 25 September for the general election.
Much of their campaign was based on the premise that they were the right party to 'win
the peace,' that the apparent victory would not be thrown away. As much as anything, the
British government now had to deliver a settlement that would not only affirm British
paramountcy in South Africa, but appeal to the electorate of Britain as well. Thus, the
conduct of the war following the capture of Komati Poort was of great interest to the
government, and Mimer. This section, therefore, will examine the problems associated
with the establishment of the paramilitary police, and the problems related to the general
transition from military to civilian policing, even though the guerilla war still continued.
The establishment of an effective police force had been considered as early as July.
The guerilla tactics of the Boers appeared to be more banditry than regular military
operations at the time, and less of a threat. Eventually, as the Boers increased the scope
of their activities, and the measure of their success, Milner considered the need to
establish a police force more urgent. He asked Roberts for Baden-Powell's services to
'°' Mimer to Roberts, 21 Sept 1900, MP IV/A/175/ff.111-115.
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create and command such a force. Mimer proposed to recruit a special mounted force
from 'good men' in the Yeomamy and irregular corps. He wanted about 5,000 men and
wanted them ready as soon as possible, in order that they could takeover settled districts
and let the army do its own work. Roberts agreed to these proposals, but mentioned that
10,000 men be recruited instead.110
Having gained Roberts's acceptance of the idea, Mimer informed Chamberlain on
12 September. The initial response of the Colonial Secretary was to express his concern
about Treasury acceptance of the idea, especially as the Transvaal was supposed to bear
its own financial burdens. 111
 Roberts told Lansdowne that he was arranging with Mimer
for a police force to be established. Although Roberts did not make the point explicitly,
Lansdowne must have gathered that the formation of a police force would facilitate the
reduction of the army - and costs - in South Africa." 2 The cost of a police force
concerned the War Office greatly. Fleetwood-Wilson, the Under-Secretary of State at the
War Office, wrote to his counterpart in the Colonial Office, Frederick Graham, on 19
September, that it was presumed the cost of the police would not come from the Army
Estimates. The Colonial Office felt, however, that the War Office had no choice but to
pay while the two new colonies were under military administration, and eventually told
Mimer to proceed on this understanding." 3 As both departments seemed to accept the
situation it is most likely they did not believe military administration would last for very
long.
On 24 September, Mimer told Chamberlain of Baden-Powell's scheme and eagerly
endorsed its main points: first, that it would enable large numbers of troops to be sent
home; and secondly, that it would enable British settlers to remain in the country and be
compatible with any scheme of state assistance for settlement on the land. Evidently,
Baden-Powell wanted 6,000 men and 200 officers, who would be paid 5/- a day. That
same day Mimner told Chamberlain that he, as High Commissioner, should command the
"°Milner to Roberts; Roberts to Mimer, (tels.), 10 & 11 Sept 1900, Co 417/294/ff.605-607.
" Mimer to Chamberlain, (tel.), 12 Sept 1900; CO Minutes, 14 Sept 1900, CO 417/293/ff.893-894.
"2 Robei to Lansdowne, 16 Sept 1900, RP 110/4/865.
1t3 Fleetwood-Wilson to Graham, 19 Sept 1900; CO Minutes, 21-23 Sept 190&, Chamberlain to Mimer,
(tel.), 25 Sept 1900, CO 417/307/ff.103-106.
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police otherwise he would be unable to control costs, its organization and personnel.
Milner brushed aside any idea of conflict with the army, 'I shall have no difficulty
whatsoever about it with the military provided that they understand my position."4
It is likely Milner feared the army would take over command of the police and use it for
their own purposes. Milner had other ideas on how they should be used and wanted to
ensure they were not wasted chasing commandos.
However, Mimer did have problems with the military. Roberts informed him that
10,000 men should be recruited as it would be easier to reduce a force than increase it if
necessary. With only 6,000 men, the police would have to rely on imperial help and this
might be withdrawn if Britain became involved in a war elsewhere. Moreover, Roberts
wanted the police to have an allowance of 2/- in addition to their ordinary pay as South
Africa was expensive." 5
 Obviously, Milner had ignored Roberts's earlier
recommendation about the size of the police force, perhaps regarding it as a suggestion
rather than a point of principle. Milner immediately informed Chamberlain and included
his own reply to the Field-Marshal, which pointed out the difficult financial position of
the new colonies. As it was, Mimer expected a large garrison would be left for some time
in South Africa, thus negating the need to raise extra police officers. With regard to
Roberts's other assertion that Ireland, a much smaller country, required 15,000 police,
Milner said 4/5 of the country were against the British there, but in the Transvaal as soon
as the refugees returned, the population imbalance would not be as great. Milner
emphasised that the new colonies could not afford a large police force, and he did not
want to alienate the loyalist population immediately. Cost was a factor which Milner
seemed keen to stress perhaps because ministers were susceptible to this sort of reasoning:
an extra 2/- a day would cost more than £200,000 a year, and if paid out initially could
not be withdrawn easily if it was found necessary to do so."6 Milner was clearly
anxious: he was trying to obtain the return of the refugees, and also attempting to obviate
the need for extra police and thus lessen the costs of his new colony. But, perhaps more
than anything, Milner was trying to ensure that his police did not become a mere adjunct
H Mimer to Chamberlain, (tels.), 24 Sept 1900, CO 417/294/ff.210, 221.
" Roberts to Mimer, (tel.), 5 Oct 1900, WO 105/34/C5299.
" Milner to Chamberlain, (tel.), 6 Oct 1900, CO 4171294/ff.495-497.
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of the army. If they were used to chase Boers, there might be very few available to begin
the process of reconstruction. If Roberts's suggestion was accepted then the need for the
refugees to return might not be so pressing.
This disagreement between Mimer and Roberts prompted much discussion amongst
Colonial Office officials. Most, in fact, favoured the larger number but were aware how
much this would cost; consequently, Chamberlain told the War Office that as Mimer
regarded a force of 6,000 men as the basic establishment, and Roberts felt an extra 4,000
men were necessary 'to cope with the existing state of affairs' then the additional number
ought to be met by the Army Vote for the garrison in South Africa."7 Apart from this
intervention, the Colonial Office remained quiet during the ensuing row between Roberts
and Mimer, and the War Office was left to act as mediator. This was due, it seems, to the
fact that on 22 October Chamberlain had stipulated in the proclamation of inauguration
that the South African Constabulary (SAC) might occasionally 'discharge military
duties."8
 From then on the SAC were virtually regarded as part of the army which
reduced the Colonial Office's influence over SAC affairs.
Roberts's desire to see the police force begin operations at maximum capacity can
be attributed to two factors. First, to reinforce the impression that the war was indeed over
and police work would be sufficient to finish off the commandos; secondly, to relieve the
pressure being exerted from London for the return of troops and a reduction in costs. The
latter point was perhaps the most pressing at the time. The election campaign in Britain
was at its height, but the government had not gone into it with much confidence. Lord
Salisbury, in particular, showed little faith in the electorate especially as no government
had been returned for nearly fifty years, and his pessimism affected other ministers.'19
Within the Cabinet there were already signs of strain owing to the situation in South
Africa. The apparent ending of the war had naturally raised expectations, especially those
of Hicks Beach. He expected to see troop numbers being reduced, but nothing appeared
to have been done. Consequently, he warned Salisbury that Britain's fmancial position 'is
becoming very grave.' Hicks Beach had even analysed the military situation and felt that
117 co Minutes, 9-16 Oct 1900; CO to WO, c.16 Oct 1900, Co 417f294/ff.490-493.
" T. Jeal, Baden-Powell (London, 1989), p.332. The proclamation was dated 22 October 1900.
" Marsh. pp.302-303.
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a large garrison was maintained in Cape Colony unnecessarily; he also felt that troops on
the lines of communication were not required, 'now that there is no anny in the field
against us...For all I know, there may be a similar useless force in Natal.' Hicks Beach
considered that money was being wasted for no apparent reason.' Understandably, the
Cabinet would have liked to have seen costs being reduced, in order to offer something
concrete to the voters. As a result, Lansdowne again asked Roberts for his views about
the future garrison of South Africa, to which Roberts replied once more that until the
police force was operational it was impossible for troops to leave South Africa. As a
riposte to Hicks Beach, Roberts explained also that the garrison in Cape Colony numbered
20,000 men and both he and Mimer wanted that part of South Africa well garrisoned. No
explanation was offered but the deterrence of rebels and the guarding of prisoners were
clearly of prime concern. In an attempt to mollify the Cabinet, Lansdowne presented this
correspondence on 15 October, to show that both he and Roberts were aware of the
situation.'2'
In order to defend himself, Roberts explained to Lansdowne that Milner's plans
regarding the police were inadequate. He believed strongly that only police work was
required and wanted the imperial authorities to provide a grant in aid to the new colonies
if they could not afford the extra men.' Lansdowne agreed to this and informed the
Colonial Office accorthngly.'
While these ideas were being considered, Milner, for some reason, believed
Roberts had agreed to see the numbers of the SAC limited to 6,000 men. Why he should
think this is not clear. It may have been due to a lack of communication on the issue
between the two men. Indeed, most of October was taken up by correspondence on the
refugees, so Milner may have reached the erroneous conclusion that Roberts had not
decided to pursue the matter further. Milner was concerned anyway that the SAC would
' Hicks Beach to Salisbury, 1 Oct 1900, SP HBC/ff.222-223.
'' 15 Oct 1900, CAB 37/53170. This included Lansdowne to Roberts, (tels.), 9 Oct 1900; Roberts to
Lansdowne, (tels.), 10 Oct 1900. Hicks Beach was so concerned about the rate of expenditure that he felt
he ought to consider his own future in the government, Hicks Beach to Salisbury, 15 Oct 1900, SP
HBC/f.226.
'Roberts to Lansdowne, (tel.), 10 Oct 1900, WO 105132/1322.
WO to CO. 25 Oct 1900, CO 417/307/f.244.
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never be able to recruit more than 6,000 men owing to present circumstances. He did not
elaborate, but probably meant that owing to the guerilla war, and the fact the irregulars
were not being disbanded, there would barely be enough recruits.'
Later, Mimer expressed his views on the police more forcibly. By the end of
October Mimer's hopes, raised by the capture of Komati Poort, had been dashed. No
progress had been made on any major problem, and Mimer felt, mistakenly, that only on
numbers had any headway been made. Mimer explained that the British would look
foolish if they recruited too many men; they would look doubly foolish if they paid them
too much money. Milner was convinced 5/- a day would be enough to recruit 6,000 men
and more if necessary. Furthermore, if the new colonies had to pay for the extra men, on
top of what they were paying already, then this meant they would contribute less in
reparations. For Milner a strong police force was ideal for the strategy he advocated. Here
Milner launched another attack on the 'scouring policy' still being pursued by Roberts.
By using the SAC to patrol between strong-points, Milner felt it would be possible 'to
substitute within that area the policy of protection for that of reprisal.' Similarly, this
meant an end to the wholesale destruction of farms and a return to farm-burning as a
definite punishment. Indiscriminate destruction now appalled Milner as wasteful and
designed to increase the numbers of those in arms against the British.' This was a
plain indictment of Roberts's system - or lack of it. Mimer had now launched an attack
on the Field-Marshal and was attempting to enlist the aid of the British government to
press home his offensive.
On 7 November, the Colonial Office informed the War Office that Milner believed
Roberts had agreed to keep SAC numbers at 6,000 for a certain period. 1 This news
must have surprised Brodrick, the new Secretary of State for War, who had replaced
Lansdowne following the general election in October. He had been bullying the Cabinet
and particularly Hicks Beach into acquiescing to Roberts's demands, and had appealed to
Salisbury for his unreserved backing. Brodrick was concerned about the severe measures
Roberts was using in the new colonies. He preferred to see farm-burning as an exemplary
124 4er to Chamberlain, 22 Oct 1900, CO 4171295/f.26.
'Milner to Chamberlain, 28 Oct 1900, JC 13/1178.
IZ CO to WO, 7 Nov 1900; CO Minutes 26 Nov 1900, CO 417f307/ff.247-248, 417-418.
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punishment and may have been less than impressed by Roberts's assertion that when
railway or telegraph lines had been destroyed, 'the district within a ten mile radius is
cleared of supplies.'
Brodrick's concern about the tactics being employed in the new colonies was not
engendered solely by the situation in South Africa. Brodrick was more interested in
preparing his ground and plans for battle in the Cabinet so he could pursue his schemes
to reform the War Office and the army. This was the main reason why he had enlisted
Salisbury's help. Brodrick, therefore, wanted to see some progress made in South Africa,
and from Mimer's reports he concluded nothing substantial was being done.
In his first major communication with Brodrick, Milner attacked both Roberts and
Kitchener. It seemed Kitchener's unresponsive attitude to Mimer's suggestions of 31
October had convinced him that Kitchener was not to be trusted. Mimer explained to
Brodrick that Roberts had done all he could and was tired out. 'He will recover.. .but not
here in South Africa. His S.African work ought to close now.' Kitchener was stale and
'Worse than that, he is in a hurry.' Accordingly, the time had come, as he had said often
in the past, for the subjugation of the country:
The fatal error is not to hold District A & make sure of it before you go
on to District B. I mean the fatal error latterly, not at first, when you had
to rush. The consequence is we have a big army campaigning away in the
front & the enemy swarming in the country behind it.1
For Mimer this might have been his last chance to influence the future conduct of
the war, hence his direct attack on Britain's two leading soldiers. Perhaps for the first
time, Milner actually found the Cabinet receptive to his ideas. Indeed, the Cabinet had
become apprehensive about the methods employed by Roberts. Salisbury told the Queen
that the Law Officers of the Crown doubted whether his tactic of destroying farms within
a ten-mile radius of a Boer attack on railway or telegraph lines was within the laws of
war. Chamberlain preferred to see individuals punished not property as this was arbitrary
and affected the innocent. Consequently, Brodrick was obliged to ask Roberts to explain
' Brodrick to Roberts, (tel.), 7 Nov 1900, WO 105/30/f.182; Roberts to Brodrick, (tel.), 8 Nov 1900,
WO 105/32/1480; Brodrick to Salisbury, 28 Oct 1900, SP SJBC/ff.140-143.
Mimer to Brodrick, 5 Nov 1900, SJB/PRO 30/67/6. [Mimer's italics].
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his methods and suggested whether it might be possible to proclaim districts which had
been effectively occupied by the Btitish.'
The effect of Mimer's attack had seemingly instilled in Brodrick a detennination
to get Roberts out of South Africa and into his new job as C-in-C in Britain, and to get
the largest number of SAC in the field. No thought, however, was given to the likely
relationship between Mimer and Kitchener, Roberts's successor, or how the next campaign
would be conducted. The weakness of Brodrick's hand was that he could not order
Kitchener to respond to Milner's interventions: this would invite his resignation. After all,
Kitchener was the military 'expert' and if Brodrick intervened his actions might be
construed as undue interference. In any case, Brodrick, like many others, felt that
Kitchener was the ideal man for the job of pacifying the country, owing to his severe
reputation. Instead Brodrick hoped that a substantial police force would help win the
guerilla war without causing civil-military friction.
Thus once Brodrick heard from the Colonial Office that Roberts had agreed to the
lower figure, he became greatly concerned. The guerilla war would be prolonged, invite
civil-military disputes, and upset the accord he had reached with Hicks Beach.
Consequently, he addressed Roberts on the issue on 9 November and found that Roberts
had agreed to no such thing.'3° Roberts's motives for adhering to his viewpoint are not
hard to fathom. He was acutely aware of the need to reduce troop numbers and, therefore,
expenditure. More police, who were also considered better against the Boers, meant the
release of more troops. Moreover, once the police were operational, and on a grand scale,
Roberts could state the war - the conventional war - was over. He could then leave South
Africa sooner rather than later.
In Cabinet, Brodrick and Hicks Beach had agreed that if 10,000 SAC were
recruited they could relieve 25,000 infantry. The Cabinet agreed, therefore, to pay for the
extra 4,000 men if the new colonies could not cope with the added costs. The savings
anticipated by this measure would be more than enough to settle payment for the extra
men. Consequently, Roberts was asked if this was a reasonable assumption and promptly
' Salisbury to the Queen, 23 Nov 1900, CAB 41125/50; Bmdrick to Roberts, (tels.), 23 Nov 1900,
CAB 37/551234; Chamberlain to Milner, 25 Nov 1900, JC 13/1j92A.
Brodrick to Roberts, (tel.), 9 Nov 1900, CC) 417/307/f.421; Roberts to Brodrick, (tel.), 13 Nov 1900,
WO 105/32/1517.
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replied it was. He also told Mimer of this, saying he had agreed to it because 'The
[settlement] of the Transvaal and the ORC depends much more on police than military
arrangements. This was my experience in Burmah & I hope you will agree with
me."3' Also, in answer to Brodrick's enquiries of 23 November, Roberts told him
that officers had taken advantage of the latitude given them in order to combat the
commandos. But it was up to them to make full enquiries before ordering the destruction
of property. He added, 'but as it is essentially police work I anticipate that when our
police force is established we shall fmd the necessity of burning houses less and
less..."32
 Roberts was obviously saying the army could not be blamed because it was
undertaking a task it was not trained to do. Therefore, it was up to the politicians to hurry
the creation of the SAC, release the army from its onerous work, and thus lessen the
damage done to property. It was nothing to do with Roberts and he could do nothing
more.
Milner did not have much choice in the matter once the government had convinced
themselves of the benefits of having a large SAC. As the government was willing to pick
up the bill, Milner could not argue, but felt the extra police might not be found, especially
as Kitchener was finding it difficult to release irregulars owing to the paucity of
troops.'33
 Milner's main worry, of course, was that as the government had accepted
Roberts's advice, they had in fact endorsed the use of the police in a military capacity,
as replacements for troops. The only victory gained by Milner was that Roberts could now
leave South Africa. The future, however, remained uncertain: Kitchener was still an
unknown quantity and the war seemed far from over.
For his part, Roberts had been able to relieve the pressure on himself and
Kitchener for troop reductions because of the government's desire to see a large police
force, and because of his protestations that the guerilla war was police work. The
politicians now hoped that troop reductions would become a reality once the police force
was fully operational; after all, Roberts had assured them 10,000 policemen were worth
'' Bmdrick to Roberts, (tel.), 23 Nov 1900, CAB 37/551234(4); Roberts to Brodrick, (tels.) 24 & 26
Nov 1900, WO 105132/1600, 1609; Roberts to Mimer, (tel.), 24 Nov 1900, CO 417f296ff.89.
'Roberts to Brodiick, (tel.), 26 Nov 1900, WO 105/32/1614.
' Mimer to Roberts, (tel.), 26 Nov 1900, CO 417f296/f.90.
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25,000 infantry. Hopes and expectations had been raised once more. The SAC united most
politicians in the belief that it was the panacea for ending the war.
In the end Mimer was glad to see Roberts go, as were many others, soldiers
included.'3 ' The guerilla war had defeated Roberts's talents and his experience in Burma
did not help in South African conditions. But the fact that Roberts's campaigns had
changed the face of the war were well remembered. He returned to Britain the greatest
hero since Wellington and no politician could stand up to that sort of reputation. In South
Africa, nothing had changed except personnel. Mimer still had to deal with a leading
military figure. The only hope was that the guerilla war might be finished quickly.
Many thought Roberts was worn out, or not severe enough: most thought Kitchener would be severe
including Rawlinson, RD 5201/3317/111,29 Sept 1900; also, B. Gardner, Allenby (London, 1965), p.42; GJ.
De Groot, Douglas Haig 1861 -1928 (London, 1988), pp.84-86. Haig thought Roberts 'a silly old man.'
135
CHAPTER FOUR.
THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL:
2.K1TCHENER, MILNER AND THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT.
December 1900-A pril 1902.
On 29 November 1900, Lord Kitchener succeeded Lord Roberts as the C-in-C(SA).
Kitchener's appointment raised expectations that a significant change in the direction of
the war would occur. Whereas Roberts had been perceived as too 'gentlemanly' in his
operations against the guerillas, Kitchener was expected to end the war with the same
ruthless efficiency which had characterised his conquest of the Sudan. However, as both
he and Mimer held differing views regarding the prosecution of the war, this triggered a
long running dispute which further shifted the balance of civil-military relations in Britain
and South Africa.
Kitchener wanted an all out effort to defeat the Boers, to ensure his anny received
all necessary resources, and to give civil reconstruction a low priority. Milner wanted to
marginalise the war, to downgrade the military effort and give precedence to civil
reconstruction. Underlying these differences was something more fundamental: the
character of the future South Africa. An integral part of both Mimer's and Kitchener's
strategies was the treatment of the Boer leaders. Milner wanted to undermine their
authority and exclude them from political matters. He hoped to form a new leadership
from within the fortified zones, comprised of those willing to settle under British rule. For
Kitchener, the future peace of South Africa could only be assured by a military victory,
followed by negotiations, after which he expected the Boer leaders to accept their fate and
settle down as citizens of the Empire. Otherwise, he felt there would always be a
discontented, rebellious element within Boer society. Moreover, there was growing
discontent within the officer corps, caused by several factors, including concern over the
prolongation of the war, and about how the capitalists would benefit afterwards. Thus, the
dispute between the two officials, to which both the British government and Lord Roberts
were party, highlighted the dilemma facing the British authorities as a whole. From it two
persistent major questions arose: what was the nature of the war in the region? And how
was it to be fought? In attempting to answer these questions, the British authorities, both
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civil and military, were forced to consider who should exercise supreme control in South
Africa: the High Commissioner or the C-in-C.
The British government became extremely anxious about the continuing war.
Spiralling costs and the need to consider domestic and foreign issues found ministers
unable to decide on a policy in South Africa. Fearful of the electorate and its own party,
the government had to steer a middle course for much of the period. Ministers felt they
would antagonise public opinion if they spent more money on the war, or did not provide
enough. Should they crush the Boers or should they negotiate? And, importantly, how far
should the government allow Kitchener to exercise military authority without
consideration of political factors, such as costs and imperial policy? Moreover, disputes
between ministers threatened Cabinet cohesion. The two new service ministers, Brodrick
and Selborne, who was now First Lord of the Admiralty, were both keen to increase
expenditure, whilst the Chancellor was determined to cut back.' Thus, with army reform
and naval expansion both on the political agenda, combined with the near impossibility
of Kitchener's task, the British government was faced with a major political headache.
Ultimately, Milner sought to impose his own policy in South Africa, by enlisting
the aid of the British government. Milner presented his schemes as panaceas, providing
the direction which the British government lacked. Consequently, the politicians decided
to impose a solution on Kitchener which they believed would end the war and secure
political objectives. In the end, however, the politicians were faced with the disagreeable
task of having to acknowledge Kitchener's authority in South Africa, and the
subordination of political considerations to military requirements.
The chapter comprises seven parts. The first examines the period between
December 1900 and February 1901 and shows how both the politicians and soldiers
reacted to the escalation of the guerilla war, particularly after the Boers invaded Cape
Colony. Section two concentrates on the peace talks at Middelburg, on the development
of a 'military' viewpoint towards the war, and the growing antagonism between Kitchener
and Milner. After the collapse of the talks Mimer became totally disillusioned with
Kitchener and sought to undermine his authority. Section three, therefore, examines how
Mimer persuaded the British government to implement his policies in South Africa.
'Yakutiel, p.138.
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Section four deals with the dispute between Roberts and the British government and how
this began to affect relations between Kitchener and Mimer. It also examines the period
between July and August 1901, the high point of Mimer's success, but shows how he
undermined that success by antagonising Roberts and by agreeing to have Cape Colony
cleared of rebels before changing military strategy throughout South Africa. Section five
shows how Mimer's policy was finally undermined by Kitchener's refusal to implement
his schemes, by dissension within the Cabinet, and Roberts's backing of Kitchener. It
examines the crucial period when the British government contemplated Milner's request
to have Kitchener sacked and when, after due consideration, ministers realised their fate
was more or less tied to that of Kitchener's. Section six deals with the aftermath of the
British government's decision. Mimer still tried to undermine Kitchener but without the
same vigour. Finally, Section seven concludes the chapter by examining the peace talks.
Several historians have already written about the general course of the talks and it is not
intended to discuss them in detail here. 2
 Instead this section emphasizes how the views
of the military and the British government merged during the talks in favour of a
negotiated settlement. Milner's isolation, apparent after his failure to get Kitchener sacked,
became real as he alone urged 'unconditional surrender.' Consequently, Mimer failed to
impose his own ideas and policies in the face of government and public exhaustion.
I
On 16 December 1900, two Boer commandos invaded Cape Colony and opened
a new phase in the war. Following the occupation of Komati Poort, the Boer leadership
had met at Pietersburg in northern Transvaal to decide future strategy. There they resolved
to continue the guerilla war and, significantly, to carry the war into Cape Colony, where
they believed there awaited substantial support. The pursuit of this strategy ensured the
war continued unabated. Consequently, British expectations, which had arisen on the
departure of Roberts, evaporated, as both the politicians and generals searched for new
ways to end the war.
2 For a fuller account of the peace negotiations see J.D. Kestell, Through Shot and Flame (London,
1903); Le May, pp.125-154; Pakenham, pp.551-571; Amery (ed.), Times History, V, Chapter 21.
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On 24 November, Brodrick told Kitchener that the government harboured serious
doubts about the conduct of operations. The army in South Africa numbered 230,000 men,
and Brodrick believed they faced only 8,000 Boers. He wondered whether British strength
was being wasted trying to pacify the whole country and protect the cleared areas. 3 His
remark, 'It has been suggested to us,' revealed that he was forwarding Mimer's views
which he had received earlier, perhaps testing Kitchener's reactions to them. Even so, the
difficulties before the British government were real enough, and this despatch was clearly
intended to remind Kitchener to hurry his preparations, and to implement his plans.
Brodrick stated that the war had already cost £80 million, at £2.5 million a month; a
further £15 million was required to prosecute the war until March. Troops were stale,
there were hardly any regulars left in Britain; and the volunteers and militia had been
embodied far too long. It was a bleak picture, but Brodrick hoped Kitchener had
something planned; he also hoped that Kitchener and Mimer would work together
amicably, and begin starting work on the Rand.
Mimer's views had had some effect on ministerial attitudes. From Brodrick's
despatch it seems that ministers, having removed Roberts, were now determined to
maintain some control over events in South Africa. Not long afterwards, in early
December, Brodrick questioned Kitchener on the extent of farm-burning and hoped such
a punishment was inflicted only in extreme cases. Kitchener confirmed this was so and
that he had issued orders to that effect. 4
 Thus from the outset, the government had
practically accepted Mimer's ideas, which provided guidelines for Kitchener to operate
in. Brodrick's despatches, however, were instructions and suggestions, not orders: it was
too early to question Kitchener's leadership. Moreover, while accepting that the military
conduct of the war had not been a total success, ministers were conscious of the lessons
learnt as a result of political interference earlier in the war.
Kitchener appeared co-operative. He had issued instructions making farm-burning
a last resort, and, as yet, had not formed any clear conviction about dealing with the
commandos. That his job was going to prove difficult was confirmed by events a few
days later, On 13 December, General Clements's force was defeated at Nooitgedacht. It
'Brodrick to Kitchener, 24 Nov 1900, KP 22/Y4.
Brodrick to Kitchener, (tels.), 4 Dec 1900; Kitchener to Brodrick, (tels.), 5 Dec 1900; Brodrick to
Kitchener, (tel.), 6 Dec 1900, CO 417/307/ffi8l-582.
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showed that talk of reducing troops was too premature. Through the medium of Lord
Roberts, Kitchener wrote back saying he wanted fresh troops; his forces were
overstretched holding what they had and defending the railway lines at the same time.5
The vitality and vigour of the Boer forces increased fears in London and South Africa,
and Kitchener was able to use this as a reason for obtaining more troops. It was not to be
the only time a Boer victory would scupper ministerial attempts to get Kitchener to reduce
his forces. Consequently, Brodrick promised to do everything in his power to provide
Kitchener with the manpower he required, although he did question the nature of
Kitchener's dispositions, and wondered whether these might be contracted to spare troops:
We cannot help it if the Boers overrun some places which we cannot
defend, but the outlook will be serious if these attacks continue to be
successful.6
The invasion of Cape Colony on 16 December 1900, coupled with Clements's
defeat, shattered any lingering complacency amongst soldiers and politicians alike.
Kitchener realised that the invasion would overstrain his already stretched manpower
resources. In replying to Brodrick's note of 24 November, Kitchener used the opportunity
to express his opinions. First, he objected to the withdrawal of troops from areas already
occupied as this would give the Boers the opportunity to 'put up their flag and start a sort
of government again.' Secondly, he estimated Boer numbers at 20,000 a figure greater
than that supposed by the government. (It is probable Brodrick used Milner's figures).
Thirdly, as a measure against the Boer supply lines, Kitchener said he intended to take
the women off the farms and laager them near the railway; thus encouraging burghers to
join them there in relative safety.7
For the British government, the situation was alarming but not serious, although
differences of opinion began to surface as ministers reviewed the crisis. Salisbury
promised Brodrick that Kitchener would have the men he wanted, even if the Treasury
resisted. His solution, however, was draconian, although it presaged the nature of the war
to come; he told Brodrick, 'You will not conquer these people until you have starved
Kitchener to Roberts, 14 Dec 1900, RP 33/f.6.
'Brodrick to Kitchener, 15 Dec 1900, KP 22/Y8.
7 Kitchener to Brodrick, 20 Dec 1900, KP 221Y9.
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them out.' 8
 Hicks Beach said the worst aspect of the situation was the lethargic response
of the Cape government, especially as the invaders were so few in number. 9 Chamberlain
felt the invasion to be serious, and deemed it necessary for more mounted troops to be
sent to South Africa. As he told Brodrick:
If you want money or men from the Cabinet you ought to have both at
once. A shilling saved now means pounds lost hereafter.1°
However, Chamberlain wanted to make sure that the need to restart the mines should not
be lost in the general uproar over the Cape. Brodrick told Roberts that Kitchener's request
for extra troops and the obvious need for them meant trouble with Hicks Beach, who was
still calling for reductions." Thus, ministers began to take sides, although the motives
for doing so were disparate. For instance, Chamberlain's chief reason for backing
Kitchener was to ensure the mining industry was restarted, as a sort of quid pro quo.
Brodrick was a friend and admirer of Kitchener, and regarded him as a future asset in his
plans to reform the army.'2
 Brodrick was therefore determined to support him as part of
his struggle against Treasury intransigence. Hicks Beach simply did not want to sanction
an increase in men and resources when, to him, the nature of the war did not appear
serious enough. Even so, Brodrick and the Cabinet were not averse to Kitchener's scheme
to send delegates from the Burgher Peace Committee to commandos in the field, in an
attempt to induce them to surrender.' 3 Furthermore, Brodrick reminded Kitchener that
the Cabinet wanted to see the Rand restarted, although he added after Kitchener had 'dealt
with the present raid,' an indication perhaps of the Cabinet's anxiety regarding the
progress of the invasion.'4
S Salisbury to Brodrick, 19 Dec 1900, SJB/PRO 30/67/6.
'Hicks Beach to Chamberlain, 23 Dec 1900, JC 11/18/1.
'° Chamberlain to Brodrick, 21 Dec 1900, JC I liW5.
Brodrick to Roberts, 20 Dec 1900, RP 13/f.12.
12 Brodrick and Kitchener had met at Panshanger. Kitchener was adept at acquiring Mends and
supporters within high society. Royle, pp.149-150.
"Kitchener to Brodrick 27 Dec 1900; Brodrick to Kitchener, 28 Dec 1900, (tels.), CO 291/32/f373.
'4 Brodrick to Kitchener, 28 Dec 1900, KP 22/Yb.
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By the end of 1900 the extent of the Boer offensive and the stamina of their forces
were becoming apparent Everywhere the Boers were on the attack and gaining victories.
On 26 December they had attacked the goldfields at the South Rand mine. On 4 January
1901, Kitchener's Bodyguard was defeated at Kronspruit. Six days later, as an example
of Boer resolution, Morgendaal, a delegate from the Burgher Peace Committee, was
murdered in De Wet's laager. In Cape Colony, the commandos had re-ignited the
rebellion, forcing the British authorities, by 17 January, to declare almost the whole
Colony under martial law.
After an anxious period, both Milner and Kitchener highlighted the unsatisfactory
situation to their superiors in London, but stressed it was not disastrous. Milner felt the
Cape government was taking the invasion seriously and beginning to show some energy
in formulating counter-measures. He also believed that stale troops needed replacing.
Kitchener felt the invaders had not inflicted great damage and that the situation was under
control. Kitchener, like Mimer, hoped the peace committee would succeed, but added an
opinion which was significant for future developments:
my view is that if we could only hit hard, and at the same time leave the
door open we might get the Boers to give up but I am not sanguine of
success.15
Yet for the British government, the continuing disturbances in Cape Colony and
elsewhere undermined any reassurance offered by Milner or Kitchener. Brodrick was
extremely anxious. On 10 January, he told Salisbury that he expected a further demand
for troops from Kitchener. 16 Although some 2,000 fresh troops were being sent out the
need for more drafts was urgent, and he explained to Chamberlain about the difficulties
his department faced; he would have to use the SAC as reinforcements, and implied the
SAC would have to be placed under military command. Otherwise, if he gave the go-
ahead for various agents to recruit for the Yeomanry it would 'give the fmal coup de
grace to your Police.' And, so that the gravity of the situation was not lost on
Chamberlain, he added:
's Mimer to Chamberlain, 3 Jan 1901, JC 13/1/108; Kitchener to Roberts, 4 Jan 1901, RP 33/f.9.
16 Brodrick to Salisbury, 10 Jan 1901, SP SJBC/ff.164-165.
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The business presses and we have no more cavalry to send - only 3 Line
Regts left in England & no mounted infantry.'7
A further problem for Brodrick was the attitude of Hicks Beach, who could not
understand why fresh troops were required when too many of those in South Africa were
spread out doing nothing." The uneasy alliance secured with Hicks Beach in November,
regarding the SAC and troop withdrawals, was brealdng apart.'9
Moreover, Mimer's uneasy relationship with Kitchener was under severe strain.
Mimer's latent contempt for the ability of British generals was reawakened following the
success of the Boer offensive. Although he realised Kitchener was not receptive to his
way of thinking, he was, for the moment, prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt.
He knew nothing of Kitchener's plans, but said he was prepared to wait; and despite
nothing being done to restart the mines, Mimer hoped Kitchener's scheme to recruit a
Rand defence corps might presage something more substantial.2° Unhappily for Mimer
his patience was eroded throughout January and February, as news from elsewhere seemed
to confirm the inadequacy of military administration. General Pretyman continued to be
a valuable source of information, and apparently justified Mimer's suspicions that
Kitchener's plans either lacked substance, or were ineffectual. Pretyman explained about
the evacuation of important towns in the ORC, such as Jagersfontein and Smithfield.
Evidently, Kitchener wanted garrisons removed to provide troops for field operations,
which meant:
that our attempt to build up a fabric of civil government in the districts has
come to a stand still, very little can now be done far from the line of
railway.2'
"Brodrick to Chamberlain, c.10 & 10 Jan 1901, JC 11/8/6, 9.
"Hicks Beach to Brodrick, 16 Jan 1901, SJB/PRO 30/6W.
' Chapter 3, pp.132-133.
Mimer to Chamberlain, 17 Jan 1901, JC 13/1/118. Kitchener told Brodrick that it would be sometime
before the mines were restarted, especially after the recent attack on the South Rand mine. Kitchener to
Brodrick, 4 Jan 1901, KP 22/Y13.
21 Pretyman to Mimer, 2 Jan 1901, MP IV/A/173/ff.138-139.
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Furthermore, the loyalists residing in these towns had been evacuated alongside the troops
and were now resident in refugee camps; it was these people who suffered most, not the
Boer sympathizers or commandos.
Mimer's own disenchantment was palpable. His first reply to Pretyman summed
up his own frustration:
Of course, as long as our authority in the new Colonies is restricted to the
lines of the railway and a few big towns my appointment as Administrator
is more or less a farce. Military considerations are still absolutely supreme.
I am therefore not attempting to do anything but allowing things to go on
for the present on their old lines..?
Mimer, however, was unable to sit back and let the military do as they pleased. On 29
January, he sent Chamberlain an extract from a letter written by General Ridley, the
commander of the SAC, to his private secretary, Osmond Wairond. Ridley's letter seemed
to endorse the ideas which Mimer had vainly espoused to generals and politicians alike.
Ridley explained his strategy at Bloemfontein, where he was forming concentric rings of
police posts around the town. Interestingly, he announced he had used 35 burghers in
action against the Boers. This last point was used by Mimer as evidence to support his
own ideas:
The bulk of the population want to stop, but they must have something to
lean on. Our wandering columns do not give them that.
Mimer was confident that the SAC would be valuable for this sort of work, and hoped
they would not be taken by the military. In December, Chamberlain had asked for
Milner's opinions so that they might be publishedY By the time he received this request,
Mimer's patience with the military had worn thin. Consequently, on 6 February 1901, he
vented his anger and frustration, and stated that the last six months had been a period of
retrogression, referring to the outbreak of guerilla war, and the new rebellion in Cape
Colony. This was due to Roberts's flawed strategy, and, as a result, the concentration on
Pretyman to Mimer, 13 & 29 Jan 1901, Ibid., ff.133-136, 128-131.
Mimer to Pretyman, 7 Jan 1901, Ibid., f.142.
24 Milner to Chamberlain, 29 Jan 1901, Ibid., f.123. [Milner's italics]. Ridley to Walrond, 19 Jan 1901,
Ibid., ff.124-127.
Chamberlain to Mimer, 22 Dec 1900, Headlam, 11, pp.180-181.
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the guerilla war meant that the loyalists were being ignored? Mimer was determined
to use the chance of publicity to acquire the strength of loyalist opinion, and thus secure
a counterweight against military obduracy.
The continuing guerilla war did have one effect at this time, it hardened the
resolve of the government. Thus Brodrick informed Kitchener that:
We realise to the full the difficulties which you have to meet, will give you
every support in our power, with full confidence that things will be better
before long?7
All the Cabinet could do was to hope that the military difficulties would be temporary,
and that an injection of more troops would enable Kitchener to end the guerilla menace.
For the moment, at least, ministers felt they had no choice but to back Kitchener, and
resolved to meet all his requirements. Chamberlain, therefore, could offer Mimer little
concrete reassurance. He could only hope that Kitchener might meet with a military
success against De Wet or Botha, and that some start might be made to get Johannesburg
working again. Chamberlain confirmed that the Cabinet had agreed to recruit and send
30,000 reinforcements to Kitchener. Perhaps to justify the Cabinet's decision and appease
Milner, Chamberlain somewhat exaggerated the problems faced by the government.
Ministers, he wrote, had to hope some progress was made otherwise, 'public
dissatisfaction may become serious and threaten the existence of the Government in spite
of its enormous majotity.'
The war news remained discouraging. On 10 February, Dc Wet entered Cape
Colony, having evaded all attempts to capture him. Kitchener explained that the country
was too big and not every point could be watched. 3° Mimer's assertion to Pretyman, that
he would not interfere in military business, was ignored as the continual bad news
provoked Milner to urge Kitchener to begin work at the mines. Mimer realised that, for
the moment, he could not ask Kitchener to alter his military strategy; but the resumption
a Mimer to Chamberlain, 6 Feb 1901, Ibid., pp.193-202.
Brodrick to Kitchener, 2 Feb 1901, KP 22/Y20.
a Salisbury to the King, 4 Feb 1901, CAB 41(26/2.
Chamberlain to Milner, 7 Feb 1901, JC 13/1/121.
3°Kitchener to Mimer, 12 Feb 1901, MP IV/A/175/f.159.
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of work in Johannesburg was, to Mimer, both a weapon against the Boers and a linch-pin
of his future pians. Therefore, a start would be a positive move at a time when the news
was anything but encouraging.3'
II
The continued resistance of the Boers baffled the British authorities. The British
army had conquered the Boer republics and apparently the Boers had lost the war. In an
attempt to discover why the Boers remained defiant, the British government allowed
Kitchener to put out 'peace feelers' to the Boer leadership. This policy culminated in
March 1901 when Kitchener met the Transvaal commander Louis Botha at Middelburg,
to discuss what terms would secure peace. These meetings greatly affected British civil-
military relations, and revealed the growing division between military and political
attitudes towards the war and the Boers. The discussions eventually revealed that
Kitchener and Mimer held differing views regarding the ultimate settlement of the war,
and the place of the Boers within post-war South Africa. This section comprises two main
parts; the first looks chiefly at the development of a military viewpoint regarding peace
and the war itself; the second examines the talks between Kitchener and Botha.
The prospect of peace was explored by British officials throughout the period
December 1900 and February 1901, despite the attention devoted to the conduct of the
war. Chamberlain's speech in Parliament on 7 December 1900 indicated the British
government's interest. Chamberlain spoke about the future settlement of South Africa, and
stated that the Boers would only get self-government after a period of direct rule, and
after they had demonstrated their loyalty. 32
 Afterwards, Chamberlain requested that
Milner respond to the speech as a gesture towards the British public, and to demonstrate
the conciliatory policy of the British authorities. Again Mimer used the opportunity to air
his views, to impress upon public opinion that the commandos were ruthless and
desperate, and that the best policy was the one he had advocated thmughout 1900. Milner
felt the best time to approach the Boers would be after the establishment of protected
' Mimer to Kitchener, 18 Feb 1901, Ibid., ff.160-162.
'2 Haard 4th Series, LXXXVIII, 7 Dec 1900, 261-263; Garvin, Ifl, p.620.
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areas. He believed it was too early to make offers, because Chamberlain's speech had
been viewed as a sign of weakness by the Bond newspapers:
From the political point of view I think there is only one thing which can
hasten the submission of the Boers generally, and that is the spectacle of
one or more fairly extensive districts so strongly held against raiders that
we can promise any people willing to settle down in them efficient
protection.
Furthermore, he hoped to see and encourage surrendered Boers to take up arms in defence
of these protected areas, and Milner felt such men existed who from 'disgust at the
continuance of the present aimless and ruinous resistance would stand by us.' 33 In all,
Mimer attempted to bolster his position in relation to the generals, and to air his views
before a wider and, perhaps, more influential audience.
A sign of the government's concern regarding the likelihood of peace had been
given by Chamberlain at the end of December. By then the second invasion of Cape
Colony was underway, and although Chamberlain realised Mimer was preoccupied with
the problem, he did not want him to forget the need to promote ideas about peace.
Chamberlain felt that the Boers' unresponsive attitude was due to their ignorance of his
7 December speech. (The Boers usually had access to information through an unofficial
'grapevine' between the British and Botha's headquarters). Chamberlain wanted to show
critics that the government was being reasonable, and that the main impediment to peace
was the irreconcilable attitude of the Boers. Although Chamberlain was conscious of the
need to placate the loyalists, he did not want their obstinacy to be a barrier to peace:
we have to keep in mind the fact that the Dutch must in the long run live
side by side with the English, and that the best settlement would be one
which left them fairly satisfied with their condition.
Already, the British government was moving away from the concept of
'unconditional surrender,' which had dominated their thinking during 1900. They had
realised, no doubt, that the Boers might react positively to a more reasonable attitude.
Moreover, military opinion was providing ministers with 'food for thought.'
" Milner to Chamberlain, 11 Dec 1900, CO 417f296/ff.429-430.
Chamberlain to Mimer, 22 Dec 1900, JC 13/1/105.
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Following Chamberlain's 7 December speech, Major Aitham sent a memorandum
to the DM1, which practically foretold the settlements of 1902 and 1906. Altham
explained that the continuing war spelt ruin for the inhabitants of the two new colonies,
and, therefore, would have a detrimental effect on the future government of the whole
region. He said that Britain could not win the war by 'purely military methods.' But as
severe measures were the only way to respond to guerilla warfare, it would ruin the Boers
and any hopes of eventual federation. Consequently, Altham suggested that 'unconditional
surrender' should be replaced by the Boers surrendering their arms and recognizing British
authority. The Boers should then expect to be given self-government after a definite
period of 'good conduct and loyalty.' Furthermore, money should be provided to help
rebuild farms and replenish livestock; from the point of view of political economy, 'the
money will be well spent if it terminates the war, and thus leads to the permanent
settlement of South Africa.' The shorter the period of Boer probation the better. 'The
Boers spring from the same Teutonic stock as ourselves, and have the same ingrained
traditions and passion for self-government.' To do this would win over Afrikaner opinion
in Cape Colony and reduce the need to leave large forces in South Africa after the war.35
The Colonial Office minutes reflected the fact that Altham's opinions were taken
seriously. Chamberlain wanted a copy sent to Milner and added, 'It is really an argument
and a strong one against his view... '
Altham's views are instructive and indicate a wider outlook which permeated the
anny at the time, and which developed as the war continued. By December 1900, certain
officers were becoming disillusioned with the war. Many were beginning to question not
only the policies and methods being used against the commandos, but the reasoning
behind the war itself. Doubts were expressed about who would benefit after the war, and
for whom the war was being fought.
The proximity of the gold-mining industry, and the Jewish origins of numerous
Randlords, added a particularly sensitive aspect to the war, and one which was of interest
to the army. At the beginning of the war, for example, one government critic, the radical
" Aitham to DM1, 7 Dec 1900, CO 417/307/ff.619-624.
CO Minutes, 13 Dec 1900, Ibid., f.619.
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Liberal John Burns, called the army the 'Janissary of the Jews.' This issue effectively
undermined the faith of officers in the cause for which they were fighting. Anti-semitism
pervaded all classes of society; in the landed gentry and aristocracy it combined with a
general distrust and loathing of capitalists, especially those who had made their fortunes
from speculation and trade.38 It was from this class that the officer corps was largely
drawn. The officer corps, that is from lieutenant upwards, was predominantly gentrified
and from an aristocratic background, contributing to the army in 1899 some 63% of
colonels and 62% of generals. The connections between army officers and their
backgrounds remained solid as many officers returned, even whilst serving, to take up
jobs which perpetuated the values, assumptions and structure of rural society.39
Moreover, the social life of officers and the restricted nature of officer recruitment ensured
that officers came from the same social background. The army offered a good opening
career because, as Lord Wavell later wrote, 'commercial business was not in those days
considered a suitable occupation for a gentleman.'4°
The army, of course, was in daily contact with the poverty produced by the
industrial system. Owing to the lack of recruits the army had to take in those who would
normally have been rejected. Most recruits, by the time of the Boer war, were from the
industrial slums. Many were unhealthy, under-weight, under-height and disobedient. By
contrast, the army prized agricultural labourers, men with whom officers felt an affiliation,
owing to their own rural backgrounds. These men were considered fitter and more
susceptible to military discipline, but they were a declining asset and eventually only 11%
Cit. G. Wheatcroft, The Randlords (London, 1985), pp.204-206.
Ml. Bush, The English Aristocracy. A Comparative Synthesis (Manchester, 1984), pp.72-76; D.
Cannadine, The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy (London, 1990), pp.345-346; W.E. Houghton.
The Victorian Frame of Mind (London, 1973), pp.183-195. F.M.L. Thompson, English Landed Society in
the Nineteenth Century (London, 1963), pp.292-302; MJ. Wiener, English Culture and the Decline of the
Industrial Spirit 1850-1980 (Cambridge, 1981), Chapters 1-5.
3' G. Harries-Jenkins, The Army in Victorian Society (London, 1977), Chapter 2; E. Spiers, Late
Victorian Army, pp.159-161. For a discussion on how these values persisted in the Edwardian army see T.
Travers, The Killing Grounds. The British Army, the Western Front and the Emergence of Modern Warfare
1900-1918 (London, 1987), Introduction and Chapter 1.
4° Cit. E. Spiers, The Army and Society 1815-1914 (London, 1980), p.10.
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of the Edwardian army comprised such men. 41
 Thus it is suggested that the prejudices
which distinguished landed society, its anti-bourgeois ethos coloured by anti-semitism
owing to the proliferation of Jewish capitalists, permeated the officer corps as well.
Once war had broken out the prejudices of the officer corps emerged. Buller
resented having to help the besieged town of Kimberley because it was the headquarters
of De Beers, and would not tailor his strategy to suit Cecil Rhodes. Evidently, Buller
thought the British and Colonial governments far too subservient to capitalist interests.
According to his biographer, Buller never felt he could rely on Kimberley, either to hold
Out or take risks for Britain's cause.42
The resistance of the Boers invoked a latent admiration within many officers who
were surprised, at first, by the Boers' martial abilities. The Boers showed themselves to
be gifted amateurs, experts in field-craft with skills honed from a healthy, rural existence,
away from the debilitating effects of the city. In short, they were everything the average
British recruit was not.
As the guerilla war dragged on these views crystallized further. In June 1900,
Percy FitzPatrick noticed a perceptible anti-Johannesburg/anti-Jewish attitude amongst
individuals and agencies whom he deemed antagonistic towards the mining interest.
The anny, correspondents and visitors, almost without exception, as they
go home, express strong feeling against the mineowners, capitalists, "Jews
of Johannesburg," etc. etc...43
Captain Cohn Ballard thought the Uitlanders were a 'repulsive lot' adding 'the
more I see of Brother Boer the more I like him.' Ballard served throughout the war and
his letters reveal a growing discontent with what he considered the army was fighting for.
Indeed, to him British soldiers behaved like uncivilized barbarians by burning farms and
'bullying women.' In November 1900, he wrote, 'I hate the work we are doing and in fact
41 Spiers, Ibid., p.47; B. Bond, 'The Late Victorian Anny,' History Today, 11, (Sept 1961), pp. 622-623.
42 CoI C.H. Melville, The Life of General the Riglu Honourable Sir Redvers Butler (London, 1fl3), II,
pp.84-85.
FitzPatrick to Evans, 20 July 1900, Dummy & Guest (eds.), FitzPatrick Papers, pp.270-273.
Col. H.C.B Cook (ed.), 'Letters from South Africa,' Journal of the Society of Anny Historical
Research, 69, p.80.
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I hate this whole war now and am becoming a rabid pro-Boer.' 45 Various other letters
are in this style. He wished he was not fighting for the Uitlanders and hoped Britain
would be generous to the 'yeoman Boers.' Ballard also revealed that Ernest Swinton,
then an officer working in Johannesburg but later a pioneer of the tank and Chichele
Professor of War at Oxford, despised the German Jewish Randlords, and thought it a pity
British soldiers and yeoman Boers should be killed for their benefit. 47 At other levels
there was antagonism between the British army rank and file and the Uitlanders. In the
opinion of one Johannesburger, the fraternisation between the ordinary soldiers and the
black population was anathema:
The sight of soldiers and blacks drinking out of the same pewter and
carousing together, utterly destroys that moral power by which, after all,
we keep in order the teeming black population; and tends most distinctly
to insubordination.48
The British army therefore was imbued with prejudices which were reinforced by
the campaign in South Africa. As a result, there were many who favoured negotiating with
a worthy and honourable opponent.
Kitchener had also been active in trying to promote peace. He told Brodrick he had
been utilising the Burgher Peace Committee, and in January he had managed to secure the
services of ex-President Pretorius to see Botha. Kitchener explained that he envisaged the
Boers asking for certain conditions before they surrendered, so he suggested therefore that
the Boers be told that the native laws of the OFS would be maintained to allay their fears
about the place of natives in post-war South Africa. Secondly, he felt that compensation
for damage to private property could be arranged, especially if the mines paid for it, and
believed £1 million would suffice. Thirdly, Kitchener knew the Boers might ask for an
amnesty for rebels; he offered no opinion himself and just asked 'Will this be allowed?'
Ibid.
'4 lbid., p.181.
Ibid., p.246; Sir E. D. Swinton, Over My Shoulder (Oxford, 1951), p.135. Swinton's own remarks
about this period are move restrained.
Anonymous letter to Major Sir Bartle Frere in Letters from an Uidander 1899-1902 (London, 1903),
p.11!. [author's italics]. W.Nasson, 'Tommy Atkins in South Africa,' in Warwick (ed.), pp.132-133.
Ordinary soldiers apparently did not get on with English-speaking colonists either. The colonists were often
found to be less than welcoming, p.123.
151
Kitchener believed the Boers would want some guarantee that they would not be ruled by
capitalists and would have some form of self-government; he explained, 'They are I
believe absurdly afraid of getting into the hands of certain Jews, who no doubt wield great
influence in this country.'
Kitchener also realised the Boer leadership was divided, that Dc Wet and Steyn
were more fanatical than Botha. But this division, rather than providing an advantage
which the British could exploit, tended to make the peace process more difficult. As
Kitchener explained, none of them wanted to be the first to surrender. Kitchener was not
sanguine about the success of any peace overtures; he did not give any reasons but the
current Boer offensive must have demonstrated the fact that the Boers were not ready to
give in - yet. For the present Kitchener was more hopeful that his own military operations
would force the Boer leadership to the negotiating table. 49 This despatch clearly reflected
his own opinions and revealed an inclination towards leniency. It is remarkable how
similar Altham's and Kitchener's views were. What these expressions do show, however,
was the high command's wider outlook, a perspective which included the problem of how
to assimilate the irreconcilables into post-war South African society. Whereas Milner
hoped to exclude the influence of men such as Botha, Dc La Rey, Dc Wet and Steyn,
from the peace and reconciliation process, certain army officers and Kitchener expected
these men, or some of them at least, to be part of that procedure.
Evidence of this development in Kitchener's outlook came on 22 February when
he informed Brodrick that some progress had been made: Botha had agreed to meet him.
Kitchener's initial reaction was to think that his military operations had convinced the
Boers that resistance was futile. In his apparent euphoria over the prospect of peace,
Kitchener warned the government what was expected of them:
I think a personal meeting may end the war if we are prepared not to be
too hard on the Boers...It will be good policy for the future of this country
to treat them fairly well. I hope I may be allowed to do away with
anything humiliating to them in the surrender if it comes off.5°
4' Kitchener to Brodrick, 25 Jan 1901, KP 22/Y18. [Kitchener's italicsj.
5°Kitchener to Brodrick, 22 Feb 1901, KP 221Y26. Kitchener also wanted to know 'how far I may have
a free hand in discussing such points.' Kitchener to Bmdrick, (teL), 22 Feb 1901, CAB 37/56/27.
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On 28 February 1901, Kitchener met Botha to discuss terms. Kitchener's
instructions had been considered by the Cabinet and sent to him and Mimer the day
before. As Salisbury told the King, the two officials were required not to 'commit
themselves in respect to specific proposals in detail until the precise terms in which those
conditions were to be couched were submitted to Your Majesty's Government.'51
Kitchener reported the gist of the talks to Brodrick and outlined the terms Botha wanted.
Such matters as representative government; financial assistance; amnesty for rebels; and
the franchise for blacks were discussed, with Kitchener promising that every consideration
would be given to Botha's demands. 52
 Kitchener was optimistic about the outcome, and
clearly felt the terms wanted by Botha were reasonable. As he told Roberts:
If the Govt. wish to end the war I do not see any great difficulty in doing
so but I think it will go on for some time if the points raised by Botha
cannot be answered.53
However, difficulties had already developed. Brodrick wrote to Kitchener on 1
March, replying to his note of 25 January, and at the same time incorporating the
government's views about the talks. Virtually every proposal Kitchener had forwarded was
challenged. For example, no money could be promised to the Boers otherwise the Colonial
governments would demand more; loyalists would not like rebels being granted an
amnesty; and although the fear regarding rule by capitalists was acknowledged, the men
who generated the wealth could not be excluded from government. TM The outlook was
not promising for Kitchener.
Mimer met Kitchener at Bloemfontein on either 1 or 2 March. Milner had just left
Cape Colony to take up his post as Governor of the Transvaal and met Kitchener hall-
way. He did so again, as it were, when discussing the talks, except on the point of
amnesty which he later told Chamberlain was not:
51 Salisbury to the King, 27 Feb 1901, CAB 41126/3.
52 Kitchener to Brodrick, 1 March 1901, CAB 37/57/34.
Kitchener to Roberts, 28 Feb 1901, RP 33/f.17.
Brodrick to Kitchener, 1 March 1901, KP 22/Y28.
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a point which His Majesty's Government can afford to concede. I think it
would have a deplorable effect in Cape Colony and Natal...to obtain peace
by such a concession.55
Milner had no faith in the negotiations and would have avoided them if possible. But at
that stage Milner had no choice: the negotiations had taken place and the peace process
was underway. Mimer knew he could not openly sabotage the process. He believed public
opinion favoured peace; he knew the government was concerned about costs; and
Kitchener had told him that elements of the army could not be trusted. It seemed
Kitchener had lost faith in the reliability of several units. Some of the militia regiments,
had not proved capable or willing to fight their way Out of precarious situations, as some
of the actions in December and January had demonstrated. No doubt, with the poor
standard of troops arriving in South Africa, Kitchener expected much the same to happen
again. Thus Mimer realised that all he could do was to ensure, or insist, that no desperate
concessions were granted to the Boers?
On 6 March, Chamberlain telegraphed the government's instructions to Milner.
Basically, ministers endorsed Mimer's views regarding the amnesty for rebels, and would
not concede this point. On one other point, the government differed with both Milner and
Kitchener. Ministers insisted that financial assistance should take the form of loans.
Furthermore, Chamberlain added a section on the native question which Kitchener thought
was unnecessary. The government insisted Blacks and Coloureds be treated the same as
those in Cape Colony, with the civil rights they enjoyed?
Kitchener thought the government's attitude incomprehensible. After receiving the
terms and communicating them to Botha, Kitchener complained to Brodrick and Roberts.
He deprecated the attitude of the Colonial Office, for not agreeing to assist the Boers
financially, and for adding the extra clause about the civil rights of Blacks and Coloureds.
As he told Roberts, 'I am much surprised the Cabinet were not more keen on getting
peace as the expenditure on the war must be terrible.'58
' Mimer to Chamberlain, 3 March 1901, CAB 37/57f34.
' Mimer to Violet Cecil, 2 & 8 March 1901, Headlam, II, pp.211-215.
Chamberlain to Milner, 6 March 1901, CAB 37/57/34. Brodrick to Kitchener, 22 Maith 1901, KP
22/Y32.
Kitchener to Roberts, 8 March 1901, RP 33/f.18; to Brodrick, 7 March 1901, KP 22/Y30.
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General Rawlinson, recently arrived at Kitchener's headquarters, was similarly
scathing. He also wrote to Roberts and echoed Kitchener's own words. 'It seems rather
ridiculous to prolong this enormous expenditure in men and money simply for the sake
of sending a few hundred men to ptison.' Perhaps the point to be emphasised here is
not Kitchener's own view of the talks, but the prevailing view at headquarters. It seems
to be indicative of a wider outlook, one based on the idea that the politicians were
prolonging the war unnecessarily.
On 16 March 1901, Botha refused to accept the British terms. No reason was
given: all Botha said was that he did not:
feel disposed to recommend [that] the terms of the said letter shall [have]
the earnest consideration of my government.60
Both Mimer and Chamberlain were relieved; as Mimer explained to Violet Cecil, 'I hope
we shall take warning and avoid such rotten ground in the future.'6'
Some historians have focused on how Kitchener blamed Mimer for the talks
brealdng down, believing that Mimer's resistance to the idea of amnesty was the root
cause of the failure. 62
 Kitchener called Milner vindictive and was unable to fathom the
reasoning behind the decision not to grant an amnesty. 63 However, Milner's vetting of
Kitchener's proposals was not instrumental in guiding the response of the British
government. Brodrick's despatch of 1 March showed that ministers already harboured
grave doubts about the terms.
Milner was not the only one who Kitchener blamed. After further consideration,
Kitchener vented his anger first on Botha, describing him as a 'pettifogging lawyer,' and
then on those in Britain who had denounced the terms. It must be remembered that
Kitchener's ideas had been germinating since the beginning of the year, if not before. He
Rawlinson to Roberts, 23 March 1901, RP 61/f.19.
Kitchener to Brodrick, 16 March 1901, CAB 37/57/34.
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believed that even if the Boers accepted unconditional surrender, the only way for a
lasting peace would be to follow the terms he had advocated:
that is.. .if you really want to live in peace and security with them and be
able to give them self-government later. The strain on the Empire will be
very great if we are to have our Alsace 6,000 miles away instead of next
door as Germany has.M
Much of this despatch contained, like that of 22 March mentioned above, Kitchener's
ideas borne out of frustration and disappointment; hence the extremity of some of his
views. Yet, Kitchener was concerned about the future of South Africa, and seen in this
light his extreme views do have some purpose. If the British authorities were not willing
to treat with the Boers then the only way to ensure lasting peace would be to resort to
extreme measures, such as the deportation of the bulk of the population. Kitchener also
raised more cogent points. For example, he felt a policy of divide and rule might suffice
to keep South Africa quiet. He wanted to exploit the bitter feeling between surrendered
Boers and those still on commando. He also knew that to proscribe Afrikaans would give
the Boers a rallying point in the future. In effect, Kitchener told the British authorities that
the only way to defeat the Boers, without negotiating, was to resort to a policy of severe
measures to complement the work already being done, such as farm-burning and
'concentration' of civilians. Kitchener had warned ministers that without generous terms
the war would be hard, unedifying and bitter.
J3rodrick told Kitchener that he had informed the Cabinet of his views. Ministers,
however, were adamant that 'the extreme limit of concession has been reached.' Further
offers would only imply that the government was weakening. Moreover, Roberts
informed Kitchener that he had agreed with Chamberlain. It is not clear how far Roberts's
opinions influenced either Brodrick's or the Cabinet's views. Brodrick was probably aware
of them and might have used them during Cabinet discussions. Roberts never respected
the Boers as much as other officers; after all, his son had been killed by them. Roberts
never understood why the Boers prolonged the war, and tended to label them the same
way he regarded any other colonial enemy, such as the dacoits of Burma. Roberts
"Kitchener to Brodrick, 26 April 1901, KP 22'Y48 & 19 April 1901, Y44-45. Milnei planned to make
English the first language of South Africa, and replace Afrikaans in schools and courts.
65 Bmdrick to Kitchener, 20 April 1901, KP 22/Y47.
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expected the Boers to be governed like any other conquered people, and to accept their
fate; he never regarded them as potential fellow-citizens who might later join in imperial
decision making. In this respect, he was out of touch with opinion at military headquarters
in Pretoria. As it was, ministers had already made up their mind, and did not need
Roberts to make a decision for them.
III
What has not been emphasised also is the development of Mimer's own opinions
after the talks.67 Mimer realised now that Kitchener was beyond redemption, and was a
danger to his plans. Milner now abandoned his policy of restraint, and sought to press his
ideas on the British government. The failure of the talks opened the way for Mimer to
assert his own views and to do so in the knowledge that the British government was
politically and financially pressed, and inclined to look for another way forward. This
section, therefore, will examine Mimer's efforts to undermine Kitchener's position and his
attempt to see that the war was conducted according to his ideas.
Difficulties arose when Milner pressed Kitchener to alleviate some problems in the
ORC. On 9 March, the Deputy-Administrator in Bloemfontein, Major Goold-Adams,
complained to Milner that the army antagonized those Boers who were prepared to settle
down under British rule. Evidently, columns were depriving farmers of their stock, whilst
the animals on farms within reach of the commandos were being left, because they were
too far from the protected areas. Consequently, Milner informed Kitchener, and
reiterated the need to protect those who might be encouraged to take up arms against the
commandos. From Kitchener's reply a sense of irritation can be detected. But Mimer
pressed the point and informed Kitchener that the SAC were now being brought in to
widen the protected areas, thus making accommodation of all the livestock more
Roberts to Kitchener, 19 April 1901, KP 20/018.
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practicable.7° However the use of the SAC further undermined the deteriorating
relationship between Mimer and Kitchener.
On 15 April, Kitchener, clearly exasperated, addressed a memorandum to Milner
regarding the role of the SAC. This had been prompted by an earlier discussion with
Mimer, particularly over the work the SAC were to do around Bloemfontein. From that
meeting, Mimer thought he had gained Kitchener's agreement to concentrate the SAC in
order to secure certain areas from Boer encroachments. 7 ' But Kitchener complained that
the SAC were not being utilised properly, and that too few were being used outside
military garrisons. Kitchener explained that the SAC were part of the reinforcements sent
by the government earlier in the year, and so far they had achieved very little; also,
valuable officers had been removed from the army to train them. Kitchener's concluding
remarks added a controversial element to his letter: he wanted Mimer to tell Baden-Powell
that for the duration of the war:
the distribution of the SAC, and the manner in which they carry out their
military duties, both officers and men, are points on which he should
receive instructions from the Commander-in-Chief, in order to practically
carry out the scheme of their employment agreed upon between us.72
Unsurprisingly, Mimer did not agree with Kitchener's remarks. In relaying the news to
Chamberlain, Milner explained that apart from feeling too much was expected of the SAC
too soon, he was anxious about Kitchener's concluding paragraph. Mimer agreed that the
SAC should come under Kitchener's orders, but only if they were used as constabulary,
'not as just so many more mounted troops.' Mimer, of course, regarded the SAC as a
guarantee that some effort would be made to establish protected areas, and that these areas
would remain protected. Milner wanted to use the SAC to convey a sense of permanence
to those Boers who wanted to settle down. Without the SAC, it was clear Mimer did not
envisage his protected areas lasting."
7°Kitchener to Mimer, 20 March 1901; Mimer to Kitchener, 29 March 1901, MP IV/A/175/ff.177, 179-
182.
71 Milner to Chamberlain, 12 April 1901, CO 879173/650/126.
72 Memo. by Kitchener, 15 Apr11 1901, CO 879f7350/130.
Milner to Chamberlain, 19 April 1901, Ibid. Evidently, Baden-Powell complained to Milnez that he
had received no help from the military, who often Lock his horses and supplied his needs last. Jeal, pp330-
342.
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Fortunately for Mimer the Colonial Office endorsed his views and asked the War
Office to intervene and heed Mimer's advice. 74
 Once again, Mimer found that Kitchener,
by coveting control of the SAC, could not be trusted. By the end of April Milner had
accumulated a great deal of evidence which suggested that the time was ripe for him to
make a personal intervention. On the one hand, Kitchener's military strategy was not
working; the Boers were as active as ever, and the sweeping operations appeared to cause
more trouble than they suppressed. Milner's correspondence had failed to convince the
British government that an alternative strategy existed. On the other hand, news from his
friends painted a bleak picture concerning the popularity of the British government. Mimer
had already heard from Chamberlain how hostile public opinion was against the ministry,
and that a dramatic change of ministerial personnel was in the offing.75 From his friends
and correspondents Mimer learnt that the government was indeed losing the confidence
of the public, and the Unionist party as well. 76
 Some comfort was offered by Gell, who
said ministers had been shocked by Kitchener's talks with Botha?7 Consequently, Mimer
might have gained the impression that he had to act against Kitchener sooner rather than
later, before some crisis brought down the government. At his own request, Mimer asked
Chamberlain for leave to visit London not only for a rest, but to discuss the situation:
If I could get four or five fundamental points settled, it would immensely
facilitate my, and I venture to think, your task.78
Thus Milner's concerns about Kitchener's attitude towards the Boers; his intentions
towards the SAC, and the apparent weakness of the government converged to induce
Mimer to return to London and present his case in person. On 8 May 1901, Milner left
South Africa.
Mimer had judged the opportunity carefully. Ministers were unhappy about the
course of the war, and events elsewhere were becoming alarming. On 13 March, the
Co to WO, 22 May 1901, CO 879fl350/134.
" See above, p.144.
76 Godley to Milner, 27 March 1901; Camperdown to Milner, 29 March 1901. Camperdown complained
about Salisbury's nepotism and felt he should go. MP IV/B/214/ff.135, 14-15.
' Gel to Mimer, 4 April 1901, Ibid., f.123.
Mimer to Chamberlain, 29 March 1901, Headlam, II, p.245; [Milner's italics]. J. Amery, p.32.
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Cabinet had met unexpectedly to discuss Russian encroachments in China, and to consider
a Japanese request to know how Britain would stand if Japan went to war with Russia.79
Hely-Hutchinson, now governor of Cape Colony, reported that the military situation in the
Cape remained discouraging. 8° Hicks Beach continued to complain about the fmancial
situation and wanted Mimer to defer the establishment of civil administration in the
Transvaal until after his return to South Africa, as a Cost cutting exercise. 81 Although
Kitchener was eager to discuss and enumerate his military successes, he remained
pessimistic when reviewing the long term prospects, saying only that the war would last
a long time. 82
 The sense of unease prevailing within the Cabinet was highlighted by
Brodrick in two despatches to Kitchener. At first, on 18 May, Brodrick explained that
ministers hoped Kitchener might concentrate on driving Out Boer forces from Cape
Colony and the ORC, and then 'localising' the war to the Transvaal, after which Boer
resistance might be claimed to be mere brigandage. A week later, in more forthright tones,
Brodrick told Kitchener that ministers were now pressing for the return of troops. They
wanted Kitchener to answer four questions: first, when might it be possible to reduce the
area of operations? Second, what troops could be withdrawn once this was done? Third,
if Kitchener was asked to return 100,000 men suddenly, how much territory could be held
with the remainder? And fourth, did Kitchener still believe that amnesty was the only
reason why the Boers rejected the government's terms?83
While ministers awaited Kitchener's answers, Mimer arrived in London on 24 May
and held talks with Chamberlain over three days between 31 May and 2 June. The results
of these discussions were set down in a memorandum which was circulated to members
of the Cabinet. Basically, the memorandum reiterated all that Mimer had said over the
past year. However, in addition, Mimer now argued that if Kitchener's recent offensive
had failed to defeat the enemy, even with the help of the South African winter, then a new
Salisbury to the King, 13 March 1901, CAB 41126/5.
'° Hely-Hutchinson to Chamberlain, 27 March 1901, JC 11/17/6.
' Hicks Beach to Chamberlain, 10 April 1901, JC 11/18/5. Hicks Beach wondered why Mimer wanted
a rest by mturning to Britain. 'It looks as if he and Kitchener are not agreeing, unless his nerve is gone.'
Kitchener to Brodrick; to Roberts, 9 May 1901, CAB 37/57/54.
83 Brodrick to Kitchener, 18 & 25 May 1901, KP 22/Y55, Y57.
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plan ought to be devised, based on the establishment of secure areas from which fast-
moving, unencumbered columns could pursue the commandos into the inhospitable
regions of the old republics, where they would either waste away or surrender.
Before the Cabinet made a decision, however, ministers had to await the arrival
of Kitchener's answers to the questions posed by Brodrick on 25 May. Although these
answers reached London in a piecemeal fashion they all bore one overall impression:
Kitchener could not guarantee success or comply with ministerial wishes. Kitchener told
both Roberts and Brodrick that he could not reduce troops as he felt this would encourage
the Boer leaders, and could not spare the troops anyway because of extensive operations
underway in Cape Colony. 85
 These remarks probably caused some concern, if not
outright disappointment. After all, ministers had provided Kitchener with an extra 30,000
men since February, the bulk of whom had arrived in South Africa. Consequently,
ministerial attitudes began to harden. Kitchener received an intimation of this on 15 June,
when Brodrick informed him of the War Office decision regarding the use of the SAC.
Brodrick said that as far as dispositions and the strength of garrisons were concerned,
Kitchener held the authority. But, with the concurrence of Mimer and Roberts, Brodrick
stated that the government did not want to see the SAC used as part of flying columns:
The aim and duty of the Constabulary...should be to achieve prolonged,
continuous, and effective occupation of definite areas.'
On the same day, Brodrick explained to Salisbury the trouble he was having in reaching
agreement with Hicks Beach over the cost of anny reform, especially the need to obtain
more recruits.V It is conceivable this dispute also had an influence on the Cabinet
meeting of 21 June, which renewed their discussions of Mimer's suggestions, now that
Kitchener's answers had arrived.88
"Memo. by Chamberlain, 'Conversations with Lord Mimer.' 31 May-2 June 1901, IC 13/1/144. This
was circulated to the Cabinet on 12 June.
' Kitchener to Roberts; to Brodrick, 7 June 1901, RP 33/f.31 & KP 221Y60.
'4 Brodrick to Kitchener, 15 June 1901, CO 879/73/650/139.
Brodrick to Salisbury. 15 June 1901, SP SJBC/ff.209-214.
"Salisbury to the King, 21 June 1901, CAB 41/26/14.
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Evidently Mimer addressed the Cabinet himself and outlined his ideas further. His
views on the concentration of forces around strategic points doubtless struck a chord with
Salisbury and Hicks Beach who had aired similar opinions themselves. Moreover, Mimer
emphasised the need to restart the mining industry, a subject which ministers had
discussed for some time. It appears however that again no concrete decision was made at
this meeting. There seemed to be a reluctance to interfere, a legacy no doubt of the earlier
problems arising from political interference. Kitchener was told that the government was
prepared to face Parliament and obtain more cash; that ministers were prepared to await
the results of the winter operations in South Africa, although they wanted to see more
progress made at Johannesburg. Furthermore, the idea of confiscating the property of
those on commando, which was being pressed by Kitchener at the time, was rejected
because it would not hurt men whose property had already been destroyed; nor would
Cape Colony pass such legislation against rebels. However, the Cabinet held back from
a direct confrontation with Kitchener. Ministers were doubtless aware that both Mimer and
Kitchener agreed that Cape Colony should be cleared first, and were therefore happy to
followY°
Although the government had shown mounting concern about the situation in
South Africa, they had still not pressed Kitchener very hard. Mimer's frustration at this
setback was clear; five days later he presented another memorandum to the Cabinet.91
This was more extensive than the last, and emphasised his belief both that the winter
operations would not end the war, and that a new policy had to be considered. If the war
was to drag on:
it would surely be of great compensation for our protracted efforts to have
something to show on the other side. And especially if that something was
indirectly, and in the long run, itself conducive to the termination of
hostilities.
Yet again, Mimer called for a complete resumption of the mining industry; the return of
the refugees; and the development of protected areas. Kitchener's 'aggressive and
destructive policy' had achieved all it could. For Milner this would not mean a change in
' Brodiick to Kitchener, 21 June 1901, KP 22/Y64. See also part IV below.
'° Brodrick to Roberts, 21 June 1901, RP 13/f.68; Roberts to Kitchener, 21 June 1901, RP 124/1/f33.
"26 June 1901, CAB 37/57/62.
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strategy. 'It is rather the natural development due to the change of circumstances.' Milner
acknowledged the process might be slow, but believed it to be certain, and, importantly,
thought it would reduce the rate of expenditure, if not the actual total.
Mimer offered the government something concrete: a policy. His memorandum
was positive, whereas Kitchener offered little that was either constructive or practical.
Kitchener continued to explain how difficult everything was; the country, the Boers; and
the few opportunities there were to catch them. He could not see how he could reduce his
troops given the protracted nature of the war?2 In a long despatch to Brodrick, he
explained that if the government wanted to end the war, they had either to deport the
Boers to Fiji or Madagascar, or to renegotiate, making sure the Boers gave up their
independence and then let them fight amongst themselves:
The howls with which the terms were received in England and by the Cape
loyalists have to my mind put off the termination of the war for a very
long time, and made it almost impossible for Boer and Briton to settle
down peaceably, so this course having failed, we are, as far as I can see
forced into the more objectionable first course proposed?3
Kitchener's extreme views regarding the treatment of the Boers was expounded at great
length in this despatch. He also referred to the bulk of the Boer population as 'uncivilized
Africander savages with a thin white veneer.' Several historians who have commented on
this despatch have ignored the fact that the Boer leaders were not included in this
insult?4 If anything, Kitchener admired the Boer leadership, particularly since his
meeting with Botha, where the two had got on famously. Kitchener's views contained
what might be termed an unpalatable truth: if the government wanted lasting peace it
would have to be negotiated. This was a constant theme throughout Kitchener's tenure,
but he had to bombard ministers with this advice before the message was received and
fully accepted.
As it was, in the summer of 1901, British ministers either did not receive the
message, or preferred to ignore it. The government's willingness to sponsor talks in South
Africa had been demonstrated. To do so a second time, especially so soon, meant the talks
92 Kitchener to Roberts, 21 & 28 June 1901, RP 33/ff.33, 34.
'3 Kitchener to Brodrick, 21 June 1901, KP 22/Y62.
' Magnus, p.226-227; Pakenham, p.500.
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would need to have a clear chance of success. The government could not afford to be seen
either scuppering further talks, or achieving a settlement that treated the Boers too
leniently. As Milner offered a policy that did not carry such a great element of risk, it is
not surprising that the Cabinet shifted its position in his favour following a further
meeting on 28 June.
Evidently, ministers were irritated by the lack of information from the military
authorities, and after two hours discussion it was decided to tell Roberts of ministerial
concern. Ministers wanted an:
explanation of the plans by which it is hoped to bring the war to a
conclusion, and their relation to the resources which are at our
command.95
Brodrick communicated the Cabinet's decision to Kitchener the following day. Milner it
seemed had gained everything he wanted. The mining industry was to be restarted on a
larger scale, not in the limited fashion allowed by Kitchener; troops would be reduced
after the South African winter; and military operations would be curtailed in favour of
special columns formed to hunt down individual commandos?6
It was at this stage that Roberts began to play a more prominent part in the
proceedings. The reasoning behind the Cabinet's decision to notify Roberts of the
decisions made at the meeting of 28 June was to ensure that Roberts communicated them
to Kitchener. This of course was a way of making unpalatable news less so, in the
expectation Kitchener would take orders from a military superior rather than from
politicians. Roberts explained to Kitchener that ministers were fearful the country would
not tolerate any more heavy expenditure, especially when it became more widely known
that the Boers numbered only 16,000-18,000 men. As the old republics had been
thoroughly devastated the Cabinet thought it possible just to hold the lines of railway and
the principal towns, so that troop numbers could be reduced in September. Roberts also
noted that he thought it essential that Cape Colony be cleared first?7 Three days later,
Roberts again informed Kitchener of the Cabinet's ideas in a despatch that showed
" Salisbury to the King, 28 June 1901, CAB 41126/15.
'6 Brodiick to Kitchener, 29 June 1901, KP 22/Y68.
'7 Roberts to Kitchener, 29 June 1901, RP 122/1/ff.261-266.
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Mimer's influence and also reflected the fact that 'Treasury control was starting to telL'
Curiously, the tone of this letter is a lot harsher than the one before; this suggests that
Roberts might have been obliged to be more explicit. Roberts emphasised that Kitchener's
winter campaign, no matter how successful, was hardly likely to end the war. He
expressly stated that the Rand was to be restarted and refugees returned, as well as the
'necessary number of natives.' It was assumed Kitchener would carry out this policy with
about 140,000 men, leaving only 15,000 in the Cape; if the railway lines were not safe
as a result the Delagoa Bay and Natal railways would be utilised even more:
The operations now about to be undertaken are more of a police than
military nature, as their success will depend on the thorough pacification
of the more important and populous districts which it is now proposed to
hold, and the gradual extension of these protected areas until they embrace
the whole countryY
Both Roberts and Brodrick had been obliged to put pressure on Kitchener, and as
both supported his position this must have seemed distasteful. But both officials were well
aware of the problems caused by the war, and realised other alternatives had to be
considered. The reference made by Roberts that current operations were of a police nature
revealed his ambivalence at the time. Was Roberts still convinced, it might be asked, that
when he left South Africa the war was 'practically over'?
Strangely, Kitchener made no overt protest against the changes wished on him by
Milner and the government. He claimed he was not surprised by the call to reduce forces,
which he had already set in motion by the construction of blockhouses linked by barbed
wire, which were intended to protect the railways. However, he said he had hoped to use
the troops freed from defending the railway lines to garrison the blockhouses as they were
extended across the countryside. 1 This failed to elicit any sympathy from the
politicians. Ministers were enamoured of Chamberlain's idea to set up corps d'elite
"Yakutiel, p.186.
" Roberts to Kitchener, 2 July 1901, RP 124/1/1.50.
' Kitchener to Brodrick; to Roberts, 5 July 1901, KP 221Y69 & RP 33/f.35.
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designed to hunt down the Boer leaders. Roberts too pushed this idea, probably because
it was close to his vision of 'police action."°'
Whether Kitchener disliked the whole idea of reducing troops, or just baulked at
being ordered by politicians, is unclear. It was probably a mixture of both, as Kitchener
could not tolerate any interference in his campaigns. Certainly, Kitchener remained
unconvinced by the orders he had received. Kitchener thought his troops were incapable
of being turned into corps d'elite; he said he had already been chasing the leaders and did
not think the British could live off the land like Boers. He said troop numbers could not
be reduced without surrendering some occupied territory, and was not prepared to lose his
best troops; instead he would remove only Yeomanry and Militia.'° 2 The tone of
Kitchener's remarks seems to have had an effect on both Roberts and Brodrick, and both
tried to soothe his feelings; this can be seen in the notes they sent to Kitchener on 13
July. Brodrick hoped Kitchener did not think them 'nervous or nerveless' in London, and
'we are most grateful to you for responding to Lord Roberts' suggestions He explained
that the recent correspondence did not mean the government had lost faith in Kitchener.
Roberts said much the same adding, 'I at any rate, can appreciate the great difficulties
with which you have to contend.'103
Kitchener was not deterred by assurances or instructions. Despite being told by
Roberts that the government did not want him to surrender territory, and that the policy
of developing protected areas should continue, Kitchener stated that the situation in Cape
Colony would determine whether he could reduce troops or not. The best thing, according
to Kitchener, was for the government to bring pressure on the Boers, by which he
probably meant confiscation. 1°4 Brodrick did not prove receptive to Kitchener's
suggestions. The question of special or severe measures was no longer possible, and he
advised Kitchener to consider the corps d'elite scheme. Brodrick felt that if one leader
101 Roberts to Kitchener, (tel.), 5 & 6 July 1901, MP IV/A/175/f.395 & KP 20,028; Brodrick to
Kitchener, 6 July 1901, KP 22/Yb. Brodrick recommended the scheme because 'it would use up less of
our men than the general sweeping process.'
' Kitchener to Roberts, (tels.), 6 & 10 July 1901, MP IV/A/175/f.396 & RP 33/f.36.
'01 Brodiick & Roberts to Kitchener, 13 July 1901, KP 22/Y73 & KP 20/030.
10 Robep
 to Kitchener, 15 July 1901; 1(itchener to Roberts, 19 July 1901, RP 124/1/ff.95-96 & 33/f38.
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was captured, the British might declare the war at an end, and the remaining Boers
brigands.'05
Although both Roberts and Brodrick sympathised with Kitchener and said they
understood the problems he faced, neither could argue against the implementation of
Mimer's schemes. However, at a time when a dispute between Roberts and Brodrick and
the government was reaching a head, Mimer made an error of judgement which was to
put Roberts firmly on the side of Kitchener.
Iv
At this point it is necessary to examine Roberts's relations with the British
government. This is important because it helps explain why Roberts backed Kitchener
later in the year. Roberts himself was drawn into the dispute between Milner and
Kitchener at a time when he was quarrelling with Brodrick and the government. This
particular argument was over the extent of political interference in army matters and
mirrored Kitchener's problems with the politicians. When Kitchener began to resist
Milner's intervention, so Roberts complained about the actions of the British government,
a situation which drew the two generals together. This is significant because until then
Roberts had been lukewarm in his support of Kitchener. Although he never shared
Kitchener's ideas regarding a negotiated settlement and lenient treatment for the Boers,
Roberts nevertheless recognised the problems his successor faced, especially those created
by political interference. Consequently, Roberts endorsed Kitchener's leadership at a
crucial time and helped shift the balance of civil-military relations in Kitchener's favour.
Roberts's intervention has largely been ignored by historians, but to understand how and
why Kitchener was able to resist Milner and the British government, Roberts's own
relations with the politicians needs to be highlighted. This section, therefore, will examine
the two issues over which Roberts fell out with his political superiors: these were army
refonn, and the treatment of officers who had failed during the war. It will also show how
an over-confident Milner misjudged Roberts's attitude towards Kitchener, and how
'Brodrick to Kitchenei, 26 July 1901, KP 22/Y76.
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Roberts's continuing dispute with the British government ensured he gave Kitchener his
full backing.
Lord Roberts was appointed C-in-C in November 1900, following the retirement
of Lord Wolseley. Almost immediately problems arose between Roberts and Brodrick,
particularly over the position and authority of the C-in-C. Roberts, like Wolseley before
him, did not agree with the system as constituted in the Order-in-Council of 1895.1 As
far as Roberts was concerned, the C-in-C had no real authority because other lower
ranking officers on the Army Board were equal to, if not independent, of him.'°7
Brodrick disagreed, which is not surprising considering he was Under-Secretary of State
for War in 1895 and had been instrumental in formulating the new organization. Brodrick
believed that the defects of the system were due to Wolseley's style of leadership. He
emphasised that while other members of the Army Board did have their own jobs and
specific functions, it was the C-in-C's job to supervise them and, 'that supervision is
exactly what the C-in-C chooses to make it.' 108 Roberts accepted Brodrick had more
urgent problems to deal with than the office of C-in-C, such as army reform, and agreed
not to pursue the matter. But he was not put off altogether, he stated ominously that he
had not agreed to accept the Order-in-Council 'or to have admitted that I could effectively
carry out the duties of Commander-in-Chief under its provisions.' In fact, Roberts's letter
carried a complete review of the position, with his comments on where it could be
improved. It was a substantial 'broadside' before the onset of a 'ceasefire.'109
This particular dispute lapsed as the question of army reform occupied more
official time. In March, Brodrick outlined his scheme for the creation of six army corps
(three regular and three volunteer), so that in future Britain could provide an expeditionary
force and have enough troops for home defence. The scheme came under fierce attack in
Parliament, even from Unionist backbenchers, such as Winston Churchill, who objected
to the cost. The main weakness of Brodrick's measures was that they relied on a steady
' Chapter 1, pp.26-27.
Roberts to Brodrick, 26 Nov 1900, SJB/PRO 30/67.
' Brodrick to Roberts, 20 Dec 1900, RP 13/f.13.
' Brodrick to Roberts, 21 Dec 1900, RP 13/ff.16-17; Roberts to Brodrick, 27 Dec 1900, RP
110/5/1269. Brodiick ensured he gained the support of ministerial colleagues, Salisbury to BrOdriCk, 24 &
N.D. Jan 1901, SJB/PRO 30/67/7; Balfour to Brodrick, c. Jan 1901, BP Add.Ms.49720/ff.97-108.
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supply of recruits, although Roberts said this problem could be overcome by an increase
in pay."° In fact, Roberts's advocacy of increased pay was only one of several ideas he
forwarded, all requiring a great deal of expenditure. Roberts's great interest was in the
technical details of reform, such as training and new weapomy, which was expensive.
This exasperated Brodrick who, as far back as January, had warned Roberts of the
difficulty in obtaining fmancial resources from the Treasury. Brodrick became so annoyed
with Roberts that he even complained to Kitchener about his profligacy." As it was,
on 10 May, Brodrick informed Roberts that his demands for more money were unrealistic
and dangerous. He reminded Roberts that the normal estimates had increased from £24
million to £30 million and said the public were weary of heavy expenditure. Although
Brodrick recognised the estimates, passed in March, had been hurriedly put together, to
make more demands on the country so soon would cause more trouble; he even suggested
it might bring down the government."2 Roberts regarded this letter as a censure and
threatened to resign. He argued he was well aware of the need for economy but:
I trust I shall receive your support and that of the Cabinet in my
endeavours to make our army efficient, otherwise the position I hold would
be an impossible one to me."3
The second problem which strained relations between the C-in-C and Brodrick was
over the punishment of failed officers. When Roberts first reacted to Brodrick's note of
'censure,' he concluded his reply by pointing out he had also been unaware of the
tendency of the government to 'deal severely' with officers who had blundered in South
Africa."4 Since Roberts had returned from South Africa, the government and certain
backbench MP's had called for examples to be made of those officers who had been
"°Roberts to Brodrick, 8 & 13 May 1901, RP 122/1/ff.185-188, 194-196. U. Sarire, 'St. John Brodrick
and Army Reform 1901-1903,' Journal of British Studies, 15, (1976), pp.l2l-l25; J.K. Dunlop, The
Development of the British Army 1899-1914 (London, 1938), pp.1 30-136; Spiers, Army & Society, pp.243
-250.
" Brodrick to Kitchener, 11 May 1901, KP 22/Y53.
112 Brodrick to Roberts, 10 May 1901, RP 13/f.55.
" Roberts to Brodrick, 11 & 18 May 1901, RP 122/1/ff.192-193, 200-206.
" Roberts to Brodrick, 11 May 1901, Ibid.
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defeated by the Boers. By May 1901, Roberts had become exasperated by these calls and
began to react against what he considered to be political vindictiveness.
The honour and reputation of the British Army motivated Roberts more than
anything, especially if he felt they were being brought into disrepute, and, in 1901, he felt
this particularly. In that year, there was a great deal of pressure exerted by the House of
Commons to try failed officers. The House, having reassembled after Christmas 1900, was
in no mood to be lenient, especially after General Clements's defeat at Nooitgedacht.
Brodrick made a firm promise to deal with those responsible and in reply to several
questions stated:
wherever the result of a court of enquiry establishes a prima facie case, I
shall insist that the officer be brought to a Court-Martial. I know that that
is the opinion of Lord Kitchener, and I know that the Commander-in-Chief
is prepared to recommend it."5
Roberts, however, was not prepared to recommend it, especially in Clements's
case. He told Kitchener to delay the Court-Martial, even though he recognised the Cabinet
was afraid of the House of Commons. 'I have told Brodrick,' he wrote, 'that to allow the
House of Commons to be judges on military matters would be disastrous to the Anny.'
Roberts was certain that officers were unlikely to accept responsibility if threatened by
a Court-Martial should they make a mistake."6 In fact, Roberts recorded his disquiet in
a lengthy memorandum after he was informed by Brodrick that Parliament was likely to
take more than a passing interest in the action at Nooitgedacht, and, more surprisingly,
the defeat at Nicholson's Nek, which had happened as far back as October 1899."
Three of the officers involved in the defeat at Nicholson's Nek had been acquitted
by a court of enquiry after the incident, whilst a fourth had been punished, unfairly
according to Roberts. Brodrick, supported by Balfour, Chamberlain and Hicks Beach,
wanted the officers to appear before a Court-Martial, despite the fact that two of them had
been promoted since. Roberts distanced himself from Brodrick and the ministers on this
issue. Fifteen months had elapsed since the original court of enquiry and Roberts felt it
Hansard, 4th Series, LXXXIX, 25 Feb 1901, 1090. The debate in the House of Commons was
brought about by Mr. Lambert MP with an amendment to the address about diiplining failed officers, 25
Feb 1901, 1069.
"6 Robej to Kitchener, 16 & 23 March 1901, RP 122/1/ff.92-94, 102-105.
" Memo. by Roberts, 23 March 1901, RP 122/1/ff.111-116.
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was too late to reopen the case. Roberts did not consider the ministers were particularly
well-informed on the issues and believed they knew of events only 'in a general way.'
Roberts said a Court-Martial should have been established at the outset and if resorted to
now, 'I feel sure you would find [it] would have a most unsatisfactory result. It would stir
up a great deal of dirty water and do no good." 8
 By the end of August circumstances
had reached a point where it became necessary to 'clear the air.' This was prompted by
Brodrick's letter which criticized Roberts's honouring of certain staff officers of
aristocratic birth."9
Roberts's first response was to offer his second threat of resignation. The build-up
of resentment over the critical attitude of the House of Commons reached breaking point
as Roberts condemned their "ringing-cheers" [which] are often given to very doubtful
actions.' Roberts was concerned that Brodrick had little faith in him dealing with
disciplinary cases, and noticed how Brodrick always advocated harsher measures than
Roberts himself, no doubt influenced by Parliament. Roberts acknowledged he was
reluctant to bring an officer to a Court-Martial unless he was quite certain a conviction
would result; an acquittal or reprimand only made those who had brought the Court-
Martial 'in the wrong by showing that an erroneous view of the case has been taken by
them.' All the old resentment about his position as C-in-C surfaced as he went out of his
way to criticize the current organization of the War Office, and he felt he would be cast
as a failure in his present post: to stay on he required Brodrick's entire confidence.'
This explains much about Roberts's attitude and his sense of army honour, that it was all
tied in with his own self-importance and sense of authority.
Thus it is clear that during the period when Milner attempted to gain the support
of the British government, Roberts was in an ambivalent position. He was in dispute with
Brodrick and the ministry as a whole, and he knew Milner had criticised his own conduct
of operations in South Africa.' 2' Yet, he also felt there was some truth in what Mimer
said, especially as he had never regarded the Boers in the same way as Kitchener. In some
" Roberts to Brodrick, 30 August 1901, RP 122/2/ff.75-77.
119 Brodrick to Roberts, 26 August 1901, RP 13/f.88.
'Roberts to Brodrick, 1 September 1901, RP 122f2/ff.85-93; James, pp.381-82.
121 Roberts to Kitchener, 19 April 1901, KP 20/018.
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ways, Roberts probably felt Kitchener accorded the commandos too much respect. This
ambivalence in Roberts explains the nature of his response to Mimer's suggestions; it also
explains why Roberts, especially after a row with Chamberlain, later placed his reputation
and influence behind Kitchener when the latter resisted implementing Milner's scheme.
By the end of July Mimer had seemingly achieved the position of paramount
official in South Africa. In amongst the discussions relating to changes in strategy and
tactics was a debate centering on the need to complement military operations by
introducing other severe measures, such as confiscation of property or banishment from
South Africa. Initially, Kitchener took up the idea following the Botha talks; Mimer then
also took an interest in such measures, in order to secure his position, both immediately
and in the future.
On 5 April 1901, Kitchener first mooted the idea of confiscating the property of
Boers still on commando.' Kitchener felt it was time to introduce severe measures as
the only way to induce the Boers to surrender quickly, without recourse to damaging,
protracted military operations. Milner endorsed the idea and recommended it to
Chamberlain just before he left South Africa for his visit to Britain. 1 Mimer's reasons
for supporting this idea are not clear. He gave no detailed justification in his telegram. At
the time he probably felt much the same as Kitchener and wanted to see the war ended
quickly; perhaps he mentioned it merely to see how the government stood on such an
issue. Ministers were apparently unsure about using confiscation as a weapon. Milner's
telegram was shown to the Intelligence Department to determine whether confiscation
came under the rules of 'civilized warfare.' Two notes appended to the telegram were
shown to the Cabinet on 13 June, and they provide an interesting military viewpoint.
Apart from the legal arguments against the idea, it was considered that confiscation would
create 'a class of white paupers.' But to restrict the scope of confiscation was not a sound
idea either:
To enforce confiscation in the case of particular men only, such for
example as Louis Botha, would be unjust and would put against us in the
Kitchener to Roberts, 5 April 1901, RP 33/f.22.
Mimer to Chamberlain, (tel.), 8 May 1901, Co 879/73/650/128.
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future those leaders whose support is necessary to the peaceful settlement
of the country.
Whether Kitchener was informed of this opinion is uncertain, although he would
have understood the sentiment. Whereas Mimer might have favoured the tactic to deprive
the Boer leadership of power and influence, it is likely Kitchener wanted to frighten the
Boers into submission without actually proceeding with the punishment. With Roberts's
backing, Kitchener pressed his case and attempted to convince the government that
confiscation was a worthwhile expedient. 1
 Ministers, however, were more inclined to
promote what they considered legitimate methods to help shorten the war. Thus in areas
where 'our occupation is so far effective,' Kitchener was asked to consider the idea of
taxing those farmers still on commando. 1
 Kitchener was not so sanguine and replied
there was no precedent in Boer legislation, which Chamberlain believed to have existed.
Moreover, the idea of declaring zones to be fully occupied did not commend itself to
Kitchener either:
There is no district in which it could be said that our occupation is more
effective than it is over practically the whole country.
Instead, Kitchener wanted the Boer leaders told their property would be confiscated if they
did not surrender within a given time. Furthermore, Kitchener advocated the banishment
of Boer prisoners and their families, and to treat the commandos in the same manner.'
Now that the consideration of severe measures was on the agenda, Kitchener refused to
let the matter drop, and feared the war might go on indefinitely if nothing was done. The
unexpected harshness of banishing families from South Africa would, he felt, succeed in
this way.1
By the end of June, as Kitchener continued to implore ministers, Mimer had
obtained what he had set out for and appeared to be no longer interested in endorsing
severe measures. His opinion had shifted somewhat and he was against wholesale
12 Notes by the Intelligence Division, c. 13 June 1901, CAB 37/57/58.
' Roberts to Kitchener, 7 June 1901, KP 20026; Kitchener to Roberts, 14 June 1901, RP 33/f.32.
Chamberlain to Kitchener, (tel.), 18 June 1901, CO 879173/650/140.
v Kitchener to Chamberlain, (tel.), 19 June 1901, KJ' 19/IJ1O.
'Kitchener to Roberts, 21 June 1901, RP 33/f.33; to Mimer, (tel.), 26 June 1901, MP N/A/ill/f.! 15.
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confiscation, although he now favoured its use in protected areas so that newcomers could
be settled in the property and protected.'
Kitchener remained undeterred by the continual refusals to support his views. As
the government now wanted him to clear Cape Colony as a matter of urgency, Kitchener
argued that this could only be done in tandem with a policy of strong measures. 'I fear
opinions at home are far too optimistic about matters out here, and if nothing is done we
may still have veiy grave trouble." 3° Kitchener was wasting his energy. Confiscation
and banishment were ideas ministers were no longer willing to discuss. As Brodrick
explained, severity had achieved very little: farm-burning had been promoted as likely to
end the war and this had failed. With regard to banishment, this was dismissed. The
British government was not prepared to keep 16,000 hostile Boers in camps on islands
such as St.Helena; nor were they prepared to off-load the Boers elsewhere because the
Boers were 'not a marketable commodity in other lands."3'
On 25 July, after giving the matter some thought, Mimer agreed something ought
to be done to coerce the Boers after Kitchener's recent military operations, but was at a
loss to decide on the best method. He still thought confiscation within the protected areas
the best solution under the circumstances, but not banishment.' 32
 However, Milner, had
second thoughts because the day after he wrote to Kitchener he contacted Chamberlain
about a modified form of banishment. Instead of mass deportations, Mimer favoured
banishing only the Boer leaders. This course, if adopted, would solve a problem for him
by removing those whom he deemed his most implacable enemies; and, he said, it would
be good policy to help Kitchener. 'His tendency to discouragement is, to my mind, one
of the most serious features of the situation." 33
 Mimer's support for a limited form of
banishment, coupled with the perceived need to do something for Kitchener, obliged the
' Mimer to Kitchener, c. 27-28 June 1901, MP IV/A/171/f.116; to Brodrick, 12 July 1901, MP
IV/A/175/ff.368-373.
' Kitchener to Brodrick, 14 July 1901, CAB 37/58/107.
'' Kitchener to Brodrick, (tel.), 19 July 1901, CO 48/568/f.618; Brodrick to Kitchener, 20 July 1901,
KP 221Y75.
' Mimer to Kitchener, 25 July 1901, MP IV/A/175/ff.376-377.
' Milner to Chamberlain, 26 July 1901, JC 13/1/166.
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government to acquiesce.' On 7 August, a proclamation was published which
threatened Boer commandants, field-comets, and 'leaders of armed bands,' with permanent
banishment unless they surrendered by 15 September 1901. Furthermore, those Boers with
families in the camps would be charged for their maintenance, the cost to be taken from
property 'moveable and immoveable."35
Milner felt he was in a strong position. His policy was to be implemented and he
had bolstered it by obtaining a measure against the Boer leadership. His confidence must
have been high as he contemplated the future, and it perhaps explains why he wrote to
Roberts on 29 July 1901. Milner attempted to persuade Roberts that it was time to
restructure the command in South Africa. Mimer hoped to break up Kitchener's command
into three separate ones, leaving one general officer who would arbitrate over any dispute.
Mimer did not think the war, 'if it can be called a war,' had any unity, being a 'mass of
scattered and petty operations' requiring 'several directing minds.' Mimer's objective was
to place himself in overall command, as the leading official in South Africa, and this step
would ensure his policy was properly implemented by more pliable generals. For Mimer
civil considerations, such as the return of the refugees, and the resumption of industry,
were equal to the need to defeat the enemy:
Throughout the whole country civil and military questions are clearly
intertwined & constant. ..communication between the High Commissioner
& the several Generals Commanding will be essential to a satisfactory
result.1
Roberts was not so sure; he now saw that Kitchener's position was under threat.
He told Mimer that his scheme might work when peace was proclaimed and martial law
ended, but 'So long as columns have to take the field, it would, I am sure, be a mistake
to make a change in the chief command.' Roberts felt there had to be one army
commander with Milner in South Africa, and that ought to be Kitchener. Roberts still
'Chamberlain to Kitchener, 30 & 31 July 1901; Kitchener to Chamberlain, 2 Aug 1901, (tels.), CO
879173/650/160-162. Kitchener felt banishment did not go far enough, as the Boers believed a change of
government would reverse such measures. 'Confiscation is the only thing that will touch them.' Kitchener
to Roberts, 9 Aug 1901, RP 33/f.41.
'"Chamberlain to Kitchener, (tel.), 5 Aug 1901, Correspondence relating to the prolongation of
Hostilities in South Africa, PP(1901), XLVII, Cd.732, p.6.
' Milner to Roberts, 29 July 1901, RP 45/f.49.
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thought Kitchener would carry out the Cabinet's wishes regarding the change in strategy
and hoped Milner would agree with the arrangement. 1 It must be remembered that
Roberts's dispute with the British government was at its height, and it seems Roberts was
further moved to give Kitchener his support in the face of political criticism. Early in
August, Chamberlain had written to him regarding a letter from Sir William Marriott,
complaining about the military administration in Johannesburg. Chamberlain
acknowledged the complaints and said 'rightly or wrongly' there was much discontent
amongst civilians. A complaint that stood Out was that Colonials had been discharged in
contravention of their terms of enlistment.138
Roberts defended the military administration of Johannesburg by condemning the
Colonial soldiers instead. He reminded Chamberlain that they had caused him trouble over
enlistment and that they must have 'misrepresented' their terms to Marriott. He could not
believe Kitchener would have offered them terms that would have caused the same
complaints. Marriott had obviously exaggerated matters.' 39 Roberts's exasperation with
the politicians was complete.
August thus marked a turning point in civil-military relations. With Roberts
becoming ever more hostile towards the government and Kitchener growing ever more
recalcitrant, the political authorities found themselves facing soldiers who were again no
longer willing to take political considerations at face value. Kitchener felt he had good
military reasons for taking a negative attitude to the government's wishes. Since July and
earlier, he had said the situation in Cape Colony needed to be resolved before any changes
in strategy - and its corollary of troop reductions - could take place. He believed the war
was proceeding satisfactorily, particularly in Cape Colony, and that major successes had
been achieved. Kitchener was glad Roberts agreed with him.'4° Simultaneously,
Kitchener informed Brodrick of the success of the burgeoning blockhouse line and
'Roberts to Milner, 4 August 1901, RP 122/1/ff.304-305. Roberts infonned Kitchener of Mimer's
views. Roberts to Kitchener, 3 Aug 1901, KP 20iO32.
' Chamberlain to Roberts, 3 & 5 August 1901, RP 16/ff.12, 13.
' Roberts to Chamberlain, 4 Aug 1901, RP 122/1/ff.308-312; Roberts to Kitchener, 9 Aug 1901, KP
20,033.
° Kitchener to Roberts, 17 & 23 Aug 1901, RP 33/ff.42, 43.
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reaffirmed his faith in the current system, and stressed the importance of 'my weekly
bag.' The Boers were being drained and would eventually give in:
I am afraid there is no other way as the people we are dealing with are too
stupidly obstinate to believe in the hopelessness of their struggle.141
The obstructive tone of Kitchener's correspondence alarmed ministers in London,
particularly Brodrick. He knew Kitchener was not happy with the terms of the banishment
proclamation, and revealed his own concern by telling Chamberlain that he had asked
Kitchener to explain his remarks regarding the need to clear Cape Colony.142
Chamberlain, however, was not convinced by Kitchener's pronouncements, and ridiculed
his suggestions and recent schemes. Chamberlain, in fact, remained wedded to his idea
of using corps d'elite. Brodrick informed Kitchener of Chamberlain's views, but toned
them down, clearly anxious to avoid a rift between Kitchener and Chamberlain, and
conscious perhaps of his own difficulties with Roberts. 143 Brodrick also informed Mimer
of Kitchener's views, and added that the government was keen to get troop numbers
reduced after 15 September, so as to save money and obviate the need to summon
Parliament for financial assistance. Brodrick, however, was reluctant to force Kitchener's
acquiesence, or to bring home cavalry prematurely. He asked Milner, therefore, to see
Kitchener and try to find a 'middle-course." But if he was after a modicum of help
from Mimer than he was mistaken to expect it over Cape Colony. Mimer was not
convinced the best way to make savings was to reduce troop numbers in Cape Colony,
even though the situation was improving. Mimer suggested instead that 'rubbish' should
be disbanded (he did not elaborate but probably referred to Yeomanry and Militia, of
which Kitchener also complained), and by getting the Cape government to contribute to
costs by paying certain units currently financed by the imperial authorities.' 45 Milner,
of course, continually feared a widespread uprising in the Cape, brought about by a Boer
military success. He readily understood Kitchener's fears regarding the safety of the
141 Kitchener to Brodrick, 23 Aug 1901, KP 22/Y80.
142 Brodrick to Chamberlain, 17 Aug 1901, IC 11/8139.
143 Chamberlain to Brodrick, 24 Aug 1901; Brodrick to Kitchener, 26 Aug 1901, IC 11/8/41, 43.
' Brodrick to Milner, 27 Aug 1901, MP IV/A/171/f.117.
' Milner to Brodrick, 31 Aug 1901, Ibid.
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Colony, and this was his weak point. His support for Kitchener undermined his own case,
as did his support for a banishment proclamation, as well as his own over-confidence in
discussing military matters with Roberts. Not only had he ranged the army high command
against his scheme, he had helped Kitchener to use the situation in Cape Colony as basis
for rejecting his scheme altogether.
V
Although Kitchener and Roberts were becoming obstructive, Milner's position still
remained strong. By the end of August he had persuaded the British government to
implement his policies and to issue a proclamation of banishment against the Boer leaders.
However, Kitchener's reluctance to begin reducing troops and alter his strategy gradually
undermined Milner's success. Eventually, the British authorities were faced with a
dilemma: should they sack Kitchener, as Milner came to believe, or should they endorse
Kitchener's expensive and cumbersome strategy and maintain Cabinet cohesion, in the
face of intensifying disputes between ministers over the conduct of the war. This section
explains how Mimer's position crumbled in the face of Kitchener's intransigence,
Roberts's support of Kitchener, and ministerial dissension.
The main reason behind the Cabinet's acceptance of Mimer' s strategy was that it
held out the hope of cuts in expenditure, and the likelihood of troop reductions. This, of
course, was of paramount importance in furnishing reserves for both the defence of Britain
and India. As Milner's ideas seemed to promise much, the Cabinet was impatient for
some intimation from Kitchener that his strategy was working.
In early September Brodrick tried to impress on Kitchener the need for troop
reductions and financial retrenchment. He told him he was anxious about the reduction
of troops and was fearful of having to call Parliament in December, which he felt would
encourage the Boers. He suggested the 15 September would be a suitable occasion to
announce reductions, proclaiming at the same time that the character of the war had
changed. Then Kitchener might be able to reduce his army to 140,000 men without much
comment being made about it.'
146 Brodrick to Kitchener, 6 & (tel.), 13 Sept 1901, KP 22/Y84 & CAB 37/58/86.
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Mimer, following Brodrick's request on 27 August, also spoke to Kitchener
personally to emphasise these points, and reported back that although Kitchener was
averse to troop reductions at present, the situation in the Transvaal and the ORC was
better than he (Mimer) had anticipated. Moreover, Kitchener was beginning to make
effective cuts in costs, especially by reducing the most expensive troops in the army.
Recruiting for local corps had been stopped, and he was busy reducing the number of
Yeomanry. 'Taking all things together,' Milner continued:
expenditure in South Africa on pay and rations should now begin to show
substantial & progressive diminution...But I think it would be dangerous
to press K. to reduce at this moment beyond what he is already doing
except possibly in artillery, amount of wh. appears to me still excessive.
If Cape Colony could be quieted much larger reductions would at once be
possible.'47
Kitchener, with a subtle reminder of the efficacy of his system, told Brodrick that
his columns were achieving satisfactory progress, owing to the limited space within which
the commandos operated. He was in the process of reducing some troops, but it was
difficult to release too many, as there were more blockhouse lines to hold, and baggage
trains to guard for the mobile columns. He promised he would reduce numbers as soon
as it was possible.'48
All in all, things did seem to be improving: on the military front two encouraging
successes had been recorded, both against troublesome commandos in Cape Colony. On
5 September, Lotter's force was routed and Lotter himself was captured by Scobell's
column near Cradock; five days later, Scheeper's commando was badly beaten by Crabbe
at Laingsburg.
However, the cheerful outlook forwarded by Milner and Kitchener, was not shared
by Hicks Beach. He objected to the current rate of expenditure (especially for the armed
forces in Britain), and in an increasingly embittered correspondence with Chamberlain,
to which the service ministers were a party, increased the animosity felt amongst his
cabinet colleagues for the Chancellor himself.
' Mimer to Brodrick, 11 Sept 1901, MP IV/A/171/ff.119-124.
' Kitchener to Brodrick, 13 & (tel.), 14 Sept 1901, KP 22/Y85 & CAB 37/58/107.
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Hicks Beach deprecated the continual increase in the service estimates which had
risen substantially throughout the 1890's. In 1896, the navy was allocated nearly £19
million; in 1901 that figure had increased to nearly £31 million. It was a similar story
with the army: in 1896 the estimates stood at over £18 million; in 1901 the estimates had
risen to nearly £28 million. Both the service estimates had increased by 50% over five
years. 149 Hicks Beach was worried about paying off debt once the war was over and was
against raising taxes to do so. In the meantime, he wanted to reduce the rate of increase
of the non-war estimates, which in itself undermined the plans of both Brodrick and
Selborne. They wanted the rate increased in order to pay for schemes they considered
important to the nation's survival as a great power. Thus Brodrick insisted that army pay
should be increased to attract more recruits; whilst Selbome objected to Hicks Beach's
propensity to tell the Admiralty how to spend their money, and would not cut his
estimates abruptly for the sake of the Treasury. Selborne advocated a gradual reduction,
over six years.15°
Chamberlain was caught in the middle of this bad feeling and was able to
appreciate both sides of the argument. He sympathised with Brodrick, and realised that
a dictatorial stance taken by the Treasury was likely to induce the resignation of both
Brodrick and Roberts. But Chamberlain himself had little sympathy for Kitchener. The
despatches from Cape Colony continually told of the problems caused by the military
administration of martial law; and as this was the time when Kitchener was doing his
utmost to secure martial law in the Cape ports and antagonising the Cape ministry as a
result, Chamberlain's patience with Kitchener had worn thin. Eventually, he was obliged
to inform Brodrick that he also felt that Kitchener could manage in South Africa with
150,000 men.15'
The problem as far as Brodrick was concerned was that Kitchener seemed to be
doing his best to meet the Cabinet's demands. Added to Milner's rather sanguine report
" Hicks Beach to Salisbury, 13 Sept 1901, SP HBC/ff.272-277; to Chamberlain, 10 & 16 Sept 1901,
JC 11/18/9, 11.
50 Brodrick to Chamberlain, 10 Sept 1901, JC 11/8/51; Selbome to Chamberlain, 21 Sept 1901, JC
11f32/13. Selborne's Memo. to Salisbury, 31 Oct 1901, presented to the Cabinet on 16 Nov 1901, Boyce
(ed.), pp.128-136. Yakutiel, pp.187-203.
'' Chamberlain to Brodrick, 12 & 17 Sept 1901, JC 11/8/52, 54.
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of his conversation with Kitchener, Brodrick reacted with undisguised contempt to the
way Hicks Beach was trying to pressurise the military to make drastic reductions in South
Africa, reductions which could possibly jeopardise future operations. Brodrick it seemed
took the Chancellor's strictures personally, and took out his annoyance on
Chamberlain.'52
 On 18 September, Brodrick, by now overstrained with events in Cape
Colony and army reform at home, told Chamberlain:
I am straining every nerve to decrease expenditure. But last week the
return...from S.Africa showed men to feed 315,000, horses & mules
241,000...! am doing all that a man here day after day can do, short of
ordering troops home whom K. cannot spare."53
Brodrick himself was as convinced as Kitchener seemed to be regarding the
efficacy of clearing the Cape Colony, before any reductions could be made; and, coupled
with Kitchener's desire to be cooperative, Brodrick stuck firmly to the military point of
view.
Roberts also backed Kitchener, and was only too ready to support him after the
distasteful business in the summer, when he had been obliged to order Kitchener to
implement Milner's ideas. Roberts's unreserved backing of Kitchener was due to a
combination of factors. First, Roberts held Kitchener in high esteem after their successful
time together in 1900; secondly, Roberts was now extremely irritated by the British
government; thirdly, he resented Mimer's interference; and finally, as the sum of all these,
professional solidarity ensured his support for a fellow officer: after all, the reputation and
honour of the British army was at stake. Unsurprisingly therefore, on 19 September,
Roberts made his support for Kitchener apparent in a long memorandum to Brodrick, in
which he outlined Kitchener's difficulties in the Cape. A copy was also sent to Kitchener,
letting him know that he did have friends in high places.' Moreover, Roberts was
prepared to take the argument further, on the following day, Brodrick received a letter that
combined both pomposity and an indirect threat to members of the Cabinet:
'52 B, jck was also under pressure from the King who said the only way forward was to 'allow Lord
Kitchener an entirely free hand...' S. Lee, King Edward VII. A Biography, (London, 1927), II, p.79.
' Brodrick to Chamberlain, 18 Sept 1901, JC 11/8/55.
lM Roberts to Brodrick, 19 Sept 1901, RP 1222/ff.134-136.
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As regards any reduction of the force now in South Africa, we need not
trouble ourselves. I consider that an impossibility until peace has been
established throughout Cape Colony, and a reliable Police Force has been
raised... The Times of to-day takes the view, which I feel pretty sure is
generally held throughout the country, and it is for us at the War Office to
see that everything is done to keep the Army in South Africa in a
thoroughly efficient state.'55
Roberts was obviously full of his own self-importance, but his opinion could not
be ignored and was, perhaps nearer the truth than the politicians might have wished.
Already Chamberlain had warned Hicks Beach that his demands might risk the resignation
of both Brodrick and the C-in-C; 'We cannot fairly say to all the experts "cut down the
army by so many millions" unless we have some broad idea of how the necessities of our
defensive position can be met with the smaller sum.' Chamberlain also realised that the
time was not ripe for cuts, and that the public and the party would not support reductions,
'...against the advice of all the experts and merely to save taxation and pay off debt."
Hicks Beach was not deterred by this advice, nor by the growing criticism of his
views from Brodrick and Selborne, and carried the correspondence further. So when
Roberts made his views known, Brodrick felt it necessary to put the military view before
the Cabinet at the end of the month.
However, before that took place the military situation took a turn for the worse,
and ironically bolstered Kitchener's position rather than undermining it. On 17 September,
Gough's force in Natal was ambushed by Botha, and Gough himself captured. On the
same day in Cape Colony, Smuts surprised a party of 17th Lancers and defeated them
also. If this was not enough, De La Rey emerged from his lair in the Western Transvaal
and attacked Von Donop's forces at Kleinfontein (24 Sept), and Kekewich's column at
Moedwil (30 Sept). The effect of these humiliations, far from blotting Kitchener's record,
merely showed that it was far too early to start thinking of troop reductions while the
Boers were still active and capable of administering such stinging defeats. A further irony
was that in themselves these setbacks hardly affected the military situation at all: they
' Roberts to Brodrick, 20 Sept 1901, RP 122/2lff.149-150. The Times noted, 'The public, with their
plain common sense, grasp the truth, which seems to escape the custodians of the national purse, that to
attempt to make war "on the cheap" is, in the long run, the costliest and the most inept of all follies.' The
Times, 20 Sept, p.7.
156 Chamberlain to Hicks Beach, 12 Sept 1901, JC 11/18/10.
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were humiliating but they did not hold up the process of grinding down Boer resistance.
British forces were still numerically superior and the blockhouse line was beginning to
deny the Boers access to foodstuffs. But press reports tended to over-react when news of
these minor engagements arrived in Britain, and exaggerated their value to the Boers.
Kitchener himself had complained earlier about the effect of the press coverage,
particularly that of the Daily Mail. Articles appearing in that paper, according to
Kitchener, tended to help prolong the war by giving the Boers hope. Kitchener believed
that if the press could just ignore the Boers, it would deflate their self-confidence and
make them realise they could not influence opinion in Britain.' But, as Roberts's
earlier note suggested, the government was sensitive to adverse press coverage, especially
from those papers deemed sympathetic to the Unionist cause.
On 30 September Brodrick presented his memorandum to the Cabinet, and
reiterated the now unshakeable 'opinion', that in order for the Cabinet's strategic
recommendations to be carried out, it was necessary first to end the fighting in Cape
Colony, something even Mimer agreed with. All efforts to increase mobility and destroy
the commandos operating in Natal and the Cape was being done. 'The net result, however,
of these proceedings is to make it impossible as well as impolitic to withdraw any body
of troops, and Lord Kitchener makes it clear that he cannot part with any infantry.'
Brodrick explained that Kitchener was doing all he could to make economies, as he
himself was doing at home. Essentially, Brodrick's memorandum was a plea for a
relaxation of the pressure he and the military were under to make concessions for the
political well-being of the party. In fact, he argued that reductions in expenditure and
troop numbers would have the opposite effect, and alienate the party with the electorate.
With the recent defeats as evidence for the military, Brodrick quieted criticism for the
time being. Chamberlain used the lull to terminate his correspondence with Hicks Beach
on 4 October.'58
Kitchener sought to explain that what was needed was not a relaxation of measures
against the Boers, but an increase in their intensity: in other words to follow his way of
doing things. Thus he called for harsher measures against the Boer leaders as a sign of
'' Kitchener to Roberts, 9 Aug 1901, RP 33/f.41.
Memo. by Brodrick, 30 Sept 1901, CAB 37/58i1; Chamberlain to Hicks Beh, 4 Oct 1901, JC
11/18/15.
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the government's commitment to his strategy. He informed Roberts that more could be
done in selling Boer property, and by sending the women of those due for banishment out
of the country. Kitchener wanted a more stringent policy imposed and believed the Boers
would take notice of this if it was pushed by the Colonial Office. This was followed on
18 October by a demand that rebels who had recently joined the Boers deserved the
severest penalties.
Kitchener also became more blunt in his appreciation of the situation. He told
Roberts on 15 October that it was impossible for him to follow the instructions of the
government, and said that as the Boers showed no signs of reducing their operations he
'could well employ even more mounted troops that are efficient.' Brodrick laid this
communication before the Cabinet and recommended that 'the supply of necessary troops
to Lord Kitchener must not be slackened."6° Two days later, Kitchener emphasised that
although the Boer invasion of Natal had been a failure, 'they seem as fanatically disposed
to continue the war as ever, and I fear it can only end by our catching all or almost all
of them. It is hard work for our men and horses, and must take a considerable time. I
think you ought to be prepared for this.' Kitchener was now distancing himself from the
orders he had received in the summer, he was openly asking for more troops and arguing
that it would take time to bring the Boers to heel. Kitchener even suggested that if
Brodrick thought anyone else could do better, 'I hope you will not hesitate for a moment
in replacing me. ..You must remember that as we go on catching Boers, we weed them
out, and the residue left in the field are generally their best men and therefore more
difficult to deal with.'16'
Kitchener was known to suffer bouts of depression and to sulk for days on end,
but his recommendation that he should be sacked was never supposed to be taken
seriously. It was a calculated gesture in that he knew Brodrick would send telegrams
reassuring him, something perhaps he was psychologically in need of; it also served as
a reminder that there really was no one else who could replace him.
159 Kitchener to Roberts, 4 & 18 Oct 1901, RP 33/ff.52, 53.
"° Memo. by Brodrick, 16 Oct 1901, CAB 37/58,99.
161 Kitchener to Brodrick, 18 Oct 1901, KP 22/Y95.
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This was emphasised when the government became concerned about Kitchener's
health, thinking he might have been suffering from stress and strain. The only replacement
qualified enough to oversee the whole of the South African military theatre was Roberts.
He told Kitchener that the government had consulted him about a replacement should he
need a rest and added, 'My hope is that you will be able to hold on and bring the war to
a satisfactory conclusion, but we cannot afford to lose your services, and whenever you
think you have had enough don't hesitate to let us know.' He then volunteered his
services as a replacement should Kitchener want to take up the offer of a rest.162
The effect of these words on Kitchener can only be guessed, but it may be
assumed that while they offered comfort to a man suffering from periodic bouts of self-
doubt, they may have also increased his sense of self-worth. It was now obvious that
whatever the government might think of his methods, the only threat they could offer in
the form of a replacement was Lord Roberts, whose reputation had been somewhat
tarnished by the onset of the guerilla war in 1900. Kitchener's reply to Roberts does not
seem to indicate any concern about his own position, but more for the situation in South
Africa. In fact, Kitchener's concerns relate only to those problems that beset any
commander in such a war; the annoyance of the pin-prick defeats; press exaggeration;
staleness of officers and men; and a desire for fresh troops to lead the hunt for the
Boers.'63
If Kitchener was untroubled by government anxiety and hardly feared for his
position, he spared little thought for Mimer's views as well. In mid-September, Kitchener
spoke to Mimer on the issue of the 'three commands' and told him that it was not in the
best interests of the army. Triumphantly, Kitchener told Roberts that Mimer had evidently
agreed that 'it was quite a bad plan, and that you will hear nothing more about it from
him.' Roberts reply was equally comforting, 'I think, as I believe I must have told you,
Mimer's idea of three separate commands [is] out of the question. It would inevitably
result in his becoming the Commander-in-Chief in South Africa. You may depend upon
such a proposal never being accepted here."
'Roberts to Kitchener, 19 Oct 1901, RP 122f2/ff.209-210.
"3 Kitchener to Roberts, n.d. Nov 1901, RP 33/t58.
' Kitchener to Roberts, 13 Sept 1901, RP 33/f.46; Roberts to Kitchener 27 Sept 1901, KP 201040.
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On 30 October, one of Kitchener's best commanders, Colonel Benson, was killed
and his column heavily defeated during operations in Natal. Kitchener was able to use this
disaster finally to reject the government's strategy. Again, although the defeat was not one
of prime military importance, Benson had been a very successful leader, working with one
of the best intelligence officers, Wools Sampson. This in itself tended to make the setback
seem far worse than it was; Benson's death certainly shook Kitchener, but it gave him the
excuse he needed to begin his own counter-attack on the Cabinet's demands for
reductions. Kitchener rammed home the problem in a way the politicians would find hard
to refute: he told them that some risks had to be run:
and if a column like Benson's, operating 20 miles outside our lines is not
fairly safe it is a very serious matter and will require a large addition to
our forces to carry on the war...! am sending you a telegram on the subject
of reinforcements, I have been in hope that the recent loss of prestige in
Natal and shortness of everything, would cause the break-up of a large
section at least of the enemy's forces. The recent activity of the Boers
everywhere however, makes me reconsider the situation. As we drive them
Out of areas it takes more troops to keep them out, and I consider that
more troops will hasten the end which we all so much long for.'65
Kitchener's letter not only showed again how military defeat could be exploited
to help his cause, it exacerbated tensions within the Cabinet. The consequence of
Kitchener's reasoning was effectively to isolate Hicks Beach and his notions of
expenditure cuts. Ministers were determined to maintain the Cabinet's effectiveness and
cohesion by acquiescing to Kitchener's demands, and they agreed to despatch
reinforcements.' It might be asked why the Cabinet did not order Kitchener to reduce
his forces and adopt Mimer's strategy, when it was obvious that other columns would be
destroyed as a result of Kitchener's policy? The answer is probably that the Cabinet
realised they might have risked Kitchener's resignation if such an order had been sent.
And without a viable alternative to Kitchener they could not gamble on his meekly
following their orders.
By the end of October, Mimer was heartily sick of the military's management of
affairs in South Africa and his patience with Kitchener had reached breaking point.
' Kitchener to Brodrick, 1 Nov 1901, KP 22/Y100.
' Brodrick to Kitchener, 21 Oct 1901; Kitchener to Brodrick, 23 Oct 1901; Memo. by Brodrick, 25
Oct 1901, CAB 37/58/107. Salisbury to King, 29 Oct 1901 & 5 Nov 1901, CAB 41/26122, 23.
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Kitchener had earlier told Brodrick that he and Mimer were cooperating quite happily,
opening more mines and bringing in more refugees to Johannesburg.'67 But this
assumption revealed his lack of understanding in dealing with Mimer.
Although no record of Mimer's views has been found, it seems unlikely that he
took kindly to Kitchener's rejection of his idea about the 'three commands.' For Milner,
it was further evidence of Kitchener's intransigence and surely added to his growing
frustration. Moreover, he must have been aware that Kitchener was now asking for
reinforcements, which meant that he was not going to reduce his forces as a preliminary
to setting up protected areas. And, to make matters worse, the situation in the
concentration camps had deteriorated to an all time low, as the mortality figures reached
344 per 1000 in October.' So when, on 31 October, having been prompted it seems
by Benson's disaster, Chamberlain wrote on behalf of the Cabinet to ask what exactly had
happened in South Africa since Mimer's visit in May and June, Mimer was ready with
his reply.
Chamberlain's telegram revealed an underlying impatience within the government
for the way in which the war was being conducted. Mimer was to tell them why protected
areas had not been set up; why special columns had not been formed to go after specific
Boer leaders such as Steyn and Botha; and why the condition of the camps had
deteriorated so drastically, especially as this was causing comment in Britain, and
becoming a serious political liability. He added, 'I know it is a delicate matter interfering
with military discretion but you might discuss this question with Kitchener & in any case
I desire fullest possible report & explanations from you..."
Milner wasted no time in sending his reply and informing the Cabinet what exactly
he thought of Kitchener. It shows more than anything the reality of the civil-military
position in South Africa; Milner confessed that:
I do not think that my opinions, frequently expressed have any weight with
the C.in.Chief...He has probably more than the ordinary soldier's contempt
' Kitchener to Brodrick, 11 Oct 1901, KP 22/Y94.
' Le May, p.109. By September there were over 110,000 inmates in the camps; in March there had
been about 35,000, but there had not been an increase in the number of camps themselves. In April 395
deaths were recorded; in October 3,205. In Brandfort and Kroonstad camps the death rate exceeded 1,000
per 1,000 per annum. Spies, pp.215-216.
' Chamberlain to Milner, (tel.), 31 Oct 1901, JC 13/1/190.
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for the opinions of a civilian, &, though he is always perfectly friendly &
ready to listen, I find discussion of these matters with him quite
unprofitable & am indisposed to continue it... It is impossible to guide a
military dictator of very strong views & strong character.
Mimer had virtually given up trying to influence Kitchener's decisions and was
resigned to letting him get on with it 'nothing is worse,' he wrote, 'especially in military
matters, than a compromise between two schemes.' He acknowledged that Kitchener was
not going to conduct the war according to his views, or anyone else's; the only way to
ensure there was a change was to have Kitchener replaced, even though this was no
guarantee that his replacement could do the job better. Mimer believed, however, that the
more amenable General Lyttelton would be prepared to see the occupied areas put to work
and not view the whole issue as a military one: if Lyttelton was given explicit
instructions, Milner was quite convinced he would carry them out to both his and the
government's satisfaction. Mimer added that he wanted control of the railways, in order
to facilitate rapid reconstruction; at present he believed the railways were not working to
their full capacity and were doing very little for the civilian population. And for good
measure, Milner explained that Chamberlain's idea of using special mobile columns to
catch specific Boer leaders had not been carried out according to plan; that is, the leaders
themselves had not formed the specific target that Chamberlain wanted, only their
commando had been the object of Kitchener's pursuers. In summing up, Milner was quite
clear as to what was needed; 'Let us make up our minds that the Boers will fight on; let
us beat them as hard as we can; but let us simultaneously go on with our own
170
Chamberlain showed this letter to many of his ministerial colleagues, including the
Prime Minister. Chamberlain was reluctant to endorse or criticise Mimer's letter until he
had discovered the views of other ministers, a recognition perhaps that a decision for or
against Milner might change the course of the war)" The question before them was
should civil authority be asserted or not. This probably explains the fact that those who
recorded their opinions for Chamberlain were not unanimous. Those who favoured
170 Milner to Chamberlain, 1 Nov 1901, JC 13/1/191. [Mimer's italics].
' Ministerial Comments. c.15-16 Nov. 1901 JC 13/1/192-197.
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Mimer's scheme were Selborne, Walter Long and Lord Ashbourne: those opposed to
Mimer's ideas were Lansdowne, Lord James of Hereford, R. W. Hanbury, Brodrick,
Balfour of Burleigh, Lord George Hamilton and Akers Douglas. The reasons for the
division are revealing: the pro-Milner group believed Kitchener was exhausted and that
a stage had been reached when it was quite safe to replace him with another officer. On
the other hand, the opposing group felt that replacing Kitchener would be looked upon as
a defeat, and that he was not as tired as his critics and Mimer made out. The King also
subscribed to this view, telling Brodrick that if Roberts was sent out the world would
assume they had lost confidence in Kitchener. 'Unless Kitchener is really seriously ill,'
he continued, 'he should remain at his post and see the war out, or it would have a
deplorable effect and damage the prestige of the Army in a terrible way." 72 Lord
George Hamilton believed that the Buller affair would make the Army unmanageable if
Kitchener was removed;173
 but Akers Douglas was, perhaps, more correct when he
suggested that Kitchener was second only to Roberts in the confidence of the public,
implying that the loss of public confidence in the government would be a disaster.
Lord Salisbury's opinion was the decisive element in settling the matter. He could
not understand why Mimer wanted Kitchener replaced, and stated that Mimer was vague
in his criticisms of Kitchener, nor had he explained fully why Lyttelton would do a better
job:
I do not see how we can move in this direction. No one will take our bare
estimate (even if we all agree) as a ground for casting what must be a
slight on a servant who has done and is doing valuable service, and
reversing or changing the course of military policy, which has had a
measure of success, in favour of an indefinite experiment for whose issue
we have no sort of guarantee: and which will always have this objection
adhering to it, that it is the judgment of laymen against the judgment of
soldiers. We must know much more fully in detail what it is that Milner
has asked in vain of K. before we make it a ground for superseding K. by
a commander chosen by Mimer)74
Ifl Edward VII to Brodrick, 14 Nov 1901, cit. Lee, p.82. [The King's italics].
In October, Buller had contravened army regulations by making a public speech about the aftermath
of Colenso, and referred to documents which the government had withheld from the public. Consequently,
Roberts and Brodrick had Buller sacked. However, many Liberals took up Buller's cause and he still
remained immensely popular.
' Salisbury to Chamberlain, 26 Nov 1901, JC 1 1f30f216. [Salisbury's italics].
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This was the real crux of the matter, not the possible effect emphasised by 1_c May
of a combined Kitchener - Buller sacking on army morale.'75 He suggests that Lord
George Hamilton spoke for the majority of the Cabinet when he said the Buller affair
would make the army unmanageable; but it appears that no other minister even mentioned
Buller and Hamilton was not a weighty voice in the Cabinet. Sacking Kitchener at any
time was fraught with danger. Even offering Kitchener an early appointment in India, in
the hope of mollifying his feelings, would hardly have disguised the fact of his sacking
from him or the general public. It might have provided a smokescreen to hide the truth
from the public, but all smokescreens vanish fairly quickly: it would soon have become
common knowledge that Kitchener and the politicians had fallen out. But, as Salisbury
pointed out, the great imponderable was that there was no clear, hard evidence to suggest
that the alternative approach would succeed. For a government already lambasted by the
press, such a policy was too dangerous to contemplate. What if Milner's policy had
backfired; what if the Boers did manage to disrupt the protected zones and made the
business of reconstruction impossible? The government might then be left with the
humiliating task of recalling Kitchener - that is if he wanted to go back to South Africa.
If Lyttelton failed, who could replace him?
Milner's letter obliged the government to look hard at their position in relation to
Kitchener, what they saw was not encouraging. Salisbury might use the Buller affair as
one of his own reasons for not sacking Kitchener, but that episode was merely a
convenient cover. He knew that to remove Kitchener against his will would have caused
the break-up of his Cabinet, especially as there was no one of high renown (or of high
public profile) to succeed him. The Buller episode hid the unpalatable truth that ministers
were tied to Kitchener: if he sunk into oblivion, so would they.
Chamberlain, reluctantly it seems, acknowledged the force of Salisbury's viewpoint
- that nothing should be done to give the impression the government had lost faith in
Kitchener - although he ventured the thought that it might look natural if Kitchener was
transferred to India.' 76
 Chamberlain, however, had said much the same as Salisbury to
Winston Churchill after the latter had criticised the government for giving the generals too
' Le May, pp. 122-124.
'Chamber1ain to Salisbury, 26 Nov 1901, SP CC/f.203.
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much latitude. Then, Chamberlain had argued that he could not just step in and interfere
without consulting Kitchener; this would have resulted in wholesale resignations, 'and a
state of anarchy which would be worse than anything which we have yet known."
Salisbury's reasoning merely confirmed what Chamberlain already knew, and dashed any
hopes that a way might be found to control Kitchener. Chamberlain ended his
acknowledgement with the vain hope that it might be possible to relieve the military of
control of the railways and supplies, but it was not expressed with any degree of
conviction and fell far short of persuading Salisbury.
Mimer had, moreover, weakened his own position by supporting Kitchener on
certain issues. For example, Mimer had already supported Kitchener on the banishment
issue, despite the reluctance of ministers. Furthermore, in September, Mimer asked
Chamberlain for an extra proclamation to complement that of 7 August' 78 Mimer
wanted to see a wider definition accorded to the term confiscation. He wanted to sell off
the property of all burghers in the field to defray the costs of keeping civilians in the
concentration camps. This was particularly aimed at the Boer leaders whose families were
not in the camps, but in the towns, with the commandos, or absent in Europe.
Chamberlain prevaricated, said it was against international law, and might be considered
a breach of faith if a new penalty was established rather suddenly.'79 Again, in
November, Milner intervened on behalf of Kitchener when he poured cold water on
Chamberlain's 'special columns' idea, virtually contradicting his earlier pronouncements:
I doubt whether, with the single exception of Steyn the capture of any
leader, even Botha or De La Rey (tho' these two are far the most
important) would have quite as much effect as we suppose. The Boers have
a wonderful knack of developing leaders as they want them & I am not by
any means sure that if Botha or De La Rey were caught tomorrow Ben
Viljoen or Kemp would not in a few weeks be found to do just as well or
ill.'8°
" Chamberlain to Churchill, 15 Oct 1901, cit. R.S. Churchill, Winston S. Churchill, (London, 1969),
H, Companion volume, I, pp.93-94. Churchill's original letter is in JC 11,9/5, 14 Oct 1901.
'' See Section N, p.174.
"Milner to Chamberlain, 27 Sept 1901; Chamberlain to Mimer, 2 Nov 1901, CO 879113/6501260,278.
110 Mimer to Chamberlain, 15 Nov 1901, JC 13/1f201. [Mimer's italics].
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In his desire to control all aspects of the settlement of South Africa it is not
surprising to find that some members of the Cabinet were unable to agree with Milner,
as he often sounded like Kitchener himself. But, at least Mimer's efforts had woken
ministers to the fact that Kitchener would have to oversee British policy throughout the
region. Only Mimer seemed reluctant to acknowledge this, although, eventually, even he
had to admit there was nothing he could do either to change Kitchener's strategy, or have
Kitchener removed.
VI
This section examines the aftermath of Milner' s failure to get Kitchener sacked
and falls into two parts. The first shows how the British government, now aware that it
could not threaten Kitchener with the extreme option of sacking, instead sought to keep
Kitchener's mind firmly fixed on the task of rounding-up the Boer commandos. Having
granted more reinforcements in October, ministers were determined that Kitchener should
finish the war quickly. For the time being, all talk of troop reductions and cuts in
expenditure was stopped, as the military campaigns became the focus of government
attention. The second part deals with Mimer's continuing and fruitless attempts to
undermine Kitchener's authority.
Kitchener was made aware of this in November after he and Mimer had agreed
with Governor McCallum of Natal to deport certain women from South Africa. These
were the wives of some of the leading men still on commando and Mimer wanted them
removed simply because it was part of his policy to get the Boer generals out of the
country altogether. For Kitchener it was a military decision as it was believed the women
were passing military secrets to the commandos.'8'
When the Cabinet met on 19 November they were unanimous that such a decision
would cause more harm than good.' Kitchener on hearing of this decision was deeply
concerned:
McCallum to Chamberlain, (tel.), 9 Nov 1901, CO 879f735O/288; Le May, p.105; Spies, pp.273-
275. The women were the wives of Steyn, Roux, Dc Wet, Schalk Burger and Hertzog.
"Salisbury to the King, 19 Nov 1901, CAB 41/26125; McCallum was told to suspend the order by
Chamberlain on 10 Nov 1901, (tel.), CO 879(73/650/289.
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By cancelling the order, our position has of course been weakened and the
Boers have another opportunity of proving to themselves that our threats
are nothing more. Whether this is better than the trouble that would be
caused in England by some people who might consider our action was
wrong or ill-judged is a matter that probably appears of greater importance
according to where it is viewed from.'
Kitchener may have been right; but it showed ministers were determined to make
sure he stuck to his task and did not indulge in any more experiments, whose value in the
past had proved illusory. The gist of Brodrick's note to Kitchener on 23 Nov 1901, was
that there had been no appreciable result from various measures tried over the last two
years. Thus it showed clearly that ministers were determined to keep Kitchener's attention
fixed on the military campaigns. To this end, the Cabinet, at Roberts's suggestion,''
decided to send General Hamilton back to South Africa. Hamilton was given secret
instructions to keep watch over Kitchener's handling of the war, and to report back about
his methods and the state of the country as a whole. Brodrick told Kitchener that everyone
was concerned about his health, and they hoped Hamilton would relieve him of some of
his more onerous tasks. Nothing was said of Hamilton's secret instructions, but the
government was now committed to keeping Kitchener's mind fixed firmly on resolving
the conflict.'85
Brodrick also became anxious lest Kitchener should fail to use the reinforcements,
sanctioned in October, for operations in the Cape. Kitchener had told Roberts that the
situation had stabilised somewhat and thought any flesh troops ought to be used in
keeping the likes of De Wet, De La Rey and Botha out of the colony: he was ever
mindful of the panic that had ensued in Natal following Botha's earlier invasion.' But
Brodrick wanted to make sure Kitchener did not lose sight of the main objective: the
clearance of Cape Colony. Although he was aware that the situation in the colony had
183 Kitchener to Brodrick, 15 Nov 1901, KP 221Y102.
18 Rob	 to Brodrick, 2 Nov 1901, RP 122f2/ff.245-246.
'83 Robens to Hamilton, 22 Nov 1901, RP 122/2Jff.265-267; Brodrick to Kitchener, 16 Nov 1901, KP
221Y 104. Kitchener was quite relieved to hear Hamilton was returning, and added that he would not be
surprised if the government had decided to recall him for not finishing the war quickly enough. Kitchener
to Brodrick, 8 Nov 1901, KP 22/Yb!. Hamilton, though, told Kitchener of his 'secret orders.'
186 Kitchener to Roberts, 29 Nov 1901, RP 33)1.61.
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improved, and that the new troops might be better employed elsewhere, Brodrick wanted
Kitchener to finish the war in the Cape once and for all as this '... would be the best
guarantee of future progress.' Only then could troop reductions go ahead, and mining and
agriculture be resumed. Moreover, Brodrick was now thinking of the estimates for 1902-
1903, and Kitchener was the only one who could supply him with information as to when
reductions in the army might be made: Brodrick suggested 30 June 1902 as a time when
reductions might start to take place)'
Kitchener's forces were being systematically worn out by the repeated Boer hunts,
and he consequently sent in a request for even more troops instead of ideas on reductions.
Kitchener wanted more Yeomanry and Australians, as many of the former were
clamouring to go home. Some of them were only being paid lfld a day, compared to the
5/- a day for those who had come via Rhodesia and the Colonial forces.' 88 The main
problem for the government, however, was that Kitchener's demands threatened, once
again, to reopen the disputes within the Cabinet. Hicks Beach had intimated that he would
not accept raising more troops at 5/- a day, and Brodrick was certain he would find
himself at odds with the Chancellor if Kitchener's demands were not met.' As it was,
a drop in War Office expenditure enabled funds to last until February, and allowed
Brodrick to press for the reinforcements to be sent; this request was granted sometime in
late December.'9°
Brodrick was concerned by Kitchener's demands, and he suggested to Kitchener
that he would be supported by the government if he followed Salisbury's favoured option
of holding only selected positions and using the extra troops to hunt down the Boers.
Evidently Brodrick was anxious to impress on Kitchener how imperative it was to end the
war quickly, especially as the government expected, 'a strong revulsion of feeling
Z7 Brodrick to Kitchener, 7 Dec 1901, KP 22/YllO.
On 14 November, Kitchener asked the Adjutant-General, General Kelly Kenny, to start sending 1,000
drafts per month for the Yeomanry commencing January 1902. Kitchener to Adj-Gen., 14 Nov 1901,
SJB/PRO 30/67/8.
" Brodrick to Salisbury, 19 Dec 1901, SJB/PRO 30/67/8.
' Yakutiel, pp.203-205.
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here. ..We have great confidence here that when you have had time to alter the disposition
of your troops the war will enter on a new phase."9'
Privately, ministers criticised Kitchener's tactics and strategy. Salisbury was clearly
apprehensive about Kitchener's methods, and the adverse effect they were having on
public opinion in Britain. He cited the arbitrary punishment of those whose guilt had not
been fully established, such as in accusations of disrupting communications, where being
in the neighbourhood was often considered guilt enough; nor was he satisfied that burning
the house of a Boer commandant was justified simply because the man was still on
commando. Both Lansdowne and Chamberlain agreed with Salisbuiy.' Ministers were
acutely conscious of, and sensitive to, the growing political unpopularity created by
Kitchener's methods. Moreover, these complaints also reflected ministerial frustration at
their lack of authority, and an awareness, perhaps, that this criticism would have little or
no effect on Kitchener.
Frustration and anger was growing in political circles. Having been constantly
informed that the only way the war could be won was for the military situation to
improve, every setback was likely to cause much irritation. When, on 7 March 1902, Lord
Methuen was wounded and captured at Tweebosch, the politicians were incensed. 'It is
really our worst since Colenso,' Brodrick told Violet Cecil, 'His [Methuen's] mounted
troops bolted, and I have to begin the old driving & harrying to get some one made
accountable. The Cabinet are quite out of patience with it & I really don't wonder...'1
Brodrick pestered Kitchener immediately, demanding to know who was
responsible. Methuen's disaster was the second in ten days (Von Donop's convoy had
been taken at Yzer Spruit by De La Rey on 24 February), and followed too closely Dc
Wet's victory at Tweefontein on Christmas Day. Information was now coming in which
suggested that the Tweefontein disaster might have been avoided, because troops in the
vicinity had been warned that de Wet was nearby. Brodrick told Kitchener that he wanted
examples made: 'People here will stand anything now in the way of men & money; but
'' Brodrick to Kitchener, 22 Dec 1901, KP 22/Y115(a).
192 Salisbury to Brodrick, 28 Nov 1901, SiB/PRO 30/67/8. This also contains the comments o(
Lansdowne & Chamberlain.
"3 Brodrick to Violet Cecil, 14 Maith 1902, VMP VM36t174136.
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they will not readily overlook carelessness in a small section of the force when you, all
your officers & 99 out of every 100 men are undergoing immense exertions."
All this government anger, however, merely threatened to reopen old wounds left
by earlier skirmishes with Roberts over who should be responsible for militaiy discipline.
Roberts now seemed quite calm on the subject, having expended his anger during the
summer of 1901, when he had threatened to resign. He told Hamilton that, 'Brodrick is,
as you know, inclined to do things off his own bat, but he has improved immensely in
this respect, and I don't think he will again instruct Kitchener how to deal with officers
who may be unsuccessful." 95
 Indeed, Kitchener was later informed by Roberts that he
had arranged for all disciplinary communications to come from him, and not from
Brodrick.'
For Mimer, the government's inability to deal decisively with Kitchener must have
come as a great disappointment, but he did not give in and continued to press his views
on the government whenever he could. Although limited progress had been made on the
Rand, Mimer remained unsatisfied. Between November 1901 and April 1902, Mimer
still tried to influence the conduct of the war, and continued to seek the support of the
British government.
Mimer's refusal to admit that nothing could be done while the war lasted, and his
reluctance to concede anything to the military, was due in part to the anger felt at the
army's continual hindrance of his plans. While certain high-ranking officers said they
agreed with him, they claimed there was always a reason why they could not act upon his
demands. Nothing it seemed could be done to alleviate the refugee problem at the Cape,
or get more industry working on the Rand. This was the view of the Chief of Staff in
Johannesburg who said Mimer did not understand the real problem; the railways were
already working at full capacity, but repeated attacks on the line kept it in a disorganised
state. Mimer was fobbed off with the remark that the difficulty of supply and transport
" Bmdrick to Kitchener, 15 March 1902, KP 22/Y132; Brodrick to Kitchener, 13 March 1902,
SiB/PRO 30/67/9, for concern over the Tweefontein disaster.
'"Roberts to Hamilton, 4 April 1902, RP 122f3/ff.227-232.
'96 Rob	 to Kitchener, 18 April 1902, KP 20/069.
"Between May and December 1901 some 13,500 refugees had returned to the Rand; by December 15
mines were operationaL Cammack, pp.173, 183.
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was much greater than he realized. Mimer, however, remained unconvinced. He informed
Chamberlain that the railways could supply both the military and the civil population and
felt they were being wasted. This was part of Mimer's complaint to Chamberlain about
Kitchener, and was another reason why he wanted him sacked. Milner said the railways
should be worked under his authority.1
Kitchener had stopped political criticism of his own methods by continually
referring the government to the difficulties in Cape Colony. It was a case that was
difficult to argue with, and as long as Kitchener diverted all his resources to ending the
problem, there was little Mimer could do about it. But when he received messages from
Hely-Hutchinson, explaining the situation as he saw it, as he did on 20 November,
Milner's temper was hardly soothed. Hely-Hutchinson wrote to him after talking with
General French:
He agrees with me that K. doesn't attach sufficient importance to the
necessity of clearing Cape Colony. He expects fighting to go on for
another six months. ..Chamberlain has telegraphed to me to write him a
despatch which he can publish, showing the pro gress...in the Cape Colony.
Not an easy job if I am to keep clear of impliedly criticising military
organisation & arrangements.
In addition, the situation in the concentration camps had reached an all-time low
as child-mortality in particular had reached unprecedented levels in October. In November
the mortality figures rose again, much to Milner's chagrin. While ordering his officials
to do all they could to procure anything they needed in the way of food and
medicine s,20° Milner was in no doubt who was to blame for this appalling state of
affairs. Although he himself realised that excuses and explanations were no longer
adequate to explain the terrible conditions in the camps:
I should much prefer to say at once, as far as the Civil Authorities are
concerned, that we were suddenly confronted with a problem not of our
making, with which it was beyond our power properly to grapple. And no
doubt its vastness was not realised soon enough...The fact that it [mortality]
continues, is no doubt a condemnation of the Camp system. The whole
'COS, Johannesburg to Mimer, 6 Nov 1901, MP IV/A/175/ff.245-246; Mimer to Chamberlain, 1 Nov
1901, JC 13/1/191.
'"Hely-Hutchinson to Mimer, 20 Nov 1901, MP IV/A/174/ff.151-152. [Hely-Hutchinson's italics].
Milner to Goold Adams, 4 Dec 1901 & 14 Jan 1902, MP W/A/173/ff.245-248, 249-252.
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thing, I think now, has been a mistake. At the same time a sudden reversal
of policy would only make matters worse. At the present moment certainly
everything we know of is being done, both to improve the camps and
reduce the numbers in them. I believe we shall mitigate the evil, but we
shall never get rid of it.2°'
However, as Milner's opinions carried little weight in shaping military strategy, the influx
of civilians to the concentration camps continued.
Mimer's anger boiled over as Kitchener continued to pursue his own policies.
Every quarrel or disagreement became magnified by Mimer's intense frustration at having
to play second fiddle to Kitchener. Yet the more he complained, the greater the realisation
that Kitchener, could not and would not be moved. All Mimer could do was to let off
steam in his letters to Chamberlain, but this only increased the growing realisation of his
own weakness. Mimer admitted he could not agree with Kitchener on anything, even
though they remained on friendly terms:
You may say if you differ from him on a matter wh. concerns you, why
not have out, & if you can't carry your point refer to the Government for
a decision? The answer is two fold. Firstly, such a decision if contrary to
the C-in-C's views would only be formally obeyed. In the 101 small &
devious ways in wh. it is possible for a man in possession of all the
sources of power & channels of information, to avoid carrying out orders
he does not agree with, things would go on as before. And secondly, and
this is my strongest reason, I am personally quite determined to be no party
to a domestic quarrel. I am too painfully impressed by the odiousness of
the exhibition of differences amongst ourselves. I mean amongst leading
Englishmen out here by the handle they afford the enemy.'
Milner conceded that he and Kitchener were so far apart in their views that no
blame could be attached to the other. Yet this did not prevent him reiterating his views
on the best strategy to employ in the new colonies. A golden opportunity was being
wasted as nothing was being done to take advantage of the deserted country; Mimer had
given up trying to make the military change their minds as to cultivation. Even the revival
of industry, where some progress had been made, had required a great effort (and still
did), to keep it going.2°2
 What could be done to end this situation? Very little according
201 Milner to Chamberlain, 7 Dec 1901, JC 13/1f204.
Mimer said that the military were quite capable of putting up obstacles, as they did later with the
recruitment of Portuguese natives Milner complained Kitchener had 'tabooed' too much ground for British
officials to recruit in, owing to his blockade on Delagoa Bay from the Transvaal. Mimer to Kitchener, 17
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to Mimer, Kitchener would not go until the war was finished and the only way Mimer
could see that happening was (as he said 'Heaven forbid'), by a 'compact' or by catching
eveiy last Boer still on commando, which would take years: this in itself did not matter
as long Milner's ideas were followed, but Kitchener would never do this. Mimer could
only hope that some event would turn up to oblige Kitchener and half the army to be
recalled to Britain by public demand. 'In that case, if we could get our SAC back, & a
practicable General, I think the bulk of the country would soon be quite quiet & we could
scare off a few desperate districts till the fire gradually burned itself out. It is doing that
already in places.'203
Mimer, of course, had used such outbursts before, during the pre-war crisis
particularly in July 1899, following Chamberlain's apparent acceptance of Boer terms.
Then, Mimer had tried to redirect the way the British government was handling the crisis,
through his own correspondence and the press. In 1899, Mimer's task was somewhat
easier as he and the government were on the same wave-length and the distance between
them was not great. 2°4
 This time however Milner was dealing with an entirely different
situation and the same tactics were neither applicable nor successful. Milner could no
longer influence the British authorities has he had done previously. He was no longer in
charge in South Africa: Kitchener was.
On 12 March, in response to Milner's complaints, Chamberlain attempted to soothe
the High Commissioner; but all he could do was to re-emphasise the nature of the
problem they faced. It was the same old story which in his heart of hearts Milner knew
to be correct. After making some suggestions and then destroying their feasibility
immediately, Chamberlain stated, 'On the whole I see nothing for it but patience and a
stiff upper lip, but I would beg you not to be discouraged and in spite of difficulties to
press forward on every possible occasion your scheme of resettlement and recultivation
March 1902, MP IV/A/175/L266.
Milner to Chamberlain 8 Feb 1902, JC 13/1/209. [Milner's italics].
°' Porter, Origins, pp.23O-233. In October 1901, Kitchener was criticized in The Spectator, which called
for his dismissal. The ediux, St.Loe Strachey was a friend of Milner's and it is likely that Mimer prompted
the article. Pakenham, p.535. Evidently, the article suggested sending out Roberts to replace Kitchener. This
annoyed Lionel Curtis, then wcxking for Milner in Johannesburg. 'Here people who really know the facts
thank heaven that we have one man strong enough for this colossal but inglorious work.' L. Curtis, With
Mimer in South Africa (Oxford, 1951), p.326.
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as well as developing the mining industries.' Then, more as an afterthought it seems than
a concrete piece of advice, he concluded in an attempt to boost flagging spirits, 'If you
find at any time that I can usefully intervene by bringing pressure to bear through the War
Office, pray let me know. I might be able to do so without mentioning your name if it
seemed desirable to keep you out of it.'5
Mimer may ruefully have thought that Chamberlain's pressure had not achieved
much in the past. This attempt to provide Mimer with a tonic shows the paucity of the
measures left open to the government in supporting their political nominee, as a balance
to their all-powerful military one. Mimer had by now recognised this; his complaints had
borne little fruit in the way of changing policies in South Africa. Over the past six
months, he might have asked, when had the Cabinet intervened decisively on his behalf?
When had they said he was right and that Kitchener must comply? Milner replied to
Chamberlain that he was more disgusted with military conduct than discouraged: this may
have been true. He knew, by then, that a peace settlement still had to be concluded and
he could get what he wanted from that. 'I feel very strongly as ever,' he wrote, 'that as
long as a military dictator is necessary, it is not worthwhile to fight.'206 As long as
Milner could control the aftermath and have a pliable general in command, who did not
interfere in what Mimer considered civil matters, then he could tolerate the pre-eminence
of the military at this stage of the war. Mimer was intelligent enough to know that he and
Kitchener were the same type of person - ruthlessly dedicated to what they thought best
and determined to pursue their immediate objectives to a successful conclusion - and
unlikely to reach agreement on the issues at stake. Indeed, some of Mimer's utterances
in his letters are remarkably similar to some of Kitchener's. For example, in his letter to
Chamberlain on 20 December 1901, Mimer discussed the current agitation amongst the
Liberal pro-Boers and stated that the only sensible thing they had said was regarding his
recall, 'wh. would at least have this element of good in it that it would greatly add to my
personal comfort & leave the conduct of the main battle to a younger man...' This is
exactly the same sort of tactic employed by Kitchener, a sort of dare to his political
Chamberlain to Milner, 12 March 1902, IC 13/1/212.
Mimer to Chamberlain, 6 April 1902, IC 13/1/216. [Milner's italics].
Milner to Chamberlain, 20 Dec 1901, JC 13/1t206.
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superiors. There can be no doubt though, that men such as Kitchener and Mimer would
never have been able to stomach an ignominious recall, whatever the glowing attributes
which might have followed. Milner's recognition of his secondary position to Kitchener
may have come late in the day, but it made him all the more determined to make the
peace negotiations a success, and achieve after the war, that which he had patently failed
to do during it.
How accurate was Mimer's assessment of Kitchener as a 'military dictator'?
Mimer might have used the term pejoratively, but there is little truth in the assertion, If
we use the definition of a dictator as a 'statesman or soldier invested with absolute power
to deal with a crisis,' 208
 then Kitchener hardly fitted the bill. Kitchener got his way
through pressure of circumstances and his manipulation of events. However, as both
officials wanted to wield absolute authority in South Africa, each regarded the other as
a dictator and this was the root of the trouble between them. The problem for Mimer was
that Kitchener held the advantage. Kitchener's authority was legitimate, in that he was
entitled to the powers he wielded. While the war lasted, Kitchener's opinion, as the soldier
and technical expert, was virtually sacrosanct, and under Colonial Office regulations the
political authorities in South Africa were obliged to defer to his judgement.
In order to gain complete authority for himself, Milner had to persuade the British
government that the war in South Africa was not a war in the conventional sense. He had
to convince London that the war could be left to the SAC and not the army. Given that
Roberts regarded the Boers as bandits rather than soldiers, Milner's insensitive handling
of the Field-Marshal was a great mistake. Essentially, Milner's priority was to coax and
cajole the government away from their reliance on Kitchener, to undermine Kitchener's
prestige as the military expert and assume the mantle of civilian commander-in-chief in
his stead. Owing to the government's uncertainty and loss of faith in Kitchener in June
1901 Milner nearly succeeded. In the end, when the government was faced with a choice
of either Kitchener or Milner, they chose the former because, in reality, they had little
choice. Kitchener not only held legitimate authority, he held the popularity of the British
public; he was the new symbol of Empire and he was getting the political authorities out
of the mess they had created. In the face of such reasoning Milner just could not compete.
F.G. Fowler & H.W. Fowler, The Pocket Oxford Dictionary (Fifth Edition, Oxford, 1977), p.229.
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Kitchener has left little evidence of his opinions about other leading figures, even
Milner.209 We know, however, that Kitchener thought Mimer vindictive after the Botha
talks, and was aware of Mimer's contrary opinions regarding the Boer leadership. Like
Mimer, Kitchener always thought he knew best, and he doubtless thought he knew what
was best for South Africa and the Empire. Consequently, Kitchener was determined to
remain the dominant British official in South Africa, not only to enhance his career as a
successful general, but to ensure the right post-war settlement was achieved.
VII
The talks between Kitchener, Mimer and the Boer leaders, which took place
between April and May 1902 and ended with the signing of the Treaty of Vereeniging on
31 May, completed the shift in the civil-military balance towards the military which had
begun three years earlier. Whereas Milner remained wedded to the concept of
'unconditional surrender,' the British government was caught between Milner's outlook
and that of the army, which favoured a negotiated settlement. Before they could maintain
a balance between the civil and military in South Africa, ministers had to repair the
divisions within their own ranks; the government had to consider not only what was right
for South Africa, but what was right for its own political survival. During the negotiations
Kitchener and Milner vied with each other to impress their views and opinions on the
British government. Although Mimer deplored the negotiations, he was determined to
achieve two main objectives: first, to limit any concessions made to the Boer leadership
in order to curtail their influence in post-war South Africa; secondly, to promote the
interests of the loyalists above those of the Boers. However, Milner's support dwindled
as Kitchener's (and the anny's), ideas appeared more reasonable and acceptable to both
Boers and British ministers. For Kitchener, his objectives were straightforward his cause
'was neither that of the Kimberley diamond dealer nor that of the Uitlander on the Rand.
He looked for a South Africa pacificara, a South Africa a,nica.'21° His opinions were
still those he had expressed at the Botha talks in 1901, that once the Boers gave up their
Evidently, on his way to India in 1903, Kitchener destroyed many of his private papers. Royle, p.198.
210 Arthur, Kitchener, II, pp.105-106.
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independence and laid down their arms then the main military and political objective had
been achieved.
Kitchener's view had much support from generals and officers on the veldt211
and at headquarters. In Pretoria, General Rawlinson echoed Kitchener's views on the need
to negotiate and promise self-government after a reasonable time otherwise, 'you will
never have what we call peace.' Just as important was the need to have friendly Boer
institutions to oppose the influence and power of Johannesburg and the 'goldring.'212
Following his return to South Africa in December 1901, as Kitchener's Chief of
Staff, General Hamilton apparently saw his task not only to help Kitchener, but also to
help bring the Boers to the negotiating table, where they would be offered generous terms.
Hamilton's views offer a particularly clear insight into the mood of army headquarters
and, while his enthusiasm appeared to get the better of him at times, his correspondence
reveals that 'pro-Boer' opinions were already entrenched amongst elements of the officer
corps. Hamilton's letters provide the only detailed views of an officer at headquarters,
complemented solely by the few remarks left by General Rawlinson. Those staff officers
who published, or had published by others, autobiographical material hardly mentioned
any political views pervading Kitchener's headquarters. Their aim was to emphasise
consensus and provide anecdotes for the general public. 213 Consequently, there is a
dearth of material related to the workings and opinions of the General Staff in Pretoria
and, as a result, Hamilton's correspondence is important for the light it sheds on those
around Kitchener. As his opinions often matched those of the officers mentioned above
and, as he states below, many officers in Pretoria, it is likely Hamilton became, in his
own eyes at least, an unofficial spokesman for a general viewpoint pervading the officer
corps. However, Kitchener's own correspondence mentions nothing about life at
headquarters and it is impossible to say if Hamilton's opinions influenced Kitchener.
211 Cook (ed.), 'Letters from South Africa,' 26 May 1901, p.181; 2 Dec 1901, p.240. Gardner, p.46;
J.E.B. Seely, Adventure (London, 1930), pp.81-82, 89.
212 Rawlinson's Diary, 27-31 Dec 1901, RD 5201/33/5. [Rawlinson's italics].
213 Lord Birdwood, Khaki and Gown. An Autobiography (London, 1941); In My Time. Recollections and
Anecdotes (London, 1945). Charlotte Maxwell, Frank Maxwell. A Memoir And Some Letters (London, 1921).
In 1901-1902, he was Kitchener's favourite ADC and known as the 'Brat.'
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Nevertheless, Hamilton offered an articulate and persuasive viewpoint that complemented
Kitchener's own ideas.
Hamilton's beliefs fell into two main categories: the favouring of a negotiated
settlement; and an intense distrust and dislike of Mimer and Johannesburg. Hamilton had
definite objections against the policy of 'unconditional surrender,' and here he seems to
have followed Kitchener's reasoning. 214
 In December 1901, he felt the Boers would
never settle under British rule if they were forced into surrendering. If they were offered
terms, Hamilton believed the Boers, as a law-abiding people, would then keep their
promises embodied in a peace treaty. Having made no promises under 'unconditional
surrender,' Hamilton said the Boers would consider they had every right to rise again. He
based these opinions on Steyn's and De Wet's captured letters, but at the same time
considered a more practical reason for showing leniency. 'I should not be at all surprised
if we did not require their aid someday to steady the Johannesburgers who will be very
apt to run riot.'215
After familiarising himself with the operations and personnel of headquarters, and
the political situation in South Africa, Hamilton detected two differing perspectives
regarding a future settlement. Hamilton told Roberts that on one side stood Milner,
Johannesburg, 'and some of the loyalists of Cape Colony and Natal;' whilst on the other
side stood, Kitchener,'with nearly every soldier of any standing or experience that I have
spoken to on the subject up to date.' The first group wanted to crush the Boers utterly,
just as the Burmese and Punjabis were crushed; the second group felt this policy would
prove too costly, especially against '... a fine, hitherto, independent white race.'216
Hamilton proclaimed his antipathy towards South African capitalists and Jews: in
certain respects he mirrored General Butler, being, like him, an intellectual who aimed his
considered opinion against those whom, he believed, had done much to undermine South
African society. Consequently, Hamilton became suspicious of Mimer's associations with
214 Kitchener believed the Boers favoured unconditional surrender 'to preserve their legal right to give
trouble later.' Kitchener to Roberts, 18 Oct 1901, RP 33/f.53.
Hamilton to Wife, 19 Dec 1901, HP 25/1212/12. Also the letter from Frank Maxwell to his mother,
12 May 1902, in which he echoes the opinions of Hamilton and Kitchener on this point, in Charlotte
Maxwell, p.101.
216 Hamilton to Roberts, 27 Dec 1901, HP 24/7/10/7.
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the mining industry. The power and influence of Johannesburg in a post-war South Africa
was a favourite theme of Hamilton's. To him, the Johannesburgers were an impediment
to the peaceful absorption of the Boers into the Empire. He believed the Johannesburgers
meant 'to run the show' and would not pay any subsidy towards the cost of the war.
Equally, Mimer's association with the mining interest also impeded a peaceful solution.
Hamilton felt the Boers would never negotiate with Mimer because he was regarded as
a 'Johannesburger,' whereas Kitchener was seen by the Boers as a plain military man -
disliked but not hated. Hatred of Milner and Johannesburg kept the Boers in the field, not
enmity for Kitchener and the army. He advised that 'when you come to make peace it
should be engineered through the military, and not through the political channel.'217
After all, as Hamilton explained to Winston Churchill:
I cannot tell you how strongly I feel that if we could incorporate these
Boers into the Empire, we should be doing a vast deal more for the future
of our race and language, than by assimilating a million Johannesburg
Jews.218
Thus Hamilton embodied all the prejudices and values of the officer corps referred
to earlier;219
 anti-capitalism, anti-semitism and admiration for the Boers. Like many
officers he also had little sympathy for the loyalists, and regarded them as narrow-minded,
parochial and selfish.22°
How far these views influenced the opinions of British ministers is uncertain.
Nevertheless, the Cabinet was receptive to such persuasion. Between April and May 1902,
opinion within the Cabinet shifted towards the idea of leniency towards the Boers, as
relations between ministers became even more strained by the prospect of peace. Apart
from concerns over a new Education Bill, ministers were divided over Brodrick's army
217 Hamilton to Brodrick, 16 Jan 1902, HP 2417/10/10/2. This letter was sent to Roberts first who never
showed it to Brodrick. However, copies were sent to Wyndham and Winston Churchill.
218 Cit. Churchill, p.116. Hamilton told Churchill in March. 'Do let us profit by our experience when
we smashed the Zulus for the Boers, and not repeat the mistake by annihilating the Boers for the
Jewburghers.' Cit. Pakenham, p.562.
219 See above, pp.147-iSO.
'Loyalists from conviction are, in this country, few and far between.' Hamilton to Brodrick, 16 Jan
1902, see fn.217.
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reforms and the need to return to more orderly and traditional finance.' These
divisions even affected Chamberlain, hitherto Mimer's staunchest ally, whose own
adherence to 'unconditional surrender' waned. Chamberlain was prepared to assume a
more flexible standpoint and was unwilling to back Milner unconditionally. tm Mimer
was told that 'K. is of course the danger, he is offering the Government what seventeen
of them want.' The British government could not afford to lose another opportunity
for peace and the generals, particularly Kitchener, offered a viable solution to the
government's predicament.
Mimer had been unable to prevent the talks taking place and soon discovered that
the British government was prepared to back Kitchener over certain issues which Milner
thought vital, such as the compensation clauses. Kitchener backed Boer demands for
money to pay for farm rebuilding. Mimer resisted these demands because he felt the
British would eventually pay for the Boer war effort, and because he realised the gold-
mining industry would probably have to foot the bill. However, Milner had no support in
the Cabinet, the consensus of opinion being that the question of money should not stand
in the way of a settlement, and that if the talks collapsed over this issue the public would
never forgive the government.
Unable to impose his own policy in South Africa, Mimer had waited to influence
the peace talks instead. But here he came up against war weariness and the British
government's concern over other issues. Milner was unable to conduct the negotiations
on his own, principally because the Boers despised him and the British government was
uncertain about his commitment to a rapid peace. Milner hoped to eliminate the influence
of the Boer leadership; hence his initial reluctance to talks, and his attempts to undermine
Salisbury to the King, 19 & 24 Jan 1902, CAB 41127/1,2; Hicks Beach to Salisbury, 26 March 1902,
SP HBC/ff.284-285; Salisbury to Chamberlian, 29 March 1902, JC 111301225; Chamberlain to Salisbury,
1 April 1902, JC 11/301226.
m Clain to Milner, 9 & 13 April 1902, JC 13/11219, 222. Also, Hicks Be&h to Chamberlain,
13 April 1902, JC 11/18(20, supporting Chamberlain.
Lady Violet Cecil to Mimer, 17 May 1902, Headlam, II, p.342.
' Milner to Chamberlain, 21 May 1902, JC 13/11254; Chamberlain to Mimer, fl May 1902, CAB
37j1j5; Ritchie to Chamberlain, 26 May 1902, JC 11127/5; Brodrick to Kitchener, 24 May 1902, KP
221(151; Salisbury to the King, 27 & 29 May 1902, CAB 41/27/19, 20. Le May, pp.148-i49; Pakenham,
pp.563-564.
206
their political credibility by making no concessions of any practical value. However,
Mimer lacked the support of the British government, which, in the end, wanted the war
to end more than they wanted to see Mimer's vision of a British South Africa become a
reality. On 31 May 1902, the Boers finally surrendered by signing the Treaty of
Vereeniging.
Kitchener saw better than Milner that the immediate reconstruction of South Africa
needed the support of the Boer leadership, not their hostility. For once his views were in
harmony with those of the British government and the British public. Kitchener's views
dovetailed neatly into sentiments prevalent in Britain. His victory speech in Johannesburg
summed up both his policy and those sentiments:
judged as a whole, I maintain that they [Boers] are a virile race and an
asset of considerable importance to the British Empire, for whose honour
and glory I hope before long they may be fighting side by side with
us.2
As for Mimer, he never accepted the situation created by the settlement; for him,
the South African struggle continued:
It has changed its character: it is no longer war with bullets, but war it still
is.. .It is quite true we hold the winning cards, but it is not true that we
have won the game, and we cannot afford to lose a single trick.2
223 Cassar, p.135.
Mimer to Wilkinson, 27 April 1903, SWP 9011/42/18/17.
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CHAPTER FIVE.
INVASION, REBELLION AND MARTIAL LAW:
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND THE WAR IN CAPE COLONY.1899-1902.
Relations between the imperial authorities and the soldiers at all times centred on
the conflicting demands of political responsibility and military requirements. The war in
Cape Colony was no exception, constantly raising the fundamental question faced by
imperial and Cape politicians and officials: where to draw the line between military and
governmental responsibilities. Indeed, throughout the war in the Cape the demands of the
soldiers were rarely compatible with the views of the politicians. And, as a result, the
British government became involved in an increasingly acrimonious dispute between the
army and the local government. This dissension arose following two Boer invasions, and
after the imposition of martial law to prevent subsequent rebellions.
Four problems confronted both politicians and soldiers throughout 1899-1902. The
first was for both sides to understand martial law in practice and to decide the limits of
military rule and the power of military courts. Martial law had not been imposed on such
a scale before and especially not on European colonists. Cape politics had already split
largely on racial lines, between the British and Afrikaner populations; with a British army
using martial law against Afrikaners - both actual and potential rebels - the prospect of
severe martial law administration was consequently very real. The civil authorities in
London and Cape Town were concerned, therefore, that the army should administer
martial law without provoking rebellion and within certain guidelines. The second problem
followed the first: how to deal with rebels effectively while punishing them without undue
severity. Under martial law the army could inflict any penalty, from execution to penal
servitude. In some cases the death penalty might be necessary, but wholesale executions,
or mass lengthy imprisonments, could also provoke rebellion and cause lasting resentment.
Thirdly, there was the need to resolve major disagreements between the various civil and
military authorities. Unsurprisingly, the civil authorities, especially the Cape government,
remained concerned about the administration of martial law and wanted their opinions
heard. The army, of course, resented political interference in a difficult and sensitive
process. But with the war lasting longer than anyone thought possible, and with a general
rebellion the main war aim of the Boers, the strain on the British authorities inevitably
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erupted into a series of disputes. Lastly, after the emergency had ended the military had
to be indemnified for their actions. As martial law was considered outside the ordinary
legal process the actions of the military were deemed to be illegal. By indemnifying
officers, ministers showed they were satisfied with the army's administration of martial
law, and that the army's actions had been justified by circumstances. Only those officers
whom it was considered had acted beyond their powers were denied the protection of an
indemnity act and could be tried for their actions. Essentially, the need for an indemnity
act was regarded as a deterrent, to ensure army officers did not use their new powers
unduly. The imperial government could pass an indemnity act, but for political reasons
it was deemed essential that the self-governing colony indemnify the army. Not only
would this keep within constitutional convention, it would also demonstrate political
confidence in the army. The British government, therefore, was concerned that the army
should not provoke a constitutional crisis by antagonising local politicians who might then
refuse to pass an indemnity act. This concern persisted throughout the war and was
constantly reiterated by imperial politicians and law officers.
In explaining how the civil and military authorities coped with war, rebellion, and
martial law in Cape Colony, Part One of this chapter will concentrate on the period of the
first invasion, October 1899 to September 1900, considering in particular how the
authorities first dealt with the issues raised by the imposition of martial law. Section one
explores the pre-war views on martial law; section two examines the problems arising
from martial law in practice, and how the military responded to civilian complaints; and
section three deals with the problems associated with the punishment of rebels within
Cape Colony's sensitive political and racial climate.
Part Two will cover the second invasion, December 1900 to November 1902, when
martial law was imposed throughout the Colony and created difficulties on a far larger
scale than before. It will focus on the acrimonious disputes between the Cape government
and the military, in which the British government became increasingly involved. The first
section again deals with the problems associated with martial law administration, as the
military attempted to overcome ministerial fears as martial law was extended. Section two
examines the various disputes which punctuated civil-military relations in 1901, and how
they became increasingly acrimonious. Section three will cover the post-war problems
209
associated with the culmination of martial law and the need for an indemnity act,
particularly in a volatile political environment.
In trying to resolve the various disputes, particularly those in 1901, the British
government frequently had only two options: where agreement was unobtainable they
could either dismiss the Colonial ministry or override the military leadership. However,
both options were fraught with danger: the Cape government was a constitutional
administration and could not be dismissed lightly; but nor could the army be allowed
unfettered activity under martial law. British ministers faced a dilemma they found
impossible to resolve satisfactorily.
PART ONE.
I
Martial law is essentially the imposition of military rules on civilians during a
period of war, rebellion or both. There has never been a written code of practice as
martial law was (and is) considered an unspecific response to a specific situation. The
annual Army Act allowed military law to function in peacetime, enabling the army to
discipline its members outside the civil law. The Act legalised military courts; permitted
them to function beside civil courts; and laid down ground rules about procedure which
mirrored those of their civilian counterparts. However, the Army Act offered little
guidance to soldiers when called upon to discipline civilians, except for the procedure
associated with certain Courts-Martial which were often used to try rebels. This process
was specifically designed for the trial of soldiers in wartime, and in campaign conditions,
when it was unlikely that time would allow for proper procedures. This was known as a
Field-General Court-Martial and comprised three or more officers. Passing a death
sentence required the agreement of all officers, but apart from that procedure was left
open to fit the unforeseen circumstances of a campaign. 1 Yet, while the Army Act
provided for the trial of civilians under martial law, it gave no guidance on how to operate
martial law itself.
1 Maniial of Military Law (War Office, London, 1899), Chapter 5, p.49. Also in the reprint of the Army
Act, Ibid., pp.382-383.
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The confusion surrounding the interpretation of martial law and the powers allowed
under its provisions had been starkly illustrated thirty years earlier during the Jamaica
rebellion of 1865. In Jamaica, Governor Eyre had put down a rebellion utilising martial
law, but had appeared to abuse his authority by arresting one of his critics, a man named
Gordon, and then taking him to the district under martial law for trial by a Court-Martial.
Once there, Gordon was found guilty of rebellion and executed.
The rebellion was crushed by the British and Eyre was criticised in Britain over
his handling of the whole issue. So great was the attack that Eyre and the officers
comprising Gordon's Court-Martial, Nelson and Brand, were put on trial to answer for
their conduct. An extensive legal debate followed because the prosecution attempted to
establish that martial law was 'no law at all.' 2 and that the use of arbitrary powers by the
military was not justified. Owing to the confusion over the definition of martial law, the
jury was unable to reach a verdict and requested something be done to clarify martial law
procedure. Consequently, the Colonial Secretary, Lord Carnarvon, issued a set of rules for
colonial governors in case such a situation arose again.
The proposed rules covered various aspects of martial law administration. Rules
1 and 2 stated that the Governor was responsible for proclaiming and ending martial law;
when issuing a proclamation the Governor had to be satisfied that the suppression of
rebellion could only be achieved by subjecting the rebellious district to a period of direct
military control. Rules 13 and 14 dealt with the punishment of offenders. A Provost
Marshal was to be appointed and could only punish offenders he, or his assistants, had
actually seen perpetrating an offence. Otherwise offenders had to be sent for trial by a
Court-Martial, under the local commanding officer (or an officer deputed by him) and at
least two other officers. Rule 19 insisted that sentences could not last beyond the period
of martial law, and no sentence of penal servitude could be awarded. Carnarvon stressed
that:
as these Regulations have in no respect the force of law, so it is not
intended that officers should be under rigorous obligation to observe them
in all cases, and under all circumstances. The intention is that Officers may
derive from them some guidance more or less determinate, though not
absolute; and that they may operate, on the one hand, as some relief from
responsibility to those by whom they may be observed, and, on the other
2 Townshend, 'Martial Law: Legal and Administrative Problems...' p.172.
211
hand, as some prima fade increase in responsibility to those by whom they
may be dispensed with.3
Carnarvon's statement acknowledged the fact that neither he, nor anyone else, could
legislate for unforeseen emergencies, and that military officers had to have some leeway
in dealing with the complications of a future rebellion.
After the Jamaica case and before the war in 1899, martial law was discussed by
several constitutional experts. Most agreed that the imposition of martial law had some
validity within the constitution, as it was considered lawful for the Crown to meet force
with force.4
 However, this statement was qualified by certain conditions. Whilst admitting
that an officer assumed 'absolute power' when exercising martial law, these commentators
were quick to explain that the military's right to punish rebels was severely limited. They
maintained that while civil courts were still functioning, they should be responsible for
the punishment of rebels. The military therefore had the right to use necessary force to
put down a rebellion but prisoners captured during and after were to be released into the
custody of the civil authorities. It was acknowledged that at times it would be impossible
to use civil courts; therefore, military courts or Courts-Martial would be utilised for this
purpose.5
Although they were referred to as courts, tribunals established to try rebels were
not considered to be courts by the legal experts. This was because the idea of civilians
being tried by soldiers was anathema and deemed to be a direct threat to the independence
of the judicial system, and to civil rights generally. The civil contempt for martial law
courts arose from the fact that under martial law these courts were not obliged to follow
procedure laid down by the Army Act, especially when operating in the field. Thus, any
26 Jan 1867, WO 32/8173.
C.M. Clode, The Administration of Justice under Military and Martial Law (London, 18fl), p.l58;
A.V. Dicey, Law of the Constitution (London, 1885), p.288; J.F. Stephen, A History cf the Criminal Law
of England, (London, 1883), I, p.208. An anonymous writer in the Edinburgh Review, 195, (1902),
disagreed. He said martial law was unknown to the law of England even in this form.
terms military courts and Courts-Martial were interchangeable. The latter was the name used fir
those courts established by the Army Act to try soldiers, but it was convenient to use this term to describe
courts established under martial law, as they also comprised army officers.
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punishments inflicted by military courts were deemed unlawful; and if the death penalty
was carried out, it was, according to Dicey, technically murder.6
There were ways for officers administering this form of summary justice to protect
themselves. Military courts themselves should be composed of:
Men (civil or military) whose experience and character afford to the
Criminal the best security for the exercise of a sound judgment and
discretion in the most solemn function of Judicial Administration which
they as Judges ai thus unexpectedly called upon to discharge.7
In discharging their duty officers had to show good faith and to ensure a fair trial,
even if strict legal procedures were not followed. 8 Only when the military could show
that their decisions were boná fide, that they had not acted with undue ruthlessness, would
their actions be indemnified. Even so, those who had exceeded their power would not be
covered by its stipulations. 9 The threat of legal action was considered sufficient to deter
officers from exercising too much arbitrary power, the fate of Governor Eyre, and the
military officers Nelson and Brand, were highlighted as examples of what could happen
to those officers who were too ruthless.'°
Such then were the main contentions of constitutional lawyers who had considered
the nature of martial law, from which two main points can be deduced. First, that rebels
should be tried by civil courts if they continued to function during a rebellion. Secondly,
that if military Courts had to be used, procedure should be regular, without showing undue
severity; this would ensure officers were indemnified for their actions under martial law.
No commentator, however, explained procedure well enough to obtain an overall
consensus of opinion, and gaps in interpretation still remained. The legal experts failed
to realise, for example, that decisions taken in military courts would reflect the seriousness
of the situation, as perceived at the time. Moreover, if the threat of legal action was
6 Dicey, p.293; Stephen, p.215; Clode, p.167.
Clode, p.166.
'Clode, p.167; W.F. Finlason, Martial Law (London, 1872), pp.29-30.
'Anon., Edinburgh Review, p.90; Stephen, p.215.
'°Clode, pp.167-169; Finlason, p.19; Cosgrove explains Dicey's view, that he believed the army would
be restrained by this consideration. Cosgrove also mentions that F.W.Maitland took the opposite view,
arguing that the military would not be deterred during a crisis when hard decisions had to be made, p.124.
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emphasised beforehand, military officers might be reluctant to administer martial law
effectively. These then were the fears and problems facing both the civil and military
authorities; one side was fearful of military excesses, the other concerned about exercising
the correct amount of power. However, these were only opinions and did not carry any
real legal weight as such. They were there to guide the authorities; and it was they who
were left to discover how beneficial such opinions would be in the face of actual
rebellion.
II
This section discusses the problems associated with the administration of martial
law between October 1899 and June 1900. The various authorities, imperial, local and
military, discovered how little was known about the operation of martial law and that the
guidance offered often proved worthless. In a rebellious district, for example, martial law
gave the military the power and latitude to formulate regulations and to arrest on
suspicion, which caused enormous resentment amongst the local Afrikaner population and
dissension between the Cape government and the army. Consequently, this period was
characterised by the army's attempts to clarify and define martial law administration, in
order to gain the confidence of the Colonial authorities.
The situation in Cape Colony always worried the British. In 1899, the white
population numbered some 370,000. According to the 1891 census, whites of British
origin totalled about 130,000; those of Dutch descent numbered some 230,000." Milner
was intensely suspicious of the Afrikaners, and feared a Boer invasion might provoke a
rebellion. The overt sympathy of the Afrikaners for their brethren in the republics was a
widely acknowledged phenomenon, and one which had contributed significantly to ending
the war against the Transvaal in 1881.12 The prospect of disturbances or rebellion by the
Afrikaner population had concerned the Colonial authorities prior to the outbreak of war.
In Natal, this problem was considered earlier than in Cape Colony, especially as war
seemed likely and Natal was expected to become the main battlefield. In early September,
"Colonial Office List, 1899, p.95; Statistical Register 1899. CO 53/137.
12 Schreuder, pp.147, 164; Robinson and Gallagher, pp.64, 72.
214
Hely-Hutchinson, expressed fears that spies or Boer sympathizers, might commit acts of
sabotage or undermine the loyalty of natives.' 3 Later, he told the Colonial Office that he
was about to issue a proclamation warning potential rebels about the consequences of
treason; which could mean either the death penalty, or forfeiture of property.' 4 At the
same time, Hely-Hutchinson despatched a copy of the Attorney-General's views on
martial law.
In his memorandum, Bale, the Attorney-General, stated first and foremost that
martial law was not recognised by Roman Dutch law, just as it was not recognised by
English law.'5
 He then gave a brief summary of what he understood martial law to mean
from a number of previous cases. From these several points were isolated. First, the
military exercised martial law without the help of civil courts; and, therefore, martial law
courts were illegal and had to be legalised by an indemnity act; secondly, sentences
imposed under martial law could not continue after martial law had ended. Bale stated that
officers who had put down the Langalibalele revolt in 1873 were indemnified for all acts
done in suppressing the rebellion. 16 Thus Bale emphasised, like earlier commentators
such as Dicey and Clode, that the military should show restraint when administering
martial law.
On 15 October, four days after the Boer invasion, Hely-Hutchinson proclaimed
martial law in the districts north of the Tugela river. He did so after consulting General
White, the GOC(Natal), who had asserted that martial law was vital to deal with spies,
many of whom operated in Ladysmith and the northern districts.'7 Hely-Hutchinson also
13 Hely-Hutchinson to Chamberlain, 6 Sept 1899, CO 1791206/f.227.
14 Hely-Hutchinson to Chamberlain, 28 Sept 1899, Ibid., f.376; for Proc. No.1, 29 Sept 1899 Ibid.,
ff.447-448.
'5 Roman Dutch law was the main law of both the South African colonies, in Cape Colony the British
introduced trial by jury in 1827, but overall Roman Dutch law was left intacL Monica Wilson & L
Thompson, The O4ord History of South Africa, (Oxford, 1969),!, p.302. As Natal had once been a district
of Cape Colony, Roman Dutch law was used for the administration of justice and kept after Natal became
a separate colony. Colonial Office List, pp.96, 190.
'6 HeIy-Hutchinson to Chamberlain, 29 Sept 1899, CO 179/206/f.436; enclosing Memo. by Bale, 25 Aug
1899, Ibid., ff.437-446.
17 White to Hely-Hutchinson, No.16, 14 Oct 1899; Hely-Hutchinson to White, 14 Oct 1899, White to
Hely-Hutchinson, No.19, 14 Oct 1899, (tels.), Ibid., ff.702-705; Hely-Hutchinson to Chamberlain, 15 Oct
1899, Ibid., f.691. The need to deal with spies was the reason forwarded to Chamberlain.
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urged White to order his officers to be circumspect when administering martial law, and
not to hang or shoot spies without reference to a higher authority. 18 Although Hely-
Hutchinson never actually mentioned consulting the Natal government, it is unlikely he
acted without their concurrence. Hely-Hutchinson did consult Bale who confirmed that a
proclamation of martial law would entitle White to arrest those suspected of spying.'9
In Cape Colony, Mimer proclaimed martial law the day after Hely-Hutchinson, and
did so with the concurrence of ministers. Mimer was extremely anxious about the
relatively defenceless state of the Colony, especially with so few troops available. 2° At
first, the Boers did not launch a direct invasion as their strategy was confined to the
investment of Mafeking and Kimberley. Consequently, Mimer's proclamation was
confined to the areas around the two besieged towns. He informed the Colonial Office that
this was 'a step absolutely necessary for the defence of Kimberley, having regard to the
number of spies and disloyal persons in and near it.' 2' Milner's proclamation explained
that martial law was in force because:
it is.. .expedient in certain districts of this Colony that measures should be
taken for the more speedy trial and punishment of all persons giving
information, succour, countenance or support to the said enemy?
By issuing proclamations both Mimer and Hely-Hutchinson had followed the practice said
by the experts to be the correct procedure. 23 Thus a public announcement was made,
after which the Civil Commissioner/Resident Magistrate (both offices were usually held
by the same man), ensured it reached local inhabitants by placing and distributing bills
or posters at prominent places within the district or town. Both Governors, therefore,
informed the population that owing to special circumstances the rule of law had passed
from the civil authorities to the military. Thus occurred the traditional response to invasion
"Hely-Hutchinson to White, (tel.), 16 Oct 1899, Ibid., ff.707-708. White readily complied, Natal Field
Force Orders, 18 Oct 1899. No spy could be executed without reference to White first, Ibid., f.709.
"Hely-Hutchinson to White, (tel.), 14 Oct 1899, Ibid., f.704.
Milner to Chamberlain, 8 Oct 1899, CO 417/267/f.763; 11 Oct 1899, Ibid., f.951.
21 Milner to Chamberlain, (tel.), 16 Oct 1899, CO 417/268/f.119.
Proc., No.279, 16 Oct 1899, CO 48/542/f.919. The proclaimed districts were: Mafeking, Vryburg,
Taungs, Barkly West, Kimberley and Herbert.
23 Clode, p.165; Stephen, p.214.
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and rebellion (real or potential); what followed, however, revealed all too clearly that
although the initial response was traditional, what to do after the proclamation remained
a mystery.
This aspect was noticed at the Colonial Office once they received a copy of
Mimer's proclamation. The minutes revealed that officials understood little of the
practicalities of martial law administration. Yet they perceived that certain questions had
not been considered by the proclamation. Chamberlain, for example, asked whether
military courts could award death sentences; this was an aspect of military power so
fraught with political repercussions that it is surprising this question was not considered
earlier. In response, H.B. Cox, the Legal Under-Secretary, drafted a memorandum to
explain the Colonial Office view on the subject.
Cox began by stating that martial law 'entails the suspension, during the period of
its existence, & within the districts within which it is proclaimed of the operation of the
ordinary law of the land.' According to Cox, the executive was informing the public that
this was necessary in order to protect the community, and was done in the expectation of
an indemnity act being passed afterwards, relieving those who had administered martial
law 'from the consequences of having acted unlawfully.' Cox's memorandum was in fact
based on Carnarvon's regulations passed in 1867, and expressed the legal judgements
therein. Cox thus brought these regulations to the notice of the Colonial Office, referring
especially to Articles 13 and 14 in order to answer Chamberlain's question.
In his regulation No.1, Cox referred to the GOC receiving written instructions from
the Governor, a procedure enumerated in Article 5 of the 1867 regulations. It appears
General Forestier-Walker was not given any special instructions, while Milner was
unfamiliar with the requirements set out by Carnarvon's rules. In fact on 24 October,
Mimer asked the Colonial Office whether the 1867 regulations were still in force because
the military authorities were ignorant of martial law. Probably the answer to this question
24 19 Oct 1899, CO 417t268/ff.1I7-118.
Cox seemed to have simplified his interpretation of Article 13: he wrote that an officer commanding
could appoint a Provost Marshal to punish those caught committing a crime. Article 13 is more explicit: a
Provost Marshal should have written orders 'limiting him to the punishment of such offenders... as he or
his assistants may actually see committing any crime...'
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was required for his own information as much as for that of the army. Consequently,
the Colonial Office wanted Lansdowne's opinion on the matter. Colonial Office officials
must have been aware that as part of the general regulations they would still be in force,
even though they did not appear in the published Colonial Office Lists; possibly, they
wanted to make sure the War Office had not, in the meantime, supplemented them with
rules of their own. Eventually, the War Office notified the Colonial Office that Lord
Lansdowne still considered them the principal guide for proceedings under martial lawP
Even with guidance at hand, the Cape government became increasingly concerned,
especially after the OFS invaded the midland districts of the Colony on 1 November. As
the Boers advanced south and east, they ignited the rebellion Milner so feared, as
Afrikaners joined the commandos in ever increasing numbers. Consequently, martial law
was extended to cover the various districts in and around the invasion zone? The rapid
extension of martial law caused much concern in the Cape government. Schreiner, the
Prime Minister, made it clear that the 'free parliamentary institutions and Constitutional
Government of the Colony will not be suspended,' and that martial law would be imposed
only in those areas invaded by the Boers. Ministers' views were based on a deep and
profound suspicion of the military assuming punitive powers. Not only was this due to
fears about the army being left free to threaten parliamentary government, but also to a
more parochial fear of the army treating locals too harshly. In the unusual circumstances
of Cape Colony, with its Afrikaner majority, the Cape government feared that a heavy-
handed stance taken by the military, with its limited knowledge of South Africa, would
provoke an even greater outbreak of rebellion. The actions of the military would now set
the standard not only for the way martial law was administered, but judged also. In Cape
Colony these factors were inextricably linked: the army would not just be subduing a
2 Mimer to Chamberlain, 24 Oct 1899, WO 32/8173.
n wo to CO. 31 Oct 1899, Ibid.
Proclaimed districts: Dc Mr, 3 Nov; Colesberg, Molteno, Aliwal North, Wodehouse, Qucenstown,
Cathcart, 15 Nov; Hay, 16 Nov. Ameiy (ed.), Times History, VI, p.547.
Schreiner to Mimer, 6 Nov 1899, CO 48/543/f.245. Milner felt that if the invasion was pushed martial
law might have to be proclaimed generally. He expected ministers to zsist this, and hinted they might have
to be dismissed. The Colonial Office hoped Schreiner would resign if a clash over martial law arose. Milner
to Chamberlain, 15 Nov 1899, Ibid., f.405; CO Minutes, 15-16 Nov 1899, Ibid., f.404.
218
domestic disturbance; it would be crushing a rebellion and imposing its will on
'foreigners' as well, with whom it had little or no sympathy.
The military, despite appearances, were uncertain about their position under martial
law. Before General Buller arrived to assume overall command, British forces had been
insufficient to resist the Boer invasion and had retreated from those districts under Boer
occupation, and which were proclaimed to be under martial law. For example, on 23
October, the Civil Commissioner of Barkly West urged Schreiner to have troops sent to
his district as their absence was likely to inflame the rebellion further. 3° However, when
Buller arrived in Cape Town on 31 October, he showed no interest in martial law,
believing it had no particular value, except that it allowed the military to arrest rebels
'without fear of the habeas corpus.' 31 Nevertheless, Buller had to confront the difficulties
raised by the proclamations and the lack of guidance offered to his troops. Just before he
left for Natal, he therefore issued a circular to magistrates whose districts were under
martial law, in an attempt to define their role under the authority of an army officer.
The circular explained the object of the proclamation, which was 'to enable all
steps necessary for the defence of the District to which it applies...to be taken with the
greatest promptitude, and without the restrictions of ordinary civil process.' Offenders
could be arrested without warrant, by the military or civil authorities, and merely on
suspicion of being a spy or giving aid to the enemy. Once detained they would await trial
in a 'Special Court' by the military authorities. Emphasis was placed on the role of the
senior military officer whose orders were 'binding upon all persons within that locality,
and must be implicitly obeyed...' Certain restrictions were placed on the military: they
could not conscript for military service, or commandeer goods, which had to be paid for
promptly. Buller also stressed that the civil courts should, if possible, carry on as normal,
although 'subject to any directions which may be given them by the Military Authorities
in the paramount interest of the defence of the country.'
Buller's circular attempted to clarify the relationship between the military and civil
authorities during the administration of martial law, and to make it as uncontentious as
Civil Commissioner to Schreiner, 23 Oct 1899, CO 48/543/f.160.
' Buller to Mimer, 2 Nov 1899, MP W//229/f.214.
32 c.25 Nov 1899, CO 48/545/ff.80-81.
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possible, considering the low value he placed on its efficacy. However, Buller did not
offer any real direction about proceeding against offenders. But then again he could not
legislate for the unforeseen. As the rebellion and therefore martial law was considered to
be a temporary phenomenon, Buller possibly thought that placing the military in control
of a district would cause few problems.
The Cape government, however, thought otherwise, and questioned the technical
details of martial law. Complaints were already being made about the army's use of
martial law, and from their nature some idea of its operation can be obtained. Apparently,
complaints were forwarded through the magistrates or sent directly to members of the
legislature.33
 The first major protest was made by T.P. Theron, President of the Afrikaner
Bond, who reported an incident which highlighted the irregular nature of martial law
administration. Evidently, a civil officer and 60 soldiers had ridden into Britstown, which
had not been proclaimed (although the civil officer said the proclamation at De Aar
covered a radius of 200 miles), and acted as though martial law was in force. Theron
protested about the imposition of a curfew; the need for passes to enter or leave; the
searching of property; and the disarming of farmers. He pointed out that when the patrol
left, martial law went with them, a clear indication of the problem facing the army of not
having enough troops to enforce martial law, or administer it on a uniform basis. Theron
also mentioned one aspect which would recur throughout the war: the power of the
military authorities to arrest on suspicion. He noted that several people were arrested in
Britstown on suspicion and then taken to Dc Aar. Most were detained for days or weeks
and released without charge; some were detained longer. This sort of activity was one
reason why so few were actually tried by military courts during the first invasion.M
Under martial law, the local commandant could introduce regulations immediately
and do anything considered necessary. As most regular officers were serving at the front
there was a shortage of good soldiers and, consequently, Colonial volunteers were relied
on to oversee the operation of martial law. This of course might add to the bitterness
already felt by the locals, especially if the commandant showed bias or personal prejudice.
For instance, Colonel Crewe of Brabant's Horse, who later commanded at Aliwal alter
Le May, p.49; P. Lewson (ed.), Selections from the Correspondence of John X. Merriman 1899-1905
(Cape Town, 1966), fn.322, p.122.
Theron to Schreiner, 23 Nov 1899, CO 48/545/11.87-93.
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it was recaptured from the Boers and rebels, had earlier lost an election there and was also
president of the loyalist South African League. 35 Moreover, the British began offering
rewards to Blacks and Coloureds for information about Afrikaners hiding their weapons.
This system was open to abuse as disgruntled servants could easily produce a gun and
blame their employers. Blacks and Coloureds were not liable to have their weapons
confiscated, as Afrikaners were.
Consequently two reports, written by the Cape Attorney-General, Sir Richard
Solomon, and which contained Theron's letter, were sent to Milner. The first was in
response to Solomon's own fears about the legality of martial law proceedings; the second
was in response to Buller's circular.
Solomon was alarmed by the prospect of civilians being tried by military courts.
He could not stomach the thought of civilians being tried for offences that had no basis
in civil law. In fact Solomon urged that offenders should only be arrested after they had
broken the law of the land, and not for contravening martial law regulations. 38 Two days
later, on 27 November, Solomon emphasised his objections even further by complaining
about certain passages of Buller's circular. Again he was worried by the prospect of
civilians being tried in military courts. Solomon did acknowledge that in certain
circumstances the speedy trial of offenders by a special court might be necessary. But,
reverting to an ancient tradition, he stated that when the civil courts were open offenders
should be passed over to them forthwith. 'The fact that the sentence of Courts-Martial
established on the grounds of paramount necessity are illegal, is an additional reason for
my earnest desire to have all persons, where possible, tried by legally established
courts.
Such was the distrust of the army that when, on 9 December, Milner forwarded
a request from Colonel Wynne, the Chief-of-Staff in Cape Town, for an extension of
" P. Lewson, John X. Merriman. Paradoxical South African Statesman (London, 1982), p.221.
Nasson, Esau's War, p.152; Black Society in the Cape Colony and the South African War of 1899-
1902: A Social History (unpub. PhD thesis, Cambridge, 1983), pp.47-48.
Ministers to Mimer, 28 Nov 1899, CO 48/545/ff.82-83.
' Memo. by Solomon, 25 Nov 1899, Ibid., ff.84-85.
Ibid., 27 Nov 1899, Ibid., 186.
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martial law, 'for the greater security of the troops and the lines of communication,'40
ministers, while not refusing the request, made their objections clear. They wanted the
military warned that their actions required legalisation by an Act of Indemnity and that
those who committed misdemeanours might find themselves without this cover. They
argued that in certain districts martial law had done nothing but irritate and upset
locals.4'
Mimer noted their objections and declined to extend martial law. This was despite
the requests of other military officers at the front. General French, operating from
Middelburg and Cradock, wanted it extended; as did the Officer Commanding at East
London, who was concerned about communications with the force under General Gatacre.
Mimer sympathised with the army especially as Forestier-Walker had endorsed his
officers' requests. Milner told Schreiner's government that:
Martial Law itself will not disturb anything, but it is required in order to
strengthen the hands of Her Majesty's Forces in the protection of Districts
already disturbed by the presence or near approach of the enemy.
He added that military injudiciousness was just as likely to happen in districts not under
martial law as a consequence of the rigours of campaigning.42 This was obviously a
warning to the government that Milner's patience was wearing thin and that they could
not expect him to be so accommodating in future.
However, the imperial military authorities had already considered the question of
introducing some form of guidance for martial law administrators. On 7 December,
Colonel Wynne issued orders setting out offences, procedure and punishment designed to
harmonise relations between civilians and the military. Wynne's efforts were a bold
attempt to provide an up-to-date, pragmatic guide, based, it seems, on the circular of 1867,
leading to a consistent form of martial law administration throughout the Colony. Wynne's
orders reiterated Buller's earlier remarks regarding the object of martial law and listed
offences that were 'likely' to be encountered. These were:
(a) Treasonable or seditious acts and words, or acts and words tending to
excite dissatisfaction, disloyalty, or distrust of the Government.
4° Mimer to Ministers, 9 Dec 1899, Ibid., f.95.
41 Ministeis to Mimer 11 Dec 1899, Ibid., ff.97-100.
42 Mimer to Ministers, 29 Dec 1899, Ibid., ff.102-106.
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(b) Enlisting or engaging in the military forces of the enemy.
(c) Aiding or abetting the enemy.
(d) Carrying on trade with or supplying goods to the enemy. Destroying
Railways, Bridges, or Telegraphs, and acts endangering the safety of
H.M.Forces, also the contravention of rules and regulations made by the
military authorities under the Proclamation.
(e) Being suspected of any of the above offences.43
Wynne also explained the procedure necessary once a suspect had been arrested.
First, there had to be a preliminary investigation by either a military officer or a local
magistrate. This was meant to ascertain whether there was any case to be answered in
court. Wynne stipulated that the local courts should continue to try ordinary cases, and,
interestingly, minor breaches of martial law regulations. This went against the opinion in
Bale's memorandum of August 1899, and showed how practical difficulties would
outweigh theoretical objections against the civil authorities being associated with martial
law administration. Serious breaches of the regulations, however, were to be dealt with
by military courts, comprising at least three members, including a civil magistrate if
available: this was not mandatory. Once a court had been constituted the procedure
followed was to be that of a Field-General Court-Martial under the Army Act. Wynne
added that all evidence and defence should be written in full and that records were to be
preserved and forwarded to the Deputy Judge Advocate General in Cape Town.
Furthermore, offenders had to be tried in a martial law area and sentences served in the
martial law district where the sentence was awarded.
The instructions were explicit in their procedural context and differed little from
those in the 1867 regulations. They reflected the views forwarded by commentators, such
as Clode and Dicey, who were concerned about limiting the effects of military courts
trying civilians. In this respect the instructions were not controversial and were designed
to alleviate civilian fears. Yet they emphasised the complete lack of understanding of
martial law by the military, and did nothing to help the man on the spot - the officer
administering martial law. The part dealing with offences left open a serious problem
regarding interpretation. For instance part (a) did not make clear exactly what constituted
treasonable or seditious acts or words; in a district threatened by Boer invasion and
therefore a possible Afrikaner uprising, treasonable or seditious words or acts would have
7 Dec 1899, WO 32/7871.
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a different connotation than in a district not directly threatened. Differences of
interpretation, leading to inconsistency in martial law administration, were the outcome
of this lack of understanding.
Unsurprisingly, therefore, complaints about the administration of martial law
continued to be sent to the Cape government. Most complaints invariably found their way
to Mimer, who eventually produced a substantial note of his own regarding martial law
administration.
The complaints that arose stressed how problematical martial law administration
was. The Cape authorities wanted to preserve some degree of control because to them
unbridled martial law meant militaty rule and the loss of their own position and
responsibility. This battle placed Milner in the middle and did nothing to enhance his
opinion of either the military or the Cape authorities. In December, Mimer informed the
Colonial Office about what he considered the frustrating aspect of martial law - that at
any time, and without realising, the military might contravene the law even though
necessity demanded it. Moreover the battle for supremacy between the civil and military
courts was at its height. Mimer referred to the case of an individual named Michau, who
was a Kimberley attorney and had been arrested at the Modder river on suspicion of
having helped the enemy, possibly during the earlier battle. Evidently, the Chief Justice
wanted the man brought before a civil court, and Milner believed that the Chief Justice
expected this to be done all the time, 'a view which insisted upon, would, as it seems to
me, reduce Martial Law to a nullity.'"
Milner developed this point after a heated discussion with Schreiner over military
administration of martial law. Mimer acknowledged this was a cause for anxiety but could
imagine no other way of dealing with the rebellion. When many of the inhabitants of the
Cape were aiding and abetting the enemy, the army had to have exceptional powers. The
power to arrest and detain on suspicion '...is of the greatest value in checking
insurrection.' Most of the Boer sympathizers had been known beforehand but could not
be arrested under the ordinary law. Under martial law, however, this situation was
redeemable, although it had been imposed too late to save Colesberg, Albert, and Aliwal
North from rebellion. Milner was determined Middelburg and Cradock districts would not
"Mimer's Diary of Events, 27 Dec 1899, CO 417t285/f.79-80.
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suffer the same fate, and that potential troublemakers would be arrested before they could
incite rebellion.45 Milner's remarks illustrated the dilemma facing the civil authorities.
Where the potential for insurrection existed martial law was, apparently, an excellent
weapon to stifle it. Yet the administration of martial law relied on the military, and they
were virtually uncontrollable whilst it was in operation. The other horn of the dilemma,
therefore, was how much control could the civil authorities exercise whilst the army
administered martial law. The only way the civil authorities - ultimately in the person of
Mimer - could try and retain some influence over the military, was to keep complaining
about the army's actions and plead for some form of consistency. Consequently, the
Colonial Office asked Lord Lansdowne to impress upon the army that 'discretion' was
required whilst administering martial law. On 19 March, the War Office replied that Lord
Roberts had taken steps to instill in his officers the need to apply discretion.
Such was the criticism of the military that Milner was obliged to write to Roberts
himself. Milner explained that he wanted to extend martial law to those areas under threat
from invasion and possible rebellion. 'But I hesitate to extend it, while there is so much
evident ignorance on the part of military officers of the real nature of Martial Law, and
such lack of uniformity in the administration of it.' Mimer was annoyed particularly with
stories of people being arrested merely for expressing sympathy for the Boer cause, the
result of which tended to increase that sympathy. Milner added that he did not wish to
limit martial law but 'the arbitrary power of the military should be exercised in
accordance with some clearly defined principle' which utilised the local magistrates'
knowledge of their areas. For Mimer, the basic starting point for his 'clearly defmed
principle' was Wynne's Army Orders of 7 December, although he argued these had not
been 'universally observed.' He referred especially to the part about a preliminary enquiry
into a defendant's case, which he said, was the greatest grievance against the military
administration, If the army had adhered to this 'principle' then offenders could not claim
an unfair trial, and their sentences would not then be remitted by an ordinary court, even
after martial law had ceased. Milner did add that this procedure was slow and should not
be treated as a hard and fast rule. Everyone under suspicion should be kept on remand
45 Thid., 30 Dec 1899, Ibid., ff.82-83.
Ibid., 9 January 1900, CO 48/545/ff.144-149; CO to WO, 27 Feb 1900, IbkL, f.138; WO to CO, 19
March 1900, Co 417/306/f.469.
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until further evidence could be accumulated: those not guilty could then be released
immediately. Everything would be satisfactory once every case had been examined and
headquarters and the Governor informed about proceedings. Milner also reminded Roberts
that under Colonial Office regulations the Governor ought to receive full reports relating
to martial law on a regular basis. Until this was done, until martial law was 'more
systematised', and until Milner could rely upon the military to 'understand the nature of
the powers they are called upon to exercise', he was reluctant to extend its operation.47
Mimer was desperately trying to steer a middle course between civilian
susceptibilities and military necessity. Having recognized on the one hand that the military
needed a certain degree of freedom to make martial law work, he had to make them aware
of the political problems they were creating in Cape Colony. Mimer's weakness, however,
was that he was perhaps more afraid of rebellion than anyone else, and over-emphasised
the rebellious attitude of Afrikaners. This can be seen in his remarks about giving a
suspect a fair trial, where he qualified his strictures by saying not to make it a hard and
fast rule. In effect not only was he contradicting himself, he was undermining the very
essence of his criticism of military administration. Milner was always prepared to forget
politics when he felt his interests were threatened, especially by ungrateful Afrikaners.
As far as Mimer was concerned, the military courts were 'for the time being'
absolute. 'They lay down such rules as they see fit, and inflict such punishments as they
may prescribe for their intervention'. But, Milner was apprehensive about acknowledging
this principle without any qualification. He thought that a civil magistrate or judge should
always be on a Court-Martial. Milner felt this would allay civilian fears as the magistrate
would possess knowledge of the 'language, the habits, and the idiosyncracies of the
people...' However, what Milner did not say was that there was no guarantee the presence
of a civilian magistrate would have any noticeable effect upon the procedure of a Court-
Martial. Even while expressing his fears Milner had grudgingly to admit the efficacy of
a system deemed necessary for the defeat of rebellion and insurrection. Trying to allay
the Colonial Office's misgivings, he stated that everything would be done:
to confine the inevitable exercise of arbitrary power within the narrowest
limits compatible with the public safety, and to ensure that it shall be
Mimer to Roberts, 12 Jan 1900, CO 48/545/ff.258-265.
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wielded as much in accordance with the principle and even the forms of
ordinary law as circumstances permit.48
For their part, the army high command, while anxious to be co-operative, wanted,
nevertheless, to maintain a degree of independence whilst administering martial law.
Roberts discussed the matter with Mimer and, apparently, objected to Mimer's view
regarding courts of a mixed composition. Roberts agreed that civil courts should deal with
civil matters, but other cases, that is those where the safety of the anny was at stake,
should be thed in a military court, which in terms of composition followed the procedure
set out under military law. Later, Mimer told Chamberlain that after discussing the matter
with Roberts, he was inclined to agree with the Field-Marshal, and had consequently
withdrawn the paragraph relating to mixed Courts from his despatch of 3 January.49
Milner did not say why he changed his mind, considering he had a valid point as
a civilian concerned at the use made by the military of arbitrary powers. Roberts,
unfortunately, gives us no clues as to his opinion; it may be assumed that the military
were suspicious of civilian interference, and particularly suspicious of the partiality of
Colonial legal officials or procedures. In a recent case, for example, many rebels had been
very lightly dealt with, so it was important that convictions be successful?°
Nevertheless, the military did try to allay civilian wariness and again issued
guiding instructions. 5 ' This time they were issued under Kitchener's auspices, and were
a response to the continuing complaints emanating from the civil authorities: they may
have been intended also to divert civilian interest in the proceedings of military courts.
Kitchener in fact issued two sets of instructions: the first, while very similar to the orders
is sued by Wynne in December, emphasised the distinction between civil and military
courts, making it plain which court dealt with certain offences. Thus was enshrined the
"Milner to Chamberlain, 3 Jan 1900, Co 417f285/ff.52-62.
49 Milner to Chamberlain, 22 Jan 1900, CO 4171285/f.398. In practice, no civilians ever sat on a military
court. Papers relating to the Administration of Martial Law in South Africa, PP(1902), LVII, Cd.981, p.20.
(Hereafter Cd.981).
5°On 1 January 1900, Colonel PiIcher captured about 40 rebels at Sunnysicle. For some reason they were
handed over to the civil authorities for trial; although local jury found them guilty, the Acting Chief Justice
of Cape Town only awarded light sentences, ranging from six months to five years. Milner to Chamberlain,
13 June 1900, WO 32/8179; Amery (ed.), Times History, VI, p.550.
' Memo, by Kitchener, 30 Jan 1900, WO 32/8176.
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determination of the military to maintain their own authority in dealing with rebels who
attacked the army directly or indirectly. Kitchener insisted his officers follow regular
procedures in dealing with suspects, especially when they had been brought before a
military court, so that the case could be dealt with promptly. As for punishments,
Kitchener stated that in addition to those authorised by the Army Act, military courts
could impose a fine or sell off the offender's moveable property. Furthermore, Kitchener
stated that a person deported from a martial law area should pay a bond agreeing not to
return, risking forfeiture and further trial and punishment if he did. Basically, Kitchener
reinforced previous requests that officers be lenient and systematic, and took some
practical steps to ensure it happened. His aim, it seems, was to standardize administration,
and to emphasise the separate powers of civil and military courts. By so doing the army
could prevent complaints about administration and thus remove the possibility of civilian
interference in the proceedings of Courts-Martial.
Four days later, Kitchener issued a circular memorandum which stressed the need
for caution when investigating information regarding the disloyal conduct of
Afrikaners.52
 Feelings of sympathy for the enemy and selling them goods were not
considered to be offences: giving information to the Boers of a military nature and
fighting with the enemy were. It was made clear that a defence based on the plea of being
commandeered in an area supposedly annexed by the enemy would not be tolerated.
Acting under force ma]cure might mitigate circumstances, but clear proof would be
required for a successful plea to be entered. As a sop to the civil authorities magistrates
were deemed to be assistants and advisers to the military.
The last paragraph of Kitchener's orders contained an interesting detail that bears
on the discussion regarding the status of military courts. Kitchener stated that where the
offence was high treason and of a serious character, and if proved would mean the death
penalty, then the officer had to apply to Kitchener for a trial under a mixed commission,
comprising a Judge of the Supreme Court and four commissioned officers. This was a
small concession after the army's insistence that civil and military courts should remain
52 3 Feb 1900, Ibid.
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separate.53
 As for the circular and the earlier memorandum, there was no dissent in the
Colonial Office; Lambert minuted, 'Their substance and tone is excellent... ''
III
How to punish rebels effectively, but without unnecessary severity was a question
which required delicate handling. In Cape Colony, not only was the nature of the
punishment difficult to decide, the British authorities also had to ensure that punishments
inflicted under martial law continued after the emergency ended, an issue which conflicted
with accepted procedure as recorded in the 1867 Regulations. Moreover, the need to
balance the interests of all those involved, imperial, Colonial, Afrikaner, and military,
proved an arduous and time-consuming task for the British authorities. Four questions
arose: first, could the army inflict 'severe' punishments; second, could they deport rebels
to other districts in the Colony; third, could rebels be punished by forfeiture of property;
and fourth, how could vast numbers of surrendered rebels be dealt with.
On 11 December 1899, Buller asked Lansdowne how severe he could be to those
found guilty of aiding and abetting the enemy, even though they offered the defence that
they had been forced to do so under a Boer proclamation of annexation. Buller was now
in Natal and questions relating to martial law administration were beginning to surface
there. Although Natal did not have the same racial problems found in Cape Colony,
martial law nevertheless raised problems that had a direct bearing on the way it was
administered in its sister colony. In fact, the experience gained in dealing with martial law
problems in one colony was always relevant for dealing with problems in the other.
Moreover, Buller's question placed the onus of interpretation flnnly on the British
government. This made sure he would not face the dilemma suffered by military officers
in the past, that is trying to decide how severe one should be in administering
punishments, without being accused of failing in one's duty if the punishment was too
lenient.55
 On receipt of this request from the War Office, officials at the Colonial Office
" Kitchener did stress the desirability of having impartial witnesses. Ibid.
CO Minutes, 9 April, 18 May, 25 June, 1900, Co 417/287/ff.626B-635.
Buller to Lansdowne, 11 Dec 1899, CO 417/275/f.1055.
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wrote that leniency ought to be the paramount consideration, as they did not want to see
the creation of another set of martyrs as at Slagter's Nek. They wanted Buller to have
power of discretion in relation to military necessity, but to avoid inflicting the death
penalty if at all possible.
Chamberlain echoed the opinions of his officials, although he was more scathing
about the nature of the defence offered by offenders. The only difference in Chamberlain's
reply was that he advocated forfeiture of property as a punishmenC After consulting
Salisbury, Lansdowne thought it best to get additional legal opinion on the subject, and
informed the Judge Advocate General (JAG) of Buller's request.58
The JAG replied that 'the Commander-in-Chief is subject to no superior authority
of a legal kind, and the exercise of his powers is limited only by such considerations of
justice and prudence as commend themselves to him.' As to inflicting punishments, the
JAG wrote that there would be great differences in the cases but that the excuse being
offered - pretended annexation - 'is not entitled to any favourable consideration.'
However, what the JAG meant by considerations of justice and prudence was not
explained. The problem being that one officer might pass a severe sentence believing it
to be true justice for the offence committed; another might consider the offence in a
different light and be more lenient. Each though would have applied his own consideration
of justice and prudence. This became apparent when Hely-Hutchinson, reported to the
Colonial Office that four Natal farmers had been sentenced to 5 years imprisonment by
a Court-Martial, for looting the property of loyal colonists. Hely-Hutchinson had in fact
made a mistake: six days later, he informed Just that the farmer had not been sentenced
to five years, but one year with hard labour. This, of course, did not alter the problem
because martial law was not expected to last that long.60 Ordinarily, this might seem
reasonable for the crime of looting and reflected one officer's view of justice. However,
5'CO Minutes, 15-17 Dec 1899, Ibid., ff.1051-52. In 1815, several Afrikaners were hanged at Slagter's
Nek after a failed rebellion.
' Chamberlain to Lansdowne, 12 Dec 1899, WO 3217871.
' Lansdowne to Salisbury, 14 Dec 1899; Salisbury to Lansdowne, 14 Dec 1899, Ibid.
5'	 to Lansdowne, 15 Dec 1899, Ibid.
° Hely-Hutchinson to Chamberlain, 16 Dec 1899, CO 179[208/f.216; to Just, 22 Dec 1899, Ibid., ff214-
215.
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this prompted a substantial debate in the Colonial Office and revealed another side of the
argument. Lambert noted that it was useless to pass such a sentence, arguing that martial
law would never last that long, and referred his colleagues to Article 19 of the 1867
circular. 61 Lambert acknowledged that an act by the Colonial government could extend
sentences beyond the period of martial law so that offenders would serve their full term.
Wilson said much the same, pointing out that in 1878 the Law Officers stated that 'as
soon as the necessity for martial law had ceased then those imprisoned under its
regulations would be liable for release.' Wilson, like Lambert, added that an indemnity
act ought to be obtained to cover proceedings under martial law, but saw no reason to
interfere with the sentences mentioned by Hely-Hutchinson as they would cease once
martial law had ended. While Sir Robert Herbert agreed with Wilson's summary, Selborne
objected to the idea of sentences not carrying beyond the lifetime of martial law. Wilson,
in reply to Selborne's question as to what could be done to remedy this problem, said that
only legislation passed before martial law ended was the answer. Selborne urged that the
Governors be consulted on this point and asked Chamberlain, 'Surely it is not to be
contemplated that all rebels sentenced under martial law should go scot free when the war
is over?' To which Chamberlain replied, 'It would be a possible argument for
shooting.'62
The second problem encountered by the military and passed on to the British
government occurred in January 1900. On 8 January, Forestier-Walker asked Lansdowne
whether a civilian tried and sentenced in a military court under martial law could carry
out his sentence in a district that had not been proclaimed. This question touched on the
legality of deportation, something that had been referred to in December. Forestier-Walker
explained that the problem was urgent as there was 'insufficient jail accommodation in
districts subject to martial law.' 63 Again Lansdowne sought legal advice and referred the
matter to the Deputy Judge Advocate General (DJAG), who, in his report, stated that the
61 Article 19 stated, 'As sentences of Courts-Martial may not avail beyond the term of Martial Law, no
sentence of imprisonment beyond that term should be awarded, nor any sentence of penal servitude.' WO
32/8173.
CO Minutes, 9-16 Jan 1900, CO 179/208/11.212-213. H.F. Wilson was the Colonial Office Legal
Assistant. Hely-Hutchinson was asked to make Natal ministers aware of this problem. Chamberlain to Hely-
Hutchinson, 19 Jan 1900, Ibid., 11.226-227.
63 Forestier-Walker to Lansdowne, 8 Jan 1900, WO 321787 lfl)79/725.
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first part of Forestier-Walker's question was dealt with by paragraph eight of Wynne's
Army Orders.M The second part the DJAG understood as 'Can a sentence of deportation
from one proclaimed district to another or from a proclaimed district to that part of the
Colony which is still under the regime of the Common Law be legally carried out in the
proclaimed districts under Martial Law?' Unfortunately for the military authorities, on this
point the DJAG could not find a direct precedent. He stated that under martial law the
Commander could inflict any punishment required by military exigencies. The DJAG
meant no doubt that if the Commander-in-Chief saw fit to deport an offender under
martial law to wherever he thought suitable, then he had every right to do so, as the
ordinary law had been suspended. And in conclusion the DJAG remarked that after
martial law had ended on British territory, an act of indemnity was normally passed. This
had been done in Natal in 1874 and in Cape Colony in 1835-36, and in 1846-47.
As an added safeguard, the Law Officers of the Crown were asked to pass
judgement on the issue and the memorandum of the DJAG: on 18 January they recorded
their first opinion on martial law matters in South Africa. The Law Officers agreed that
a term of imprisonment should be carried out in a martial law area; likewise they agreed
a sentence of deportation could be passed but emphasised that an offender could not be
detained if he had been deported to a non-martial law district. The Law Officers also
stressed the propriety of passing an indemnity act and, just as important, an act to confirm
sentences awarded by martial law courts, lest serious questions arise once martial law had
ceased to operate.
Forfeiture of property was another punishment considered by the authorities. In
November it was discovered that the Boer General, Joubert, held land in Natal and the
Attorney-General was asked whether it might be confiscated. He was also asked whether
this punishment might be applied to rebels. The Attorney-General said that Roman Dutch
6 Paragraph eight.'Sentences of Military Courts under martial law must be carried out within the limits
of the District in which martial law has been proclaimed.'
' Memo. by DJAG., 13 Jan 1900, WO 32/78711V791725.
LO Report, 18 Jan 1900, Thid.
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law forbade confiscation from either a rebel or an enemy alien; nor did he agree with the
idea of retrospective legislation to create the punishment of forfeiture.67
Colonial Office officials shared the same opinion; Lambert noted that '...I doubt
if confiscation for treason exists now in any civilized code.' He also remarked that
retrospective legislation would never be passed in Cape Colony, and was not worth the
bother. However, Cox pointed out that a Cape law allowed appropriation of a rebel's
property:
Consequently, if loyal colonists think fit to enter into possession of rebels'
farms they will not be liable to be dispossessed.
He suggested also that where rebels were punished by fine it could be levied by 'escheat
of the rebels' property.' But for the present he advised nothing be done. The matter
was put before the Law Officers and was the first occasion on which their opinion was
called for, although they did not record their views until after those on deportation. They
stated categorically that forfeiture was a punishment unknown to either English or Natal
law. Retrospective legislation, they added, was a matter of policy, but they could not
condone its use, nor could they offer any adequate reasons why it should be
considered. Not surprisingly, their opinion coupled with political considerations were
enough to deter the Colonial Office from taking any action for the present and nothing
was done.
As the military situation improved so the question of dealing with those rebels
captured in arms, or aiding and abetting the enemy became prominent. This was prompted
particularly by a telegram, on 26 January 1900, from the Boer governments to Lord
Salisbury which demanded that rebels captured in arms should be treated as Prisoners-of-
War (POW's), and if this was not done the Boer leadership would regard it as justification
for ordering reprisals against British prisoners. Chamberlain informed Mimer of this and
asked for information regarding the numbers of rebels and the proceedings taken against
them.7° Mimer replied that the rebels captured at Sunnyside on 1 January 1900 (see
Bale to 1-lime, 14 & 21 Nov 1899, Co 179/207/ff.931-932, 936-937.
CO Minutes, 7-15 Jan 1900, Ibid., ff.909-913.
LO Report, 25 Jan 1900, CO 179/216/ff.446-449.
7°Chamberlain to Milner, 30 Jan 1900, WO 321787 1j079/1 158.
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fn.50) were the only rebels taken in arms and not treated as POW's. Moreover they were
being dealt with by the civil authorities; and any found to be citizens of the Transvaal or
OFS before the war would be treated as ordinary POW's. None claimed to be burghers
under the Besluit of 29 September 1899 - that is none had joined the Transvaal forces
prior to the outbreak of war - although he was prepared to see them treated as POW's:
But in my opinion it would be a colossal blunder, and likely to have
serious effects in causing an extension of the rising in the Colony if we
were to treat Colonial rebels as prisoners of war.7'
The Law Officers reported on 6 February regarding this matter and stated first that
any captured rebel given over to the civil authorities for trial had in fact been classed as
a traitor and not as a POW. Anyone detained as a POW did not have the right to claim
a trial for treason even though he was guilty of a high treason as a rebel. This, they wrote,
an indulgence of which he cannot complain,' implying, no doubt, that it was less
dangerous to be regarded as a POW than a rebel, since the latter could be tried for treason
and possibly face the death penalty. Secondly, there would be a problem if a rebel was
removed from civil custody to be detained as a POW. Difficulties would arise as to the
legality of his detention, especially after an application for a writ of habeas corpus. The
Law Officers felt that being taken from the civil authorities might be construed as a
discharge from custody and would prevent his rearrest as a POW. Thirdly, anyone treated
as a POW could be sent to St. Helena as others were, unless a law of the Cape or St.
Helena said otherwise. They suggested the two Attorney-Generals (of Cape Colony and
St. Helena) give advice on the matter. The Crown had powers to detain POW's where it
thought fit. Fourthly, it was necessary to bring anyone known to be a British subject to
trial as quickly as possible. If he was kept as a POW then the Crown had elected not to
treat him as a traitor, especially if he had been detained for a long time. Lastly, it would
be difficult to convict a rebel if he had been treated as a POW and then, alter the war,
was tried for treasonY
7'Milner to Chamberlain, 1 Feb 1900, Ibid. The Besluit was a law of the Transvaal Volksraad of 29
Sept 1899. This law made all foreigners serving with the Boer forces into burghers immediately, despite
various residence qualifications normally attached to citizenship.
LOReport,6Feb 1900,WO32,174.
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Lambert, at the Colonial Office, was perturbed after reading this; he wondered if
a rebel might query the legality of his arrest by petitioning the Supreme Court or the
Attorney-General of Cape Colony. He also wondered if the remarks made by the Law
Officers were applicable to the laws of Cape Colony, and that the Chief Justice of the
Cape might decide that civil courts ought to deal with all doubtful cases. Lambert felt the
Bond were anxious to involve the British authorities in a dispute with the Colony's courts.
As for Kruger's protests they could be ignored, especially as the Sunnyside rebels were
unlikely to be hanged.
The problem of dealing with rebels now began to assume the proportions of a
crisis as the number of those surrendering increased rapidly. Advice on the matter came
from all directions. In January, General Ardagh finally replied to a minute from
Chamberlain, after pondering the question of rebels since December. Chamberlain wanted
advice on how to punish rebels for stealing loyalist property. Ardagh, in a rather extreme
reply, advocated the extension of martial law by the imperial government throughout the
Colony without consulting either Milner or the Cape government. Ardagh believed this
would simplify matters immensely:
The executive will have to obey Lord Roberts. The trial of rebels will not
be a mere farce, and they will feel that they can no longer rely on the
immunity offered by the Bond ministry.It is not necessary that the rebels
should be executed, but entire forfeiture of property should be executed.74
After reading this memorandum Lansdowne was certain that Ardagh's opinion that
Milner need not be consulted (the Cape ministry was not mentioned), was not one the
Colonial Office could or would subscribe to. 75 He was right Just and Chamberlain both
minuted that the extension of martial law was out of the question; to extend it to areas
well beyond the invasion zone required far greater justification than existed at present.
Graham disagreed with Ardagh's ideas on forfeiture. This would punish the innocent and
'3 CO Minutes, 8 Feb 1900, CO 417/305/if. 167-168. As mentioned in fn.50 the rebels only received light
sentences.
'4 Chaznberlain's Minute, 23 Dcc 1899; Memo. by Ardagh, 21 Jan 1900, CO 41713061ff.370-379, 368-
370. Ardagh was consulted probably because of his interest in aspects of military and martial law. He was
military adviser to the British delegation at the Hague Convention and helped draft the rules of International
Military Law.
'3 Lansdowne to Chamberlain, 23 Jan 1900, Ibid., 1.381.
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mean the necessity of retroactive legislation. Graham wanted rebels punished in person;
the leaders by imprisonment and fine; the rank and file by one or other, or both according
to the seriousness of the crime; and all by disfranchisement.'6
The method of trying rebels was also discussed by the authorities in Cape Colony.
On 27 January, Solomon suggested to Kitchener that a judge of the Supreme Court ought
to preside over cases of high treason. Solomon believed that this would give confidence
to the accused and his friends, and confidence in the belief that due process of law was
being carried out. Solomon's motives for suggesting this no doubt coincided with those
of the Colonial Office: a shared dread of the military imposing death sentences on
civilians, even if they were convicted rebels."
Kitchener was quite prepared to agree to this, replying he had no objections, and
promptly embodied this proposal in his circular of 3 February.' 8 Probably, he just wanted
to avoid an argument in order to get something done, and ensure that everything was in
order before he moved to the 'real war' further north. (Kitchener and Roberts left for the
Modder river on 8 February).
Colonial Office officials were glad that rebels would not face the death penalty
without reference to themselves. Lambert expressed the view that it might be necessary
to inflict the death penalty in some cases, but the 'essential thing seems to be to prevent
Courts Martial from hanging people simply because they are rebels."9 Mimer was
informed of Chamberlain's approval regarding the appointment of a Supreme Court Judge
to oversee Courts-Martial for high treason. Chamberlain urged Mimer to find out whether
the death penalty was being inflicted in cases that had been tried promptly because of
military reasons. He also wanted to know what was being done in Natal and reminded
Mimer of General White's order that no sentence of death would be carried out without
his permission.8° Chamberlain however had no cause for concern. Up to 30 April 1900
76 CO Minutes, 28-29 Jan, 2 April 1900, Ibid., ff.382-383, 357-358.
" Solomon to Kitchener, 27 Jan 1900, CO 48/545/f.439.
7' Kitchener to Solomon, 28 Jan 1900, Ibid., 1.440. This was Kitchener's concession to the civil
authorities alter Roberts had complained earlier about mixed commissions of civilians and soldiers.
7'CO Minutes, 28 Feb-2 Mar 1900, Ibid., 11.435-436.
Chamberlain to Mimer, 5 Mar 1900, Ibid., ff.444-445.
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only 19 cases had been tried by military courts and not one of the accused had been
condemned to death. In Natal the story was the same, 14 cases and no deaths.81
In fact rebels were now willing to surrender in numbers and the military either
required instructions or were prepared to let them surrender on lenient terms. On 24
February 1900, Mimer informed Chamberlain that General Brabant wanted instructions
as to what terms should be offered to rebels to induce them to surrender. Lord Roberts,
evidently, was too busy to consider the matter, so Mimer recommended that all except the
ringleaders could go back to their farms, pay a deposit for good behaviour and undertake
to reappear for trial; however, this meant that all rebels would have to be charged.
However, Mimer mentioned Schreiner's suggestion that on laying down their arms, rebels
should be allowed to return to their farms but would 'remain liable to be called to account
at any time hereafter for their part in rebellion or any offences which they may have
committed in connexion with it.' Mimer favoured this idea because he felt that if the
authorities insisted on arresting and trying all the rebels then they would face grave
problems. First, there were too many rebels to guard; second, too many rebels would
escape conviction, and third, it would discourage the tendency to surrender. This
alternative was also favoured by Chamberlain. He wanted to see the same procedures
adopted in Natal and in the Cape: a regularised system of surrender to avoid any legal
objections later. This was to be impressed upon the military authorities.
Such was Chamberlain's apprehension that he sought the opinion of the Law
Officers on the subject. They reported that binding rebels to appear for trial depended on
the Cape law of procedure. This was unknown to English law, unless the individual had
already been charged. If a rebel had been detained by the civil authorities, he could only
be released on bail by a British Secretary of State, or a member of the Queen's Bench
Division. As to the question whether rebels would be allowed to return to their farms
without entering into recognizances, but still be liable for trial either before or after the
end of the war, the Law Officers saw no objections to this even if: rebels had been
Si In fact, the first award of the death penalty was not until 4 Feb 1901 and this was commuted to 6
months imprisonment with hard labour. No citizen of Natal was executed after trial by a military court
Cd.981, pp.214-215.
' Milner to Chamberlain, (tel.), 24 Feb 1900, CO 417/286/ff.492-493.
'3 Chamberlain to Mimer, (tel.), 27 Feb 1900, Ibid., ff.500-501.
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detained as POW's, or had returned to their farms having been neither a POW, nor in
civil custody. Again, where the prisoner had been in civil custody beforehand, the
question asked depended on the Cape law of procedure.TM
Following this advice the decision was made to allow rebels to surrender merely
on condition to appear for trial later. To this Mimer, Roberts and the Cape ministry
agreed. Natal, however, did not and wanted to treat rebels differently especially as they
had fewer to deal with than Cape Colony. Mimer explained to Chamberlain that Natal
thought surrender terms would only encourage rebels to believe they would be treated
leniently; paroled rebels, moreover, might interfere with the collection of evidence. Natal
wanted rebels arrested immediately and would release them only after they had explained
their absence from their homes satisfactorily: too much leniency would upset loyalists. It
is interesting to note the fact that Lord Roberts, normally an advocate of harsh treatment
for rebels, agreed to the lenient conditions. This may be explained by Mimer's concluding
remarks when he made the point that the prompt surrender of rebels had 'the immediate
and important object of a rapid pacification of the disturbed districts, and the release of
a large number of troops to deal with the original enemy...' Roberts obviously knew his
priorities.85
Chamberlain was prepared to let Natal deal with rebels differently; this was due
to the confidence the British had in the Natal ministry and, of course, to the political
problems there being less acute than those in Cape Colony. On the other hand, he
preferred to see every rebel suffer in some way, 'pour encourager les autres'; he suggested
inflicting a small fine on the rank and file and a severer punishment (just what, he did not
specify) on the ringleaders.
All this was for the future when it would be decided exactly how the rebels would
be dealt with. Throughout March and April the number of surrendered rebels grew well
beyond the means of either the military or civil courts to try them all. The army high
command was content to bring in the rebels and waive the right to try them in military
' LO Report, 26 Feb 1900, CO 417f305/ff.206-209.
'3 Milner to Chamberlain, 8 Mar 1900, CO 417/287/ff.178-182. Roberts told Milner that he had issued
a warning in rebel districts that any who rebelled again would face full punishment. Roberts was not going
to let rebels off that lightly. Roberts to Milner, 9 April 1900, WO 105134,C957.
$6 CO Minutes, 27-29 Mar 1900, CO 417/287/ff.176-177.
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courts. The campaign in the north took priority especially as army numbers were thinning
owing to lengthy lines of communication and casualties. Graham noted:
It appears...that the military authorities on the spot have a natural
inclination to facilitate military operations by offering good terms to those
rebels who surrender.V
Indeed, Roberts was glad to withdraw the army's involvement in bringing the
rebels to trial. He informed Mimer that no more sentences would be confirmed and no
more Courts-Martial would be held until further notice. As far as he was concerned:
The sentences are more or less a farce, when they must come to an end
concurrently with the termination of the state of martial law. For no one
supposes or wishes that martial law will be in force a day longer than is
absolutely necessary.
Now that the Colonial Office, the Cape Ministry and Milner had agreed on a
lenient course to induce rebels to surrender, it seemed, for once, that all the authorities
were united on a major point. However, this did not prove to be the case.
While the military authorities in South Africa were prepared to let ordinary rebels
be tried by civil courts, the military authorities in Britain made a last effort to gain
complete control over trials for high treason. On 23 March 1900, the War Office informed
the Colonial Office that arrangements made allowing a judge of the Supreme Court to sit
on a military tribunal had not been approved, by either Lord Wolseley, or the JAG. The
following reasons were advanced for their refusal:
(1) The Judge will not take any oath. (This reflected the military's
suspicion of the Colonial judiciary.)
(2) Officers will probably be unable to ensure that due weight is given to
military considerations.
(3) Questions of treason affecting Military operations. ..[would] be better
dealt with by purely Military Courts Martial, while all other cases against
civilians will where this is possible be better disposed of by an entirely
civilian tribunal.
(4) So far as is known, in South Africa there are few Judges whose verdict
will be acceptable to both sides.
' Co Minutes, 2 April 1900, CO 417/306/f.357.
' Roberts to Mimer, 18 April 1900, MP IV/A/175/ff.16-19.
WO to CO. 23 Mar 1900, WO 32/8177.
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The Colonial Office were alarmed at this sudden change of front by the military,
especially as it carried grave political implications. As the Cape government had agreed
to the appointment of a Supreme Court judge, the abrupt rejection of their idea would
cause a great loss of confidence in the trial procedure. Lambert said that 'it seems better
that a few should escape rather than the suspicion of military violence should rest on
every conviction.' He deprecated shunning the Cape government as the original
arrangement would bind the ministry to the imperial authorities, a point seized on by
Chamberlain for its obvious political good sense. Chamberlain did not want the Cape
government's co-operation rejected; by agreeing to the Judge, Schreiner's Cabinet had
taken some of the responsibility for punishing rebels. Moreover, having a civil judge on
a military tribunal would make the ministry amenable to the establishment of a judicial
commission for punishing the bulk of the rebels and compensating the loyalists. The War
Office decision, therefore, was not greeted with any enthusiasm whatsoever.9°
Lansdowne, after seeing Chamberlain's objections, overruled Wolseley and the
JAG because the political difficulties caused by such a change would have been too
great.9' There does not appear to be any other correspondence which throws light on
Wolseley's actions. His distrust of civilian interference was apparent, and perhaps he was
determined to ensure that rebels who had attacked the army in some form or other would
be properly punished; moreover, Wolseley might have been suspicious of a judge whose
brother was in Schreiner's government. However, he was too late in his objections as the
arrangement had been agreed to by the military authorities in South Africa. They realised
that dealing with rebels was now a political problem and one that would tax the resources
of the military if they were obliged to undertake a major share of convicting prisoners.
On 13 June 1900, Mimer sent Chamberlain his summary of the administration of
martial law. What he said showed clearly that the trials by Courts-Martial were few in
number, even after the serious revolt in the north-east of Cape Colony. So many rebels
were captured that the procedures laid down in Kitchener's memoranda proved too time-
consuming and incapable of dealing with the influx of prisoners. Consequently very few
were dealt with by Courts-Martial, and only one was of major importance. This was when
% CO Minutes, 23-25 March 1900, Co 417/306/ff.470-473; Co to WO, 27 Mar 1900, WO 32,ll8.
'1 W0 to CO. 28 Mar 1900, CO 48/550/f.20.
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two rebels were sentenced to five and ten years imprisonment. By June over 8,000 rebels
had been dealt with. Overall the administration of martial law during the period between
October 1899 and June 1900 had been characterized by a lack of intervention by the
military courts.
The complaints against the military centred on the various regulations they had
imposed and administered. Theron's letter, and Milner's own observations suggested that
many complaints were justified. The high command, however, did endeavour to introduce
an efficient and reliable administration of martial law. Unfortunately good intentions could
never legislate for individual caprice, or plain ruthlessness.
The stories that emanated from various districts about military despotism may
explain the near hysterical fear about the trial of civilians in military courts. However,
sentencing of rebels had been lenient: Buller's request for instructions in December had
placed the onus on the British government to declare its policy, and for political reasons
they decided that death sentences would only be awarded as a very last resort. When the
rebellion was at its height, the government also sought opinion as to what punishments
were permissible. It was decided that forfeiture of property was out of the question and
the death penalty politically inexpedient. Deportation, from one martial law district to
another or to a non-proclaimed area, was permissible - although the latter was hedged by
various restrictions. Once the last rebellion had collapsed and an influx of prisoners taken
in, only the ringleaders were deemed guilty enough to face the death penalty; the rank and
file were disfranchised for five years. Eventually, on 12 October 1900, the Cape
authorities passed an Indemnity and Special Tribunal Act, which indemnified the military
for their actions done under martial law, and confirmed all prison sentences so that
prisoners would serve their full terms. At the same time a Special Tribunal was
established to try the thousands of rebels either still in custody, or who had returned to
their farms after promising to appear before a court. Even so, martial law was removed
from only a few districts, including Cathcart, Queenstown, Molteno, Steynsburg, and
Britstown (except De Aar), as the majority were considered too disturbed to return civil
to Chamberlain, 13 June 1900, WO 32/8179.
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administrationY However, by the end of October the rebellion was over and the main
war also appeared likely to end soon.
PART TWO.
On 16 December 1900, Boer commandos invaded the Colony again and, as before,
incited rebellion. Unlike the first invasion, these commandos were not content to occupy
territory and then do nothing. Between December 1900 and May 1902, the Boers were
determined to provoke a colony-wide rebellion designed to undermine British rule.
Consequently, martial law was reintroduced on a far larger scale; by the end of January
1901, it had been proclaimed throughout the whole Colony, except the ports and native
territories.
The new Cape ministry, under Sir Gordon Sprigg's Progressive party, was thought
to be more amenable to the needs of the military. But, like their predecessors, they shared
a fundamental suspicion of the military when the latter were called upon to administer
martial law. While the disputes were the same as before, the scope and intensity of the
arguments were far greater. The first section, therefore, will concentrate on the efforts
made by both the civil and military authorities to make martial law administration more
systematic and benevolent. The second part will examine the major disputes which arose
as a result of the extension of martial law, and how they increased in intensity and
eventually affected imperial strategic policies. Section three will show how difficult it
could be for the imperial civil and military authorities to obtain indemnity and
confirmation acts from a recalcitrant and antagonistic local government.
I
Despite his misgivings regarding the efficacy of martial law, Mimer's fear of
rebellion easily submerged the doubts he had. Even before the Boers invaded, Milner was
anxious about the restless state of the frontier districts and felt that unless the Colony
" Those districts still under martial law: Colesberg, Albert, Aliwal North, Wodehouse, Glen Grey,
Mafeking, Vryburg, Taungs, Barkly West, Herbert, Phillipstown, Hopetown, Prieska, Kenhardt, Barkly East,
Gordonia. Most of these districts had been placed under martial law in March following renewed invasion
and rebellion. Cd.981, pp.7-9.
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settled down martial law would have to be proclaimed throughout. Although he realised
that owing to the paucity of troops little could be done to enforce martial law, he
believed, 'the policy of showing a bold front is the only way to avert fresh trouble.'
Mimer suggested a modified course of action to the Cape government, clearly not
wishing to alarm ministers with talk of martial law throughout the whole Colony. Instead,
he advocated placing the lines of communication under martial law to forestall sabotage.
Unfortunately, ministers were reluctant to comply, believing the situation was not as bad
as Milner suggested?6 Yet Mimer was unable to remain calm or take a detached view
of the situation. This was a measure of the importance Mimer placed on the region, as the
one area which could alter the balance of the war in favour of the Boers. Mimer never
lost this anxiety and it affected his remarks and views accordingly. He tended to regard
Afrikaners as foreigners, placing them on a par with the Boers from the republics. Milner
felt that unfriendly citizens should be treated like the population of an occupied country;
and the only way to do this was through martial law. He wanted martial law imposed to
prevent sedition and rebellion before they occurred:
The mere proclamation of Martial Law would...produce an immediate
effect in restraining the unbridled license of the present agitation. Even if
it did not, a firm but judicious use of extra powers to prevent seditious
spealdng and writing, to prohibit meetings calculated to inflame public
feeling, and to control movements of dangerous agitators by confining
them to their own homes or keeping them in some safe locality,
would. ..produce the desired effect?6
When the Boers invaded Cape Colony on 16 December 1900 martial law could be
put off no longer. Four days later, martial law was proclaimed throughout the
western/midland districts? This time the Boers moved into districts that had not been
occupied during the first invasion. They made rapid progress towards De Aar, and it
Mimer to Kitchener, 30 Nov 1900, CO 48/548/f.467. Kitchener thought this was the best option.
Kitchener to Mimer, 1 Dec 1900, Ibid., f.468.
95 Milner to Ministers, 1 Dcc 1900; Ministers to Mimer, 3 Dec 1900, CO 48/548/ff.478. These were
illegible, but gist gained from Mimer's reply & Chamberlain's reply of 31 Dec 1900, Ibid., f.465.
Mimer to Ministers, 4 Dec 1900, Ibid., ff.478-484.
The newly proclaimed districts were: Britstown, Victoria West, Richmond, Hanover, Murraysberg,
Graff Reinet, Aberdeen, Middelburg, Steynsburg, Cradock, Tarka and Molteno. Ibid., f.747. On 27 Dec
1900, Beaufort West and Carnarvon were also proclaimed. Ibid., f.775.
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seemed they would launch themselves into the western heartlands. This, apparently,
persuaded ministers to proclaim martial law in the threatened areas. For the time being
Mimer was convinced the proclamations would dampen the rebellion, and that the best
solution to the crisis had been appliedY
The new Attorney-General Sir James Rose Innes, was less than certain about the
use of martial law. He could not divest himself of the view that the civilian authorities
ought to take some part in its administration. By so doing, Innes was contradicting the
whole concept of martial law; the civil authorities relinquished control over the exercise
of the ordinary law as a form of deterrent; by passing this authority to the military they
hoped to inspire terror in rebels who faced the prospect of being brought to justice by the
more arbitrary process of military law. If the ordinary civil government was seen to be
taking part in this process it could have one or two consequences. First, the civil
government would be associating itself with a process which was considered illegal.
Secondly, they would lessen the deterrent effect of giving the military the task of
administering justice. Civilian interference would not only highlight a division between
the civil and military authorities, it might even weaken the impact of martial law.
When martial law was proclaimed Innes made the first of his demands regarding
how it would be administered. He was aware of the earlier difficulties created by the
imposition of special regulations, and his initial actions seemed to have been aimed at
trying to prevent this happening again. However, Innes was more concerned about the way
the military dealt with cases of sedition. He wanted the military to take cognizance of a
'simple code' in areas where there was no rebellion. By allowing magistrates to try
ordinary cases of sedition and a mixed court to try graver cases, Innes tried to moderate
the potentially capricious aspects of military jurisdiction, and introduce a controlling
civilian feature into the bargain.'°°
Innes was determined to get his point across. On 22 December he sent Mimer
three sets of proposals regarding the difficult question of sedition and the authority of
S MiIners Diary of Events, 20 & 27 Dec 1900, Ibid., ff.842-843, 857-858.
'9 C. Townshend, Britain's Civil Wars: Counter-Insurgency in the Twentieth Century (London, 1986),
p.178.
100 Innes to Mimer, 20 Dec 1900, CO 48/548/ff.782-784.
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magistrates. In one set - his instructions to magistrates - Innes explained that 'Martial Law
is administered by the Military Authorities and not by the civil courts.' The magistrate
was to proceed as normal, circumstances permitting, even if the military required him to
try a suspect, arrested under martial law regulations, by the ordinary law. For example,
some Afrikaners were arrested under martial law for stealing livestock from an English-
speaking farmer. Ordinarily, this was a civil crime and not one for the local commandant
to worry about.'°' But dealing with breaches of the regulations required the magistrate
to forego his office, as he had become an officer deputed for the purpose by the
commandant. The magistrate was allowed, in minor cases such as being unable to produce
a pass, or being out after curfew, to inflict a small fine (E30), or three months
imprisonment. On any graver charge the magistrate, as the commandant's deputy, was
required to carry Out a preliminary investigation, and after sending his report to the
commandant, had to send a copy of the evidence and the report to the Attorney-General.
If a trial was recommended, a special tribunal would be established to try the offender.
Innes explained to Milner that he wanted magistrates to deal with all ordinary criminal
cases, as if martial law was not in force. The only difference being that the magistrate
would act as a commandant's deputy for breaches of the regulations. The use of the term
'deputy' was the first occasion this term was used and revealed Innes's desire to introduce
a regular civilian element into martial law proceedings. By doing so, Innes clearly wanted
commandants to hold the minimum amount of power possible, and to keep civilians out
of the hands of the military.'°2
 However, by using the term 'deputy,' Innes also implied
a more definite relationship between the commandant and magistrate: that is, the
magistrate was clearly subordinate to the military officer, and in no position to question
or criticize his superior.
The military authorities in Cape Colony also did not want a repeat of the friction
that had characterised relations between civil and military officials before. Colonel Trotter,
Forestier-Walker's Chief of Staff, issued two circulars designed to forestall this problem.
The first was a set of instructions for the benefit of commandants. Like earlier
instructions, commandants were told not to interfere in the regular life of civilians and that
101 Nasson, Esau's War, p.145.
102 Innes to Mimer, 22 Dcc 1900, CO 48/548/ff.786-787, 788-789.
245
magistrates should deal with cases under the ordinary law. Commandants were informed
they could make any regulations for, among others, restricting the movement of
'undesirable persons', for prohibiting meetings, for examining suspicious consignments,
'and generally for maintaining good order, military discipline, and the peace of your
district.' Again, commandants were empowered to arrest anyone on suspicion of helping
the enemy, although all such arrests had to be reported to a superior officer.'°3
The second circular informed commandants of the Attorney-General's instructions
to magistrates, which as Trotter remarked, were designed to relieve the commandant 'from
the burden of criminal judicial work.' In these more explicit instructions Trotter
differentiated between two types of offence: breaches of the ordinary law and breaches
of special regulations. Magistrates would deal with the former as outlined in Innes's
proposals; but with regard to the latter, Trotter made it clear that in framing various
regulations the commandant 'should be careful not to harass the people by maldng more,
or severer, regulations than are necessary for military purposes...' Trotter's new
instructions brought those of the military into line with those issued by Innes. This was
reinforced by Trotter's remarks regarding the punishment of those convicted of using
seditious language. He emphasised that it was not 'desirable to take notice of every loose
and unguarded expression of persons of no consequence. ..not likely to have any effect on
the conduct of others.' And anyone accused of using 'printed matter of an inflammatory
character' should be dealt with under the ordinary law for seditious libel. Annexed to the
circular was a copy of the Regulations with Respect to the use of Seditious Language.'°4
For the time being military and civilian instructions seemed to be in harmony. But
the nature of the warfare now engulfing Cape Colony made even this relationship
problematic. On 17 January 1901 martial law was extended throughout the whole colony
except for the ports and the native territories. This meant that large areas were now, for
the first time during the war, under martial law. It seems this rapid extension caused
certain problems as both the civil and military authorities endeavoured to come to terms
21 Dcc 1900, Ibid., f.785.
29 Dcc 1900, Cd.981, p.42-43. The annexed copy of the regulations viz., seditious language read
'No person shall make use of any language with the intention eithec
(a)Of raising or fomenting disaffection among Her Majesty's subjects.
(b)Of promoting hostility between different classes of such subjects, under a penalty not exceeding six
months imprisonment and a fine of £100, or one or other of such punishments.' Ibid.. p.45.
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with the situation. Consequently, a new set of instructions were issued designed primarily
for the benefit of those new to the administration of martial law, and once again they were
formulated by Trotter. His new circular began with an explanation of what martial law
was in a legal sense, and he was careful to explain that acts done under martial law
required to be indemnified afterwards to protect those who administered it as these acts
were illegal. The rest of the circular virtually repeated the two earlier sets of instructions,
and the whole exercise was designed to bring some uniformity into martial law
administration and thus avoid friction with the civil authorities.'°5
As in earlier attempts to secure uniformity theory diverged from practice and a
host of complaints were sent to Cape Town. Although a determined effort had been made
to reduce tension by regularizing the contentious aspects of martial law - that is those
regulations open to wide definition - it had failed to take into account human fallibility.
There were numerous examples of commandants abusing the powers given them under
martial law, and many of the complaints echoed those made during the first invasion.
Often, commandants acted to suit their own ends and prejudices, and with the extension
of martial law throughout the whole colony, the volume of complaints grew accordingly.
At Stellenbosch, for example, the local commandant called MacDonald told
Merriman's wife that he intended to arrest Afrikaner politicians, such as Te Water and
Cronwright-Schreiner, not for any particular reason, but for their 'tone and ulterior
meaning."°6
 In August 1901, a certain Dr. Reinecke was deported from Ceres to
Malmesbury - fifty miles away - on a vague charge of breaching regulations designed to
secure public order and peace. Not long after 22 leading Afrikaners suffered the same
fate.'°7
 Kitchener blamed these occurrences on the poor calibre of the men employed,
stating most were Colonials recruited by General Brabant, the commander of the Cape
forces.'°8
 But, owing to the nature of the guerilla war and the ever present threat of
8 Feb 1901, Cd.981, pp.46-49.
Lewsen, Merriman. Paradoxical Statesman, pp.234-235. John X. Memman himself was arrested in
August 1901 by MacDonald's successor Major Potts and confined to his property for three days. His travel
pass for outside the district was not returned until 6 Sept. Ibid., p.247
' F. Mackamess, L4f:ing the Veil in Cape Colony (London, 1902), pp.5-i.
Kitchener to Hely-Hutchinson, 4 Sept. 1901, CO 48/554/f.200. Captain Fraser, who arrested Reinecke,
was Australian. For other examples of the idiosyncracies of local commandants see Le May, p.116.
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rebellion, no regulations or guidelines could ever legislate for every given situation, which
left greater scope for individual interpretation.
A major attempt was made to remedy this situation when, on 1 May 1901, a
detailed set of instructions were issued by the Deputy Assistant Adjutant General, Captain
Cockerill. These instructions were designed 'to secure uniformity in the administration of
Martial Law in Cape Colony [and] are to be strictly complied with.' Unlike other
instructions, these actually came with a set of regulations. Obviously some note had been
taken of the more contentious aspects of martial law administration, where the
commandant's regulations often reflected his personal prejudices: Cockerill therefore
attempted to remove the personal element. Even so, the main problem remained - no pre-
written regulations could ever legislate fully for unforeseen circumstances or personal
prejudice, as the examples mentioned earlier indicate. In fact Regulation No.10 dealing
with seditious language remained much the same as the instructions issued in December
1900. Like them, Cockerill's instructions also allowed the possibility of a wide definition
of 'seditious language', with all its attendant troubles. In areas of high tension the slightest
remark could inflame opinion, a remark that would be ignored in areas not directly under
threat. Despite the good intentions of the pamphlet, a degree of latitude remained that
could endanger the relationship between civilians and the army.'° 9 However, the officials
at the Colonial Office were impressed by Cockerill's efforts. Cox said:
It is an instructive object lesson on the "barbarity" of our proceedings. The
system seems to have been excellently arranged.°
In December 1901 a fundamental reorganisation took place in another attempt to
bring uniformity into martial law proceedings. This time the district commandants were
removed and magistrates took their place. The magistrates were then overseen by a
military Administrator of Martial Law, who commanded an area comprising a number of
districts and had the power to create regulations. Although the main aim of this
reorganisation was to produce a better form of administration, it may also have been a
device to control the magistrates.
'° Pamphlet by Capt. Cockerill, I May 1901, CO 48/552/ff.682-71 1. A second edition was published
on 21 Aug 1901 (Cd.981, pp.99-109) which embodied six circulars issued after 1 May. These dealt with
various aspects such as prisoners on parole and payment for animals.
110 CO Minutes, 20 June 1901, CO 48/552/1.679.
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By bringing in magistrates to administer virtually every aspect of martial law, the
military were granting them greater responsibility. Thus the reorganisation can be seen as
a ploy to share the burden of administration and also deflect civilian criticism. If the
magistrate was seen as the public face of martial law administration not only would it
engender confidence amongst the locals, it would also weaken the division implicit
between the civil and military authorities. The military were not so much seeking to
control magistrates, as to absorb them into the administration process."
The Attorney-General's office in Cape Town apparently realised the implications
inherent in the new organisation. Magistrates were informed in a circular that the military
were only borrowing their services:
But you remain at the same time the representative of the Civil
Government as fully as before; and the responsibility entailed by that
position is undiminished; you are still the Civil head of your district and
as such bound to pay careful attention to its economic and social
conditions, and to draw attention to all matters of importance occurring
within it.112
Thus, the prospect of a magistrate becoming an adjunct of the military concerned the Cape
government. They had unwittingly agreed earlier to make the magistrate a 'deputy' and
had found it difficult to argue for the magistrate's independence. Now they impressed on
magistrates the need not to surrender any vestiges of autonomy to the military.
As mentioned earlier the continual efforts of the military to introduce uniformity
into the administration of martial law were designed not only to enhance the efficiency
of martial law administration and to lessen its contentious aspects, but also to reduce
civilian interference. These efforts though were nearly always undermined by civilian
reluctance to allow the army the freedom to tackle the varying conditions of guerilla
warfare. In February 1902, a dispute arose over the commandeering of animals which
exemplified the problems faced in Cape Colony.
On 17 February 1902, Sprigg's government addressed a lengthy minute to the
Governor, which was then passed on to the military authorities. Ministers complained
about commandeering and the order given to farmers to drive their stock to the nearest
Martial Law Administration, Captain Cockerill, 1 Dec 1901, Cd.981. pp.116-117.
" 19 Dcc 1901, WO 3213O.
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town on the approach of the Boers, and also against the army's employment of
Blacks."3
This brought a stinging response from Kitchener which emphasised the frustration
felt by the military for the way in which the civil authorities hampered the administration
of martial law. Kitchener was annoyed at the tone of the minutes and especially at the
'grudging assistance' offered by the Colonial authorities:
It is the fixed determination of the Boers that, when driven by force of
arms from the Republics they will enter the Cape Colony, and it is to be
prepared for such an emergency and to prevent destruction of property that
the Martial Law Regulations complained of are formed."4
Kitchener's outburst revealed how the Cape government had exasperated the
military authorities by continually complaining about the administration of martial law.
In fact, by 1902, Kitchener had accumulated a great deal of antipathy towards Sprigg's
government after a series of disputes which had threatened to undermine the whole war
effort.
II
In 1901, the clash between the conflicting demands of civil and military power
reached the highest levels of government - both British and Colonial. This section will
outline the progressive decline in relations between the Cape government and the military,
and will also show how the imperial government became steadily embroiled as well, first
to restrain the military and secondly, to ensure that Kitchener was able to concentrate on
clearing Cape Colony without undue hinderance from the Cape authorities. He would then
be able to implement Milner's schemes discussed in Chapter Four. Four major disputes
are examined: first, the differences over the power and authority of military courts
following the end of the Special Tribunal; second, the treatment of rebels; third the row
over martial law administration; and lastly, the crisis regarding the extension of martial
law to the ports.
"3 Ministers to Hely-Hutchinson, 17 Feb 1902; Hely-Hutchinson to Kitchener and Settle, 19 Feb 1902;
also Hely-Hutchinson to Settle, 21/22 Feb 1902, CO 48/558/ff.696-699, 694-695, 729-731, 732-736.
'j Kitchener to Hely-Hutchinson, 25 Feb 1902, CO 48/559/ff.92-93.
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The Special Tribunal had been established to try those who had committed treason
or crimes of a political nature in the six months both before and after the promulgation
of the Indemnity and Special Tribunal Act, passed on 12 October 1900:" the Special
Tribunal would consequently expire on 12 April 1901, after which it was to have no
effect. But following the second invasion, when rebels were captured or surrendered in
numbers, confusion reigned as to how they would be tried. As early as 15 January,
Kitchener informed Milner that men from Myburgh's rebel commando wanted to know
what terms would be offered if they wished to surrender.' 16 The Cape government
commented that as the Special Tribunal was still sitting they ought to be tried under its
provisions, and quoted Clause eight of the Indemnity and Special Tribunal act to this
effect. Clause 8 stated that the Special Tribunal would try cases of high treason for six
months after the promulgation of the act. Ominously, ministers added that after the end
of six months rebels would then be liable to trial by the ordinary tribunals of the Colony,
thus facing penalties under the ordinary law including death, something the Special
Tribunal could inflict, but was not specifically designed to do so. Its purpose was to
induce rebels to surrender with an offer of leniency, and with the prospect of severer
treatment if they did not. 117
 The problem here was that the Special Tribunal was
essentially a peacetime court designed primarily to try rebels who were no longer under
the jurisdiction of martial law. Its job was to ensure that Cape Colony became settled and
that former rebels were absorbed into the life of the Colony, having been punished quickly
with no time to harbour grudges. At the Colonial Office this point was quickly realised.
Ommanney wrote that rebels surrendering now ought to be dealt with summarily by
martial law courts, as martial law had been proclaimed. Lambert answered:
Yes, no doubt in theory they might suffer any penalties at the hands of the
military which military necessity might dictate. But in practice there are
great difficulties in inflicting many such penalties; the death penalty is not
considered permissible and no sentence of imprisonment imposed by a
Court-Martial avails beyond the period of martial law. As a matter of fact
the number of persons punished by Courts-Martial during the former
115 See above, pp.239-240.
116 Kitchener to Mimer, 15 Jan 1901, Co 48/551/f.187.
117 Ministers to Hely-Hutchinson, 15 Jan 1901, Ibid., f.188.
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invasion was very small indeed compared to the number of rebels. The end
of martial law it is said is not punishment but the suppression of rebellion.
Ommanney decided the situation was unsatisfactory but preferred to wait until cases
arose.'t8
The widespread nature of the guerilla war made the punishment of rebels a
difficult question. If Lambert was correct in saying that martial law was not designed to
punish but suppress then one of the major deterrent effects of the procedure would have
been lost. Harsh punishment for those who committed heinous crimes whilst in rebellion
was considered the only fit solution to deter future offenders.
On 2 March 1901 the first execution of a Cape citizen took place under the
auspices of martial law. An Afrikaner named van Heerden allowed his property to be used
during an ambush of a British military party, who were all severely wounded. Van
Heerden was captured by the local column commander, Colonel Goninge, who quickly
established a Court-Martial, comprising four officers, three of whom belonged to the Cape
Defence Forces. Van Heerden was condemned to death and shot straight after." 9 Three
days later, three Cape citizens were executed at De Aar for high treason, robbery and
murder. As martial law had been proclaimed the military were entitled to punish rebels
deemed to have endangered the lives of British servicemen, or to have committed gross
criminal acts. By now the rebellion had grown to alarming proportions, and more rebels
had been captured; but to proceed under martial law clashed with the supposed authority
of the Special Tribunal.'20
 Kitchener became concerned lest the conflict over judicial
authority should undermine the value of martial law. He was prepared to let civil courts
cany on as normal, but properly constituted Courts-Martial, following military law
procedure, he decided, ought to deal with cases when military reasons necessitated such
a course:
CO Minutes, 20 Feb 1901, Ibid., f.184.
1 °In October 1902, the War Office exonerated Goninge. Van Heerden was tried and executed on the
same day -2 March 1901. He was not brought before the Court-Martial, but his answers to questions on
the same day were entered into the proceedings of the court Brodrick considered 'substantial Justice had
beezi done.' The Colonial Office felt it would have been better to have shot Van Heerden Out of hand, rather
than hold a trial 'which was no trial.' CO 48/564/ff.115-126; CO Minutes, 16 Oct 1902 & WO tO CO, 15
Oct 1902, CO 48/568/ff.631-634.
'There were no more executions until June, although military courts continued to operate and six
offenders were given prison sentences ranging from 5-10 years penal servitude. Cd. 981 pp.125-134.
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There is a great tendency amongst the civil authorities to deal with martial
law as if it was a power given into their hands to wield, instead of being
entirely in the hands of the GOC and this is being done in Cape Colony,
where to my mind very irregular courts are formed under martial law of
civilians and officers mixed and in which the regular procedure of Courts-
Martial is omitted.
Kitchener added that as this had been arranged by Milner and the Cape government he
had not interfered, 'but it does not seem to me a proper manner to use martial law when
it is declared for military reasons in a country."2'
Kitchener's exact meaning is unclear. No civilians ever sat on a military court and
one can guess that he referred either to magistrates trying minor cases, such as breaches
of martial law regulations, or that he referred to the continual operation of the Special
Tribunal, which was trying cases that should have gone to a military court. Having the
two systems operating at the same time, therefore, might have been the main reason
behind Kitchener's complaint. Perhaps it was just Kitchener's method of getting his own
way, to reduce another form of civilian interference in military business; to exaggerate a
problem and make his solution seem the most beneficial.
The whole situation came to a head just after the Special Tribunal expired. On 14
April, Kitchener was involved in a series of telephone calls with Mimer after he had heard
some disturbing news from General Settle, who had replaced Forestier-Walker in
February. It transpired that the Attorney-General had issued a circular on 6 April
informing magistrates that once the Special Tribunal expired the following week, acts of
treason and rebellion were to be dealt with by the ordinary courts. Settle told Kitchener:
...this is a grave omission, and notice as it stands is in no way deterrent,
as rebels will only know that they are safe in hands of Dutch juries...
And because the rebellion was spreading and the number of rebels increasing:
Prompt punishment is necessary for serious crimes, and this can only be
met in present state of affairs by Military Courts.'
121 Kitchener to Brodrick, 29 March 1901, KP 22/Y38. Brodrick felt that imprisoning rebels was not
important exiling them was better in order to prevent them living 'cheek by jowl' with loyalists. Brodrick
to Kltchener, 4 April 1901, KP 22/Y39.
Kitchener to Mimer, 14 April 1901, by telephone where Settle to Kitchener, (tel.), 11 April 1901 waS
discussed. Also, Kitchener to Milner 14 April 1901, by telephone, discussing Settle to Kitchener, (tel.), 13
April 1901, in which Settle quotes local opinion, (an influential Bond member) in favour of trying rebels
in a military court. All in WO 32/8139.
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Kitchener explained to Mimer that after discussing the matter with Solomon, who was
now his legal adviser, he believed that anyone who joined the rebels after 12 April should
be tried by Court-Martial in martial law thstricts.' Mimer cautioned against this until
after consultations with the Cape government 'in order that appearance of conflict between
civil and military may be avoided.' Mimer wanted minor crimes tried by civil courts,
leaving the military courts free to deal with those caught in arms, or assisting the enemy.
But the time had now come 'when we should not hesitate to inflict the death penalty for
clear acts of rebellion.'
The Cape government, however, was not entirely convinced by Mimer's
arguments. They did not believe a 'calm judicial atmosphere' could be found in military
courts, although they did recognise they were necessary for prompt action when the safety
of the state was at stake. Ministers wanted the accused to have a 'full and fair trial' and
only those charged with bearing arms or committing treacherous acts (among others),
should face trial by Court-Martial. The court had to be properly constituted, by
experienced officers, and would make use of the services of a magistrate. Where possible
the accused could cross examine witnesses; and everything was to be recorded for
Kitchener's confirmation. Only when these conditions had been fulfilled would the
government accede to Kitchener's wishes. Kitchener agreed and on 23 April 1901,
a notice was published in the government Gazette explaining that any rebels charged with
bearing arms, or helping the enemy, or directly inciting others to do so, would be liable
to trial by Court-Martial and 'liable to the severest penalties of the 1aw."
The Colonial Office remained uncertain regarding the status of sentences once
martial law had ceased. Consequently on 19 April they addressed the War Office on the
' Kitchener to Mimer, 14 April 1901, Ibid.
134 Mimer to Kitchener, 14 April 1901, Ibid. Kitchener informed Hely-Hutchinson the same day of his
and Mimer's decisions. Kitchener to Hely-Hutchinson, (tel.), 14 April 1901, CO 48/5521ff.fl3-224.
' Hely-Hutchinson to Kitchener, (tel.), 17 April 1901, CO 481552/ff.225-228.
Kitchener to Hely-Hutchinson, (tel.), 18 April 1901, in this the notice was sent in for government
approval. It was approved on 20 April, Ibid.. ff.229-230.
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matter.' 2 The DJAG returned his opinion on 28 May, in which Brodrick concurred. The
DJAG argued that as everything done under martial law was in fact legal, then sentences
would continue after martial law and after a peace treaty had been signed. The DJAG
explained that the use of martial law was a royal prerogative exercised through the
Commander-in-Chief or Governor. In South Africa the accused had been given every right
under the procedure of an ordinary Court-Martial: in fact the proclamation of martial law
was so regular a writ of habeas corpus would not be granted, 'as there had been no
wrongful confinement, and there had been a violation of law as laid down by the
Governor, in accordance with the accepted usages of war.' If all prisoners were to be
released at the termination of martial law would not the Commander-in-Chief apply more
vigorous measures beforehand? 'The will of the commander is the source of martial law
and he might even decide to increase the application of the death sentence."
This opinion differed from one expressed by the Law Officers in 1878, as Cox
explained in the Colonial Office minutes on the DJAG's letter. Therefore the opinion of
the present day Law Officers was sought.' 29 The Law Officers reported somewhat
differently Ft the view expressed by the DJAG. They stated emphatically that persons
imprisoned under martial law were entitled to release at the end, and that civil courts
would have authority to order their release:
What is called martial law is only the temporary application of force by the
Executive under a condition of affairs which renders necessary the
abrogation of civil rights established by law, and when such condition of
affairs is at an end parties heretofore affected by Martial Law are restored
to their civil rights.
They concluded by stating that legislation was necessary for the continuation of sentences
once Martial Law had ended.'3°
By rejecting the DJAG's report the Law Officers compelled the War Office to
examine its own views as to procedure under martial law. General Nicholson, the
1V CO to WO, 19 April 1901, WO 32/8137. Cox mentioned the sentencing of one Auret, who was found
guilty by a Field-General Court-Martial of joining and assisting the enemy. He was given 2 years
imprisonment and a £2,100 fine, (or an extra year if he could not pay).
' WO to CO, 28 May 1901, including report by DJAG, 23 May 1901, CO 48/556/ff.547, 550-552.
' CO Minutes, 1 June 1901, Ibid., f.547. CO to LO, 21 June 1901, WO 32/8140.
130 L0 Report, 6 July 1901, WO 32/8141.
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Director-General of Military Intelligence, asked his predecessor, General Ardagh, on 15
July to review the problem. Ardagh favoured the opinion of the Law Officers saying that
tribunals under martial law, no matter how correct their proceedings, were not legal under
English law. They were only:
a formal and systematic method of employing force for the repression of
disorder and the safeguarding of public interests against acts of violence
and treason by rebels and enemies.
Therefore sentences given by these courts were illegal, and were only legalised by a
subsequent act of indemnity or by a statutory court. Nor did Ardagh agree with the view
that martial law was the will of the commander. He argued this was a misconception of
Wellington's opinion which referred to a commander operating in a foreign country.
Ardagh explained that ordinary courts would not tolerate any excess in the administration
of martial law and would punish those who exceeded their powers. Ardagh felt that using
the virtually interchangeable titles of 'military courts' or 'Courts-Martial' added to the
confusion because they were associated with the legal tribunals convened under military
law:
The great majority of our officers have the idea that a Court-Martial under
martial law is a legal court, and that its decisions have the same force as
a statutory Court-Martial under the Army Act. This leads to confusion of
thought and an entire misconception of what martial law means.'3'
General Wood, the Adjutant-General, thought Ardagh was wrong but offered no
reason why he thought so. It is likely he assumed martial law ought to facilitate what he
thought instinctively was justified. Wood thought that deporting prisoners to St. Helena,
Bermuda or Ceylon would ensure their punishments continued after martial law was
abrogated, especially as these men 'richly merit severe punishment.' Nicholson remarked
that the British government would accept the Law Officers views as it was desirable to
get an act to indemnify officers and also to confirm sentences passed in the Cape and
Natal.'32
Nicholson inferred the British government did not like the thought of the Colonial
authorities refusing to pass the necessary legislation and having to do this themselves. Of
131 Report by Ardagh, 18 July 1901, WO 32iI4O.
'WO Minutes, 2 & 7 Aug 1901, WO 3218141.
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course he was correct; this was the last thing the Colonial Office wished to happen,
considering the political difficulties inherent in such a course. Nicholson realised also that
if martial law prisoners were deported, as Wood suggested, a writ of habeas corpus could
be served at a place of deportation, which meant prisoners would probably be freed. It
was decided therefore that once martial law ended, or preferably beforehand, it would be
advisable to get the Colonial government to pass legislation confirming martial law
sentences.
Of course, Colonial compliance depended largely on the local government having
good relations with the military. However, just after the dispute over the authority of
military Courts was resolved, differences also arose over the treatment of rebels,
highlighting the opposing views of the army and the Cape government, as well as the
difficulties of the British government as it attempted to settle the dispute. Moreover, this
dispute also reveals the influence of the Cape situation on wider issues then being
discussed by Mimer, the British government and Kitchener.
On 13 June 1901, Kitchener informed Brodrick that a number of rebels had
actually been captured on commando; he wanted to know that if death sentences were
awarded after trial would the government agree to his confirming some sentences in order
to make examples. 133
 Evidently, some thirty rebels had been captured. Several had been
tried, and seven were already sentenced to death; furthermore, another fourteen sentences
were on their way to Kitchener for confirmation. In addition, Kitchener explained that
captured rebels believed that sentences of imprisonment would not hold good once martial
law ended, so they were not acting as a deterrent. Consequently, Kitchener wanted
severity to prevent others from joining the rebels.'
Kitchener's requests were discussed immediately by the Cabinet, and ministers
agreed to have the worst offenders executed.'35 The British authorities were clearly
exasperated with the situation in Cape Colony. The rebellion and elusiveness of the
commandos was preventing the British from being able to run down the war effort, and
'"Kitchener to Brodrick, (tel.), 13 June 1901, CO 48/568/f.617/No.550.
'' Kitchener to Brodrick, (tel.), 14 June 1901, Ibid., No.552; c.14 June 1901, KP 22/Y61. General
French, who held the seven prisoners sentenced to death, staled that the military situation demanded seventy.
Kitchener to Brodrick, (tel.), 16 June 1901, CO 48/568/f.617/No.554.
' Salisbury to the King, 14 June 1901, CAB 41/26/13.
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concentrate against the commandos in the former republics. It was now time to deal
harshly with rebellion, but as Brodrick explained, Kitchener should only execute a selected
few, those who had committed outrages or attacked the army or communications in some
way.
Surprisingly, in July Kitchener, after consulting General French at Middelburg,
decided to alter his policy towards rebels. This revealed, once again, Kitchener's muddled
view of dealing with the Boers and their rebel allies. In June he had wanted to make
examples and demonstrate British severity, now he wanted to temper this by emphasising
British magnanimity. It was also a measure of Kitchener's frustration with the war in
Cape Colony that he should try opposing expedients at the same time. And it was a
change of position which brought him into conflict with both London and Cape Town.
Kitchener told Brodrick that whilst visiting French, he had spoken to Mr. de Waal
of the Afrikaner Bond. Kitchener was told that while severity might act as a deterrent, it
did not act as an inducement to surrender. Consequently, as a measure of leniency,
Kitchener decided to inform rebels that if they surrendered voluntarily before 1 September
1901, they would only receive imprisonment for one year. Those that did not surrender
before then could expect the severest treatment. Brodrick, however, was sceptical and
ordered Kitchener not to proceed until he had heard from Chamberlain.' Kitchener
responded promptly and stopped the promulgation of the order. In confirming the
cancellation, however, Kitchener wondered if Chamberlain objected to any leniency
towards rebels and warned, 'If this is not allowed, I fear we shall have a very long and
difficult task in the Cape Colony. General French was also of the same opinion.'
Moreover, Kitchener stressed that the military had to resort to expedients in Cape Colony
because the enemy knew it was the British weak spot. 'If Cape Colony goes on in its
present state the reduction of troops as proposed will be impossible.'" Kitchener was
' Bmdrick to Kitchener, (tel.), 17 June 1901, CO 48/568/f.617/No.555. Mimer also favoured shooting
rebels. Mimer to Chamberlain, 16 July 1901, JC 13/1/160. In June only 6 rebels were executed. Cd.981,
p.126.
' Kitchener to Brodi-ick; Brodrick to Kitchener, 18 July 1901, WO 32/8012.
' Kitchener to Brodrick, (tel.), 19 July 1901, CO 48/553/ff.401-402.
Kitchener to Brodrick, 19 July 1901, KP 22/Y74.
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trying to shift responsibility for dealing with the rebels on to the civilian authorities, and
to make sure they realised the consequences if they refused to back him.
Ministers, however, remained reluctant to back Kitchener. Chamberlain was
prepared to be lenient, but wished first to consult the Colonial governments and Hely-
Hutchinson.' Brodrick reminded Kitchener, 'how far the problem between leniency and
severity is from being an exact science."4' Kitchener infonned Hely-Hutchinson of his
order to French and explained the reason behind his decision, and why he had not
consulted the civil authorities. Essentially, Kitchener felt that the order was a military
matter because it dealt with rebels who would eventually come before military courts on
charges of treason. Kitchener could then use his discretionary powers to confirm or reduce
sentences to fit the case: that is, he would alter or confirm the decisions of military courts
in order to show leniency towards those who surrendered voluntarily. Therefore, he could
not see how his order bound the British government. 142 Despite this plea, Kitchener's
views were not acceptable to the Cape government or the Governor. Although Hely-
Hutchinson sympathised with the general idea behind Kitchener's policy, he felt that
Kitchener had approached the problem incorrectly. It seemed Kitchener was 'offering a
fresh set of terms which might be understood as indicating hesitancy, and that the
announcement as to 1st September would therefore be regarded by many as a mere brutem
fulmen and would fail of effect.' 143 As it was, the Cape government refused to endorse
Kitchener's policy and insisted that the note issued on 22 April be adhered to.''
Kitchener was disappointed by the attitude of all the political authorities.
Chamberlain had told him that the order to French had a political effect, 'in view of
severe sentences in the past, and necessity of confirming Court-Martial proceedings by
legislation in the future.' Chamberlain was concerned that the order neither exempted
'°Chamber1ain to Kitchener, (tel.), 19 July 1901, CO 48/556/f.614. Chamberlain actually telegraphed.
'I am quite prepared to, etc., with regard to rebels.'
141 Brodrick to Kitchener, 20 July 1901, KP 221Y75.
142 Kitchener to Hely-Hutchirison, (tel.), 20 July 1901, CO 48/553/ff.404-405. Kitchener actually wanted
Hely-Hutchinson's opinion of his answer to Chamberlain of 20 July 1901.
143 Hely-Hutchinson to Kitchener, (tel.), 21 July 1901, Ibid., f.406.
' Ministers to Hely-Hutchinson, 22 July 1901, Ibid., f.403.
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Natal rebels who would be dealt with separately; nor those 'guilty of acts contrary to uses
of war."45
For Kitchener, these objections seemed almost incomprehensible. He told Hely-
Hutchinson that he and French hoped to shorten the war and save the imperial government
large sums of money.' To Chamberlain, Kitchener explained that any omission about
rebels who committed grave offences could easily have been remedied; and as French was
issuing the order it could only apply to Cape Colony anyway.'47 In a detailed account
of the controversy to Brodrick, Kitchener was more forthright. Once more Kitchener had
failed to end the war quickly and, once again, it was because of the war in the Cape. He
had been thwarted after his talks with Botha because the government said they did not
want to upset the loyalists. Consequently, Kitchener's patience with Sprigg's ministry was
wearing thin. He could not understand why ministers had disagreed with his proposals;
he had wanted to inflict no more than one year's imprisonment on rebels and this was
more severe than some of the sentences handed out in Cape courts, so how could that be
lenient? Nor could he see how the matter was political as Chamberlain suggested.
Kitchener added:
We tried to the best of our endeavours to use the powers given us under
martial law to bring about the end of the war, and it seems to me a grave
responsibility to stay the hands of the military authorities on the spot for
some political reason.
Kitchener felt that Cape officials were reluctant to end the war: 'they have got their hands
well into the Imperial money bags.' He said if he was restricted in this way, then the war
in Cape Colony would not end quickly. And, in that case, it would be impossible for him
to reduce troop numbers and cut back expenditure."
Chamberlain to Kitchener, (tel.), 21 July 1901, CO 48/556/f.614.
146 Kitchener to Hely-Hutchinson, (tel.), 23 July 1901, CO 48/553/f.411.
' Kitchener to Chamberlain, (tel.), 24 July 1901, CO 48/556/f.615.
141 1(itchener to Brodrick, 26 July 1901, K!' 22/Y77. On seeing this Chamberlain defended his decision
by saying he did not think rebels would surrender, nor could he authorise the severe punishmentS of all
rebels after 1 September. It would 'only make ourselves ridiculous by threatening what we could not
perform. I am afraid Lord Kitchener attaches too much importance to "bluff', but it is a veiy dangerous
game when you do not hold the cards.' Chamberlain to Brodrick, 20 Aug 1901, JC 11/8/40.
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As if in retaliation for Kitchener's less than effusive remarks about their conduct,
Cape ministers directly challenged the army's administration of martial law. Although the
Colonial Office had applauded Cockerill's attempts to lessen the impact of martial law,
the Cape government remained critical of the army's administration of martial law. On
28 August 1901, Hely-Hutchinson sent Kitchener a series of complaints compiled by
Innes. These ranged from the forcible conscription of locals into Town guards,
imprisonment of suspects without trial, and severe requisitioning. Innes wanted stricter
control of commandants, and, if possible, the appointment of experienced magistrates as
commandants in certain districts.'49 Innes also telegraphed to Solomon in Pretoria,
drawing his attention to the case of several men from Paarl having been detained without
trial. The Cape Supreme Court was taking an interest in the matter, and Innes said he
would tly and stop men arrested under martial law from being confined in ordinary
prisons; he was clearly concerned that this would give the Supreme Court a reason for
intervention. Innes was particularly annoyed at the fact that most men were held on
suspicion 'based upon statement of intelligence agent to intelligence Officer. We know
the kind of agents employed, and we know how prejudiced and injudicious many local
intelligence officers are.'15°
General Wynne, the GOC(Cape District), took umbrage at this and complained to
Kitchener that although there were some inegularities, he would deal with them. Apart
from complaining about Innes going behind his back by writing to Solomon, Wynne
argued that while it was necessary to prevent abuse of power by commandants, it was
equally necessary to prevent Innes controlling the administration of martial law through
reports and complaints forwarded by magistrates.'5'
Kitchener agreed with Wynne. In his reply to Hely-Hutchinson's note of 28
August, Kitchener had already stated that it was difficult to determine what constituted
'a reasonable time' for suspects to be remanded. One advantage of martial law he
149 macs to Hely-Hutchinson, 27 Aug 1901; CO 48/553/ff.1016-1020. Hely-Hutchinson to Kitchener,
28 Aug 1901, Ibid., 1.1014. The loyalist South African Vigilance Committee also sent in similar complaints
to Mimer. CO 48/554/f.33; Le May, pp.116-ill.
'50 lnnes to Solomon, (teL), 7 Sept 1901, CO 48/554/if.206-207. The magistrate at Worcester reported
that 4 men who refused to join the Town Guard had been imprisoned. Although he had little sympathy for
them, this action was causing widespread unrest amongst locals. Ibid.. 1.210.
' Wynne to Kitchener, 8 Sept 1901, Ibid.. (.217.
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explained, 'is to enable suspected persons to be arrested without laying sworn information
against them.' If Innes had any problems Kitchener expected him to address General
Wynne first.152
The row between Wynne and Innes centred on who had the last say in the
administration of martial law. Wynne refused to act on any complaints sent in by
magistrates, 'seeing that the Magistrates are the deputies to the commandants,' and wanted
Innes to discourage these reports. 153
 hines defended his view that the magistrates should
send in reports on commandants whom they believed had overstepped their authority. But
Innes was clearly uneasy; his use of the term 'deputy' was now being used against him
to good effect by Wynne. hines was forced on to the defensive: he said magistrates were
only deputies in a limited sense, they had been loaned by the civil authorities to help the
administration of martial law. In effect, the civil officer was independent of the
commandant and beholden only to his political superiors.'
Wynne, on the other hand, felt it was the right of the military to administer martial
law without undue interference, and that in a war situation this was an absolute necessity.
He said as much to Hely-Hutchinson:
The Military Officer responsible for administering Martial Law in each
district must of necessity be supreme...it is not right that his orders or the
manner in which he performs his duties should be subject to the criticism
of the Magistrate who acts as his Deputy but in no way shares his
responsibilities.
He said hines's complaints were ' exaggerated and highly coloured;' nor could he find
any evidence that any commandant had overstepped his authority. The Colonial Office
thought Wynne's answer 'a very good one.' 155 So did Kitchener and Solomon. Solomon
thought most complaints were exaggerated and told Kitchener that he had found this when
152 Kitchener to Wynne, 9 Sept 1901, Ibid., t218; Kitchener to Hely-Hutchinson, 4 Sept 1901, CO
48/554/if. 198-199.
153 Wynne to Innes, 12 Sept 1901, WO 32/8128. Wynne refused to act on a report from the magistrate
of Clanwilliam, who complained that the local commandant, Captain Fryer, was buying horses from farmers
at low prices. At the time farmers in districts threatened by the Boers had to move their livestock to areas
that were deemed safe.
Innes to Wynne, 14 Sept 1901, Ibid.
155 Wynne to Hely-Hutchinson, 17 Sept 1901, CO Minutes, 14 Oct 1901, CO 48/554/ff.560-573, 545.
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he was Attorney-General.' Innes, however, continued to argue that the sole
responsibility for maintaining martial law rested with the government. Despite this stand
on high principle, Innes could not make Wynne budge. Wynne retorted that of some 194
prisoners in Cape Colony, up to 31 August, only 29 were held on indefinite charge. He
also remarked to Hely-Hutchinson that if Innes wanted to make complaints, 'he should
adopt a method less calculated to create mischief and bring the administration of martial
law into contempt." With both officials unwilling to compromise the dispute petered
out. However, the row between Wynne and Innes could not have come at a worse time
for Kitchener because he was pressing the Cape government for the extension of martial
law to the Cape ports, and Cape Town in particular.
Although the heated row which developed between Kitchener and the Cape
government over this extension has been well covered,' 58 analysis of the dispute has
been limited to the local difficulties, and its wider ramifications have been overlooked.
The interest of the British government in this dispute related to its own ongoing problems
with Kitchener over the change of military policy in South Africa, which he had been
ordered to implement in June, following Milner's visit to London.' What began as a
local dispute ended with all the British and Colonial authorities - civil and military -
involved.
As early as January 1901, the local command had appealed for this extension of
martial law to Milner. They believed that recruits for the commandos were passing
through the ports on their way into the interior. In the end, the anny's request was denied
and the Cape ports were not included in the general proclamation as the government
considered they had enough authority to deal with undesirables who might come
ashore.'6°
'' Kitchener to Wynne, (tel.), 24 Sept 1901, Ibid., f.700.
"Wynne to Hely-Hutchinson, 26 Sept 1901, CO 48/554/ff.706-709.
Le May, pp.114-121.
'Chapter Four, Section III onwards.
'Forestier-Walker to Mimer, 11 Jan 1901, inc. memos by Colonels Cooper & Moms (11 & 10 Jan);
Sprigg to Mimer, 14 Jan 1901, CO 48/551/ff.167-169, 171-172.
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On 18 July 1901, Kitchener himself asked the Cape government to extend martial
law. The Colonial Office realised, however, that the army's request might provoke Sprigg:
Lambert noted, 'At present the seat of Govt. at Cape Town is free from martial law & the
Colonial Govt. has at least the appearance of freedom from military direction.' 16 ' This
was the obvious problem; the Cape government felt unable to surrender the last vestiges
of its authority. If Cape Town was given up to martial law, the government would become
merely an appendage of army rule, and Cape Colony would fall under military
dictatorship. If the army was given a completely free rein a general uprising was certain.
Innes later wrote:
I held a strong view that this was not practicable. When once Martial Law
exists the will of the Military must prevail; they may consult me, but there
is nothing to compel them to take one's advice.'62
The concern of the British government became more intense after Brodrick learnt
from the Admiralty that Union Castle steamers were conveying known 'undesirables' to
Cape Town. Brodrick therefore asked Kitchener about how much control he exercised
over this process. 163
 Kitchener replied that as the ports were not under martial law he
was unable to do anything about it.' Both Chamberlain and Mimer were aware of this
prob1em. Mimer was informed of the problem directly by General Nicholson. To
Nicholson's question, 'what action do you think His Majesty's Government should
take?" Mimer replied immediately that the extension of martial law was a necessity
and said he would urge it on the Cape government through the Governor.' Mimer's
reasons for backing Kitchener are not hard to fathom. He had just persuaded the British
161 Kitchener to Hely-Hutchinson, (tel.), 18 July 1901; CO Minutes, 13 Aug 1901, CO 48/553/if.432-433,
429.
'Innes to Wife, 16 Sept 1901, in H.M. Wright (ed.), Sir James Rose Innes. Selected Correspondence
(Cape Town, 1972), p.299.
'Brodrick to Kitchener, (tel.), 7 Aug 1901, CO 48/556/f.596.
Kitchener to Brodrick, (tel.), 12 Aug 1901, Ibid., fi97.
Chamberlain to Hely-Hutchinson, 9 Aug 1901, WO 32/8115.
' Nicholson to Mimer, (tel.), c.13 Aug 1901, CO 48/556/f.598.
"The telegram to Nicholson was tuaIly sent by Consul Bell in Madeira, whei Mimer had received
Nicholson's telegram. Bell to Nicholson, 14 Aug 1901, Ibid., f.599.
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government to implement his policy in South Africa in preference to Kitchener's.'
Now he wanted nothing to prevent Kitchener from finishing the war in the Cape because
he knew the sooner Kitchener achieved this, the sooner he would be able to implement
his own schemes in the two new colonies. Thus Mimer wanted Kitchener to receive all
the help he could get.
Chamberlain was also prepared to recommend the extension of martial law.'
He and other British ministers were aware that until Kitchener cleared Cape Colony there
would be no reductions in troops or costs, both of which the British government wanted.
Kitchener realised this and seemed willing to involve the British authorities in his dispute
with Sprigg. He told Brodrick how important it was to end the war in the Cape before any
troop reductions could be made; however, his task was difficult' as the Cape govt. give
no help and will not allow martial law in Capetown and the ports, so as to prevent recruits
joining.' Kitchener had sent Solomon to Cape Town to 'convert' Sprigg but he had failed;
he wanted Mimer to try but doubted he would succeed. 17° The important point here was
what was not said but surely hinted, that it was now up to the British government to
intervene and encourage Sprigg to extend martial law.
Imperial intervention, however, was difficult while the dispute between the army
and the Cape ministry was at its height. Ministers had forwarded to Hely-Hutchinson
another comprehensive set of complaints about the administration of martial law, including
one from the loyalist Vigilance Committee and the South African League.'7' Hely-
Hutchinson agreed that martial law ought to be extended, but after receiving these
complaints preferred to see a restricted form applied to the ports, allowing the anny only
to arrest undesirables and to censor local publications. He had discussed this with Milner
and Wynne, who were favourable, but required Kitchener's final appmval.' Colonial
Chapter 4 pp.159-163.
'Chamberlain to Hely-Hutchinson, 14 & 17 Aug 1901, WO 32/8116. On 24 Aug 1901, Chamberlain
explained how alarmed Brodrick was, and that he too advocated extension. mid., 24 Aug 1901, WO
32/8117.
"° Kitchener to Brodrick, 23 Aug 1901, KP 221Y80.
171 Ministers to Hely-Hutchinson, 29 Aug 1901, CO 48/554/ff.28-31.
'n Hely-Hutchinson to Chamberlain, (tel.), 31 Aug 1901, CO 48/553/f.1067; to Mimer, 31 Aug 1901,
in which he recommends restricted martial law. CO 48/554/f.41.
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Office comments, however, reveal how the British authorities were beginning to move
against Sprigg: Graham noted '...the Cape Ministers do not in my opinion look beyond
their own noses. It may come to coercing them in the end.' Chamberlain was equally
forthright. He wanted Sprigg informed that the British government could not tolerate the
lack of support from Sprigg's ministry. 173 Moreover, Chamberlain revealed the
sensitivity of the British government when he noted later:
my view is getting stronger that something ought to be done to meet the
wishes of Lord K. & to prevent people saying that the leaders of the civil
authorities are paralysing the hands of the soldiers.174
Chamberlain was clearly concerned that his critics should not be given any further
ammunition. He wanted to ensure, therefore, that extraneous political considerations
should not impede Kitchener who was, after all, supposedly carrying out ministerial
instructions. This was in effect a quid pro quo; Kitchener should implement imperial
policy, while imperial politicians would help him against Sprigg. And as Kitchener had
agreed to a modified form of martial law in the Cape ports he appeared the more
conciliatory of the two sides.175
In Britain, anti-Sprigg and pro-extension attitudes were becoming evident amongst
soldiers and politicians alike. Lord Selborne favoured extension, believing the guerilla war
would thereby be 'stamped out' in Cape Town and the ports. His antipathy toward Sprigg
was clear:
It really is preposterous that after our immense sacrifices of men and
treasure we should be blocked by the stupidity, conceit and timidity of
Sprigg.'76
Clearly, the apparent wilfulness of Sprigg seemed to undermine all that had been achieved
in London during Mimer's visit in May and June. Similar opinions were voiced by
officials at the War Office. The Permanent Under-Secretary, E. Ward, having recently
'CO Minutes, 3 Sept 1901, CO 48/553/f.1066; Chamberlain was calmer when he asked for a summary
of ministers' objections. Chamberlain to Hely-Hutchinson, (tel.), 3 Sept 1901, WO 32/8117.
' CO Minutes, 17 Sept 1901, CO 48/547/f.671.
175 Milrier to Hely-Hutchinson; Kitchener to Hely-Hutchinson; Hely-Hutchinson to Ministers, 7 Sept
1901, (tels.), CO 48/554/ff.191-196.
176 Selbome to Chamberlain, 8 Sept 1901, JC 11/32/11; Chamberlain acknowledged Selborne's view but
said Sprigg's objections were valid. Chamberlain to Selbome, 10 Sept 1901, JC 11/32/12.
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served in South Africa, believed Cape Town to be 'the centre of intrigue and sedition.'
General Nicholson was convinced Cape ministers wanted to gain the benefits of a
successful war but without offending the Afrikaners, 'who were largely responsible for
the war taking place, and whose object has been to oust the British from South
Africa." Thus the sensitivity of the British authorities, coupled with the desire to
afford Kitchener the utmost support, prompted the British government to back the military
on this issue, and to override any objections made against the military administration of
martial law.
The Cape ministry nevertheless felt unable to sanction the extension of martial law.
As far as Sprigg was concerned he had been offered opinions not facts, and felt that
prevailing measures in the ports were sufficient to prevent the smuggling of arms and the
publication of seditious material. Nor did he and his ministers believe that the military
authorities would consult the civil as Kitchener promised if martial law was
Kitchener, however, rejected Sprigg's reasoning and emphasised his point once
more. He told Brodrick that the obstructionism of Cape ministers was hurting the British
government financially; they were prolonging the war by their intransigence and
preventing the reduction of the 5/- a day men. Kitchener repeated again that until the
situation had improved he could not reduce troops,' 79 and, more belligerently, informed
Hely-Hutchinson that if the Cape government did not modify its attitude he would impose
a blockade around the ports.' 8° The situation seemed to get out of hand when, on 15
September, Sprigg learned that Kitchener was to have non-military shipping diverted to
Durban, a port which was under martial law.' 8' This news only increased Sprigg's
intransigence and indignation and he threatened to resign, which caused a minor panic in
'77 W0 Minutes, 9 Sept 1901, WO 32117.
'Ministers to Hely-Hutchinson, 10-13 Sept 1901, CO 48/554/ff.197, 340-34 g. Innes said he was not
prepared to work martial law on even terms with the military, as one side had to be supreme.
179 Kitchener to Brodrick, 13 Sept 1901, KP 22/Y85.
'- Kitchener to Hely-Hutchinson, (tels.), 15 Sept 1901, CO 48/554/1.350, 352.
"ADC to PM, (teL), 15 Sept 1901, CO 48/554/1.360. Kitchener's ADC was supposed to have sent the
telegram to the military Post Master, not the Prime Minister. Whether Kitchener was actually behind this
is not clear. He later explained that he wanted his own mail diverted to Durban. Kitchener to Brodrick, 20
Sept 1901, KP 22/Y88.
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the Colonial Office. 182
 Although Kitchener appeared to have gone too far, especially
after his blockade threat, this new development enlivened a matter that was in danger of
going cold because of Sprigg's obduracy. It brought the extension crisis to a head and
revitalised British attempts to end the problem conclusively, particularly as it highlighted
Kitchener's conviction that the extension of martial law was a military necessity. The
whole issue had eroded Chamberlain's patience as much as Kitchener's, and he informed
Hely-Hutchinson that the problem had to be resolved. He confirmed that Kitchener could
not divert shipping without the express approval of the British government - which they
would not give; but made plain his own exasperation and urged ministers to
reconsider.'83
Perhaps to mollify the outraged Cape ministry and appear, once again, the example
of moderation, Kitchener provided specific information on Boer activities in Cape Town.
He explained that the Boers in The Hague had sent letters informing their compatriots that
ammunition would soon arrive; various commandos, such as Lotter's, were well supplied
with ammunition which could only have come from the ports; spies in Cape Town were
well known but without martial law could not be arrested easily.'TM
As a last resort, Sprigg and Innes met Kitchener and Mimer in Johannesburg
between 1 and 3 October 1901. Eventually a compromise solution was agreed: a modified
form of martial law would be introduced in the ports and a martial law board would be
established to hear complaints against the administration of martial law throughout the
Colony. It was all rather an anti-climax considering the vitriol expended by the politicians
and the soldiers. For their part, Cape ministers probably realised they had made their
point. Rather than risk the possibility of dismissal, they found it easier to negotiate, to
obtain conditional martial law and remain in power. Thus on 9 October 1901, martial law
was extended to the Cape ports.
How far Kitchener thought extension would end the war is uncertain. Of itself, it
hardly made any difference to the conduct of operations, which were helped more by
', Hely-Hutchinson to Chamberlain, (tel.), 16 Sept 1901, CO 48/554/f.298; Chamberlain to Mimer, 17
Sept 1901, WO 32/8119; to Brodrick, 17 Sept 1901, JC 11/8/54.
" Chamberlain to Hely-Hutchinson, (tel.), 19 Sept 1901, WO 32/8125.
"4 Hely-Hutchinson to Ministers, 19 Sept 1901, CO 48/554/if.654-657.
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successes in the field against the commandos of Lotter, Scheepers and Kritzinger, and the
isolation of Smuts in Namaqualand. General Macready, however, who was responsible for
martial law in Port Elizabeth, thought extension was beneficial; he later wrote that Boer
recruits from America arrived frequently, mostly as cattlemen. Once ashore they joined
an irregular unit and then deserted to the Boers with arms and ammunition. Under martial
law, Macready wrote, this soon finished. According to him, a vital Boer supply line was
cut.1
However, it is likely that Kitchener, faced with politicians who questioned his and
his officers' actions, felt threatened by their intransigence, or at least, greatly hindered and
demanded extension in order to stifle criticism. Moreover, considering his and his army's
low opinion of the loyalists, perhaps it is not surprising that Kitchener sought to enhance
army authority and weaken the influence of the Cape ministry, particularly after he had
gone so far to enlist the help of the British government. Ironically, Kitchener utilised the
same arguments against Sprigg and Innes, as he did against the British government's
attempts to impose Milner's policy in South Africa.
On the surface, with the establishment on 14 October 1901 of a Martial Law Board
to examine all complaints regarding the administration of martial law, civilian authority
appeared to have achieved a degree of control over martial law procedure. Three members
comprised the board: L.L.Michell, Chairman of the Standard Bank of South Africa,
JJ.Graham and Major Fearon.' But Michell, who was also chairman of the board, told
Hely-Hutchinson that while realising his role was to make commandants more
circumspect, he would do nothing to undermine their authority and discretion.
Consequently, the Board would distinguish between a 'substantial grievance and a mere
inconvenience.' Nor would the Board challenge the right of the military to deport
offenders from one district to another without charge:
because we recognise that there may exist reasonable grounds for suspicion
although it may not consist with the public interest to formulate precise
charges thereon.
' N. Macready, Annals of an Active L?fe (London, 1924), I, pp.' 18-120. Macready was later in
command of martial law districts in Ireland, c.1920-1922.
One was nominated by the Governor, the Prime Minister and the GOC Cape respectively. Captain
Cockerill later replaced Fearon on the board.
" Michell to Hely-Hutchinson, 6 Nov 1901, CO 48/555/ff.290-292.
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In fact, the military would be left very much to their own devices. There was
nothing in the Board's brief that would alter fundamentally the administration of martial
law. Even if complaints were made and upheld, the commandant would not be punished
and could easily arrest the complainant on grounds of suspicion, knowing the Board
would be unlikely to interfere. The only restraining mechanism in this process was if any
commandant made a name for himself as a ruthless administrator and complaints about
his conduct came regularly before the Board. The commandant might then find himself
hauled up before his commanding officer. Other than that, the administration of martial
law was left to continue as before.
III
In May 1902, peace seemed likely as Boer delegates met at Vereeniging to decide
their future. The provision of a new indemnity and confirmation act was the main problem
facing the imperial authorities, especially as a political crisis was about to erupt in the
Cape and the confirmation of sentences was one issue endangered by it. Sprigg's ministry
had not been elected and was a minority government; moreover it had only faced
Parliament for two or three months in 1900, in order to pass the first indemnity act, after
which Parliament had been prorogued. Now, the imperial and military authorities had to
secure the passage of an indemnity act for actions which had gained the enmity of both
Sprigg's government and the Afrikaner Bond. Moreover, Mimer wanted Parliament
prorogued indefinitely because he felt Sprigg's government would not last long, and a
Bond ministry would endanger his own plans by continually fermenting hatred in Cape
Colony, and possibly in the old republics. This section therefore will examine both the
theoretical and practical problems surrounding the need to obtain indemnifying legislation;
and secondly, the crisis generated by Sprigg's political manoeuvring and his insistence on
a local commission to examine the administration of martial law.
On 10 May 1902, the Colonial Office again sought the opinion of the Law
Officers, this time on the specific issue of how to get confirmation of sentences passed
uncfer martial law.IU The Law Officers reported on 30 May, the day before the Boers
1N CO to LO, 10 May 1902, WO 32/8141.
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signed the peace treaty at Vereeniging. In answer to the first question, in which the Law
Officers were asked whether there was any need for new legislation to confirm and
legalise martial law proceedings, they replied in the affirmative. Interestingly, they stated
that bona fide acts done under martial law during a state of war were lawful under
common law; but without a new indemnity act they believed that individuals who
administered martial law might be open to prosecution afterwards. This revealed the way
opinion had moved since the beginning of the war regarding the necessity of an indemnity
act as the natural conclusion to a proclamation of martial law. Moreover, the Law Officers
again confirmed that martial law sentences would come to an end when martial law
ceased, and so fresh legislation was required to confirm sentences as well. Many prisoners
had been sent to other colonies and this raised problems as to which authority had to pass
the required legislation. According to the Law Officers an act by the Imperial Parliament
was the only method by which sentences could be confirmed under these circumstances.
They were concerned that local legislation, that is in the holding colonies such as St.
Helena, Ceylon, the Seychelles and Bermuda, would be unable to cover the period when
the prisoners were on the high seas.
The Law Officers were also questioned on what needed to be done if martial law
was maintained after the conclusion of peace. This might be necessary to cover the period
when rebels were surrendering and perhaps returning home. The Colonial Office was
anxious about the possibility of a conflict with the civil courts, if martial law was
continued when its operation seemed unessential. To this question the Law Officers could
offer little help and said vaguely that it could only be remedied by legislation. In their
general observations they remarked that, overall, imperial legislation was best suited to
cover all eventualities. They reminded the Colonial Office of the undesirability of
prisoners being freed by writs of habeas corpus and the effect a civil action against Lord
Kitchener and other officers responsible for administering martial law might have. As it
was, the Colonial Office needed little reminding that the political troubles in Cape Colony
made the passing of local legislation extremely problematic.
The constitutional crisis in Cape Colony began to intrude on the final days of
martial law. This had begun earlier in the year when Rhodes and Jameson organized a
"LO to CO, 30 May 1902, WO 32/8141.
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petition calling for the suspension of the Cape constitution. This was designed to prevent
a meeting of the Cape Parliament and a general election based on the pre-war registers.
Rhodes and his supporters believed that if Parliament reassembled, Sprigg's government
would be defeated and a Bond ministry would win the subsequent election. When Rhodes
died in March, Mimer became the covert leader of this agitation. On 10 May the petition
was presented to Hely-Hutchinson, after which Milner publicly endorsed the suspension
movement when he allowed a letter of his to be published by the petition's
organizers.'90
By early June, the move to prevent the Cape Parliament reassembling on its pre-
war basis was now at a crucial stage and was undermining the authority of the Sprigg
ministry. Sprigg was doing his utmost to keep office and deprecated any interference by
the imperial authorities, especially Mimer. Mimer was fearful that if the Cape Parliament
reconvened, the Afrikaner interest would oust Sprigg's pro-British ministry and again form
the government. If this happened the prospect of indemnity and confirmation acts being
passed seemed remote. The British authorities feared that the Afrikaners would open the
way for a host of civil actions against military personnel, possibly even against Kitchener
himse1f while martial law prisoners would be released without serving their full terms.
The only possibility therefore was for an act to be passed in London which would
override the Cape Parliament. Politically this was unattractive, as it might lead to
difficulties with other self-governing colonies. Jealous of their own semi-independence,
the self-governing dominions might view an imperial indemnity act as unwarranted
interference into the internal affairs of a constitutional government. Either way, an
imperial act was fraught with danger and had to be viewed as a last resort.
The Colonial Office thus turned their attention to ways of bypassing the necessity
of obtaining an indemnity act from the Cape Parliament. Lambert and Cox managed to
see the Attorney-General and put before him certain questions in order to gain his private
opinion on the matter as a sort of guide. First they suggested the possibility of sending
martial law prisoners to the Seychelles or Bermuda to make them serve their full sentence.
The Attorney-General was not sanguine about this and doubted its legality; he said it
could only be done by an act of either the Cape or Imperial Parliaments. He too
190 J Amery, pp.103-114; Headilam, II, pp.413-426.
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maintained that once martial law ended in Cape Colony, so did martial law sentences.
Passing an act in the Seychelles or Bermuda was not permissible. However, he was aware
of a recent ordinance in the Seychelles that allowed the detention of martial law prisoners,
but it was not enough to detain them after the end of martial law.
Lambert and Cox also broached the subject of the constitutional crisis. The
Attorney-General said that suspending the constitution would solve the dilemma facing
the British authorities. If the Cape Parliament was unable to convene, the imperial
authorities would have to pass the necessary legislation. On reading these comments, Just
made a pertinent remark that suspension might not have the desired effect because it could
lead to a conflict between the Cape Supreme Court and the executive authority. Having
sown doubt in the minds of his fellow officials, it was thought best to consult the Law
Officers once more, specifically on the issue of prisoners sentenced to penal servitude
under martial law.'91
The constitutional crisis was not the only problem facing the government in
London. On 16 June 1902, Hely-Hutchinson informed Chamberlain that once order was
fully restored in Cape Colony, an application would be made to the Supreme Court for
the release of 200 rebels, convicted under martial law for murder and other offences.
According to Hely-Hutchinson the Supreme Court was likely to grant them their release
and he felt duty bound to remind Chamberlain of:
the grave results that are likely to ensue in the above and other matters in
the event of the process of ordinary law being allowed full scope as soon
as it can be said that all active disturbances have ceased.'
The Colonial Office responded immediately by informing the War Office of the situation
and suggested moving prisoners to the ORC.'
On 24 June 1902, the Law Officers reported to the Colonial Office. Their views
were based on those given during the unofficial meeting between the Attorney-General
and the Colonial Office officials. They reported that removing martial law prisoners from
the Cape to another colony would be indefensible: it would be attacked in Parliament and
's' Co Minutes, 6-7 June 1902, Co 417/357/ff.42-44.
192 Hely-Hutchinson to Chamberlain, (tel.), 16 June 1902, CO 48/561/ff.561-562.
' CO to WO, 24 June 1902, CO 48/561/ff.563-565. Moving prisoners to the ORC appeared to be
permissible, as they would be moved from one martial law district to another.
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might be illegal, 'as not justified by the exigencies of martial law.' They did state that the
Seychelles Ordinance might prevent prisoners from seeking to have their sentences
terminated once martial law ceased in Cape Colony. If not, they suggested that legislation
should be enacted either in Britain or Cape Colony.'
Something needed to be done, therefore, to avert a clash with the Supreme Court
of Cape Colony, which could lead to grave political troubles in London. On 2 July 1902,
Chamberlain announced his decision against suspension of the Cape constitution, after he
had come to an arrangement with Sprigg, following the latter's visit to London for the
Colonial Conference. Earlier, on 27 June, Chamberlain promised a royal commission to
examine martial law sentences and to decide against suspension, in return for Sprigg
confirming that the Cape legislature would pass an indemnity and confirmation act.'95
That day, Hely-Hutchinson also informed Sprigg's Cabinet that a suggestion had been
made that as a dispute between the Supreme Court and the executive was impending, the
announcement of a special commission 'to revise all unexpired sentences and report on
them before local Parliaments are asked to confirm them by legislation,' might be a
solution to the problem.' Ministers were quite enthusiastic about this, and although
they suggested a couple of minor conditions, they were otherwise in favour.'
Apparently, this harmonised relations between all those concerned in the
administration of martial law; the Cape government, the imperial authorities and the
military. On 1 July 1902, Hely-Hutchinson was informed by the Cape Attorney-General
that he thought that if an application was made for the release of martial law prisoners,
then the Supreme Court would grant a 'rule nisi at a long date', which meant the court
would not reach a judgement until the Cape government had passed an indemnity and
confirmation act. Meanwhile, the Attorney-General had assured the Court that this would
be done as quickly as possib1e.''
LO Report, 24 June 1902, Co 417/357/ff.59-64.
'S Sprigg to Chamberlain, 28 June 1902, JC 11/34/4.
"Hely-Hutchrnson to Ministers, 27 June 1902, CO 48/562/f.180.
"7 Ministers to Hely-Huchinson, 27 June 1902, Ibid f.181. The conditions were an enlargement of the
scope of the commission and that a judge of the Supreme Court should sit on it. The agreement was signed
by T Lynedoch Graham, the scting Prime Minister in Sprigg's absence.
' Hely-Hutchinson to Chamberlain, 1 July 1902, Ibid., f.190.
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The following week, Hely-Hutchinson was able to report that a clash with the
Supreme Court had definitely been averted. Evidently, Hely-Hutchinson had advised
General Settle, the GOC(Cape Colony), to return to the government the responsibility for
keeping law and order. The Chief Justice then told the Attorney-General that there was
now no likelihood of a dispute arising with the Supreme Court, and so it seemed the
controversy over the administration of martial law was at an end.'
As part of his arrangement with Sprigg, Chamberlain had agreed to appoint a royal
commission from Britain, to examine the cases of those serving sentences under martial
law as an extra measure to instil confidence in the public: especially in Cape Colony. The
commission, consisting of Lord Alverstone, Chief Justice of England, Mr. Justice
Bingham, and General Ardagh, was appointed to look into current sentences only, after
which the Governor would then decide to amend any in accordance with
recommendations. The commission had no extra powers; its task was merely to review
sentences.2°° Whilst the British authorities were anxiously awaiting the passing of the
indemnity act, Sprigg promised, in Parliament, to appoint a local commission to examine
all martial law sentences and enquire into the administration of martial law, which meant
that some officers might be called upon to account for their actions. The scope of this
commission was much wider than that sent from Britain and might involve the imperial
authorities in a plethora of legal actions brought by disgruntled Afrikaners. Moreover,
under Section 62 of the first Indemnity Act, it seemed the Cape government might have
to appoint a local commission anyway.
Chamberlain was furious with Sprigg but should not have been surprised. Sprigg,
in his letter of 28 June, had practically demanded that the royal commission examine
expired sentences as well as those still running. 202 Hely-Hutchinson told Chamberlain
that the British had been prepared to appoint a local commission in October 1900, and
that Lord Roberts had agreed to select a military officer to serve on it. Moreover, officers
'"Hely-Hutchinson to Chamberlain; Settle to Brodzick, (tels.), 8 & 9 July 1902, Ibid.. if.450, 449.
°° Report of the Royal Commission Appointed to Inquire into Sentences Passed Under Martial Law.
PP(1902), LXIX, Cd.1364, pp.iv-v.
Hely-Hutchinson to Chamberlain, (tel.), 23 July 1902, CO 48/563/f350.
Chamberlain to Hely-Hutchinson, (tels.), 4 & 19 Aug 1902, Ibid., f.351; CO 48/564/f.21.
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and soldiers could be compelled to attend a local commission because of the Indemnity
and Special Tribunal Act of October 1900.203 Apart from a possible statutory obligation,
Sprigg's motives were somewhat suspect, and seemed to be a combination of pique and
political survivaL He was not daunted by threats from Chamberlain such as dismissal, or
that his actions might lead to greater ill-feeling between the British army and the
Afrikaners. At one time Sprigg told Hely-Hutchinson that he did not want a local
commission, but Hely-Hutchinson realised that Sprigg was under pressure from the
opposition and felt that Chamberlain's objections 'did not appear to weigh with him in
comparison with his desire to conciliate the opposition.' 204 Hely-Hutchinson though was
left in a difficult situation; he was not sure whether he ought to sign a proclamation
authorising a local commission, even though he was obliged to under the constitution. He
realised that some members on the government benches were only half-hearted in their
opposition to the appointment of a local commission.205
As for the army, the new commander in South Africa, General Lyttelton, said he
would forbid officers and men to attend any local commission and was supported by
Settle and Mimer. 206 However, Brodrick informed Lyuelton and Settle of the Cape
government's statutory right to compel attendance; his suggested way out was that men
and papers be removed from Cape jurisdiction.207
Lyttelton attempted to argue that as martial law was still in force no civilian court
could interfere with a military one. He realised that Brodrick's suggestion was impractical,
and said it would be impossible to remove all officers and men; even Settle would have
to go. Furthermore, the Cape Attorney-General had copies of papers involving cases of
conviction. Even so, Settle was in the process of sending as many men and documents out
Hely-Hutchinson to Chamberlain, (tel.), 13 Aug 1902, CO 48/563/ff.792-793. The Royal Commission
would not have called officers and soldiers; its task was to examine the cases of those imprisoned.
Hely-Hutchinson to Chamberlain, 5 & 17 Aug 1902, WO 32/8150; CO 48/564/if. 19-20.
Hely-Hutchinson to Chamberlain, (tels.), 21, 22, 23, 27 August 1902, Co 48/564/ff.162, 176, 186,
347-348.
Lynelton to Brodrick, 31 Aug 1902; Bmdrick to Lyuelton, 1 Sept 1902; Hely-Hutchinson to
Chamberlain, (tels.), 3 Sept 1902, CO 48/564/ff.369, 527-528.
207 Brodrick to Lyuelton, (tel.), 5 Sept 1902, WO 32/8143.
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of the Colony. 208
 Settle also explained to Brodrick that if the army reactivated martial
law they risked a clash with the Supreme Court with all its attendant problems. Moreover,
martial law would be repealed very soon, once the indemnity act was passed; the statutory
power of a local commission, however, would still remain. Settle believed that Chapter
6, paragraphs 96-97, of the Manual of Military Law, allowed him to refuse to produce
documents on the grounds of being detrimental to the public service. To this, Lord
Alverstone had agreed.
However, J.S. Ridley, the Legal Assistant at the Colonial Office said that if Hely-
Hutchinson gave his assent to the appointment of a local commission, he would, in effect,
be saying the Crown had agreed to it; Settle's view would then seem highly dubious. He
concluded by saying that Settle's position would be 'morally and politically indefensible,
and I can find no legal precedent for it.'21°
British anxiety was such that Hely-Hutchinson proposed dismissing Sprigg and
replacing him with Schreiner, whom, he believed, controlled a large section of the
political middle-ground. He had now concluded that Sprigg was a puppet of the Afrikaner
Bond, which in itself made Sprigg's dismissal a necessity - though not an urgent one.211
Even so, the actual passage of the Indemnity Act was hardly noticed as the furore over
the local commission continued. Sprigg had clearly won over the opposition by promising
a Cape commission and on 15 September 1902, the Indemnity Act was passed. 212 The
issue now souring civil-military relations centred firmly on whether the army could be
made to account for its activities by the local authorities.
British anxiety was increased when an officer was asked to appear before a special
committee of the Legislative Council; Brodrick told Settle to order officers to decline to
give evidence because they did not have the relevant documents. Settle replied that this
was not much good as they could call upon Lyttelton, who had the relevant documents:
Lyuelton to Brodrick, 7 Sept 1902, Ibid.
°' Settle to Brodrick, 9 Sept 1902, Ibid. Hely-Hutchinson to Chamberlain, 10 Sept 1902, CO
48/565/f. 16.
210 co Minutes, 11 Sept 1902, CO 48/565/f.11; CO to WO, 16 Sept 1902, WO 32/8151.
211 Hely-Hutchinson to Chamberlain, 10 Sept 1902, CO 48/565/ff.112-113.
212 Hely-Hutchinson to Chamberlain, 12 & 16 Sept 1902, Ibid., f.1 18.
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Settle decided to fall back on the 'detrimental to public service' excuse, in which both
Hely-Hutchinson and Alverstone concuned. 213 When Hely-Hutchinson told Chamberlain
that all copies of documents held by the Attorney-General could be used even if Brodrick
refused to send the originals, Chamberlain realised the British authorities had lost this
particular argument. Consequently, Chamberlain informed the War Office that there would
be no legal objection to officers claiming that to give evidence would be prejudicial to the
public interest: it was the only defence the army had.214
Just like the dispute over the extension of martial law, the row over the local
commission petered out. On 14 November 1902, Parliament was prorogued without the
local commission being appointed. Hely-Hutchinson reported that he had received no
advice from ministers about its appointment and all seemed quiet.215 Sprigg had
undoubtedly used the local commission as a tactic to ensure his own political survival,
especially as he might have pursued the matter further than he did, and insist army
officers appear before a Cape commission. Whether he just cut his losses is not certain.
Perhaps Sprigg felt he had done enough, having kept power and discomforted the imperial
authorities at the same time; it was not worth pursuing an issue that might end his
political career. It was an anti-climax to a heated and controversial disagreement between
the imperial authorities and a self-governing colony, and left many problems unresolved.
Iv
The administration of martial law in South Africa revealed all too clearly the
confusion and uncertainty regarding its place in the British constitution and its use in self-
governing colonies, particularly as the white dominions had begun to assert their own
sense of national identity. Some aspects were apparently settled for the future by the
South African debates; the indemnity act, for example, became an accepted feature of
procedure. Reference to the Law Officers had also confirmed the need for complementary
" Settle to Brodrick, (tels.), 25 & 29 Sept 1902; Brodrick to Settle, (tel.), 26 Sept 1902, WO 32il43.
214 Chamberlain to Hely-Hutchinson; Hely-Hutchinson to Chamberlain, (tels.) 10 & 11 Oct 1902, CO
4815641f.738; CO 48/565/f.574. CO to WO, 4 Nov 1902, WO 32152.
215 Hely-Hutchinson to Chamberlain, (tel.), 18 November 1902, CO 48/566/ff.638-641.
278
legislation to ensure martial law sentences did not lapse when martial law was abolished.
Similarly, punishment of civilians was largely confined to terms of imprisonment or penal
servitude, and the infliction of the death penalty was regarded as a last resort. The
principal feature of these developments was that they were all decided not on military
grounds but in response to the political situation in Cape Colony.
The few historians who have looked at the administration of martial law during
the South African War, have left many issues unexplored.216 In particular they have
ignored the fact that only by heeding the interaction of local and imperial politics can the
administration of martial law in South Africa be understood. The British government
intervened directly on numerous occasions, and by constantly approaching the Law
Officers for guidance helped shape the framework within which martial law was
administered. For instance, the vital question of how to punish rebels meant the British
government became involved in the supervision of martial law from the beginning. This
was especially true during the first rebellion, when certain punishments were considered
too problematical, such as the forfeiture of property. However, it was the British
government which deemed the death penalty to be politically inexpedient and, as a
consequence, ensured the army used executions sparingly, even when Cape Colony rose
in revolt for a second time. Fortunately, Kitchener's political acumen meant that the use
of the death penalty against rebels was kept to a minimum; only 33 rebels were executed
out of over 500 cases brought before military courts.217
In order to ensure the cooperation and compliance of the Cape government at a
crucial time, the British authorities were prepared to override military opinion. This
happened in March 1900, when Wolseley and the JAG rejected the Cape government's
assistance in trial procedures. In 1901, the imperial authorities had to conduct a delicate
balancing act to ensure that the army felt confident administering martial law, while at the
same time ensuring Sprigg's government was not unduly antagonised by military actions.
Hence the British government's intervention during the extension crisis of August to
November 1901, to persuade Sprigg to extend martial law to the ports and to prevent the
military from inflaming an already tense situation. The British government achieved both
216 Townshend, Gaibraith, and Le May.
217 Cd.981, pp.125-130.
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aims. No historian has linked this episode with the decisions taken after the Mimer-
Cabinet talks in June 1901. The British government intervened primarily to safeguard
Mimer's policy by ensuring Kitchener was not hampered in his task of clearing Cape
Colony.
The British government, whilst determined to restrain the military, also had to
guarantee officers were indemnified for deeds done under martial law, which at the time
had been considered necessary. Rather than lose the confidence of the soldiers, the British
government had to pass an indemnity act; political considerations ultimately determined
that the act was passed in the Cape rather than in London. The British authorities had no
choice but to stand by their officers and, as a result, military administration of martial law
was not investigated, nor arbitrary practices questioned by the imperial government. The
indemnity act, therefore, became the sole form of protection against both possible litigious
revenge by those who had suffered under martial law, and any challenges by the local
government. Even if the local legislature passed an indemnity act, a Colonial government
exercising its right to establish a local commission of inquiry into martial law
administration could easily embarrass the imperial authorities - both imperial and military.
Thankfully for the British, no such commission sat in Cape Colony and the ramifications
of such an action were never felt.
Nothing was done to clarify martial law procedure any further after the war.
Ardagh hoped to work with the respected constitutional expert Professor Holland, but died
before any work of note was produced. Holland's own volume eventually dealt with
International Military Law, rather than British martial law which was left in abeyance.218
The military and colonial departments proved reluctant to examine the subject themselves;
events in South Africa were considered too sensitive and likely to open old wounds. The
matter was not broached again until the outbreak of the troubles in Ireland, but the civilian
authorities were averse to acknowledge the conclusions drawn from the South African
experience. They could not face the fact that in order to defeat rebellion by declaring
martial law it was necessary to hand over all authority to the military. After Ireland,
martial law was never used again by the British, who preferred to rely on Emergency
211 T.E, Holland, The Laws of War on Land (Written and Unwritten) (Oxford, 1908), pp.14-li.
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Until now, little work has been done on British civil-military relations during an
imperial conflict. Works dealing with nineteenth-century British civil-military relations
have focused on the disputes arising from the administration and reform of the army.
Moreover, historians have preferred to study the First and Second World Wars for
examples of civil-military relations under wartime conditions. The primary aim of this
thesis, therefore, has been to emphasise the importance of the South African conflict as
a valuable case-study in civil-military relations both during the late nineteenth-century and
under the stress of war.
Britain's imperial wars were usually small-scale affairs, requiring the presence of
few troops to deal with a minimal threat to the Empire's frontiers. Moreover, because of
primitive communications and the nature of the terrain, generals often acted without
consulting their civilian superiors.' In short, these conflicts have rarely provided ideal
material for a study of civil-military relations.
The South African War, in contrast, does provide suitable material. The scale of
the war was immense; it was fought over a vast area, with over 500,000 British soldiers,
against an enemy who posed a direct threat to the security of the Empire. Moreover,
owing to better communications it afforded the political authorities - both imperial and
local - the opportunity to influence military operations on a scale hitherto unknown.
Consequently, this thesis has attempted to answer the controversial question of control:
how far were the political authorities determined to extend their constitutional supremacy
into areas which the generals considered their own; and how far were soldiers willing to
resist such interference or extend their own influence. Overall, the conclusion drawn by
this thesis is that by 1902 the generals had managed to frustrate undue political hindrance
and increase their own influence and authority over events in South Africa. Essentially,
the thesis has argued that the army played a far greater role in shaping British attitudes
and decisions during the war, and influenced the settlement to a far greater extent than
has previously been acknowledged.
1 B. Bond (ed.), Victorian Military Campaigns (London, 1967), pp.19-20.
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II
Britain's parliamentary system provided the framework within which civil-military
relations operated. The civil-military balance firmly favoured the politicians, as Britain's
generals, unlike many of their European counterparts, acknowledged the supremacy of
their political superiors. 2
 However, British civil-military relations were rarely harmonious
owing to the disputes over army administration and reform, and these antagonisms carried
over into the formulation of policy against the Boer republics.
The measures designed to deal with Boer intransigence during the period 1895-
1899 reflected the priorities of the government and ultimately political dominance of civil-
military relations. Although the government constantly consulted their military advisers
as Anglo-Boer relations deteriorated, ministers usually modified advice to suit political
requirements. During the 1897 crisis, for instance, the government adapted military advice
to suit the vagaries of foreign and British public opinion. The military failed to appreciate
that the government had to consider the political implications of the advice offered: public
opinion, financial costs, and electoral survival determined how the government would
react to a particular crisis. Consequently, there was no real consensus between politicians
and generals. Final decisions regarding the military support of political demands were
usually compromises which displeased the generals even though they appeared to work.
The need to appease public opinion and a Gladstonian attitude towards costs
ensured the government used the same methods to deal with Boer intransigence during
the final crisis in 1899. Despite constant demands by the soldiers for the mobilization of
a strong force, the government prevaricated until the last moment which had a detrimental
effect on the military situation in South Africa. Until then, the government had controlled
its relations with the generals: it had accepted military advice when compatible with
political interests, and had not allowed the military either to assert undue influence, or to
pressurise ministers into hasty decisions. However, with the outbreak of war and a
succession of defeats arising from British military weakness in South Africa, government
control of the generals began to slip.
British imperialism had greatly popularised the army and its successful generals,
2 Spiezs, Late Victorian Army, pp.155, 175.
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and practically immunised the military from criticism; for example, OW. Steevens wrote
that the officer who ordered the charge of the 21st Lancers at Omdurman could not be
punished because 'the populace had glorified the charge of the 21st for its indisputable
heroism.'3
 This fervour undermined the government's ability to control the generals. The
army was considered the victim of ministerial irresponsibility and procrastination during
the pre-war crises, and political interference was blamed for General White's defeats in
Natal. Although the government had tried to cultivate public opinion, it was not enough
to absolve ministers from blame. The formulation of policy was the responsibility of
government and that policy had failed. A nation accustomed to victory could not
contemplate the fallibility of its military heroes, such as Wolseley, Buller and White.
Instead, public opinion preferred to blame the politicians: as Spenser Wilkinson noted,
'Ministers have a higher duty than that to their party...A change of ministry would be an
inconvenience, but no more.'4
Domestically, the Unionist government had not been a great success before 1899.
The conquest of the Boer republics in 1900 helped redeem its reputation, and enabled the
government to win the general election that year, but it was only one of several factors
contributing to the government's electoral success? Yet, even this success failed to revive
an almost moribund ministry. The strain caused by the war, by events elsewhere in the
world, and by domestic difficulties drained the government. Contemporaries noted how
the war had exhausted leading ministers: Gibson Bowles, a prominent backbencher noted,
'Souls, Cecils,...are alike found wanting and there has arisen the most profound
exasperation with the Ministry, which, when so well provided, has done so ill.' Churchill
realised, 'The Government is not very strong...The whole Treasury bench appears to me
to be sleepy and exhausted and played out.'6
The government's appointment of Roberts was a last ditch measure by a ministry
'T. Royle, War Report. The Correspondents' view of battle from the Crimea to the Falkiands
(Mainstream Publishing, 1987), p.56.
Wilkinson, Lessons, p.32.
M. Bentley, The Climax of Liberal Politics (London, 1987), p.l07; Price, pp.98-132; Blanch, in
Warwick (ed.), pp.222-225.
'Cit. JP. Cornford, 'The Parliamentary Foundations of the Hotel Cecil,' in R. Robson (ed), Ideas and
Institutions of Victorian Britain. Essays in Honour George Kitson Clark (London, 1967), p.308; R.
Churchill, Winston S. Churchill, (London, 1967), II, pp.22-23.
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which had lost the confidence of the public and many of its own supporters. Ministers had
performed badly as war leaders and needed Roberts to restore some faith in their ability.
Consequently, Roberts was given carte blanche to correct the military situation. Only alter
he had conquered the Boer republics did the government feel confident enough to try and
reassert its views and priorities.
However, the government could never insist the generals take note of their
demands. In dealing with Roberts ministers were inhibited by public opinion and, in
Lansdowne's case, by too much personal regard. 7 The government could not afford to
become involved in a public dispute with Roberts over policy in South Africa.
Consequently, ministerial calls for the reduction of troop numbers and costs were hints
and suggestions rather than direct orders. The government had to be circumspect in
dealing with Roberts and had to gently cajole 'the greatest hero since Wellington.' By
promoting Roberts to C-in-C in Britain, the government felt able to start afresh with his
successor, Kitchener.
Kitchener's appointment, however, marked the nadir of political control. This is
not to say that the government meekly surrendered their authority. Kitchener had to fight
hard to maintain his influence in order to fight the war his way. As his strategy relied on
attrition to defeat the Boer commandos, Kitchener was dependent on large numbers of
troops which kept costs high. In early 1901, outright victory seemed remote and progress
was slow. Nevertheless, despite the prolonged guerilla war, the government remained
fearful of public censure if it tried to interfere in Kitchener's management of the conflict.
The main problem facing the government was that it had no alternative policy to offer.
Instead, ministers were eventually forced to rely on Milner's scheme which promised
large-scale reductions in costs and troop numbers.
Even so, Kitchener was able to thwart the implementation of Milner's scheme
through a combination of sound military advice and the knowledge that the government
had no other prominent general to replace him. Kitchener also had powerful support from
Roberts, especially alter the latter had clashed with Brodrick over army reform and
discipline. Moreover, disputes between the service ministers and Hicks Beach weakened
Chamberlain remarked, '...while thoroughly agreeing with Lansdowne's principle of leaving the
Generals a free had, I always thought he might have asked a few more questions and occasionaily have
submitted his own views for consideration. No good official would ever complain or be discouraged by this.
Chamberlain to Brodrick, 26 Dec 1900, IC 16/4j2.
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the government's position still further. It was left to Lord Salisbury to acknowledge
explicitly that the government was tied to Kitchener and was in no position to sack him,
as Milner wanted. There was no guarantee that either a new general or different policy
would end the war any faster. The government realised that Mimer's policy, designed to
protect occupied areas behind a screen of defences and mounted patrols, and to ignore the
Boer commandos outside those screens until they accepted unconditional surrender, meant
the war might continue indefinitely. Conversely, Kitchener's policy of attrition, followed
by negotiations and lenient terms once the Boers had surrendered, offered the best hope
of a rapid end to the war. By late 1901, the government preferred Kitchener's advice
rather than that offered by Milner.
Relations between the British government and its generals throughout the period
1895-1902 reveal that a parliamentary government must rely on several factors when
dealing with the military. First, it must have a system of consultation designed to
harmonise the often conflicting priorities of politicians and generals. Secondly, it must
have the support of public opinion whatever happens on the battlefield. Thirdly, it must
have a sound scheme of its own when it is dissatisfied with the present conduct of
operations. Unfortunately for the British government it was unable to rely on these factors
sufficiently to ensure it exercised complete control over the generals. Consequently,
ministers were more dependent on the advice and opinions of those officers who
dominated events in South Africa. Perhaps Lord Esher was correct when he wrote: 'In the
long run, luck in War is on the side of statesmen, who by precedence and forethought
bend it to their will.'
Ill
For Milner it was essential from the beginning that the military should comply
with political demands. Between 1898-1902, Milner dealt with three leading generals and
quarrelled with each. General Butler held views directly opposed to Mimer's. He and
Milner clashed on an ideological level as much as they differed on the practical approach
to the South African crisis. However, Milner discovered that unless he had the complete
$ Cii. Hamer, p.174.
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backing of the British government there was little he could do to prevent Butler's
criticism. However, one consolation for Mimer was that Butler was his subordinate, and
had to follow the High Commissioner's lead.
This was not the case after the outbreak of war. In his dealings with Roberts,
Mimer was unable to assert his authority, to ensure the military conducted operations
which suited his own fears and aspirations. He was censured for expressing concern over
the defenceless state of Cape Colony in 1900; and was frustrated by Roberts's reluctance
to get the Uitlander refugees moved back to the Rand. The clash between Milner and
Roberts was over priorities and whose should take preference. Roberts's needs were short-
term and designed to help the immediate necessities of his army. Milner took the long-
term view believing his priorities were essential for the future well-being of South Africa.
Unfortunately for Mimer, because of the continuation of the guerilla war, Roberts's
requirements were deemed to be paramount.
Kitchener's appointment ended Milner's attempts to use the war as a means of
reconstructing South Africa according to his own principles. Kitchener was able to resist
two attempts to undermine his authority, both initiated by Milner. The first was an attempt
to make Kitchener redirect his strategy to suit political requirements. Mimer convinced
the British government that the guerilla war was not 'proper' warfare: it was banditry and
did not require the services of high-ranking generals and large numbers of troops. Mimer's
strategy meant that military operations might be scaled down to permit the resumption of
civilian life in the occupied areas. However, Kitchener's assertion that Cape Colony had
to be cleared of guerillas first was virtually unarguable, particularly as Mimer agreed this
should be done. Kitchener was able, therefore, to carry on fighting the war much as before
without altering either his strategy or methods. Consequently, Milner's second attempt
centred on his demand for Kitchener's dismissal and replacement by a more pliable
general. Forced to choose between the two, the government opted for Kitchener and
confirmed that he was indispensable. The war required winning and the government
preferred to accept the advice and experience of the military expert. To change the
management of the war at this late stage offered too many uncertainties and not enough
hope. By 1902, Kitchener's position was secure; the British government, exhausted by
internal rivalries and problems elsewhere was in no condition to back Milner and incur
the odium of dismissing Kitchener.
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In 1901, Mimer had gained the support of the British government by offering an
alternative strategy to Kitchener's relentless, and apparently fruitless, pursuit of the Boer
commandos. However, Kitchener and other officers began to offer another policy of their
own. This was tied into ideas about a peace settlement then beginning to circulate. The
alternative offered by the military was that to conclude peace, the British authorities
would have to negotiate with the Boers and drop the idea of 'unconditional surrender.'
The Botha talks revealed that Kitchener and Mimer differed over the place of the Boer
leadership in a future South Africa. Kitchener favoured negotiations and believed that a
lasting agreement could only be achieved by including the Boer generals in the peace
process. In this, Kitchener was supported by various elements in the army. The desire to
negotiate with the Boers arose from several factors. One derived from a soldierly
admiration for an honourable foe, another from the view that the Boers should not ruled
by Jewish mine-owners in Johannesburg, with whom Mimer was far too friendly.
These views say much about the social origins and values of the professional
soldier. There was a strong connection between officers and landed society in Britain,
which tended to create a general attitude antipathetic towards capitalists a.nd
businessmen.9
 Army officers did not care either for the political leadership of
Johannesburg or its society which comprised many wealthy capitalists of dubious social
origins. In contrast, all the Boers appeared to have connections with the land, and
represented a society with which many officers empathised. In 1902, General Hamilton
made himself the mouthpiece of Kitchener's staff and nurtured the view that the British
should negotiate with the Boers, to preserve an anti-Johannesburg section in the future
South Africa.
Thus the army offered the British government the chance of an early and lasting
conclusion to the war, not the speculative ideas propagated by Mimer, who felt the war
would peter out sometime in the future and that negotiations were unnecessary. As the
British government needed a feasible scheme to ensure peace, ministers inclined towards
Kitchener's view and eventually accepted his solution. During the talks Milner remained
isolated and defensive, and tried desperately to salvage something from the negotiations.
That is not to say the landed genuy refrained from capitalistic enterprises, although '...no member of
the aristocracy would have cared to be classed as a businessman.' F.M.L Thompson, The Rise Qf
Respectable Society (London, 1988), p.153.
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Several historians have tended to dismiss the importance of the war and the
eventual peace settlement in explaining the 'failure of Milnerism."° However, this thesis
has argued that Milner failed after the war because he was unable to obtain certain
advantages during it. One of the most important was the exclusion of the Boer generals
from the political leadership of the Boer people. Mimer's relations with the generals were
based on the prospect of the military providing a 'clean slate' for the reshaping of both
South Africa and the Boer leadership. The first step for Mimer had been to get the mines
working again; the second step was the establishment of a para-military force designed
to protect those willing to surrender to the British. Hence his clashes with Roberts over
the refugees and the SAC. The third step was the isolation of the Boer generals as the
new South Africa was created behind the SAC's protective screen. Kitchener's failure to
provide this screen and his advocation of talks with the Boer leadership undermined this
third, and most important step. Mimer had even backed Kitchener's attempts to have the
Boer leadership banished, but this revealed the underlying differences between Kitchener's
and Mimer's views. Kitchener believed the threat of banishment would induce the Boers
to surrender, once achieved he then expected to negotiate terms;' 1 Mimer wanted actual
banishment and only decided the idea was a dead-letter in May 1902, at the conclusion
of the peace talks.' 2
 The acknowledgment of the Boer generals as political leaders, which
was implicit in the Treaty of Vereeniging, was the one thing Milner had fought hard to
prevent throughout the war. The very fact that Botha and his colleagues had preserved
their reputations and negotiated as leaders meant that in future their positions as rallying-
points for an anti-Mimer opposition was assured. For this, the Boers had Kitchener and
the army to thank.
'°Le May sees the 'failure of Milnerism' coming after the treaty, see Chapter 7; Pakenham argues that
as Mimer prevented a date for self-government he had prevented a disastrous peace, pilO Denoon is more
explicit: 'We may confidently exclude the peace negoliations...as having any major bearing upon the failure
of [post-war] imperial policy.' p.230.
Kitchener promised minor leaders they would not be banished if they surrendered, Kitchener to
Brodrick, 20 Dec 1901, KP 22/Y113(b).
Denoon attributes Mimer's abandonment of banishment to the idea that he wanted to secure the future
peace of South Africa. This makes it seem that Mimer was advocating leniency during the negotiations.
Mimer announced his 'conversion' on 21 May 1902, which seems rather late in the day to be thinking of
future peace. Milner's advocacy was merely a face-saving formula and acknowledged that he had lost the
struggle against the Boer generals. Leniency had nothing to do with it. Mimer to Chamberlain, 27 May 1902,
Headlam, II, p.358; Denoon, p.59.
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Iv
The introduction of martial law undermined the Cape government's ability to resist
the encroachment of militaiy authority. The uncertain position of martial law in the British
constitution, coupled with the need to defeat widespread rebellion, ensured the army were
given extraordinary powers, and the right of politicians to criticise military conduct was
severely curtailed.
Relations between the Cape government and the military were often antagonistic.
Both Cape governments - Schreiner's and Sprigg's - complained bitterly about the loss
of authority to the military, and about the army's treatment of civilians. Despite repeated
attempts to assert their right to question the army's activities the Cape authorities could
do little to change the administration of martial law. To the army, the obstructionism of
local politicians undermined efforts to contain and prevent rebellion. Yet despite the
continual rows between the Cape authorities and the army, neither Roberts nor Kitchener
called for the dismissal of the Cape government. The military never made an issue of this,
and demonstrated the constitutionalism of Britain's officers. Instead, the generals relied
on the mediation of the British government, and imperial intervention is crucial to our
understanding of martial law administration.
It was the British authorities, in association with the Law Officers, who enabled
the local government and the military to work together in some degree of harmony.
Imperial intervention was vital in preventing the wholesale resignation of both Schreiner's
and Sprigg's ministries. However, the British government realised that to win the war the
army had to be accommodated; this sometimes forced London to take sides, particularly
during the extension crisis of late 1901. At a time when the British government was
desperate for some change in fortune in South Africa, the clearance of Cape Colony
became a crucial issue. Having adopted Mimer's scheme as a panacea to end the war, the
defeat of the rebellion was a vital prelude before its implementation. Sprigg's refusal to
extend martial law, which the military demanded as a preliminary to their operations,
taxed the patience of Chamberlain and other ministers. Imperial intervention eventually
helped secure what the army wanted: the extension of martial law to the Cape ports.
The war in South Africa completely changed ideas about the administration of
martial law by imperial forces throughout a self-governing colony. Imperial authority was
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unable to override completely the views of local politicians. Dominion sensitivity
prevented the imperial government from ordering Cape politicians to obey the demands
of the army. With the help of the Law Officers, however, over the punishment of rebels
for example, the British government kept the army's administration of martial law within
some degree of constitutional propriety. However, the problems with securing a local
indemnity act for the military revealed that imperial authority could no longer be taken
for granted, and that local government would not tolerate slights to its constitutional
powers. The war in fact changed imperial perceptions of martial law. It was no longer
considered a ready weapon to use against rebellion; military power had been so extensive
and caused so many problems that after the war the British authorities preferred to ignore
the subject altogether. Although forced to use martial law in Ireland, the British
government refused to impose it throughout the country but confined to a specific area,
so as not to antagonise the whole population. Those specialists who did examine the issue,
notably the British General Staff in 1914, preferred to confine to their colonial setting any
precedents arising from the administration of martial law. However, a modern assessment
has concluded that the South African conflict remains one of the main areas providing
case-law for an appreciation of the doctrine of martial law in Britain.13
The clash between the civil and military authorities over control in war is a
constitutional problem most British governments have faced. It was not a new
phenomenon encountered by politicians and generals in the First World War. The South
African War caused serious problems between the civil and military authorities which
anticipated those of 1914-1918. In South Africa, military influence over the course of the
war was enhanced by the failure of the politicians to assert their authority. That is not to
say that certain generals deliberately sought to strengthen their own power over the
politicians. The enhancement of military authority and prestige during the South African
war emanated from several factors, one of which was a defensive reaction to what the
generals considered as undue political interference. The generals sought to preserve their
professional authority and reputations, and were helped by the effects of imperialism,
nationalism and the late-nineteenth century 'cult' of the military expert which produced
'3 Memo. by General Staff, c.May 1914, CAB 16/3 1/EP2; E. Wade & A.W. Bradley, Constitutional and
Administrative Law (10th Edition, London, 1985), pp.552.
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a climate of opinion too ready to accept military expertise in war, rather than the opinions
of civilian amateurs. The idea that war was too important to be left to the generals had
not yet developed. Those officers still in command at the end of the war benefitted from
the enhancement of military authority and prestige. Officers such as Haig, French and
Rawlinson all reached the pinnacle of their profession. For Kitchener, however, perhaps
the highest accolade awaited him. Such was his reputation and image of power and
authority that in 1914 he became Secretary of State for War, the first serving soldier to
sit in the Cabinet since i660.H






















Public Record Office, Kew.
Ardagh Papers (PRO 30/40).
Buller Papers (WO 132).
Cabinet Papers:
Memoranda (CAB 37).
Letters to the Monarch (CAB 41).
Colonial Office Papers:
Cape Colony (CO 48).
Confidential (CO 879).
High Commission (CO 417).
Natal (CO 179).
293
Orange River Colony (CO 224).
Transvaal (CO 291).
Kitchener Papers (PRO 30157).
Midleton Papers (St. John Brodrick, PRO 30/67).
Roberts Papers (WO 105).
War Office Papers:
Army Circulars, Memos. and Orders, (WO 123).
Misc, papers on South African War (WO 32 & 33).
South African War Papers (WO 108).
War Office Council & Army Council Records (WO 163).
OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS.
The Queen's Regulations and Orders For the Army (London, 1899).
Manual of Military Law (War Office, London, 1899).
Intelligence Dept., Section B., (War Office), Military Notes on the Dutch Republics of
South Africa (War Office, June 1899, Boer War Books/York, 1983).
Hansard Parliamentary Debates, (4th Series, 1899-1902).
Mercer W.E., & Collins, A.E., The Colonial Office List (London, 1899).
Parliamentary Papers.
PP(1900) LVI	 Cd.43 Further Correspondence relating to Affairs in South Africa
(in continuation of [c.9530], 1899).
Cd.44 Correspondence Relating to the Defence of Natal.
Cd.261 Further Correspondence relating to Affairs in South Africa
(in continuation of (Cd.43], 1900).
Cd.264 Correspondence relating to Affairs of the Cape Colony.
Cd.420 Further Correspondence relating to Affairs in South Africa.
Cd.426 Proclamations issued by Field Marshal Lord Roberts in
South Africa.
PP(1901) XLVII
	 Cd.457 Despatches relating to the War in South Africa. Vol.L
Cd.458 Vol.11., Natal Field Army.









Cd.522 Despatches by General Lord Kitchener, dated 8th March
1901, relative to Military Operations in South Africa.
Cd.528 Papers relating to Negotiations between Commandant Louis
Botha and Lord Kitchener.
Cd.546 Letter from Commandant Louis Botha to Lord Kitchener,
dated 13th February 1901.
Cd.547 Further Correspondence relating to Affairs in South Africa
(in continuation of [Cd.420], 1900).
Cd. 663 Further Papers relating to Negotiations between
Commandant Louis Botha and Lord Kitchener (in continuation of
[Cd.528], 1901 and [Cd546], 1901).
Cd.732 Correspondence relating to the prolongation of Hostilities
in South Africa.
Cd.98 1 Papers relating to the Administration of Martial Law in
South Africa.
Cd.903 Further Correspondence relating to Affairs in South Africa
(in continuation of [Cd5471, 1901).
Cd. 1163 Further Correspondence relating to Affairs in South Africa
(in continuation of [Cd.9031, 1902).
Cd.1364 Report of the Royal Commission appointed to inquire into
sentences passed under Martial Law.
CL1789 Report of His Majesty's Commissioners appointed to
inquire into the military preparations, and other matters connected
with the war in South Africa.
Cd.1790 Minutes of evidence taken before the Royal Commission
on the war in South Africa, Vol.!.
Cd.1791 Minutes of evidence taken before the Royal Commission
on the war in South Africa, Vol.11.
Cd.1792 Appendices to the minutes of evidence taken before the
Royal Commission on the war in South Africa.
295
PUBLISHED DIARIES AND CORRESPONDENCE.
Anon. Letters From an Uitlander 1899-1902. Letters to Major Sir Bartle Frere (London,
1903).
Arthur, 0., (ed.), The Letters of Lord and Lady Wolseley 1870-1911 (London, 1922).
Barnes, J., & Nicholson, D. (eds.), The Leo Amery Diaries, 2 vols. (London, 1980-1988).
Blake, R., The Private Papers of Douglas Haig 1914-1919 (London, 1952).
Blunt, W., Scawen, My Diaries, 2 vols. (London, 1922).
Boyce, D.G., (ed.), The Crisis of Power. The Imperial and Naval Papers of the Second
Earl of Selborne 1895-1910 (London, 1990).
Brett, M.V., (ed.), Journals and Letters of Reginald Viscount Esher, 4 vols. (London
1934-38).
Buckle, G.E., (ed.), The Letters of Queen Victoria, Third Series, 3 vols. (London, 1932).
Cook, Col. H.C.B., 'Letters from South Africa,' (The coffespondence of Capt. C.R.
Ballard), Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, 69, (1991),
pp.66-80, 170-182, 233-255.
Dummy, A.H., and Guest, W.R., (eds.), FitzPatrick. South African Politician. Selected
Papers 1888-1906 (Johannesburg, 1976).
Foot, M.R.D., & Mathews, H.C.G., (eds.), The Gladstone Diaries, 11 vols. (Oxford, 1968-
1990).
Headlam, C., (ed.), The Mimer Papers, 2 vols. (London, 1931-35).
Lewsen, P., (ed.), Selections from the Correspondence of John X. Merriman 1899-1905
(Cape Town, 1966).
Mackail, J.W., and Wyndham, 0., (eds.), The Life and Letters of George Wyndham,
2 vols. (London, 1926).
Wright, H.M., (ed.), Sir James Rose Innes. Selected Correspondence (Cape Town, 1972).
CONTEMPORARY WORKS.
Amery, L., (ed.), The Times History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902, 7 vols.
(London 1900-09).
An Average Observer, The Burden of Proof; or England's Debt to Sir Redvers Buller
(London, 1902).
296
Cairnes, Capt. W.E., An Absent Minded War (London, 1900).
Churchill, W.S., The Boer War (London to Ladysmith & Ian Hamilton's March)
(Mandarin Paperback, London 1990).
Clode, C.M., The Military Forces of the Crown, their Administration and Government, 2
vols. (London, 1869).
The Administration of Justice Under Military and Martial Law (London, 1872).
Conservative Central Office, Constitutional Year Book (London, 1900-1902).
Cook, E.T., The Rights and Wrongs of the Transvaal War (London, 1902).
Dicey, A.V., The Law of the Constitution (1959 Edition, First Published London, 1885).
Doyle, Sir A Conan., The Great Boer War (London, 1900-1902).
Evans-Gordon, Maj. W., The Cabinet and War (London, 1904).
Finlason, W.F., Martial Law (London, 1872).
Henderson, G.F.R., The Science of War (London, 1908).
Hobson, J.A., The War in South Africa: its Causes and Effects (London, 1900).
The Psychology of Jingoism (London, 1901).
Imperialism: A Study (Third Edition, 1938 & 1988, First Published London, 1902).
Holland, T.E., The Laws of War on Land (Written and Unwritten) (Oxford, 1908).
Iwan Muller, E.B., Lord Milner and South Africa (London, 1902).
Kestell, J.D., Through Shot and Flame (London, 1903).
Lucy, H.W., A diary of the Unionist Parliament 1895-1900 (Bristol, 1901).
The Balfourian Parliament 1900-1905 (London, 1906).
Mackarness, F., Martial Law in the Cape Colony During 1901 (London, 1901).
Lfting the Veil in Cape Colony (London, 1902).
Maurice, Sir F., & Grant, M.H., History of the War in South Africa, 4 vols. text, 4 vols.
maps, (London, 1906-1910). (The Official History).
Methuen, A.M.S., The Tragedy of South Africa (London, 1905).
Sheil, J.D., Cape Ti,nes Law Reports of all cases decided in The Supreme Court of the
Cape of Good Hope, vols. X & XI, (Cape Town 1901-1902).
Stead, W.T., Shall! Slay My Brother Boer? (London, 1899).
War in South Africa. Methods of Barbarism (London, 1901).
Steevens, G.W., From Cape Town to Ladysmith (London, 1900).
Stephen, Sir J.F., A History of the Criminal Law of England, Vol.!, (London, 1883).
297
The Times Newspaper.
Wheeler, Capt. 0., The War Office. Past and Present (London, 1914).
White, Arnold., Efficiency and Empire (London, 1901, this edition, Harvester Press, 1973,
edited by G.R. Searle).
Wilkinson, H.S., British Policy in South Africa (London, 1899).
Lessons of the War (London, 1900).
War and Policy (London, 1900).
Williams, C., Hushed Up (London, 1902).
Wilson, H.W., With the Flag to Pretoria, 2 vols. (London 1900-1902).
After Pretoria. The Guerilla War, 2 vols. (London, 1902).
Worsfold, B., Lord Milner's Work in South Africa (London, 1906).
MILITARY MEMOIRS AND BIOGRAPHIES.
Arthur, 0., Life of Kitchener, 3 vols. (London, 1920).
Ballard, C., Kitchener (London, 1936).
Birdwood, Lord., Khaki and Gown: An Autobiography (London, 1941).
In My Time. Recollections and Anecdotes (London, 1945).
Bonham Carter, V., Soldier True: The Life and Times of Field-Marshal Sir William
Robertson 1860-1933 (London, 1963).
Butler, L., Redvers Buller (London, 1909).
Butler, W.F., An Autobiography (London, 1911).
Cassar, G.H., Kitchener: Architect of Victory (London, 1977).
Collier, B., Brasshat. A Biography of Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson (London, 1961).
Dc Groot, 0., Douglas Haig 1861-1928 (London, 1988).
de Watteville, Lt-Col. H., Lord Roberts (London, 1938).
Durand, M., The Life of Field-Marshal Sir George White V.C., 2 vols. (Edinburgh and
London, 1915).
Farwell, B., Eminent Victorian Soldiers. Seekers of Glory (London, 1986).
Fuller, J.F.C., The Last of the Gentlemen's Wars (London, 1937).
Gardner, B., Allenby (London, 1965).
Gough, Gen. Sir H., Soldiering On (London, 1954).
Hamilton, Gen. Sir I., Listening for the Drums (London, 1944).
298
The Co,nmander (Edited by Maj. A. Farrar-Hockley, London, 1957).
Hamilton, I., A Life of General Sir Ian Hamilton (London, 1966).
Hannah, W.H., Bobs: Kipling's General (London, 1972).
Holmes, R., The Little Field-Marshal. Sir John French (London, 1981).
James, D., Lord Roberts (London, 1954).
Jeal, T., Baden-Powell (Pimlico Edition, London, 1991).
Lyttelton, Gen. Sir N.G., Eighty Years: soldiering, politics and gaines (London, 1927).
Macready, Gen. Sir N. Annals of an Active Life, 2 vols. (London, 1924).
Magnus, P., Kitchener. Portrait of an Imperialist (Penguin Edition, London, 1968).
Malmesbury, Susan, Countess of., The Life of Ma]or-General Sir John Ardagh (London,
1909).
Maurice, F., & Arthur, G., The Life of Lord Wolseley (London, 1924).
Maurice, Sir F., (ed.), The Life of General Lord Rawlinson of Trent (London, 1928).
Maxwell, Mrs F., Frank Maxwell: A Memoir and some letters edited by his wjfe (London,
1921).
McCourt, E., Remember Butler. The Story of Sir William Butler (London, 1967).
Melville, C.H., The Life of the Rt-Hon. Sir Redvers Buller, 2 vols. (London, 1923).
Robertson, Field-Marshal Sir W., From Private to Field-Marshal (London, 1921).
Royle, T., The Kitchener Engima (London, 1985).
Seely, J.E.B., Adventure (London, 1930).
Smith-Dorrien, Sir H., Memories of Forty-Eight Years' Service (London, 1925).
Swinton, Maj-Gen. Sir E.D., Over My Shoulder (Oxford, 1951).
Warner, P., Kitchener (London, 1985).
Williams, W.W., The Ljfe of General Sir Charles Warren (Oxford, 1941).
Wood, Field-Marshal H. Evelyn., From Midshipman to Field-Marshal, 2 vols. (London,
1906).
POLiTICAL MEMOIRS AND BIOGRAPHIES.
Amery, L.S., My Political Life, 3 vols. (London, 1953-1955).
Askwith, Lord., Lord James of Hereford (London, 1930).
Allay, J.B., Lord Haliburton; a memoir of his public service (London, 1909).
Biggs-Davison, J., George Wyndham: A Study in Toryism (London, 1951).
299
Churchill, R.S., & Gilbert, M., Winston S. Churchill, 8 vols.(& Companion volumes)
(London 1967-1989).
Curtis, L., With Milner in South Africa (Oxford, 1951).
Dugdale, B., Arthur James Balfour, 2 vols. (London, 1936).
Dummy, A.H., & Guest, W., Inteifering in Politics. A Biogrq,ahy of Sir Percy FitzPatrick
(Johannesburg, 1987).
Egremont, M., Balfour: A L(fe of Arthur James Balfour (London, 1980).
Fraser, P., Joseph Chamberlain (London, 1966).
Lord Esher. A Political Biography (London, 1973).
Garvin, J.L., & Amery, J., Life of Joseph Chamberlain, 6 vols. (1932-1969).
Gollin, A.M., Proconsul in Politics: Mimer (London, 1964).
Hicks Beach, Lady V., Ljfe of Sir Michael Hicks Beach, 2 vols. (London, 1932).
Judd, D., Radical Joe: A Life of Joseph Chamberlain (London, 1977).
Lee, Sir S., King Edward VII. A Biography, 2 vols. (London, 1927).
Mackay, R.F., Balfour: Intellectual Statesman (Oxford, 1985).
Marlowe, J., Milner: Apostle of Empire (London, 1976).
Midleton, Earl of., Records and Reactions 1856-1939 (London, 1939).
Newton, Lord., Lord Lansdowne. A Biography (London, 1929).
O'Brien, T.H., Milner (London, 1979).
Rose Innes, J., James Rose limes: Autobiography (Edited by B.A. Tindall, Oxford, 1949).
Walker, E.A., Lord De Villiers and His Times. South Africa 1842-1914 (London, 1925).
W. P. Schreiner: A South African (Oxford, 1937).
Wilkinson, H.S., Thirty-Five Years 1874-1909 (London, 1933).
Wrench, J.E., Milner: The Man of No Illusions (London, 1958).
Young, K., Arthur James Balfour. The Happy Life of the Politician, Prime Minister,
Statesman and Philosopher 1848-1930 (London, 1963).
Zebel, S., Balfour: A Political Biography (Cambridge, 1973).
SECONDARY SOURCES.
Alder, J., Constitutional and Administrative Law (London, 1989).
Anderson, 0., A Liberal State at War (London, 1967).
300
Anglesey, The Marquess of., A History of the British Cavalry, 4 vols. (London, 1973-
1986).
Barnett, C., The Collapse of British Power (Second Edition, Gloucester, 1984)
Bentley, M., Politics Without Democracy (London, 1984).
The Cli,nax of Liberal Politics (London, 1987).
Benyon, J., Proconsul and Paramountcy in South Africa (Natal, 1980).
Blake, Lord, & Cecil, H., (eds.), Salisbury: The Man and His Policies (London, 1987).
Bond, B., The Victorian Army and the Staff College 1854-1914 (London, 1972).
(ed.), Victorian Military Campaigns (London, 1967).
Brookes, E.H., & De. B. Webb, C., A History of Natal (Natal, 1965).
Bush, M.L., The English Aristocracy. A Comparative Synthesis (Manchester, 1984).
Cammack, D., The Rand at War 1899-1902 (London, 1990).
Cannadine, D., The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy (London, 1990).
Coleman, B., Conservatism and the Conservative Party in Nineteenth Century Britain
(London, 1988).
Davenport, T.R.H., The Afrikaner Bond. A History of a South African Political Party
1880-1911 (Cape Town, 1966).
Davey, A., The British Pro-Boers (London, 1978).
Denoon, D.A., A Grand Illusion. The Failure of Imperial Policy in the Transvaal Colony
During the Period of Reconstruction 1900-1905 (London, 1973).
Dummy, A.H., Sir Alfred Milner and the Outbreak of the Anglo-Boer War (Durban,
1976).
Dunlop, J.K., The Development of the British Ar,ny 1899-1914 (London, 1938).
Ehrman, J., Cabinet Government and War 1890-1940 (Cambridge, 1958).
Eldridge, C.C., (ed.), British Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century (London, 1984).
Farwell, B., The Great Boer War (New York, 1977).
Ferguson, T.G., British Military Intelligence (Maryland, 1984).
Finer, S.E., The Man on Horseback. The Role of the Military in Politics (Second Edition,
London 1988).
Flournoy, F.R., Parliament and War (London, 1927).
Fowler, F.G., & Fowler, H.W., The Pocket Oxford Dictionary (Fifth Edition, Oxford,
1977).
301
French, D., The British Way in Warfare 1688-2000 (London, 1990).
Friedberg, A.L., The Weary Titan. Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline 1895-
1905 (Princeton, 1988).
Fuller, Maj.Gen. J.F.C., The Conduct of War 1789-1961 (Methuen Edition, London, 1979).
Gibbs, N.H., The Origins of Imperial Defence (Oxford, 1955).
Gooch, J., The Plans of War: The General Staff and British Military Strategy c.1900-1916
(London, 1974).
The Prospect of War (London, 1981).
Gordon, H., The War Office (London, 1935).
Grenville, J.A.S., Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy: The Close of the Nineteenth Centuty
(London, 1964).
Halperin, V., Lord Mimer and the Empire (London, 1952).
Hamer, W., The British Army. Civil-Military Relations 1885-1905 (Oxford, 1970).
Harries-Jenkins, 0., The Army in Victorian Society (London, 1977).
Heuston, R.F.V., Essays in Constitutional Law (Second Edition, London, 1964).
Holmes, C., Anti-Semitism in British Society 1876-1939 (London, 1979).
Houghton, W.E., The Victorian Frame of Mind (Thirteenth Printing, London, 1973).
(ed), The Wellesley Index to Victorian Periodicals 1824-1900, vols. 1-3, (London,
Toronto, 1966, 1972, 1979).
Howard, M., (ed.), Soldiers and Governments (London, 1957).
James, L., The Savage Wars. British Campaigns in Africa 1870-1920 (London, 1985).
Johnson, A.F., Defence by Committee: the British Committee of Imperial Defence 1885-
1959 (London, 1960).
Judd, D., Balfour and the British Empire (London, 1968).
The Boer War (London, 1977).
Koss, S., (ed.), The Pro-Boers: Anatomy of an Anti-War Movement (Chicago, 1973).
Kruger, R., Goodbye Dolly Gray (First NEL Mentor Edition, London, 1967).
L.ehmann, J., The First Boer War (Second Edition, London, 1985).
Le May, 0., British Supremacy in South Africa 1899-1907 (Oxford, 1965).
The Victorian Constitution (London, 1979).
Mackenzie, J., Propaganda and Empire (Manchester, 1984).
(ed.), Imperialism and Popular Culture (Manchester, 1986).
302
(ed.), Popular Imperialism and the Military 1 850-1 950 (Manchester, 1992).
Marais, J.S., The Fall of Kruger's Republic (Oxford, 1961).
Marsh, P., The Discipline of Popular Government: Lord Salisbury's Domestic Statecraft
1881-1902 (Sussex, 1978).
McCracken, J.L., The Cape Parliament 1854-1910 (Oxford, 1967).
Morris, J., Heaven's Com,nand (Penguin Edition, London, 199).
Pax Britannica (Penguin Edition, London, 1979).
Farewell the Trumpets (Penguin Edition, London, 1979).
Nasson, B., Abraham Esau's War. A Black South African War in the Cape 1899-1902
(South African Edition, Cambridge 1991).
Nimocks, W., Mimer's Young Men: the 'Kindergarten' in Edwardian Imperial Affairs
(London, 1970).
Omond, J.S., Parliament and the Army 1642-1904 (Cambridge, 1933).
Pakenham, T., The Boer War (Futura Edition, London 1982).
Pelling, H., Popular Politics and Society in Late Victorian Britain (London, 1968).
Porter, A.N., The Origins of the South African War. Joseph Chamberlain and the
Diplomacy of Imperialism 1895-1899 (Manchester, 1980).
(ed.), Atlas of British Overseas Expansion (London, 1991).
Porter, B.J., Critics of Empire. British Radical Attitudes to Colonialism in Africa 1895-
1914 (London, 1968).
The Lion's Share. A Short History of British Imperialism (Second Edition, London,
1984).
Price, R., An Imperial War and the British Working-Class: Working-Class Attitudes and
Reactions to the Boer War 1899-1902 (London, 1972).
Pyrah, G., Imperial Policy and South Africa 1902-1910 (Oxford, 1955).
Robinson, R., Gallagher J., & Denny, A., Africa and the Victorians: the Official Mind of
Imperialism (Second Edition, London, 1981).
Robson, R., (ed.), Ideas and Institutions of Victorian Britain. Essays in Honour of George
Kitson Clark (London, 1967).
Royle, T., War Report. The Correspondents' View of Battle from the Crimea to the
Falklands (Mainstream Publishing, 1987).
Sampson, V., & Hamilton, I., Ann-Commando (London, 1931).
303
Samuel, R., (ed.), Patriotism. the Making and Unmaking of British National Identity,
3 vols. (London, 1989).
Schreuder, D.M., Gladstone and Kruger. Liberal Government and Colonial Home Rule
1880-1885 (London, 1969).
Searle, G.R., The Quest for National Efficiency. A Study in British Politics and Political
Thought 1899-1914 (Oxford, 1971).
Shannon, R., The Crisis of Imperialism 1865-1915 (Paladin Edition, St. Albans, 1976).
Skelley, A. R., The Victorian Army at Home (London, 1977).
Southgate, D., (ed.), The Conservative Leadership 1832-1932 (London, 1974).
Spiers, E.M., The Army and Society 1815-1914 (London, 1980).
The Late Victorian Army 1868-1902 (Manchester, 1992).
Spies, S.B., Methods of Barbarism. Roberts and Kitchener and Civilians in the Boer
Republics (Cape Town, 1977).
Springhall, J., Youth, Empire and Society (London, 1977).
Steiner, Z., Britain and the Origins of the First World War (London, 1977).
Sweetman, J., (ed.), Sword and Mace. Twentieth Century Civil-Military relations in
Britain (London, 1986).
Symons, J., Butler's Campaign (London, 1963).
Thompson, F.M.L., English Landed Society in the Nineteenth Century (London, 1963).
The Rise of Respectable Society (London, 1988).
Thompson, J.A., Mejia, A., (eds.), Edwardian Conservatism. Five Studies in Adaptation
(Beckenham, 1988).
Thompson, L., A History of South Africa (London, 1990).
Thornton, A.P., The Imperial idea and Its Enemies. A Study in British Power (London,
1959).
Townshend, C., Britain's Civil Wars: Counter-Insurgency in the Twentieth Century
(London, 1986).
Travers, T., The Killing Ground. The British Army, the Western Front and the Emergence
of Modern Waifare 1900-1918 (London, 1987).
Van Heyningen, E., The Relations Between Sir Alfred Milner and W. P. Schreiner's
Ministry 1898-1900 (Archives Yearbook For South African History, 1976).
304
Vulliamy, C.E., Outlanders. A Study of Imperial Expansion in South Africa 1877-1902
(London, 1938).
Wade, E., and Bradley, A.W., Constitutional and Administrative Law (Tenth Edition,
London, 1985).
Walker, E.A., (Gen. Ed.), The Cambridge History of the British Empire, Vol.8, (Second
Edition, Cambridge 1963).
Warwick, P., (ed.), The South African War. The Anglo-Boer War 1899-1902 (Harlow,
1980).
Black People and the South African War 1899-1902 (Cambridge, 1983).
Wheatcroft, G., The Randlords (London, 1985).
Wiener, F.B., Civilian Under Military Justice. The British practice Since 1689, especially
in North America (Chicago, 1967).
Wiener, M.J., English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit 1 850-1980
(Cambridge, 1981).
Wilde, R.H., Joseph Chamberlain and the South African Republic 1895-1899 (Archives
Yearbook For South African History, 1956).
Willdnson-Latham, R.J., From Our Special Correspondent. Victorian Correspondents and
Their Campaigns (London, 1979).
Williams, R., Defending the Empire. The Conservative Party and British defence Policy
1899-1915 (Yale, 1991).
Wilson, M., & Thompson, L., (eds.), The Oxford History of South Africa, 2 vols. (Oxford
1969- 197 1).
Winter, J.M. (ed.), War and Economic Development. Essays in Memory of David Joslin
(Cambridge, 1975).
Yardley, D.C.M., Introduction to British Constitutional Law (London, 1990).
ARTICLES.
Administrator, 'The Army and the Administration,' Fortnightly Review, 67, (1900),
pp.353-361.
An Englishman (H.W. Wilson), 'The Causes of Reverse', National Review, 34, (1900),
pp.830-842.
305
An Officer, 'The Government and the War,' Contemporary Review, 76, (1899),
Pp.761 -773.
Anon., (C.E. Caliwell), 'A Boer War: The Military Aspect,' Blackwood's Magazine, 166,
(1899), pp.259-265.
Anon., (G.F.R. Henderson), 'The War in South Africa,' The Edinburgh Review, 191,
(1900), pp.247-278.
Anon., (J.F. Maurice), 'The South African War and its Critics,' The Edinburgh Review,
192, (1900), pp.229-246.
Anon., 'Martial Law,' The Edinburgh Review, 195, (1902), pp.79-105.
A Soldier, (W.E. Cairnes), 'Some Reflections on the War in South Africa,' MacMillan's
Magazine, 81, (1900), p.313-320.
Bailes, H., 'Patterns of Thought in the Late Victorian Army,' Journal of Strategic Studies,
4, (1981), pp.29-45.
Beckett, I., 'The Stanhope Memorandum of 1888: a Reinterpretation,' Bulletin of the
Institute of Historical Research, 57, (1984), pp.240-247.
'Military Historians and the South African War: A Review of Recent Literature,'
Soldiers of the Queen, 54 (1988), pp.12-14.
Bond, B., 'The Late Victorian Army,' History Today, 11, (Sept 1961), pp.616-624.
'The Retirement of the Duke of Cambridge,' Journal of the Royal United Services
Institution, 106, (1961), pp.544-553.
Bunoughs, P., 'Imperial Defence and the Victorian Army,' Journal of Imperial and
Commonwealth History, 15, (1986), pp.55-73.
Cosgrove, R.A., 'The Boer War and the Modernization of British Martial Law,' Military
Affairs, 44, (1980), pp.124-127.
Dodd, C., 'The Case of Marais,' Law Quarterly Review, 18, (1902), pp.143-51.
Drus, E., 'Select Documents from the Chamberlain Papers Concerning Anglo-Transvaal
Relations 1896-1899,' Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, 27, (1954),
pp. 156-189.
Erle Richards, H., 'Martial Law ,' Law Quarterly Review, 18, (1902), pp.133-142.
Friedberg, A.L., 'Britain Faces the Burden of Empire. The Financial Crisis of 1901-05,'
War and Society, 5, (Sept 1987), pp.15-37.
Funnel!, W, N., 'The Guardians of Liberty: The Role of Civilians in British Military
306
Finance in the Late Nineteenth Century,' War and Society, 6 (Sept 1988),
pp.32-46.
Gaibraith, J.S., 'The Pamphlet Campaign on the Boer War,' Journal of Modern History,
24, (1952), pp.111-126.
'British Measures in Cape Colony 1900-02: A Study of Miscalculations and
Mismanagement,' South African Historical Journal, 15, (1983), pp.68-84.
Griffiths, A., 'The Conduct of the War,' Fortnightly Review, 397, (1900), pp.1-10.
Gwynn, S., 'The Writings and Opinions of General Sir William Butler,' The Nineteenth
Century and After, 69, (1911), pp.314-328.
Holdsworth, W.S., 'Martial Law Historically Considered,' Law Quarterly Review, 18,
(1902), pp.1 17-132.
Hutton, C.W., 'The Rebellion in Cape Colony,' The Empire Review, 2, (1902),
pp.652-655.
Marks, S., & Trapido, S., 'Lord Milner and the South African State,' History Workshop
Journal, 8, (1979), pp.50-80.
Nasson, W.R., "Doing down Their Masters:" Africans, Boers, and Treason in the Cape
Colony during the South African War of 1899-1902,' Journal of Imperial and
Commonwealth History, 12, (1983), pp.29-53.
Ovendale, R., 'Profits or Patriotism: Natal, the Transvaal, and the Coming of the Second
Anglo-Boer War,' Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 8, (1980),
pp.209-234.
Pollock, Sir F., 'What is Martial Law?' Law Quarterly Review, 18, (1902), pp.152-158.
Porter, A.N., 'Lord Salisbury, Mr Chamberlain and South Africa 1895-1899,' Journal of
Imperial and Commonwealth History, 1, (1972), pp.3-26.
'Sir Alfred Milner and the Press 1897-1899,' The Historical Journal, 16, (1973),
pp.323-339.
'The South African War (1899-1902): Context and Motive Reconsidered,' Journal
of African History, 31, (1990), pp.43-57.
Satre, L.J., 'St. John Brodrick and Army Reform 1901-1903,' Journal of British Studies,
15, (1976), pp.117-139.
Sixsmith, Maj-Gen. E.K.G., 'Kitchener and the Guerrillas in the Boer War,' Army
Quarterly, 104, (1974), pp.203-2 14.
307
Spiers, E.M., 'Reforming the Infantry of the Line 1900-1914,' Journal of the Society for
Army Historical Research, 59, (1981), pp.82-94.
Steam, R.T., 'G.W. Steevens and the Message of Empire,' Journal of Imperial and
Commonwealth History, 17, (1989), pp.210-231.
Stokes, E., 'Milnerism,' The Historical Journal, 5, (1962), pp.47-60.
Summers, A., 'Militarism in Britain before the Great War,' History Workshop Journal,
2, (1976), pp.104-123.
Townshend, C., 'Martial Law: Legal and Administrative Problems of Civil Emergency in
Britain and the Empire 1800-1940,' The Historical Journal, 25, (1982),
pp.167-195.
Tucker, A.V., 'Army and Society in England 1870-1900: A Reassessment of the Cardwell
Reforms,' Journal of British Studies, 2, (1963), pp.110-141.
'Politics and the Army in the Unionist Government in England 1900-05,' The
Report of the Canadian Historical Association, (1964), pp.105-119.
Walker, E.A., 'Lord Milner and South Africa,' Proceedings of the British Academy, 28,
(1942), pp.155-178.
THESES.
Beaver, W.C., 'The Developments of the Intelligence Department and its role in aspects
of Imperial Policy-Making 1854-1901. The Military Mind of Imperialism,' (D.Phil,
Oxford, 1976).
Moon, H.R., 'The Invasion of the United Kingdom: Public Controversy and Official
Planning 1888-1918,' 2 vols. (Ph.D., London, 1968).
Nasson, W.R., 'Black Society in the Cape Colony and the South African War of 1899-
1902: A Social History,' (Ph.D., Cambridge, 1983).
Page, A.H., 'The Supply Services of the British Army in the South African War 1899-
1902,' (D.Phil., Oxford, 1976).
Steam, R.T., 'War Images and Image Makers in the Victorian Era: Aspects of the British
Visual and Written Portrayal of War and Defence. c.1866-1906,' (Ph.D., London,
1987).
Yakutiel, M.M., "Treasury Control" and the South African War 1899-c.1905,' (D2hiL,
Oxford, 1989).
BIBL
LONDON
UNIV
